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UNDERSTANDING WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEYS (DHS) DATA

DHS COMPARATIVE REPORTS 20



OCTOBER 2008

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Sunita Kishor of Macro International Inc. and Lekha Subaiya of the Institute for Social and Economic Change.

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- to expand the international population and health database;
- to advance survey methodology; and
- to develop in participating countries the skills and resources necessary to conduct high-quality demographic and health surveys.

DHS Comparative Reports No. 20

Understanding Women's Empowerment: A Comparative Analysis of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) Data

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October 2008

Editor: Debbie Berlyne
Document Production: Betty Olmeda

This study was carried out with support provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through the MEASURE DHS project (#GPO-C-00-03-00002-00). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

Recommended citation:

Kishor, Sunita, and Lekha Subaiya. 2008. *Understanding Women's Empowerment: A Comparative Analysis of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) Data*. DHS Comparative Reports No. 20. Calverton, Maryland, USA: Macro International Inc.

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Preface

One of the most significant contributions of the MEASURE DHS program is the creation of an internationally comparable body of data on the demographic and health characteristics of populations in developing countries. The *DHS Comparative Reports* series examines these data across countries in a comparative framework. The *DHS Analytical Studies* series focuses on specific topics. The principal objectives of both series are to provide information for policy formulation at the international level and to examine individual country results in an international context. Whereas *Comparative Reports* are primarily descriptive, *Analytical Studies* have a more analytical approach.

The *Comparative Reports* series covers a variable number of countries, depending on the availability of data sets. Where possible, data from previous DHS surveys are used to evaluate trends over time. Each report provides detailed tables and graphs organized by region. Survey-related issues such as questionnaire comparability, survey procedures, data quality, and methodological approaches are addressed as needed.

The topics covered in *Comparative Reports* are selected by MEASURE DHS staff in conjunction with the U.S. Agency for International Development. Some reports are updates of previously published reports.

It is anticipated that the availability of comparable information for a large number of developing countries will enhance the understanding of important issues in the fields of international population and health by analysts and policymakers.

Ann Way
Project Director

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Mohammed Ayad for his insightful comments and Yuan Gu for her painstaking review of the numbers.

Executive Summary

This report examines the distribution and correlates of two different dimensions of the empowerment of currently married women age 15-49 in 23 developing countries. These dimensions are women's participation in household decisionmaking and their attitudes regarding specific inequalities in gender roles.

In all, this study examines 12 indicators for women's participation in decisionmaking (decisionmaking *alone*, *jointly* with the husband and/or someone else, and any participation (*alone* or *joint*) in decisions about women's health care, large household purchases, household purchases for daily needs, and visits to family or friends) and 11 indicators for two different sets of women's gender-role attitudes. The first set of gender-role attitudes is women's agreement that wife beating is justified for the following reasons: when a woman goes out without telling her husband, when she neglects her children, when she argues with her husband, when she refuses to have sex with her husband, and when she burns the food, as well as women's disagreement with all five of these reasons for wife beating. The second set of gender-role attitudes is women's agreement that a woman is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the following reasons: if she knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease, if she knows that her husband has sex with other women, if she has recently given birth, and if she is tired or not in the mood, as well as women's agreement with all four of these reasons. All 23 indicators are studied using data from 23 developing countries—13 in sub-Saharan Africa, 3 in North Africa/West Asia/Europe, 4 in Asia, and 3 in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The main goals of the analysis are to a) compare women's levels of empowerment across these countries; b) better understand which factors enhance women's household decisionmaking and promote egalitarian gender-role attitudes; c) determine whether the different measures of empowerment are related to each other in similar ways; and d) determine whether these measures of empowerment have a positive relationship with variables—such as education, employment, media exposure, age at first marriage, and spousal age difference—that can be affected by policies and programs.

Women's Decisionmaking

Across the 23 countries included in this analysis, whether women participate in decisionmaking and their type of participation (*alone* or *joint*), vary greatly by type of decision; however, there is a surprising amount of consistency across countries in the type of decisions in which women participate.

There is no country where the majority of women make decisions *alone* about women's health care, large household purchases, household purchases for daily needs, or visits to family or friends. Among the four decisions, those most often made *alone* by women are either about making daily purchases for household needs (14 countries) or about women's own health care (8 countries). *Joint* decisionmaking is not as common as might have been expected: in only 13 countries do women most commonly make one or more of the decisions *jointly*; these *jointly*-made decisions tend to be decisions about large household purchases or visits to family or friends.

The analysis of decisionmaking correlates clearly shows that the characteristics of women who participate in the four different types of decisions considered do not vary greatly by decision type across countries. However, the characteristics of women who make decisions *alone* versus *jointly* do vary across decision types and countries. Furthermore, the correlates of making decisions *alone* about purchases for daily needs and women's own health care are similar and tend to contrast with the correlates of making decisions *alone* about large household purchases and visits to family or friends.

Of all the decisionmaking correlates, the two that consistently have a positive relationship with participation in decisionmaking are age and employment for cash; these correlates are also most consistently associated with women making decisions *alone*. Higher educational attainment has a net positive effect on decisionmaking, but its effect is far from universal. Furthermore, educational attainment tends to be more consistently associated with decisionmaking *alone* for some decisions and with *joint* decisionmaking for others.

Contrary to expectations, a smaller spousal age difference has a largely negative association with decisionmaking alone and a positive association with *joint* decisionmaking. The independent effect of living in an extended family versus living in a nuclear family is not significant in the majority of countries. When this effect is significant, extended family residence is, as hypothesized, associated with lower participation levels in decisionmaking.

Higher household wealth status does not consistently enhance the likelihood that women will make decisions alone or *jointly* in most countries. Purchases for household needs are the only decisions for which the odds of making the decision alone are higher for women in the higher wealth quintiles than the lowest quintile in at least one-fourth of the countries. Visits to family or friends are the only decisions for which the odds of making the decision *jointly* are higher for women in the higher wealth quintiles than the lowest quintile in at least one-fourth of the countries.

The analysis also suggests that women in communities in which women benefit directly from higher social development levels (as measured here by the mean level of women's regular exposure to television in the community) are more likely to make decisions alone and perhaps less likely to make decisions *jointly*; whereas, social development indicators that do not represent direct benefits to women (as measured here by an indicator of husbands' education in the community) have a positive influence on both types of decisionmaking but have a more consistent effect on *joint* decisionmaking.

The analysis of women's participation in decisionmaking shows clearly that participation in decisionmaking is not a single undifferentiated variable. For any given decision, making the decision alone, making it *jointly* with a husband or someone else, or participating in the decision at all (alone or *jointly*) constitute unique variables with different correlates. This makes it difficult to treat decisionmaking as a single indicator of empowerment; to treat participation of any type in one decision as being similar to participation of the same type in any other decision; and, for a given decision, to treat participation of one type as equivalent to participation of another type. Thus, if women's participation in decisionmaking is to be used as an indicator of empowerment, theory and context must drive the definition of what type of decisionmaking in what type of decisions constitutes empowerment.

Gender-role Attitudes

In all sub-Saharan African countries (except Malawi) and in Jordan and Morocco, a minority of women (from 10 percent in Mali to 49 percent in Ghana) disagree with all the reasons justifying wife beating. In Armenia, Malawi, and all Asian and Latin American/Caribbean countries, however, the majority of currently married women (from 58 percent in Haiti to 83 percent in Nicaragua) do not agree with any reason for wife beating. Nonetheless, these results attest to a high level of socialization regarding men's right to control women in most of the countries included in this report.

A woman's age is significantly related to her agreement that one or more reasons justifies wife beating in all countries except Armenia. Furthermore, in almost all of the countries where age has a strong relationship with agreement, older women are less likely than younger women to believe that wife beating is justified for almost all of the reasons. However, the relationship between age and agreement that husbands are justified in being violent when their wife refuses to have sex with them varies greatly

between countries but tends not to be positive. In contrast, either age does not directly influence women's attitudes towards a wife's right to refuse to have sex with her husband or, when it does, the women least likely to agree that most reasons justify a woman's refusal of sex are often the youngest and oldest women.

Although the direction of causality is unclear, the report finds that women who have more children tend to agree more often with wife beating than women with fewer children; however, the hypothesis that women who have children are more likely to agree with a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband is largely supported.

The analysis shows that education is an important factor in women's acceptance of unequal gender roles. In a substantial number of countries, the more education a woman has, the less likely she is to agree that wife beating is justified for any reason and the more likely she is to accept a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband. However, in certain contexts, having only primary education is not enough to empower women; at least secondary education is required.

Women's employment for cash has a much more consistently positive effect on women's acceptance of a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband than on their rejection of wife beating. Women who are exposed regularly to mass media tend to have more egalitarian gender-role attitudes than those who are not regularly exposed.

Although a higher age at first marriage is associated with women's attitudes towards gender roles, its relationship with the two gender-role attitudes varies. Women who marry after age 18 are less likely to agree that wife beating is ever justified in the majority of countries; whereas, women who marry between ages 18 and 24 are most likely to agree that women have the right refuse sex with their husband if they do not want to have sex.

Women in wealthier households are much more likely than women in poorer households to reject wife beating. However, wealth is less consistently related to women's attitudes regarding a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband. Notably, the effect of wealth on a woman's attitude towards a woman's refusal to have sex with her husband is least likely to be positive when the reason is that the woman is tired or not in the mood.

Community socioeconomic status does not have a very consistent effect on women's gender-role attitudes, although the relationship with each type of gender-role attitude varies greatly by country and reason. Nonetheless, as with decisionmaking participation, the data suggest that the positive association hypothesized between community socioeconomic development and gender conscientization is upheld more consistently for the measure of socioeconomic development more directly associated with women themselves (women's regular exposure to television in the community) than with the indicator that is not directly related to women (husbands' education level).

The extensive analysis of gender-role attitudes points to one overarching conclusion: although women's attitudes towards wife beating and towards a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband are theorized as two aspects of women's level of conscientization, they do not appear to be measuring the same thing. In fact, the two sets of attitudes vary greatly by the characteristics of women, households, and communities in which they are manifested. On average, many of the explanatory variables that relate positively to one type of attitude tend to relate negatively to the other, and the same characteristic has a similar relationship to both types of attitudes in only a few countries. In fact, the analysis of the summary indicators of the two attitudes shows that with the exception of educational attainment, no characteristic is similarly related to both gender-role attitudes in a majority of the 23 countries studied.

Conclusions

The results presented in this report lead to two sets of conclusions, one related to the development of policies and programs for enhancing women's empowerment and the other related to the measurement of empowerment.

For policy and programs. A focus on variables that increase women's access to resources and knowledge such as their educational attainment, employment for cash, and media exposure, and those that provide a setting for women's empowerment such as a higher age at marriage and smaller spousal age differences, is supported by the analysis. However, any approach to increasing women's empowerment needs to be nuanced and tailored to specific country-level findings and settings. This conclusion follows from the fact that although variables such as education, employment, media exposure, and age at first marriage have a net positive association with the summary empowerment indicators across the 23 countries studied in this report, their relationship with each of the 23 indicators of empowerment varies across regions and, within regions, across countries. In fact, by region, the effect of these variables is most consistently positive in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and least consistently positive in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Measurement. The fact that the correlates of the 23 different women's decisionmaking and gender-role attitudes vary greatly suggests that these empowerment indicators cannot be treated as equivalent or even as substitutes. For example, *joint* decisionmaking on decisions about large household purchases is not affected by the same variables as *joint* decisionmaking about other decisions or decisionmaking *alone* about large household purchases. Correlates of any participation in decisionmaking are also different from correlates of decisionmaking *alone* or decisionmaking *jointly*; they are also different from correlates of women's gender-role attitudes. In addition, within the set of indicators for gender-role attitudes, there is great variation in how the different correlates relate to not just the rejection of wife beating or acceptance of a woman's right to refuse her husband sex, but also to the rejection/acceptance of different components of these variables. Thus, when studying women's empowerment, there is a need to be very specific about what it is that is to be measured.

1 Introduction

There are several cogent and pressing reasons for evaluating, promoting and monitoring the level of women's empowerment in a country, not the least of which is that household health and nutrition is generally in the hands of women. Hence, women's empowerment is necessary for ensuring their own welfare, as well as the well-being of their households. Empowerment of women is also critical for the development of a country, because it enhances both the quality and quantity of human resources available for development. Furthermore, the success of development efforts depends on the fruits of development reaching men *and* women, boys *and* girls (World Bank, 2001). The extent to which this happens, however, depends critically on gender relations within the society that define the worth of one sex relative to that of the other. A final, but fundamental reason for promoting the empowerment of women is that failing to empower women to reach their full potential is a violation of their basic human rights.

At this point it is necessary to be explicit about what we mean by the term "empowerment". Several researchers have tried to capture the meaning of the word (see Malhotra et al., 2002, for a review); however, the definition most relevant to the approach taken in this report is "Empowerment is the process by which the powerless gain greater control over the circumstances of their lives. It includes both control over resources and over ideology... [and includes, in addition to extrinsic control] a growing intrinsic capability—greater self-confidence, and an inner transformation of one's consciousness that enables one to overcome external barriers..." (Sen and Batliwala, 2000).

Inherent in this definition are two important ideas. The first of these ideas is that empowerment is not about power *over* others (a feature of domination), but power *to* achieve goals and ends. By conceptualizing empowerment in terms of 'power to', the definition explicitly recognizes that the process of empowerment involves not only changes in access to resources, but also an understanding of one's rights and entitlements and the conscientization that gender roles can be changed and gender equality is possible (Longwe, 1991). The second important idea is that the concept of empowerment is more generally applicable to those who are powerless, whether they are male or female, individuals or a group, or a class or caste. Hence nothing about the concept of empowerment per se applies to women alone. Nonetheless, women's empowerment, or lack of it, is unique in that it cuts across all types of class powerlessness and, unlike class powerlessness, is also played out within families and households (Malhotra et al., 2002).

Women's position and degrees of empowerment are defined by gender and gender relations in society. Gender represents not just the biological sex of an individual, but also the different *roles*, *rights*, and *obligations* that are attached by society to individuals born with male or female sex characteristics. Although sex differentiated roles, rights, and obligations vary by class and life-cycle stage, they exist in every sphere of human functioning (domestic, communal, labor market, religious, etc.) This makes gender a fundamental dimension of societal stratification. Moreover, these sex-specific roles, rights and obligations are not just different, they also tend to be *unequal*. In almost every sphere of human functioning, the roles defined for women are subordinated to those defined for men, women have fewer rights or their rights are less emancipating than those of men, and women's obligations are more limiting than those of men. Unequal gender relations imply not only that men have and can exercise greater power than women in almost all spheres of functioning, but that men also have culturally and often legally sanctioned power *over* women and have greater control of and access to resources and information. This inequality in gender relations is embodied in various societal institutions and is reproduced daily in the household.

1.1 The Challenge of Operationalizing Women's Empowerment

Although empowerment literally means “to invest with power”, in the context of women's empowerment the term has come to denote women's increased control over their own lives, bodies, and environments. In discussions of women's empowerment, emphasis is often placed on women's decisionmaking roles, their economic self-reliance, and their legal rights to equal treatment, inheritance and protection against all forms of discrimination, in addition to the elimination of barriers to access such resources as education and information (Germaine and Kyte, 1995; United Nations, 1995).

Kishor (2000) argues that capturing the empowerment process with cross-sectional data requires indicators that evaluate the end product of the process (i.e., indicators that measure *evidence* of empowerment), as well as indicators of women's access to different *sources* of empowerment and of women's location within an appropriate *setting* for empowerment. Together the indicators of *evidence*, *sources*, and *setting* provide a snapshot of both the success of the empowerment process and the hurdles that exist.

Following from the definition of empowerment provided earlier, *evidence* of empowerment must be sought in terms of indicators that measure women's control, both extrinsic and intrinsic, over various aspects of their lives and environments. Such measures include women's participation in household decisionmaking, as well as measures that suggest a rejection of the gender-based subordination of women. Potential *sources* of empowerment are those that provide the building blocks for empowerment, such as knowledge and potential advantage in access to and control of resources through employment for cash. These indicators cannot be considered *evidence* of empowerment because there is no guarantee that the powerless will use, or be in a position to use, these tools to become empowered. Nonetheless, access to resources remains an intrinsic component of empowerment.

Indicators of the *setting or conditions* for empowerment refer to the circumstances of the respondent's current and past environment; these factors are likely to condition the outlook and opportunities available to the respondent. These indicators can include indicators of current and past living arrangements and characteristics of people who have a direct influence on the opportunities available to the respondent.

Although Kishor's conceptual framework is distinct from those proposed by Kabeer (2001) and England (2000), it has a great deal in common with these approaches. For example, the first two elements of Kabeer's conceptualization of empowerment in terms of agency, resources, and achievements, are similar to Kishor's concepts of *evidence* and *sources* of empowerment. It needs to be acknowledged, however, that with cross-sectional survey data, the extent to which “*evidence*” of empowerment and access to “*sources*” of empowerment are translated into “agency” (that is, “the ability to make choices and act upon them”, Kabeer 2001, page 21) remains unmeasured. Similarly, there is a loose fit between Kishor's framework and that of England, who conceptualizes empowerment in terms of “objective bases of power” that include economic resources, laws and institutional rules, and norms held by others, and “subjective states” that include self-efficacy and a sense of entitlement.

Since 1999-2000, the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have been collecting information on three sets of women's empowerment variables that qualify as *evidence* of empowerment in Kishor's framework (2000): one that measures women's participation in decisionmaking and two others that measure women's acceptance of gender-role norms that endorse the control of women by men. By mid 2005, data on these variables had been collected in 23 developing countries. This report provides a description of each of these sets of variables, compares their distribution in all 23 countries, and analyzes them within a comparative framework. By examining the distribution and correlates of the *evidence* of empowerment variables across all 23 countries, this report aims to provide a better understanding of

women's empowerment in terms of their decisionmaking roles and gender-role attitudes across a large part of the developing world.

1.2 Gender and Women's Empowerment in the DHS Surveys

DHS surveys typically provide information on fertility, mortality, family planning, and important aspects of health, nutrition, and health care for women and children, as well as for men in several countries. Since 1984, at least one DHS survey has been conducted in approximately 70 developing countries around the world. The DHS program uses scientific sampling to collect, from eligible individuals in sampled households, a comparative body of nationally representative information on population, nutrition and health issues. Cross-cultural comparability of data is ensured by implementing a core of near-identical questions across countries; additional country-specific information needs are met by including country-specific questions and/or special DHS modules. Three "core" questionnaires are commonly used by DHS: a household questionnaire, a woman's questionnaire and a man's questionnaire. If comparable information is needed for a large number of countries on any given topic, it is important to include relevant questions in the appropriate core questionnaire, since it is these questionnaires that are implemented with little change across countries.

The data traditionally derived from the core DHS questionnaires can be used to develop a large number of indicators to measure women's status and empowerment. However, most of these indicators measured only the *sources* and *setting* of empowerment (Kishor and Nietzel, 1996). In, fact, until the late 1990s, the DHS core questionnaires contained almost no questions that directly explored the gendered context of health and demographic outcomes or questions that could be used to provide indicators of *evidence* of empowerment.

To fill this gap, an advisory group was formed in 1998 to guide the integration of gender questions into DHS questionnaires. The gender questions to be included in the core questionnaire had to conform to several DHS-specific constraints, the most cogent of which was that DHS surveys are household surveys and the main focus of the surveys has traditionally been on women of reproductive age. Hence, any investigation of gender had to be based on information that essentially pertained to and could be meaningfully collected from individuals, particularly women, in households.¹ Additional constraints included: a) all questions needed to be implementable with little or no change in all DHS countries; b) questions needed to be relevant to understanding population, health or nutrition (PHN) outcomes and changes in outcomes over time; and c) given the length of the DHS questionnaires and several competing priorities for the limited space in the questionnaire, only a few core questions specifically addressing gender issues could be added.

The three sets of *evidence* of empowerment variables described and analyzed in this report were introduced into the DHS core questionnaires as a result of the advisory group process. The first set of *evidence* variables is designed to measure women's degree of control over their environment by measuring their participation in household decisionmaking. The next two sets of variables address women's attitudes towards gender equality. As mentioned above, an essential element of empowerment is the belief in the ideal of gender equality in roles and rights. Thus, the second set of indicators explores women's acceptance of unequal gender roles by documenting their attitudes towards wife-beating and the right of wives to refuse their husbands sex. Acceptance of wife beating and the view that women do not have the right to refuse their husbands sex are indicative of women's acceptance of women's lower status, both absolutely and relative to men. While such attitudes do not necessarily signify, for example, that

¹ Once collected, the information can be aggregated to obtain community-level indicators; however, the nature of the information would necessarily reflect the experience of individuals or demonstrate how gender plays out at the household level.

women *approve* of men beating their wives, they do suggest women's *acceptance of norms* that give men the right, in this case, to discipline women with force.

The new *evidence* of empowerment questions (described below) are in addition to the questions traditionally included in the DHS surveys on other potential dimensions of empowerment such as educational attainment, media exposure, employment and earnings control, age at first marriage, and age at first childbirth.

Women's participation in household decisionmaking. Women's role in and degree of control over the process of decisionmaking in households are important aspects of women's empowerment and gender relations that have cross-cultural and household-level relevance. The choice of specific decisions to ask women about in the DHS questionnaires was guided by the need to ensure that the decision areas included were relevant to all women, whether they were currently married or not and had children or not, and that they covered different aspects of household and individual functioning. Accordingly, the question asked of all women is:

Who in your family usually has the final say on the following decisions:

- Your own health care?*
- Making large household purchases?*
- Making household purchases for daily needs?*
- Visits to family and/or relatives/friends?*
- What food should be cooked each day?*

Responses are coded as: "Respondent"; "Husband/partner"; "Respondent & husband/partner jointly"; "Someone else"; "Respondent & someone else jointly"; "Decision not made/not applicable".

Most cultures assign domestic roles, such as cooking and cleaning, to women. Accordingly, decisions about food were included in the list of decisions with the expectation that most women would be making these decisions. The atypical woman would be the one not making the decision, rather than the one making it. The questions on decisions about the two different kinds of purchases (large purchases and purchases for daily needs) were designed to tap into economic decisionmaking in the household while allowing for variation in participation according to the relative amount of money to be expended and whether the decisions are routine or not (purchases for daily needs being more routine than large purchases). Participation in decisions about visits to family or friends was expected to be most culture specific; this type of decisionmaking is less likely to involve women in cultures in which women's freedom of movement is restricted and their interaction with birth-family members is closely monitored by husbands and in-laws than in other cultures. Finally, decisions about their own health care were thought to be most fundamental to women's self interest and of direct relevance to bringing about PHN-related change.

Decisionmaking about what food should be cooked each day is not described or analyzed in this report because of the very limited variation in the proportions of women participating in these types of decisions.

Gender-role norms that justify men's control over women. Of particular relevance to demographic and health programs is the need to determine the extent to which women, the main targets of such programs, are empowered enough to have control over their own behavior, body and sexuality. Accordingly, the following two sets of questions that explore women's acceptance of norms that subordinate women's bodily integrity and sexuality to men were included in the DHS:

1. *Sometimes a husband is annoyed or angered by things that his wife does. In your opinion, is a husband justified in hitting or beating his wife in the following situations:*

If she goes out without telling him?

If she neglects the children?

If she argues with him?

If she refuses to have sex with him?

If she burns the food?

2. *Husbands and wives do not always agree on everything. Please tell me if you think a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband when:*

She knows her husband has a sexually transmitted disease?

She knows her husband has sex with other women?

She has recently given birth?

She is tired or not in the mood?

Both of these sets of questions are attitude questions and *not* questions about women's own experience. Agreement with specific justifications for a husband beating his wife or for a wife *not* being able to refuse her husband sex attests to the socialization of women in traditional gender-role norms that give husbands rights over the behavior and body of their wives. The presumption behind these questions is that truly empowered women would not accept such obvious gender-inequalities in power; empowered women would not agree with any justification for a husband beating his wife and would believe that a wife should have the right to decide when to have sex with her husband.

Even so, the justifications presented to respondents in both questions were carefully chosen to provide variation in the perceived seriousness of the behavioral norm violation. For example, even among women who accept the norm that it is a woman's duty to have sex with her husband when he wants to, a wife refusing her husband sex because she has recently given birth is likely to be a less serious gender role violation than refusing sex because she is tired or not in the mood. Similarly, not cooking food well or burning the food should be perceived as providing less justification for wife beating than neglecting the children even among women who believe that wife beating is justified.

1.3 Data

In this report, the distribution and correlates of women's empowerment are examined in terms of women's decisionmaking and gender-role attitudes in 23 developing countries—13 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 3 in North Africa/West Asia/Europe, 4 in Asia, and 3 in Latin America/Caribbean. In all of these countries, a DHS survey was conducted during the period 1999 and 2004 that included the empowerment questions. The earliest survey included in this report is the Zimbabwe DHS (completed in 1999) and the latest is the Mozambique DHS (completed in the fall of 2004). Table 1.1 provides the list of countries included in this analysis, the dates of fieldwork, and survey sample sizes.

In general, the DHS surveys use a multi-stage, stratified sample design and specially calculated weights to provide nationally representative estimates of variables of interest. In all countries included in this report, with the exception of Indonesia, Jordan, and Nepal, all women age 15-49 in sample households, married and unmarried, were eligible to be interviewed with the DHS Woman's Questionnaire. In Indonesia, Jordan and Nepal, eligibility was restricted to ever-married women age 15-49. Further, in Cambodia and Haiti, although all women age 15-49 were eligible to be interviewed, the questions on empowerment were asked in only a subset of sample households (approximately one in four households in Cambodia and one in two in Haiti).

Table 1.1. Countries, dates of fieldwork, and sample sizes for all DHS surveys included in this report and associated development indicators by country

| Countries | Dates of fieldwork | Implementing organization | All women (N) | Currently married women (N) | | GDP per capita ¹ (PPP US\$) | Ranking on GDP among listed countries | 2003 GDI ranking ¹ | GDI ranking among listed countries |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|--|---------------|-----------------------------|----------|--|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | | | | Unweighted | Weighted | | | | |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | | | | | | | | | |
| Benin | 8/1/2001-10/1/2001 | INSAE | 6,219 | 4,587 | 4,563 | 980 | 18 | 131 | 18 |
| Burkina Faso | 6/1/2003-11/1/2003 | Institut National de la Statistique et de la Demographie (INSD) | 12,477 | 9,537 | 9,654 | 1,120 | 17 | 143 | 23 |
| Cameroon | 2/1/2004-7/1/2004 | Institut National de la Statistique | 10,656 | 7,177 | 7,165 | 1,680 | 12 | 114 | 11 |
| Ghana | 7/1/2003-10/1/2003 | Ghana Statistical Service | 5,691 | 3,694 | 3,549 | 2,250 | 9 | 104 | 8 |
| Kenya | 4/1/2003-9/1/2003 | Central Bureau of Statistics | 8,195 | 4,876 | 4,919 | 980 | 18 | 115 | 12 |
| Malawi | 7/1/00-11/1/00 | National Statistics Office | 13,220 | 9,361 | 9,452 | 570 | 23 | 132 | 19 |
| Mali | 1/1/2001-5/1/2001 | Cellule de Planification et de Statistique, Ministère de la Santé and Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Informatique | 12,849 | 10,697 | 10,723 | 810 | 21 | 142 | 22 |
| Mozambique | 7/1/2003-9/1/2004 | National Statistical Institute (INE) | 12,418 | 8,377 | 8,736 | 1,140 | 16 | 140 | 21 |
| Nigeria | 3/1/2003-8/1/2003 | The National Population Commission | 7,620 | 5,157 | 5,336 | 850 | 20 | 124 | 16 |
| Rwanda | 6/1/00-8/1/00 | Office National de la Population | 10,421 | 4,891 | 5,053 | 1,250 | 15 | 129 | 17 |
| Uganda | 6/1/00-2/1/00 | Uganda Bureau of Statistics (formerly Department of Statistics) | 7,246 | 4,675 | 4,881 | 1,490 | 13 | 117 | 13 |
| Zambia | 11/1/2001-5/1/2002 | Central Statistics Office | 7,658 | 4,731 | 4,694 | 780 | 22 | 133 | 20 |
| Zimbabwe | 9/1/99-12/1/99 | Central Statistics Office | 5,907 | 3,553 | 3,608 | 2,280 | 8 | 113 | 10 |
| North Africa/West Asia/Europe | | | | | | | | | |
| Armenia | 10/1/00-12/1/00 | National Statistical Office/Ministry of Health | 6,430 | 4,198 | 4,125 | 2,650 | 5 | 78 | 3 |
| Jordan | 7/1/2002-9/1/2002 | Department of Statistics | 6,006* | 5,727 | 5,706 | 3,870 | 1 | 75 | 2 |
| Morocco | 10/1/2003-1/1/2004 | Ministère de la Santé | 16,798 | 8,851 | 8,782 | 3,600 | 3 | 102 | 7 |
| Asia | | | | | | | | | |
| Cambodia | 2/1/00-6/1/00 | National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Health | 3,741** | 2,322 | 2,245 | 1,860 | 10 | 105 | 9 |
| Indonesia | 10/1/2002-9/1/2002 | Central Bureau of Statistics, National Family Planning Coordinating Board, Ministry of Health | 29,483* | 27,784 | 27,857 | 2,940 | 4 | 91 | 4 |
| Nepal | 1/1/2001-6/1/2001 | Ministry of Health; New ERA | 8,726* | 8,324 | 8,342 | 1,310 | 14 | 119 | 14 |
| Philippines | 6/1/2003-9/1/2003 | National Statistics Office | 13,633 | 8,764 | 8,671 | 3,840 | 2 | 66 | 1 |
| Latin America/Caribbean | | | | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 7/1/2003-9/1/2004 | National Statistical Institute | 17,654 | 10,626 | 10,569 | 2,300 | 7 | 94 | 5 |
| Haiti | 3/1/00-7/1/00 | Institute Haitien de l'Enfance | 5,161** | 2,968 | 3,002 | 1,860 | 10 | 122 | 15 |
| Nicaragua | 9/1/2001-12/1/2001 | Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos | 13,060 | 7,678 | 7,424 | 2,450 | 6 | 98 | 6 |

*Ever-married women only

**All women who are asked the empowerment questions only

¹Source: *United Nations Development Programme (2003)*

GDP = Gross domestic product

PPP = Purchasing power parity

GDI = Gender Development Index

Although all interviewed women are eligible for the empowerment questions, this report is restricted to women who are currently married.² By focusing on currently married women, we are better able to determine the context of decisionmaking and gender norms. In particular, the decisionmaking questions are best suited to examine the empowerment of currently married women because, of the five possible pre-coded answers, two are possible only if the woman has a husband. Across the 23 countries, currently married women constitute about half or more of all women interviewed. The share of currently married women among all interviewed women in Indonesia, Jordan, and Nepal is over 90 percent since the original sample was restricted to ever-married women only. In Rwanda, Morocco, Nicaragua, and Haiti, in contrast, the share of currently married women in the entire sample of interviewed women is only 48-58 percent. In the remaining countries, currently married women constitute 60-78 percent of all interviewed women. Note that a woman is considered to be currently married if she says she is currently married or says that she is currently living together with a man as if married.

Table 1.1 also shows that the countries in this report vary greatly in terms of their level of development as measured by both their per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gender Development Index (GDI) (United Nations Development Programme, 2003). The GDI provides an indicator of country well-being in terms of life expectancy, educational attainment, and estimated real income after taking gender inequalities into explicit consideration. In general, the GDI is a summary indicator of country achievements that recognizes that development is incomplete unless it is shared equally between the sexes.

According to these development indicators, among the 23 countries included in this report, the Philippines, Jordan, Armenia, and Indonesia are the most developed with some of the highest ranks on both per capita GDP and GDI. Morocco also ranks among the highest on GDP per capita but is only seventh in terms of GDI. Malawi, Zambia, Mali, followed by Nigeria, Benin, and Kenya are the least economically developed of the countries included in this report and Burkina Faso, Mali, and Mozambique rank the lowest on GDI.

1.4 Descriptive Information for Countries and Women Included in This Report

Table 1.2 provides information on some key characteristics of the women included in this report by country. Several of these characteristics are classified by Kishor (2000) as either potential *sources* of empowerment (educational attainment, media exposure, and employment for cash) or variables that capture aspects of the *setting* for empowerment (age at first marriage, spousal age at marriage, and nuclear family residence). The *setting* indicators focus on the circumstances of women's lives and reflect the opportunities available to women. Urban residence, with its increased opportunities for exposure to new ideas, and wealth, with its potential for increased access to all types of resources can also be considered variables that capture aspects of the *setting* for empowerment. The information in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 attests to the tremendous variability across countries represented in this report and points to the necessity of analyzing the *evidence* of empowerment variables using multivariate tools of analysis.

² In the DHS, marital status is self-determined. Currently married women include women who are living with a man as if married. Hence, throughout this report husbands include cohabiting partners.

Table 1.2. Percent distribution of currently married women by selected background characteristics and percentage by selected characteristics

| Background characteristic | Sub-Saharan Africa | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------|----------|-------|-------|--------|-------|------------|---------|--------|--------|--------|----------|
| | Benin | Burkina Faso | Cameroon | Ghana | Kenya | Malawi | Mali | Mozambique | Nigeria | Rwanda | Uganda | Zambia | Zimbabwe |
| Age (years) | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15-19 | 6.3 | 9.1 | 11.6 | 3.9 | 6.8 | 9.9 | 3.9 | 10.7 | 10.2 | 3.4 | 9.5 | 9.3 | 8.7 |
| 20-29 | 42.4 | 39.5 | 42.0 | 35.8 | 41.1 | 46.8 | 28.5 | 40.7 | 38.6 | 41.2 | 45.6 | 45.6 | 44.6 |
| 30-39 | 32.7 | 30.4 | 29.0 | 36.4 | 31.8 | 26.5 | 35.0 | 30.4 | 30.2 | 33.9 | 29.9 | 28.7 | 28.8 |
| 40-49 | 18.6 | 21.0 | 17.4 | 24.0 | 20.4 | 16.8 | 32.5 | 18.2 | 21.0 | 21.5 | 14.9 | 16.4 | 18.0 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 7.4 | 8.0 | 12.3 | 7.3 | 6.2 | 7.6 | 10.1 | 9.0 | 10.1 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 6.7 | 8.7 |
| 1 or 2 | 30.7 | 27.9 | 31.9 | 32.8 | 31.2 | 32.8 | 33.7 | 31.1 | 27.3 | 29.2 | 26.9 | 30.8 | 42.2 |
| 3 or 4 | 24.1 | 24.4 | 23.2 | 28.2 | 29.0 | 25.6 | 28.5 | 25.2 | 22.7 | 25.3 | 25.8 | 26.1 | 24.3 |
| 5+ | 37.7 | 39.7 | 32.7 | 31.8 | 33.6 | 33.9 | 27.7 | 34.8 | 40.0 | 39.0 | 40.8 | 36.4 | 24.8 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 72.2 | 87.6 | 28.7 | 38.1 | 15.5 | 31.5 | 63.4 | 48.2 | 53.9 | 35.3 | 25.9 | 14.1 | 8.6 |
| Primary | 19.4 | 8.1 | 40.3 | 20.0 | 58.6 | 61.0 | 17.3 | 47.5 | 22.0 | 54.6 | 61.0 | 61.9 | 46.1 |
| Secondary or higher | 8.4 | 4.3 | 31.0 | 41.8 | 25.9 | 7.5 | 19.4 | 4.3 | 24.1 | 10.1 | 13.1 | 24.0 | 45.3 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Below 18 years | 46.7 | 62.8 | 61.9 | 40.8 | 38.6 | 55.6 | 37.6 | 62.3 | 66.4 | 23.8 | 59.9 | 57.6 | 39.2 |
| 18-24 years | 46.6 | 35.1 | 32.7 | 50.7 | 53.9 | 41.3 | 47.9 | 33.5 | 27.6 | 67.0 | 37.1 | 39.2 | 54.7 |
| 25 years or over | 6.7 | 2.1 | 5.4 | 8.4 | 7.6 | 3.1 | 14.5 | 4.3 | 6.1 | 9.2 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 6.1 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 5 years | 29.0 | 20.3 | 26.2 | 36.1 | 36.0 | 44.7 | 37.0 | 43.6 | 14.1 | 52.2 | 43.5 | 35.0 | 37.5 |
| 5-9 years | 33.8 | 29.9 | 33.2 | 33.0 | 38.5 | 37.9 | 33.6 | 31.6 | 33.4 | 25.9 | 31.9 | 43.4 | 35.7 |
| 10 years or more | 37.2 | 49.8 | 40.6 | 31.0 | 25.6 | 17.4 | 29.4 | 24.8 | 52.5 | 22.0 | 24.6 | 21.6 | 26.8 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Regularly exposed to media | 66.5 | 52.1 | 49.9 | 75.7 | 77.6 | 55.2 | 85.0 | 48.3 | 62.3 | 43.0 | 51.9 | 46.9 | 58.0 |
| Works for cash | 85.8 | 21.0 | 51.6 | 81.4 | 50.0 | 24.9 | 12.0 | 18.1 | 57.6 | 19.1 | 52.6 | 36.0 | 49.3 |
| Husband coresident | 82.1 | 91.8 | 78.3 | 70.3 | 78.3 | 86.1 | 87.6 | 90.8 | 90.7 | 87.5 | 86.1 | 93.5 | 72.6 |
| Lives in an urban area | 34.5 | 15.2 | 48.8 | 40.5 | 22.2 | 14.4 | 57.1 | 29.0 | 30.6 | 14.7 | 13.0 | 35.4 | 36.2 |
| Lives in a nonnuclear household | 37.4 | 40.5 | 48.1 | 27.8 | 34.7 | 27.5 | 42.8 | 39.0 | 27.5 | 20.2 | 30.8 | 41.8 | 38.3 |

Continued...

Table 1.2—Continued

| Background characteristic | North Africa/West Asia/Europe | | | Asia | | | | Latin America/Caribbean | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------|---------|----------|-----------|-------|-------------|-------------------------|-------|-----------|
| | Armenia | Jordan | Morocco | Cambodia | Indonesia | Nepal | Philippines | Bolivia | Haiti | Nicaragua |
| Age (years) | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15-19 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 11.0 | 4.8 | 3.3 | 11.2 | 2.8 | 4.0 | 6.4 | 9.4 |
| 20-29 | 27.5 | 32.4 | 37.9 | 27.4 | 32.2 | 39.2 | 30.5 | 33.8 | 34.0 | 36.2 |
| 30-39 | 35.8 | 41.2 | 31.7 | 40.5 | 36.3 | 29.7 | 38.0 | 36.4 | 35.0 | 33.1 |
| 40-49 | 34.3 | 23.8 | 19.4 | 27.3 | 28.2 | 20.0 | 28.8 | 25.7 | 24.5 | 21.3 |
| Number of children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 5.2 | 8.0 | 8.3 | 6.8 | 7.4 | 11.1 | 7.7 | 4.7 | 9.9 | 7.3 |
| 1 or 2 | 50.9 | 23.8 | 25.3 | 27.9 | 48.8 | 30.8 | 37.4 | 35.0 | 32.9 | 37.4 |
| 3 or 4 | 39.5 | 30.3 | 21.9 | 28.8 | 28.8 | 31.3 | 31.4 | 29.6 | 23.7 | 28.5 |
| 5+ | 4.4 | 38.0 | 44.5 | 36.5 | 15.0 | 26.8 | 23.5 | 30.6 | 33.6 | 26.7 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.1 | 5.7 | 84.3 | 30.4 | 7.5 | 71.6 | 1.7 | 8.6 | 40.9 | 18.1 |
| Primary | 6.6 | 11.2 | 10.4 | 56.9 | 53.6 | 15.0 | 29.1 | 55.8 | 41.1 | 43.8 |
| Secondary or higher | 93.3 | 83.1 | 5.2 | 12.7 | 38.9 | 13.5 | 69.2 | 35.6 | 18.0 | 38.1 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Below 18 years | 20.3 | 27.2 | 71.6 | 33.9 | 42.2 | 70.8 | 21.8 | 32.3 | 33.2 | 58.4 |
| 18-24 years | 70.4 | 59.2 | 25.5 | 56.6 | 48.9 | 27.8 | 58.8 | 53.9 | 53.4 | 36.2 |
| 25 years or over | 9.2 | 13.6 | 3.0 | 9.4 | 8.9 | 1.5 | 19.4 | 13.7 | 13.4 | 5.4 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 5 years | 57.9 | 42.2 | 12.6 | 70.1 | 51.4 | 58.2 | 69.3 | 69.6 | 47.9 | 58.9 |
| 5-9 years | 33.1 | 37.6 | 31.5 | 20.9 | 34.2 | 30.1 | 20.8 | 20.0 | 28.9 | 23.3 |
| 10 years or more | 8.9 | 20.3 | 55.8 | 9.0 | 14.4 | 11.6 | 9.9 | 10.4 | 23.2 | 17.8 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Regularly exposed to media | 91.1 | 90.2 | 63.7 | 66.6 | 82.4 | 49.9 | 90.7 | 89.8 | 59.7 | 91.4 |
| Works for cash | 22.9 | 9.6 | 47.0 | 36.1 | 30.7 | 11.6 | 43.4 | 55.5 | 62.2 | 39.9 |
| Husband coresident | 90.2 | 94.5 | n/a | 95.4 | 95.9 | 78.5 | 93.5 | 93.3 | 72.1 | 92.2 |
| Lives in an urban area | 58.0 | 79.7 | 24.5 | 15.1 | 45.8 | 9.5 | 53.5 | 64.6 | 37.0 | 57.6 |
| Lives in a nonnuclear household | 56.1 | 18.5 | 22.8 | 33.7 | 36.0 | 54.6 | 34.5 | 17.0 | 47.9 | 40.2 |

Note: Primary education ends in grade 8 in Armenia. Information on husband's coresidence is not available for Morocco. A nonnuclear household is one that contains the head, spouse, spouse(s), child(ren), grandchild(ren), or adopted or foster child(ren) only.
n/a = Not available

Age distribution. In all countries in this report, only women age 15-49 were eligible to be interviewed. Additionally, since only currently married women are included in this study, the age distribution across countries is sensitive to the age at first marriage. In no country is the share of women who are age 15-19 greater than 12 percent; in Armenia, Indonesia, Jordan, the Philippines, and Rwanda, this share is as low as 2-3 percent. Women age 20-29 account for the highest proportion of women in the sample in all countries except Armenia, Bolivia, Cambodia, Ghana, Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Mali, and the Philippines, where women age 30-39 are the modal age group. In addition, Armenia and Mali have a higher proportion of women age 40-49 than any of the other countries.

Number of children ever born. As expected from a sample of currently married women, the proportion of women with no children is low, ranging from 5 percent in Bolivia and Armenia to 12 percent in Cameroon. In a majority of sub-Saharan African countries, as well as in Jordan, Morocco, Cambodia, and Haiti, the highest proportion of women are women with five or more children ever born. However, in Armenia, Indonesia, Zimbabwe, the Philippines, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Mali, and Ghana, the highest proportions are women with one or two children ever born.

Education. Education and media exposure (discussed below) can help to empower women by equipping them with the information and means to function effectively, especially in the modern world. Table 1.2 shows that women's education levels vary widely in the countries included in this report. More than 70 percent of currently married women in Burkina Faso, Benin, Morocco, and Nepal have no education, and uneducated women also constitute the majority of currently married women in Nigeria. In contrast, 93 percent of women in Armenia, 83 percent in Jordan, and 69 percent in the Philippines have secondary or higher education. In most of the remaining countries, women with only primary education account for a larger proportion of currently married women than women with no education or education beyond the primary level.

Exposure to media. Media exposure, like education, is important for empowerment. In this report, women who watch television, listen to the radio, or read a newspaper or magazine at least once a week, are defined as being regularly exposed to one or more forms of media. Countries vary less in terms of media exposure than in terms of women's level of education. Mozambique (48 percent), Rwanda (43 percent) and Zambia (47 percent) are the only countries where less than half of all currently married women are regularly exposed to one or more forms of media. In the remaining countries, the proportion of women regularly exposed to some form of media ranges from about 50-55 percent in Malawi, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Cameroon, and Nepal to 90 percent or more in Nicaragua, Armenia, the Philippines, Jordan, and Bolivia.

Employment for cash. Employment, particularly for cash and in non-traditional occupations, potentially empowers women by providing financial independence, alternative sources of social identity, and exposure to power structures independent of kin networks (Dixon-Mueller, 1993). All women in the DHS are asked if they are currently employed. This initial question is followed by a short sequence of questions that attempts to elicit information on both formal and informal employment. Women who are working or have worked in the 12 months preceding the survey are asked if they are paid in cash, in kind, both in cash and in kind, or not paid at all.

Table 1.2 identifies only women who are employed for cash (including those who are paid only partly in cash). Countries vary greatly in the proportion of women employed for cash, with the majority of countries (16 of 23) having half or less than half of currently married women employed for cash. The proportion employed for cash is highest in Benin (86 percent) and Ghana (81 percent) and lowest, at 10-12 percent, in Jordan, Nepal, and Mali, followed by Mozambique and Rwanda, at 18-19 percent.

Age at first marriage. An early age at first marriage is likely to have a negative effect on empowerment by virtually terminating a woman's access to some sources of empowerment, such as formal education (Mason, 1986; 1987) and, in several countries, the resources of their natal families. Note that in the DHS age at first cohabitation with the first husband is typically used as a proxy for age at first marriage.

Table 1.2 shows that in 10 of the 23 countries, a majority of currently married women in the sample were married before 18 years. This proportion is highest at 71-72 percent in Morocco and Nepal. The only countries with at least 75 percent of women married at age 18 or later are Armenia, the Philippines, and Rwanda.

Spousal age gap. A large age difference between spouses in favor of the husband is likely to put the wife at a disadvantage with regard to her ability to exercise power within the marriage and in her marital home. Large age differences (10 years or more) are most common in Morocco, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon, where 41-56 percent of currently married women have a husband who is at least 10 years older than they are. In contrast, in Armenia, Cambodia, the Philippines, Bolivia, Nepal, and Indonesia, only 9-14 percent of currently married women are 10 or more years younger than their husband. Spousal age differences in this report are based on women's reports of their own age and of their husband's age.

Nonnuclear residence. Residence in a non-nuclear family is likely to negatively affect women's ability to access resources directly and to exercise control over household decisions (Dyson and Moore, 1983; Dixon-Mueller, 1989). The potentially much larger and multigenerational nature of non-nuclear families is likely to confound the ability of any individual woman in the household to exercise her own will in household and family-related matters.

A non-nuclear household is defined here as one that includes parents, in-laws, siblings, or other relatives of the household head other than the wife, children (own, adopted, or step/fostered), and grand children. Hence, a household is nuclear if the household head is living with a wife, own, step, adopted, or grand children, and/or unrelated individuals. A more precise definition is not possible since relationships in the household are all defined with reference only to the household head.

In 21 of the 23 countries in this report, less than one in two women lives in non-nuclear households. The only exceptions are Nepal and Armenia, where 55-56 percent of currently married women live in non-nuclear households. Nuclear residence is most common in Bolivia, Jordan, Rwanda, and Morocco, where less than one in four currently married women live in non-nuclear households.

Urban residence. The most urbanized of the countries included in this report are Jordan, with 80 percent of currently married women living in urban areas; Bolivia (65 percent); and the Philippines, Mali, Nicaragua, and Armenia (54-58 percent). The least urbanized countries are Nepal, Uganda, Malawi, Rwanda, Cambodia, and Burkina Faso, where only 9-15 percent of currently married women live in an urban area.

Wealth. The DHS does not typically collect information on household income; instead DHS collects information on household ownership of a number of consumer items ranging from a television to a bicycle or car, as well as on dwelling characteristics such as source of drinking water, toilet facilities used, roofing, and flooring. This information has been used to develop a widely accepted wealth index that has been tested in a large number of countries in relation to inequities in household income, use of health services, and health outcomes (Gwatkin et al., 2000).

The wealth index is constructed using household asset data (including country-specific assets) and principle components analysis. Each asset is assigned a weight (factor score) generated through principle components analysis, and the resulting asset scores are standardized in relation to a standard

normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Each household is then assigned a score for each asset, and the scores are summed by household; individuals are ranked according to the total score of the household in which they reside. The sample is then divided into population quintiles; each quintile is given a rank from one (poorest) to five (wealthiest). Because, by definition, the index divides the population into five groups, the index is not a tool for cross-country comparisons but is effective for understanding within-country variation by wealth in variables, including variation in the indicators of empowerment. In the chapters that follow, the wealth index will be used to better understand the effect of wealth on women's empowerment across countries.

Summary of sample characteristics. Table 1.3 provides rankings for the countries included in this report on some of the key *sources* and *setting* for empowerment variables discussed above. This table helps to summarize the large variation in the characteristics of women and the context within which *evidence* of empowerment variables need to be analyzed. All countries were ranked on three *sources* of empowerment indicators whose values were presented in Table 1.2: the percentage of women who have attended school; the percentage who are regularly exposed to media; and the percentage who are employed for cash. All of these variables have the potential to enhance the *evidence* of empowerment variables.

In general, countries have more similar rankings on educational attainment and media exposure than on employment for cash. For example, Benin, which has the highest proportion of women working for cash, is ranked 21st on educational attainment and 11th on media exposure. In contrast, Armenia, which is ranked 1st on educational attainment and 2nd on women's regular exposure to media, is ranked 17th on women's employment for cash.

Countries are also ranked on two *setting* for empowerment variables, namely, the proportion of women who were married at age 18 years or older and the proportion of women married to men less than 10 years older than they are. With a few exceptions, such as Malawi and Nepal, the rankings of countries on these two variables are similar.

Finally, the last three columns of Table 1.3 provide the following summary rankings:

- *Overall rank on sources variables:* Countries are ranked according to the sum of their ranks on each of the three *sources* variables.
- *Overall rank on the setting variables:* Countries are ranked according to the sum of their ranks on each of the two *setting* variables.
- *Overall rank on all five variables:* Countries are ranked according to the sum of their ranks on each of the five *sources* and *setting* variables.

The Philippines, followed by Armenia and Bolivia, have the highest ranks of all countries included in this report. These three countries also rank highest on the *sources* and *setting* variables separately. The lowest ranked countries are Burkina Faso and Mozambique. These countries also have similarly low ranks on the *sources* and *setting* variables separately. Countries that have a difference of 10 or more ranks between their overall rankings on the *setting* and *sources* variables include Cambodia, Ghana, and Rwanda. Cambodia and Rwanda rank very high (3rd and 6th, respectively) on the *setting* variables, but relatively low (13th and 20th, respectively) on the *sources* variables. In contrast, Ghana has a high rank on the *sources* variables (6th), but not on the *setting* variables (16th).

Table 1.3. Country rankings for selected *sources* of empowerment and *setting* for empowerment indicators

| Countries | Rankings | | | | | | Overall rank on <i>sources</i> of empowerment variables | Overall rank on <i>setting</i> for empowerment variables | Overall rank on all variables |
|--------------|--|-----------------------------|-------------------|---|---|----|---|--|-------------------------------|
| | Selected <i>sources</i> of empowerment variables | | | Selected <i>setting</i> for empowerment variables | | | | | |
| | Have education | Have regular media exposure | Employed for cash | Age at first marriage 18 years or above | Spousal age difference less than 10 years | | | | |
| Philippines | 2 | 3 | 11 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | |
| Armenia | 1 | 2 | 17 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | |
| Bolivia | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 | |
| Jordan | 3 | 4 | 23 | 4 | 9 | 9 | 5 | 4 | |
| Indonesia | 4 | 7 | 15 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 5 | |
| Cambodia | 12 | 10 | 13 | 7 | 2 | 13 | 3 | 5 | |
| Nicaragua | 9 | 1 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 4 | 10 | 7 | |
| Kenya | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 15 | 5 | 10 | 8 | |
| Haiti | 16 | 14 | 3 | 6 | 12 | 10 | 7 | 9 | |
| Zimbabwe | 5 | 15 | 9 | 10 | 16 | 8 | 14 | 10 | |
| Ghana | 15 | 9 | 2 | 11 | 18 | 6 | 16 | 10 | |
| Uganda | 10 | 18 | 6 | 17 | 13 | 12 | 17 | 12 | |
| Benin | 21 | 11 | 1 | 13 | 19 | 10 | 18 | 13 | |
| Malawi | 13 | 16 | 16 | 14 | 7 | 18 | 9 | 14 | |
| Zambia | 7 | 22 | 14 | 15 | 10 | 16 | 12 | 15 | |
| Rwanda | 14 | 23 | 19 | 3 | 11 | 20 | 6 | 16 | |
| Mali | 19 | 6 | 21 | 8 | 17 | 19 | 12 | 17 | |
| Cameroon | 11 | 19 | 7 | 18 | 20 | 15 | 20 | 18 | |
| Nigeria | 18 | 13 | 4 | 21 | 22 | 13 | 22 | 19 | |
| Nepal | 20 | 20 | 22 | 22 | 5 | 23 | 15 | 20 | |
| Morocco | 22 | 12 | 10 | 23 | 23 | 17 | 23 | 21 | |
| Mozambique | 17 | 21 | 20 | 19 | 14 | 22 | 19 | 22 | |
| Burkina Faso | 23 | 17 | 16 | 20 | 21 | 20 | 21 | 23 | |

1.5 Organization of the Report

The remainder of this report is organized to highlight and analyze, within the context of the background characteristics described in this chapter and other relevant variables, the three *evidence* of empowerment indicators on which DHS collects data. In Chapter 2, all of the decisionmaking variables are examined and in Chapter 3 the two sets of attitude variables are analyzed. In Chapter 4, the key findings of this report are summarized and discussed in ways that can yield policy relevant recommendations.

The primary goal of this report is to provide insight into factors that contribute to enhancing empowerment. It is also hoped that the tables will provide a resource for cross-country comparisons of the empowerment indicators.

2 Women's Participation in Household Decisions

Women's participation in decisions being made in their own households, that is households in which they usually live with their spouse and/or children with or without others, is widely accepted as a universal indicator of women's empowerment. As detailed in Chapter 1, in the DHS, women are asked who in their family usually has the final say on decisions about the respondent's own health care, large household purchases, purchases for daily needs, and visits to family or friends³. Women's answers are coded into one of the following categories: respondent alone, respondent jointly with her husband, respondent's husband alone, respondent jointly with others, or others only.

These DHS questions on decisionmaking have inherent limitations as potential sources of empowerment indicators. First, the specific decisions for which information is collected in the DHS cannot all be considered strategic to women's own interests. Rather the choice of the types of decisions asked about is constrained by the requirement that the decisions be relevant to the circumstances of most women and that the decisions range in type from those that women are typically entrusted to make (e.g. decisions about what food to cook or about purchases for daily needs) to those in which women's roles are not always predictable (e.g., the use of money for major household items). Secondly, these questions address only whether women take part in the decisionmaking, not whether women's participation is in any way instrumental, i.e., able to influence the outcome.

In addition to their potential limitations as indicators of empowerment, the questions do not of themselves represent indicators of empowerment, nor do they provide any guidance on how they are to be used to define one or more indicators. In particular, the questions do not provide any guidance on:

- a) How best to define participation. To count as empowerment, is it important for women to make decisions *alone* or to make them *jointly*, or does the distinction not matter?
- b) Whether *participation*, however it is defined, in each of the different decisions is equally cogent for empowerment.

An examination of the empowerment literature (see summary in Malhotra et al., 2002) also does not provide any clear conceptual guidance on these two issues, other than that empowered women participate in making the decisions that affect their lives, and that the decisions that are made reflect women's strategic life choices. In this context, it can be argued that at least two of the decisions asked about in the DHS—the decision about obtaining health care for the respondent and the decision about the respondent's visits to family or friends—are of strategic interest to women themselves because these decisions relate directly to their own specific needs. Although other persons can contribute to such decisions, ultimately, the woman herself will be the best judge of what she must do and when she needs to act. A similar case cannot as easily be made for the decision about expenditures on major household items because household income is usually a pooled resource and consequently its control is likely to be shared.

This discussion points to the large number of gaps in our understanding of how women's decisionmaking roles can be used to define indicators of empowerment. The analysis in this chapter attempts to fill some of these gaps by trying to answer the following questions:

1. Do women who make decisions *alone* differ in significant ways from women who make decisions *jointly* with their husbands or others?

³ The specific wording for this last decision varies somewhat across countries. In about half the countries, the wording used is "visits to family and relatives" and in the other half, it is "visits to family, friends and relatives." In Zambia alone, the wording used is "when to visit family, friends or relatives." Here we use "visits to family or friends" to represent all of these variations.

2. Do the correlates of each type of participation vary by type of decision?

Answers to these questions will provide insight into how decisionmaking variables can best be used to develop indicators of women's empowerment. Accordingly, the patterns of decisionmaking are compared across countries for currently married women in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, the correlates of decisionmaking *alone* and *joint* decisionmaking are compared using both bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques. In Section 2.3 the correlates of any participation in decisionmaking are discussed. Finally some conclusions are given in Section 2.4.

2.1 Comparing Women's Participation in Household Decisionmaking across Countries

Table 2.1 shows the percent distribution of currently married women by type of participation in decisionmaking according to the four types of decisions for all 23 countries. What is immediately clear from the table is that the type of participation varies greatly by type of decision in every country, and that there is a surprising amount of consistency across countries in women's decisionmaking roles with regard to the different types of decisions asked about. Note that for Nicaragua and Zambia, data are not available for the decisions about purchases for daily needs.

Table 2.1 shows that there is no country where the majority of women make each of the four decisions *alone*. Nonetheless, the majority of currently married women make one of the four decisions *alone* most frequently in seven countries, two of the decisions *alone* in another seven countries, and three of the decisions *alone* in one country, Haiti. Among the four decisions, the decisions most often made *alone* by women are about making daily purchases (14 countries), their own health care (8 countries), or both. In all but four countries (Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Morocco), the decisions least often made *alone* by women are about making large household purchases.

Joint decisionmaking is not as common as might have been expected. In only 13 countries do women most commonly make one or more of the four decisions *jointly* with their husbands, and these *jointly* made decisions tend to be either decisions about large household purchases or about visiting family or friends. In 14 countries husbands most frequently make one or more of the decisions *alone*. Notably, in 11 of these countries (10 in sub-Saharan Africa and 1 in Asia [Nepal]), at least three of the four decisions are most often made by husbands alone.

The country-by-country analysis for decisionmaking *alone* is summarized in Figure 2.1. This analysis is done by averaging the percentages of currently married women making different decisions *alone* in each region (sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa/West Asia/Europe, Asia, and Latin America/Caribbean). In all regions except North Africa/West Asia/Europe, decisions about purchases for daily needs are most often made *alone* by women, followed by decisions about their own health care. In North Africa/West Asia/Europe this order is reversed. With the exception of the Latin America/Caribbean region, the decisions least likely to be made by women *alone* are about large household purchases.

Table 2.1. Percent distribution of currently married women according to their decisionmaking pattern, by decision and country

| Decision | Respondent alone | Respondent and husband | Respondent and other | Husband alone | Someone else | Missing | Total |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Sub-Saharan Africa | | | | | | | |
| <i>Benin</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 19.5 | 13.8 | 1.6 | 60.9 | 4.1 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 14.9 | 15.9 | 3.1 | 61.9 | 3.9 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 40.7 | 18.3 | 4.2 | 32.9 | 3.8 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 17.0 | 30.7 | 2.9 | 45.1 | 3.9 | 0.4 | 100.0 |
| <i>Burkina Faso</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 8.8 | 10.6 | 0.2 | 74.9 | 5.5 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 10.0 | 13.5 | 0.4 | 70.4 | 5.6 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 25.0 | 13.5 | 0.6 | 55.9 | 4.8 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 16.1 | 15.9 | 0.9 | 61.5 | 5.6 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| <i>Cameroon</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 18.4 | 16.5 | 0.5 | 57.6 | 6.8 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 13.0 | 22.8 | 0.7 | 53.8 | 9.3 | 0.4 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 29.0 | 22.1 | 1.4 | 39.0 | 7.9 | 0.5 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 21.5 | 27.1 | 1.1 | 43.8 | 5.6 | 0.9 | 100.0 |
| <i>Ghana</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 37.0 | 20.6 | 0.9 | 34.9 | 6.6 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 20.9 | 30.2 | 1.5 | 40.9 | 6.3 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 28.8 | 32.3 | 1.4 | 31.8 | 5.5 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 20.9 | 37.9 | 1.5 | 33.7 | 5.4 | 0.5 | 100.0 |
| <i>Kenya</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 39.9 | 14.3 | 0.3 | 43.0 | 2.3 | 0.3 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 11.8 | 24.2 | 0.2 | 61.4 | 2.3 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 40.6 | 19.2 | 0.5 | 37.4 | 2.2 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 22.9 | 35.2 | 0.4 | 39.4 | 1.7 | 0.4 | 100.0 |
| <i>Malawi</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 20.5 | 7.1 | 0.2 | 70.6 | 1.6 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 6.1 | 10.8 | 0.2 | 81.3 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 20.3 | 12.1 | 0.3 | 65.7 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 17.7 | 44.5 | 0.3 | 36.2 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| <i>Mali</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 10.9 | 5.4 | 0.4 | 74.1 | 8.9 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 10.5 | 5.8 | 0.5 | 73.1 | 10.0 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 19.8 | 6.8 | 0.4 | 63.4 | 9.3 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 18.4 | 10.4 | 0.5 | 61.7 | 8.8 | 0.3 | 100.0 |
| <i>Mozambique</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 40.8 | 20.9 | 1.2 | 32.1 | 4.9 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 4.7 | 32.2 | 0.6 | 57.6 | 4.0 | 0.9 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 35.5 | 22.0 | 2.6 | 35.3 | 4.4 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 19.2 | 44.3 | 0.9 | 32.1 | 3.2 | 0.3 | 100.0 |
| <i>Nigeria</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 12.8 | 10.3 | 0.1 | 73.4 | 3.1 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 7.1 | 12.4 | 0.1 | 77.5 | 2.6 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 19.0 | 13.9 | 0.2 | 64.5 | 2.4 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 17.7 | 20.4 | 0.2 | 59.7 | 1.7 | 0.3 | 100.0 |
| <i>Rwanda</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 23.2 | 27.0 | 0.3 | 47.5 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 99.3 |
| Large household purchases | 16.5 | 32.5 | 0.3 | 49.3 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 23.6 | 31.8 | 0.4 | 43.1 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 99.9 |
| Visits to family or friends | 19.7 | 49.7 | 0.5 | 29.2 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 99.9 |
| <i>Uganda</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 43.5 | 17.7 | 0.1 | 37.6 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 11.3 | 26.5 | 0.2 | 60.0 | 1.6 | 0.5 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 18.9 | 26.6 | 0.3 | 52.5 | 1.4 | 0.3 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 24.8 | 31.2 | 0.6 | 41.7 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 100.0 |
| <i>Zambia</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 30.1 | 11.0 | 0.5 | 46.5 | 11.8 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 11.3 | 25.1 | 0.1 | 61.7 | 1.6 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | - |
| Visits to family or friends | 16.8 | 25.7 | 0.0 | 56.1 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 100.0 |

Continued...


Table 2.1—Continued

| Decision | Respondent alone | Respondent and husband | Respondent and other | Husband alone | Someone else | Missing | Total |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|--------------|
| <i>Zimbabwe</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 49.3 | 12.5 | 0.2 | 31.8 | 6.1 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 16.2 | 42.0 | 0.6 | 36.3 | 4.8 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 57.5 | 20.5 | 0.7 | 16.2 | 4.9 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 29.0 | 45.1 | 1.2 | 20.8 | 3.8 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| North Africa/West Asia/Europe | | | | | | | |
| <i>Armenia</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 33.8 | 39.9 | 1.4 | 20.2 | 4.6 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 9.8 | 50.2 | 2.2 | 27.7 | 10.1 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 42.3 | 24.5 | 3.0 | 18.0 | 12.1 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 10.7 | 64.1 | 3.1 | 16.2 | 5.9 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| <i>Jordan</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 61.4 | 25.9 | 0.5 | 11.7 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 10.5 | 53.0 | 0.5 | 33.6 | 2.2 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 37.4 | 26.8 | 0.8 | 31.2 | 3.7 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 15.5 | 66.0 | 0.7 | 16.8 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| <i>Morocco</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 12.1 | 40.3 | 4.1 | 33.1 | 10.2 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 8.7 | 41.6 | 4.1 | 33.7 | 12.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 15.4 | 33.6 | 3.6 | 34.4 | 13.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 8.6 | 47.7 | 5.8 | 28.8 | 8.8 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Asia | | | | | | | |
| <i>Cambodia</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 37.2 | 52.7 | 1.2 | 7.6 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 26.8 | 58.8 | 1.4 | 9.7 | 3.2 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 70.3 | 23.3 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 3.1 | 0.3 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 16.0 | 78.1 | 1.3 | 2.5 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 100.0 |
| <i>Indonesia</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 54.0 | 32.1 | 0.2 | 12.7 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 13.9 | 66.5 | 0.3 | 17.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 82.7 | 13.0 | 0.8 | 2.4 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 12.5 | 74.2 | 0.2 | 10.8 | 0.3 | 1.9 | 100.0 |
| <i>Nepal</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 13.4 | 12.1 | 1.8 | 51.0 | 21.1 | 0.5 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 13.0 | 17.3 | 1.7 | 41.1 | 26.6 | 0.3 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 26.8 | 14.6 | 1.9 | 30.3 | 26.3 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 15.0 | 21.2 | 2.6 | 33.7 | 27.4 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| <i>Philippines</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 75.5 | 18.2 | 0.5 | 4.9 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 21.7 | 55.2 | 1.1 | 17.4 | 4.1 | 0.6 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 56.9 | 28.7 | 1.3 | 9.0 | 3.8 | 0.3 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 27.2 | 58.6 | 1.2 | 10.0 | 2.1 | 0.8 | 100.0 |
| Latin America/Caribbean | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bolivia</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 52.8 | 34.8 | 0.4 | 10.4 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 9.5 | 67.1 | 0.6 | 19.6 | 2.4 | 0.7 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 57.1 | 32.4 | 0.7 | 6.7 | 3.0 | 0.1 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 18.9 | 66.0 | 0.5 | 12.4 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 100.0 |
| <i>Haiti</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 42.5 | 31.3 | 1.2 | 21.5 | 3.2 | 0.3 | 100.0 |
| Large household purchases | 33.0 | 35.4 | 2.5 | 19.7 | 8.6 | 0.7 | 100.0 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | 46.8 | 31.6 | 2.6 | 10.1 | 8.3 | 0.5 | 100.0 |
| Visits to family or friends | 50.9 | 36.1 | 1.9 | 7.1 | 2.8 | 1.2 | 100.0 |
| <i>Nicaragua</i> | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 46.7 | 41.2 | 0.2 | 11.3 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 99.9 |
| Large household purchases | 13.0 | 52.9 | 0.2 | 30.0 | 1.0 | 2.9 | 97.1 |
| Household purchases for daily needs | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | - |
| Visits to family or friends | 23.7 | 56.3 | 0.1 | 18.4 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 98.9 |

Note: Missing data include decisions not made and responses that are not applicable.

n/a = Not applicable or not available

Figure 2.1 Average percentage of currently married women making decisions *alone*, by type of decision according to region



2.2 Correlates of Women's Decisionmaking *Alone* and *Joint* Decisionmaking

This section provides a detailed examination of the individual, marital, and household characteristics of currently married women age 15-49 years who make each of the four decisions *alone* and those who make them *jointly*. The distributions are given in Appendix Table 2A.1-23. This analysis makes it possible to determine whether, for any given decision, women who make decisions *alone* and those who make them *jointly* differ in terms of their characteristics. However, many of the characteristics considered are likely to be related to one another, making it difficult to determine the net effect of any given characteristic on women's decisionmaking roles. Therefore, along with these bivariate results, the results of logistic regressions are also presented for each decision by type of participation (*alone* or *joint*) for all 23 countries. This latter analysis helps to identify the factors that correlate directly with different types of decisionmaking and gives insight into whether the correlates of each type of participation vary by type of decision.

Appendix Table 2B.1-23 shows the odds ratios calculated from coefficients of the logistic regressions for each of the eight dependent variables for each country. Each odds ratio gives the increase or decrease in the odds of the event (making the decision *alone* or making the decision *jointly*) occurring for a given value of the independent variable compared to the reference category. For example, in the regression for decisions about respondents' own health care, an odds ratio of 1.50 in Appendix Table 2B.14 for Armenia for the variable "employment for cash" indicates that the odds that a woman who is employed for cash makes decisions *alone* about her own health care are 50 percent higher than if she were not employed for cash (the reference category). This multivariate analysis adds to the bivariate analysis by identifying the factors that significantly affect the likelihood of the specified pattern of decisionmaking net of all other factors hypothesized as relevant.

To facilitate comparisons across countries, a table is given in each subsection that provides a summary of the significance and direction of relationships across the 23 countries from both the bivariate and multivariate analyses.

2.2A Dependent and Independent Variables

Type of decisionmaking. In this section the following dependent variables for each type of decision are analyzed for each country:

- a) Making the decision alone: For each decision, this variable includes currently married women who say they make the decision alone. For the logistic regression analysis a respondent is coded 1 if she says she makes the decision alone and is coded 0 otherwise.
- b) Making the decision *jointly*: For each decision, this variable includes currently married women who say they make the decision *jointly* with their husband or *jointly* with someone else. For the logistic regression analysis, a code of 1 is given if the respondent says that she makes the decision *jointly* with the husband or someone else and 0 otherwise. Note that in almost all countries and for almost all decisions *joint* decisionmaking is predominantly *joint* decisionmaking with the husband.

Independent variables. Explanatory variables include all the different individual, husband, union, and household variables described in Chapter 1: age in years, number of children ever born, educational attainment, employment for cash, regular media exposure, age at first marriage, spousal age difference, coresidence of husband, residence in an extended family, residence in an urban area, and household wealth. These characteristics are all known correlates of women's empowerment. For example, age, education, media exposure, and employment for cash are all potential *sources* of empowerment. Furthermore, marital and household characteristics, such as age at first marriage, spousal age difference, nuclear family residence, urban residence, and wealth, are aspects of the *setting* for empowerment because they reflect the opportunities available to women.

In addition, all of the logistic regression equations include two community-level variables defined as follows:

1. *Percentage of women in the community whose husbands have at least secondary education.* This variable is constructed using individual-level information on the husband's education level and aggregating the information to the cluster level. First, husband's education was coded as a dummy variable. Women whose husbands had no education or incomplete or complete primary education were coded 0, while women whose husbands had incomplete or complete secondary or higher education were coded 1. Next, the mean of these codes was calculated for each cluster, and the cluster value given to each woman in the cluster after subtracting her own husband's contribution to the cluster mean value. The resulting variable measures the percentage of women in the cluster (or community) whose husbands have at least secondary or higher education. (Note: For those cases where information on husband's education was coded as "don't know" or "missing," values were imputed from the wife's education level. For all countries, except Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Haiti, and Mozambique, the values imputed constituted less than 3 percent of the sample.)
2. *Percentage of women in the community who watch television at least once a week.* For this variable, women were first coded as 0 or 1 depending on whether they watched television at least once a week. Then, the mean of this variable for each cluster was given to each woman in that cluster after removing her own value from the mean of the cluster.

Both of these variables are indicators of the overall socioeconomic development of the community. Contextual control variables are included in the regression equations since recent empowerment literature suggests that contextual or community-level factors play a significant role in the process of woman's empowerment and its beneficial consequences (Mason and Smith, 2000; Desai and Johnson, 2005).

2.2B Discussion of Results

In this subsection the bivariate and regression results for each explanatory variable are discussed. Detailed bivariate results can be found in Appendix Table 2A.1-23 and odds ratios from the logistic regression can be found in Appendix Table 2B.1-23. The main findings of these tables are summarized in Summary Tables 2A-2E.

Women's Characteristics

Age. Appendix Table 2A.1-23 shows that the older women are, the more likely they are to make each of the four decisions *alone*. In fact, the percentage of women making decisions *alone* is highest in the older age groups in 19-22 of the 23 countries, depending on the type of decision (see Summary Table 2A).

There is much less consistency across countries and decisions in how joint decisionmaking varies by age. *Joint* decisionmaking is most consistently related to age only for decisions about large household purchases: in 20 of the 23 countries, older women are much more likely to make these decisions *jointly* than younger women. In contrast, *joint* decisionmaking generally increases with age in 16 countries for decisions about visits to family or friends, and in even fewer countries for decisions about purchases for daily needs (13 countries) and about women's own health care (8 countries). In fact, compared with the generally positive association of age with making each of the four decisions *alone*, *joint* decisionmaking is significantly positively associated with age for all four decisions in only six countries (Cameroon, Haiti, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, and Nigeria). In addition, *joint* decisionmaking is negatively associated with age for decisions about women's own health care in six countries, and is not significantly related to age in the remaining nine countries.

In summary, the bivariate results show that in almost all countries, only decisionmaking *alone* increases with age for all decisions. Both types of participation, *alone* or *joint*, increase consistently with age for only one type of decision, decisions about large household purchases.

Even after controlling for other relevant characteristics, a woman's age affects the likelihood of her making decisions *alone* in almost all countries (Summary Table 2A and Appendix Table 2B.1-23). The few countries where older women are not the most likely to make decisions *alone* vary by the type of decision. For example, decisionmaking *alone* does not vary significantly by age with regard to decisions about women's own health care in Jordan, Nicaragua, and Zambia; decisions about large household purchases in Indonesia and Zimbabwe; and decisions about visits to family or friends in Nicaragua. In addition, in Indonesia, Nigeria, and the Philippines, decisionmaking *alone* about visits to family or friends has a U-shaped relationship with age, implying that the age groups least likely to make these decisions tend to be the middle groups.

In comparison to the net effect of age on decisionmaking *alone*, the net effect of age on *joint* decisionmaking is far less consistent. Depending on the decision, *joint* decisionmaking does not vary with age in 8-13 countries. In two countries, Cambodia and Rwanda, *joint* decisionmaking is unrelated to age for all decisions. In several countries, the bivariate positive relationship between *joint* decisionmaking and age is explained away when controls are introduced. For example, *joint* decisionmaking about large household purchases does not vary significantly by age in Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Haiti, and

Zambia even though, in the bivariate analysis, the proportion making this decision *jointly* was significantly lower for the lowest age group.

Summary Table 2A. Number of countries where decisionmaking *alone* and decisionmaking *jointly* with the woman's husband or others has an association of the specified type with the respondent's age and number of children ever born: Results of bivariate analysis and analysis with controls

| | Decisions about the woman's own health care | | Decisions about large household purchases | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | |
|---|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|
| | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 21 | 8 | 22 | 20 | 21 | 13 | 19 | 16 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 1 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Does not vary significantly by age | 1 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 5 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 20 | 7 | 21 | 14 | 21 | 9 | 19 | 11 |
| Increases with age | 11 | 1 | 14 | 3 | 11 | 3 | 12 | 3 |
| Increases with age to age 20-29 years | 5 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Only significantly lower for women age 15-19 years | 4 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Does not vary significantly by age | 3 | 13 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 10 | 1 | 10 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 15 | 6 | 16 | 10 | 17 | 8 | 13 | 9 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 2 | 6 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| Does not vary significantly by number of children ever born | 6 | 11 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 7 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 11 | 3 | 5 | 3 |
| Increases with number of children | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Significantly higher only for women with 5 or more children | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Significantly lower only for women with no children | 6 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 4 |
| Does not vary by number of children ever born | 11 | 14 | 18 | 15 | 6 | 15 | 18 | 16 |

The bivariate and multivariate results together point to a much stronger and consistently positive relationship between age and decisionmaking *alone* than between age and *joint* decisionmaking. Furthermore, the significant increase in decisionmaking *alone* with age is not explained away by any of the control variables, suggesting that aging directly and positively influences decisionmaking *alone*.

Number of children ever born. In most cultures, bearing children is associated with increased prestige and bargaining power for married women. This increased power is hypothesized to translate into having a greater say in household decisions. This expectation is only partially supported even by the bivariate results, however. An examination of the second horizontal panels of Appendix Table 2A.1-23 and Summary Table 2A shows that the proportion of women making each of the four decisions *alone* tends to increase with the number of children in only 13 countries for decisions about visits to family or friends and 15-17 countries for the other decisions. In addition, the proportion making decisions *jointly* tends to increase with the number of children in only 6-10 countries, depending on the decision. In several of these countries, the proportions making decisions *alone* or *jointly* tend to increase from women with 0 children to women with 3-4 children, but then either remain unchanged or decrease for women with five or more children.

In a few countries, the proportions making decisions vary not with the number of children a woman has, but, rather, with whether she has any children at all. For example, women who have no

children are significantly less likely to make decisions *alone* about their own health care than women with any number of children in six countries, about daily purchases in four countries, about large household purchases in three countries, and about visits to family or friends in one country. Notably, in 4-6 countries, *joint* decisionmaking declines with the number of children ever born compared with 1-4 countries where decisionmaking *alone* declines with the number of children ever born.

In summary, the bivariate analysis shows that women's decisionmaking *alone* seems to increase with the number of children ever born more consistently across countries than decisionmaking *jointly*. In fact, *joint* decisionmaking is not significantly associated with the number of children ever born in about half the countries (11) for decisions about women's own health care and in 7-9 countries for the other decisions.

An examination of the logistic regression results shows that a large number of the significant bivariate relationships between decisionmaking and the number of children born are explained away in the multivariate analysis. *Joint* decisionmaking does not vary significantly with number of children ever born in 14-16 countries, depending on the decision. Furthermore, in 18 countries, decisionmaking *alone* also does not vary by number of children for decisions about large household purchases and visits to family or friends.

For decisions about women's own health care and making purchases for daily needs, however, decisionmaking *alone* does vary significantly with number of children ever born in the majority of countries. However, as Summary Table 2A shows, in countries where the relationship is positive, the odds of making decisions *alone* vary more often between women with and without children than by women's number of children. In addition, in some countries, having children has a negative effect on the odds of making these two decisions *alone*. Specifically, the net relationship between number of children ever born and making decisions *alone* about women's own health care in Armenia, Kenya, Mali, Nepal, and Nigeria and about daily purchases in Mozambique, Uganda, and Nepal, is negative or nonlinear.

In summary, although the proportion of women participating in decisionmaking, particularly decisionmaking *alone*, does increase with number of children ever born, this positive effect of number of children on women's decisionmaking is not upheld in the multivariate analysis for most decisions and in most countries. The only major exception is decisionmaking *alone* about purchases for daily needs.

Education. A woman's level of education is defined here in terms of a three-category variable based on the highest level of education attained: 1) no education; 2) primary education only; and 3) secondary or higher education. In Armenia *alone*, where education is virtually universal, education is a two-category variable (primary/no education and secondary or higher education). Since education is an important potential source of empowerment, the expectation is that women's decisionmaking, particularly decisionmaking *alone*, will increase with education. The third horizontal panel of Appendix Table 2A.1-23 and the first panel of Summary Table 2B show how decisionmaking varies with level of education.

The data suggest that the association of education with women's participation in decisionmaking is nuanced. In general, the proportion of women participating in decisionmaking rises with educational attainment but varies by type of decision and type of participation. The proportion of women making decisions *alone* is higher the higher the level of education in about half or more of the countries for each of the four decisions. However, education has a more consistently positive association with women making decisions *alone* about their own health care and purchases for daily needs in a larger number of countries (16-17) than with making decisions about large household purchases and visits to family or friends (11-13 countries). The countries where education level is positively associated with making at least three of the four decisions *alone* are Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, Mozambique, and Zambia in sub-Saharan Africa, Nepal in Asia, and Bolivia and Nicaragua in Latin America. In 5-7 countries,

decisionmaking *alone* about large household purchases and visits to family or friends varies either negatively or nonlinearly with education level.

In contrast to the variation in decisionmaking *alone* with education, the proportion of women making *joint* decisions tends to increase with level of education in 15 countries each for decisions about large household purchases and visits to family or friends. For the decisions about women's own health care and purchases for daily needs, *joint* decisionmaking has a positive association with level of education in about the same of number of countries (7-8) as the number of countries where it has a negative or nonlinear association. Notably, in Benin, Indonesia, Malawi, Morocco, and Nigeria, *joint* decisionmaking is positively associated with level of education for all decisions.

Summary Table 2B. Number of countries where decisionmaking *alone* and decisionmaking *jointly* with the woman's husband or others has an association of the specified type with the respondent's education level, employment for cash, and media exposure: Results of bivariate analysis and analysis with controls

| Variable | Decisions about the woman's own health care | | Decisions about large household purchases | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | |
|---|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|
| | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate (does not include Armenia)</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 17 | 7 | 11 | 15 | 16 | 8 | 13 | 15 |
| Increases monotonically | 4 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| More likely only for women with secondary or higher education | 8 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 9 |
| Less likely only for women with no education | 5 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 2 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 1 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 3 |
| Does not vary by education level | 4 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| <i>With controls (includes Armenia)</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 12 | 9 | 5 | 14 | 14 | 9 | 9 | 14 |
| Increases monotonically | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| More likely only for women with secondary or higher education | 5 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 8 |
| Less likely only for women with no education | 6 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 9 | 4 | 6 | 2 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 1 |
| Does not vary by education level | 8 | 11 | 16 | 7 | 7 | 11 | 10 | 8 |
| Works for cash | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 20 | 13 | 22 | 19 | 19 | 13 | 20 | 16 |
| Negative | 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Does not vary by employment for cash | 2 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 4 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 20 | 13 | 21 | 15 | 17 | 12 | 18 | 13 |
| Negative | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Does not vary by employment for cash | 2 | 7 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 7 |
| Regular media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 15 | 5 | 8 | 13 | 14 | 5 | 9 | 13 |
| Negative | 0 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 2 |
| Does not vary by media exposure | 8 | 13 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 8 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Negative | 7 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 6 | 1 |
| Does not vary by media exposure | 15 | 20 | 18 | 18 | 10 | 12 | 16 | 19 |

Thus, although women who are educated, do tend, in most countries, to participate more often in decisionmaking, the answer to the question of whether women with more education are more likely to make decisions *alone* or to make them *jointly* varies by decision. Once controls are introduced into the

analysis, decisionmaking *alone* is found to be positively correlated with education level in only 14 countries for decisions about purchases for daily needs, in 12 countries for decisions about women’s own health care, in 9 countries for decisions about visits to family or friends, and in 5 countries for decisions about large household purchases. In contrast, education is positively correlated with *joint* decisionmaking in about the same number of countries (9-15) in the multivariate analysis as in the bivariate analysis.

To better understand the relationship of decisionmaking with education two additional questions need to be addressed:

1. *In how many countries and for which types of decisions is the bivariate relationship of education level with decisionmaking spurious? To answer this question, Figure 2.2 below gives the number of countries where the relationship found in the bivariate analysis changes in the multivariate analysis and the direction of the change, if any, by decision and type of decisionmaking. Note that with 21 countries for which data are available for four decisions and 2 countries for which data are available for three decisions, the total number of data points across all decisions for each type of decisionmaking (*alone* or *joint*) is 90.*

Figure 2.2. Number of countries by the direction of change in the relationship between decisionmaking (*alone* and *joint*) and education level between the bivariate and multivariate analyses according to type of decision

| Direction of change in the relationship between the bivariate and multivariate analyses/Type of decisionmaking | Decisions | | | | Total |
|--|-------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-------|
| | Women’s own health care | Large household purchases | Purchases for daily needs | Visits to family or friends | |
| No change | | | | | |
| <i>Alone</i> | 15 | 8 | 15 | 13 | 51 |
| <i>Joint</i> | 13 | 21 | 9 | 16 | 59 |
| From positive to negative | | | | | |
| <i>Alone</i> | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| <i>Joint</i> | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| From positive to not significant | | | | | |
| <i>Alone</i> | 4 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 21 |
| <i>Joint</i> | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 8 |
| From negative (or nonlinear) to positive | | | | | |
| <i>Alone</i> | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| <i>Joint</i> | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| From negative to not significant | | | | | |
| <i>Alone</i> | 0 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 7 |
| <i>Joint</i> | 2 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 8 |
| From not significant to positive | | | | | |
| <i>Alone</i> | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 |
| <i>Joint</i> | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 5 |
| From not significant to negative | | | | | |
| <i>Alone</i> | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| <i>Joint</i> | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

The figure shows that there is no change in the education level and decisionmaking relationship in the case of 51 of the 90 data points for decisionmaking *alone* and 59 of the 90 data points for *joint* decisionmaking. This suggests that the bivariate relationship of education with *joint* decisionmaking is somewhat less often spurious than the bivariate relationship of education with decisionmaking *alone*. Notably, the most common change in the relationship of education level and decisionmaking *alone* is from a significant positive bivariate relationship to a nonsignificant net relationship. Furthermore, the bivariate and net relationship of education level and decisionmaking *alone* is most stable for decisions about women's own health care and purchases for daily needs. For *joint* decisionmaking, the relationship is most stable for decisions about large household purchases and visits to family or friends.

2. *To what extent does education level have the same effect on decisionmaking alone and joint decisionmaking within countries?* To answer this question, Figure 2.3 lists countries according to the direction and significance of the relationship of education level with decisionmaking *alone* and decisionmaking *jointly* by type of decision based on the results of the multivariate analysis. For each decision, in each country in the diagonal, education level has the same relationship with decisionmaking *alone* and *joint* decisionmaking.

Figure 2.3 shows that there are only 7-12 countries (depending on the decision) where education level has the same relationship with decisionmaking *alone* and *joint* decisionmaking. The only country where education level is positively associated with making all four decisions *alone* is Nepal; however, education is positively associated with increased odds of *joint* decisionmaking for all four decisions in Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, and Nigeria. Also, in four of these countries (Cameroon, Jordan, Malawi, and Morocco), education increases the likelihood of making at least three of the four decisions *jointly* as well as *alone*.

The figure also shows that there are several countries where education has no net effect on women's decisionmaking. For example, in Armenia and Cambodia, education level is not significantly related to making decisions *alone* for three decisions each and to making decisions *jointly* for all four decisions. Further, education level is not significantly related to making decisions *alone* for all four decisions in Benin and Uganda and for three decisions each in Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Similarly, education level is not related to *joint* decisionmaking for all four decisions in Haiti and Mali and to three decisions each in Ghana and Mozambique.

Together, the bivariate and multivariate analyses show that, although women's participation in decisionmaking does increase with education, women's education level per se does not have a consistent net positive influence on their decisionmaking participation in all countries and for all decisions. Education level is most likely to be positively associated with women making decisions *alone* about their own health care and about purchases for daily needs and with women making decisions *jointly* about large household purchases and about visits to family or friends.

Employment for cash. All respondents are asked about their employment status in the 12 months preceding the survey. Women who were employed at any time during this period, were asked about the nature of their remuneration (cash, cash and kind, kind only, or not paid). In this analysis, women who are paid only or partly in cash are considered to be employed for cash. Employment for cash is hypothesized to be positively associated with women's empowerment and decisionmaking.

Figure 2.3. Countries according to the direction and significance of the relationship of education with decisionmaking *alone* and decisionmaking *jointly* based on logistic regression results

| Association of decisionmaking <i>alone</i> with education level tends to be: | Association of <i>joint</i> decisionmaking with education level tends to be: | | |
|--|--|------------------------------|---|
| | <i>Positive</i> | <i>Negative or nonlinear</i> | <i>Not significant</i> |
| Decision: Women's own health care | | | |
| <i>Positive</i> | Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Nepal | Mozambique, Philippines | Haiti, Nicaragua, Mali, Rwanda |
| <i>Negative or nonlinear</i> | Bolivia | | Ghana, Zambia |
| <i>Not significant</i> | Morocco, Nigeria | Benin | Armenia, Cambodia, Jordan, Uganda, Zimbabwe |
| Decision: Large household purchases | | | |
| <i>Positive</i> | Jordan, Morocco, Nepal | | Mali, Rwanda |
| <i>Negative or nonlinear</i> | | Philippines | Haiti |
| <i>Not significant</i> | Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe | Uganda | Armenia, Bolivia, Cambodia, Mozambique |
| Decision: Purchases for daily needs | | | |
| <i>Positive</i> | Cameroon, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda | Philippines | Cambodia, Indonesia, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal Zimbabwe |
| <i>Negative or nonlinear</i> | | | |
| <i>Not significant</i> | Benin, Uganda | | Armenia, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Haiti |
| Decision: Visits to family or friends | | | |
| <i>Positive</i> | Cameroon, Jordan, Malawi, Morocco | Zambia | Armenia, Ghana Mozambique, Nepal |
| <i>Negative or nonlinear</i> | Bolivia, Indonesia, Philippines Zimbabwe | | |
| <i>Not significant</i> | Benin, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Rwanda | | Cambodia, Haiti, Mali, Uganda |

Appendix Table 2A.1-23 shows that in most countries, the expectation is upheld that women who are employed are more likely to participate in decisionmaking. In fact, as shown in Summary Table 2B, a higher proportion of women employed for cash make each of the four decisions *alone* in 19-22 of the 23 countries than women who are not employed for cash. Furthermore, in 13-19 countries, women employed for cash are also more likely to make decisions *jointly*. Among the different decisions, decisions about large household purchases are unique in that in all but four countries, women employed for cash are more likely to make these decisions *alone* as well as *jointly*. Decisions about women's own health care are unique in that in eight countries, decisionmaking *alone* is higher but *joint* decisionmaking is lower if a woman is employed for cash. Interestingly, the Philippines is the only country where women who are employed for cash are significantly *less* likely to make decisions *alone* and significantly *more* likely to make decisions *jointly* than women not employed for cash.

The bivariate findings are largely upheld in the multivariate analysis, as can be seen from Appendix Table 2B.1-23 and Summary Table 2B. Women employed for cash are more likely, even net of all other relevant variables such as age and education, to make decisions *alone* in the majority of countries, and to make them *jointly* in about half or more (12-15) of the countries. Thus, the addition of controls does not affect the largely positive influence of employment for cash on decisionmaking. The only countries where women employed for cash are less likely to make any kind of decision *alone*,

compared with women not employed for cash are the Philippines (for decisions about women's own health care) and Uganda (for decisions about visits to family or friends).

In summary, this analysis shows a strong independent positive relationship between women's employment for cash and their increased participation in decisionmaking, particularly in making decisions *alone*.

Media exposure. Media exposure, like education, is hypothesized to be positively associated with women's empowerment because it provides access to the world outside the home and potential exposure to new ideas and nontraditional roles for women. A woman is defined as having regular media exposure here if she watches television, reads the newspaper, or listens to the radio at least once a week.

From the fifth horizontal panel of Appendix Table 2A.1-23, it is evident that women who watch television, read the newspaper, or listen to the radio at least once a week are more likely than women who have less regular exposure to any of these media to make all four types of decisions *alone* or *jointly*.

As with employment for cash, the association of media exposure and decisionmaking varies across countries by type of decision and participation. Women regularly exposed to the media are more likely to make decisions *alone* about their own health care in 15 countries and about purchases for daily needs in 14 countries (Summary Table 2B). Women are also more likely to make decisions *jointly* about large household purchases and about visits to family or friends in 13 countries each. Notably, in five countries each, regular exposure to media is associated with a lower proportion of women making decisions *alone* about large household purchases and visits to family or friends; and in five and seven countries, respectively, regular media exposure is associated with a lower proportion of women making decisions *jointly* about their own health care and purchases for daily needs. Benin is the only country where participation in decisionmaking, *alone* or *joint*, is unaffected by media exposure for any type of decision. In addition, in Mali, Rwanda, Uganda, Armenia, and Indonesia, women's participation, *alone* or *joint*, in decisionmaking about their own health care is unaffected by media exposure. Similarly, any participation in decisions about large household purchases in Rwanda and Jordan, about purchases for daily needs in Mali, Uganda, Armenia, and Haiti, and about visits to family or friends in Kenya, Cambodia, and the Philippines, are not significantly affected by regular media exposure.

In summary, the bivariate analysis shows that decisionmaking is higher for women with regular media exposure, but the association appears to be more consistent with decisionmaking *alone* for decisions about women's own health care and purchases for daily needs and with *joint* decisionmaking for decisions about large household purchases and visits to family or friends.

Once controls are added to the analysis (Appendix Table 2B.1-23 and Summary Table 2B), regular media exposure does not have a significant net effect on women's decisionmaking, *alone* and *joint*, in most countries. For example, although women with regular media exposure are more likely to be making decisions *alone* about their own health care in 15 countries, the regression shows a significant positive association in only 1 country. The only type of decision that has a positive relationship between regular media exposure and the decision being made *alone* in more than a third of the countries (nine) is the decision about purchases for daily needs. Notably, regular media exposure is negatively associated with making decisions *alone* about women's own health care and about visits to family or friends in seven and six countries, respectively.

Figure 2.4 below lists countries by whether decisionmaking *alone* and *joint* decisionmaking is positively or negatively related to regular media exposure for each type of decision. The relevant relationship is not significant in any country that is not listed.

Figure 2.4. Countries by direction of the significant relationship of regular media exposure with decisionmaking *alone* and *joint* decisionmaking based on logistic regression results

| Type of decision/participation | Direction of significant association with regular media exposure | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| | Positive | Negative |
| Decisionmaking <i>alone</i> | | |
| Women's own health care | Nepal | Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda |
| Large household purchases | Nepal, Philippines | Malawi, Mali, Uganda |
| Purchases for daily needs | Cambodia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Jordan, Mozambique, Nepal, Philippines, Rwanda, Zimbabwe | Mali, Uganda |
| Visits to family or friends | Nepal | Armenia, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda |
| Decisionmaking <i>jointly</i> | | |
| Women's own health care | - | Haiti, Mali, Nigeria |
| Large household purchases | Benin, Bolivia, Mozambique | Haiti, Philippines |
| Purchases for daily needs | Benin, Burkina Faso | Cambodia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Malawi, Mali, Philippines, Zimbabwe |
| Visits to family or friends | Armenia, Rwanda, Uganda | Burkina Faso |

Nepal, Mali, and Uganda are the only countries where regular media exposure is associated with making all four types of decisions *alone*. However, regular media exposure increases the odds in Nepal and decreases the odds in Mali and Uganda of making each of the four decisions *alone*. Notably, within some countries, media exposure can both increase the odds of making one decision *alone* and reduce the odds of making another decision *alone*. For example, in both Jordan and Rwanda, regular media exposure increases the odds of making decisions *alone* about purchases for daily needs but decreases the odds of making decisions *alone* about visits to family or friends.

Overall, this discussion reveals that women who are regularly exposed to media do make decisions *alone* and/or *jointly* (depending on the decision) more often. However, this relationship is largely explained away by other variables for all decisions except those about purchases for daily needs. Furthermore, in many countries decisionmaking is negatively related to media exposure.

Union Characteristics

Age at first marriage. An early age at marriage can cut short women's access to education and the time needed to develop and mature unhampered by the responsibilities of marriage and children. In addition, a very young bride tends to be among the youngest members of her husband's family and, by virtue of her age and relationship, is unlikely to be accorded much power or independence. It is thus usually assumed that low ages at marriage are negatively associated with women's empowerment (Mason, 1986).

The sixth panel of Appendix Table 2A.1-23 shows how women's participation in decisionmaking varies by their age at first marriage. Age at first marriage is defined in terms of a three-category variable: age less than 18 years at marriage; between 18 and 24 years; and 25 years or older.

The association between age at first marriage and decisionmaking is not significant in several countries. Specifically, as shown in Summary Table 2C, the proportions of women making each of the decisions *alone* do not differ significantly by age at first marriage in 8-12 countries depending on the decision; and the proportions of women making each of the decisions *jointly* do not differ significantly by age at first marriage in 5-14 countries depending on the decision. In countries where the proportions of women making decisions vary significantly by age at first marriage, the relationship tends to be positive more often than negative. However, whether the association is more likely to be positive with decisionmaking *alone* or *joint* depends on the decision.

Summary Table 2C. Number of countries where decisionmaking *alone* and decisionmaking *jointly* with the woman's husband or others has an association of the specified type with the respondent's age at first marriage and spousal age difference: Results of bivariate analysis and analysis with controls

| Variable | Decisions about the woman's own health care | | Decisions about large household purchases | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | |
|--|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|
| | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 13 | 6 | 6 | 13 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 12 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 2 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 4 |
| Does not vary by age at first marriage | 8 | 14 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 10 | 12 | 7 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 8 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 5 | 2 | 10 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 4 |
| Does not vary by age at first marriage | 13 | 20 | 12 | 17 | 14 | 16 | 15 | 11 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Generally negative | 5 | 4 | 2 | 11 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 8 |
| Monotonically negative | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 4 |
| Less likely only for women who are 10 or more years younger than their husbands | 4 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| Generally positive or nonlinear | 6 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 1 |
| Does not vary by spousal age difference | 12 | 19 | 14 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 17 | 14 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Generally negative | 1 | 4 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 6 |
| Monotonically negative | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Less likely only for women who are at least 10 years younger than their husbands | 1 | 3 | 0 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 5 |
| Generally positive or nonlinear | 4 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 0 |
| Does not vary by spousal age difference | 18 | 18 | 14 | 15 | 12 | 16 | 17 | 17 |

A higher proportion of women married at older ages, particularly at age 25 or later, make decisions about their own health care *alone* in 13 countries and *jointly* in 6 countries. However, the association of a higher age at first marriage with making decisions about purchases for daily needs *alone* and *jointly* is positive in about the same number of countries (seven and eight, respectively). With regard to the remaining two decisions, the association is positive in more countries with *joint* decisionmaking (12-13 countries) than with decisionmaking *alone* (4-6 countries). A higher age at first marriage is significantly associated with higher proportions of women making most of the four decisions *alone* as well as *jointly* in only three countries (Cameroon, Nigeria, and Nicaragua), making the four decisions *alone* in only two countries (Burkina Faso and Cameroon), and making the four decisions *jointly* in only three countries (Nigeria, Indonesia, and Morocco).

The regression results reveal that a higher age at first marriage either does not have a net significant effect on decisionmaking *alone* or, with the exception of a few countries, has a negative or nonlinear net effect. The odds of making the decision *alone* decrease or do not increase consistently with age at first marriage in 5-10 countries, depending on the decision. In several of these countries, the odds do not differ between women married before age 18 and those married at ages 25 or older, but are higher for women married at age 18-24. The odds of making the decision *alone* are higher for women married at older ages only in Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Nepal, Nigeria, and Zambia for decisions about their own health care and in only Nigeria for decisions about large household purchases and purchases for daily needs.

With the exception of decisions about visits to family or friends, age at first marriage appears to have no significant net effect on *joint* decisionmaking in the majority of countries (16-20). For decisions about visits to family or friends, the effect of age at first marriage tends to be positive in eight countries (Armenia, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, Mali, Nicaragua, Nigeria, and Uganda) and negative or nonlinear in four (Benin, Cameroon, Kenya, and Malawi).

Overall, the net effect of age at first marriage is largely contrary to expectations, with higher ages at first marriage not affecting or having a negative effect on women's decisionmaking.

Spousal age difference. Empowerment within the family context is likely to depend, in part, on being able to negotiate power within the spousal relationship. A person's relative age is a resource which can affect the perception of strength when power and entitlements are negotiated within the "cooperative conflict" context of the family (Sen, 1990). This suggests that women who are much younger than their spouses are likely to be at a disadvantage with regard to their entitlement to power. Hence, the hypothesized direction of association of spousal age difference with participation in decisionmaking is negative, not positive, as with other variables.

The seventh panel of Appendix Table 2A.1-23 shows results for the bivariate variation in women's decisionmaking by spousal age difference. Spousal age difference is defined by a three category variable: the wife is less than five years younger than her husband (this includes wives who are older than their husbands); the wife is 5-9 years younger than her husband; and the wife is 10 or more years younger than her husband.

The results show that women's participation in decisionmaking is significantly affected by spousal age difference in less than half the countries for most decisions. Decisionmaking *alone* does not vary significantly in 11-17 countries and *joint* decisionmaking does not vary significantly in 10-19 countries, depending on the decision.

Among the countries where the relationship is significant, the number of countries where decisionmaking *alone* tends to increase (monotonically or nonlinearly) with spousal age difference is about the same as or more than the number of countries where it tends to decrease. In Indonesia, Nepal, and Rwanda, the women who are 10 or more years younger than their husbands are *more* likely to make almost all four decisions *alone* than women who are closer in age to their husbands. Nigeria is the only country where spousal age difference is, as hypothesized, negatively associated with decisionmaking *alone* for all decisions.

In contrast to decisionmaking *alone*, the proportions making decisions *jointly* tend to decline with spousal age difference, particularly for decisions about large household purchases and visits to family or friends. The proportion of women making decisions *jointly* about large household purchases decreases with spousal age difference in 11 countries and increases in only 2 countries. The proportion making decisions *jointly* about visits to family or friends decreases in eight countries and increases in only one country.

Overall, the bivariate results suggest that women's participation in household decisionmaking does not vary with spousal age difference in about half the countries. Where the bivariate relationship does vary significantly, the hypothesis that a larger spousal age difference is associated with less participation in decisionmaking is upheld more often for *joint* decisionmaking than for decisionmaking *alone*.

The multivariate analysis underscores the bivariate findings. Appendix Table 2B.1-23 and Summary Table 2C show that spousal age difference does not have a significant net effect on decisionmaking *alone* in the majority of countries (14-18) for decisions about women's own health care, large household purchases, and visits to family or friends, and in about half the countries (12) for the remaining decision.

Similarly, spousal age difference does not significantly affect *joint* decisionmaking in 15-18 countries. Furthermore, its effect on decisionmaking *alone*, where significant, is almost entirely positive for all decisions except those about purchases for daily needs. In other words, in the few countries where

the relationship is significant, the odds of making most decisions *alone* increase (rather than decrease, as hypothesized) as spousal age difference increases. Decisions about purchases for daily needs are the only ones that are more likely to be made *alone* by women whose husbands' age is closer to their own age in about one-fourth of the countries (Benin, Bolivia, Cambodia, Jordan, and Zimbabwe). In contrast to decisionmaking *alone*, the odds of making decisions *jointly* do decrease significantly in 6-7 countries for decisions about large household purchases and about visits to family or friends and in 4 countries each for the other two decisions.

From this analysis it can be concluded that neither union characteristic—age at first marriage and spousal age difference—significantly affects decisionmaking in most countries. Furthermore, where an effect is observed, it is rarely in the hypothesized direction, especially for decisionmaking *alone*.

Household Structure and Characteristics

Husband's coresidence. Because husbands are most likely to be the “other persons” making decisions in the households of currently married women, husbands' coresidence is likely to affect whether and how women participate in household decisionmaking.

As the eighth panel of Appendix Table 2A.1-23 and the first panel of Summary Table 2D show, a significantly smaller proportion of women make all four decisions *alone* and a significantly higher proportion make all decisions *jointly* if their husband lives with them. Nigeria is the only country where *joint* decisionmaking is unrelated to husbands' coresidence. Information for this variable is not available for Morocco. As Appendix Table 2B.1-23 shows, even when the analysis controls for other correlates of decisionmaking, the husband's co-residence has the hypothesized effect on all decisions and in virtually all countries.

Summary Table 2D. Number of countries where decisionmaking *alone* and decisionmaking *jointly* with the woman's husband or others has an association of the specified type with the husband's coresidence and with the respondent's residence in an extended family: Results of bivariate analysis and analysis with controls

| Variable | Decisions about the woman's own health care | | Decisions about large household purchases | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | |
|--|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|
| | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 0 | 21 | 0 | 21 | 0 | 21 | 0 | 20 |
| Negative | 22 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 22 | 1 |
| Does not vary by husband's coresidence | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 0 | 21 | 0 | 21 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 22 |
| Negative | 22 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 22 | 0 |
| Does not vary by husband's coresidence | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Residence in extended family | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 10 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 9 | 2 |
| Negative | 3 | 8 | 4 | 11 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 11 |
| Does not vary by extended family residence | 10 | 14 | 13 | 10 | 8 | 13 | 10 | 10 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| Negative | 5 | 9 | 3 | 10 | 9 | 5 | 1 | 10 |
| Does not vary by extended family residence | 17 | 13 | 17 | 13 | 12 | 15 | 18 | 13 |

Residence in a nonnuclear household. Residence in an extended household is likely to affect women's empowerment, particularly their participation in decisionmaking, for at least two reasons. First, extended households are typically composed of multiple generations, usually within a patriarchal *setting*. This implies that a woman's relative power will depend on her age, particularly her age relative to that of other household members; her relationship to other members of the extended family, including the household head; and the hierarchical structure of the household. Within the context of patriarchy, a woman typically marries in to her husband's household and is younger than her husband. For these and other reasons (Dyson and Moore, 1983), a married woman's relative status within the hierarchy of her husband's extended family is usually fairly low. Secondly, the larger the household, the greater the number of other persons who can potentially make decisions or share in the decisionmaking. Thus, it is expected that women in extended families will be less likely to participate in decisionmaking *jointly* or *alone*.

The ninth panel of Appendix Table 2A.1-23 shows how women's participation in household decisionmaking varies by whether they reside in a nonnuclear household or not. A nuclear household is one in which a couple (husband and wife) lives with their children (own, adopted, stepchildren or fostered), grandchildren, and/or unrelated individuals. All other types of households are treated as nonnuclear/extended.

The table shows that decisionmaking *alone* in 8-13 countries and decisionmaking *jointly* in 10-14 countries does not vary significantly by family structure. In Nigeria, neither decisionmaking *alone* nor *joint* is related to family structure for any of the four decisions. In the countries where decisionmaking does vary by family structure, the direction of the relationship is not always as predicted.

The bivariate results by type of decision, summarized in the second panel of Summary Table 2D, show that women in nonnuclear households are more likely than women in nuclear households to make decisions about their own health care *alone* in 10 countries and less likely to do so in only 3 countries; about large household purchases *alone* in 6 countries and less likely to do so in 4 countries; about purchases for daily needs *alone* in 5 countries and less likely to do so in 8 countries; and about visits to family or friends *alone* in 9 countries and less likely to do so in 4 countries.

Women in only four countries (Armenia, Jordan, Morocco and Nepal) are more likely to make all four decisions *alone* in nuclear households. In contrast, women in extended households in Nicaragua are more likely to make each of the three decisions asked about in the DHS in that country *alone* than women living in nuclear households. The results for *joint* decisionmaking conform more closely to the hypothesis, however. In 8-11 countries, a higher proportion of women in nuclear families make each of the decisions *jointly* than women in nonnuclear families, and the reverse is true in only 1-2 countries.

The multivariate analysis shows, however, that the effects of residence in an extended household on decisionmaking found in the bivariate analysis are largely explained away by other variables, particularly for decisionmaking *alone*. Appendix Table 2B.1-23 and Summary Table 2D show that decisionmaking *alone* does not vary with family structure in 17-18 countries for all decisions except those about purchases for daily needs; for this last decision, decisionmaking *alone* does not vary with family structure in 12 countries. *Joint* decisionmaking also does not vary significantly by family structure in more than half the countries (13-15) for each of the four decisions. However, in most of the countries where *joint* decisionmaking or decisionmaking *alone* do vary significantly by family structure, the odds tend to be lower for both types of decisionmaking if women live in an extended household than if they live in a nuclear household.

In summary, women living in extended households appear to be either no different in terms of their participation in decisionmaking from women in nuclear households, or they make decisions *alone* more often and decisions *jointly* less often than women in nuclear households. However, the multivariate analysis shows that the reason for this result is that other correlates of decisionmaking are masking the

true effects of extended household residence. In fact, the net effect of living in an extended household is not significant in the majority of countries; where it is significant, extended family residence is associated with less participation in decisionmaking, as hypothesized.

Household wealth. Like education and media exposure, wealth enables exposure to new ideas and potentially provides resources to achieve personal and other goals. Wealth is thus a potential *source* of empowerment. In many settings, wealth is also associated with traditional norms and expectations and with more successful implementation of patriarchal controls over women (Srinivasan, 1989). Despite the large variation in cultures across the countries compared here and the resulting difficulty in hypothesizing the direction of the association of women's decisionmaking with household wealth, it is hypothesized that wealth will have the net effect of empowering women.

The tenth horizontal panel of Appendix Table 2A.1-23 and Summary Table 2E give the results of the bivariate association of wealth with women's decisionmaking. The wealth measure used here is described in Chapter 1 and is derived using principle components analysis of household assets and household amenities. The resulting wealth index is a relative measure of wealth that divides the household population into quintiles based on their scores. Women in the first quintile are the least wealthy and those in the fifth are the wealthiest. Note that the wealth index is defined for each country based on the distribution of input variables in that country alone. This means that the absolute level of wealth represented by any given quintile is not the same across countries.

Summary Table 2E. Number of countries where decisionmaking *alone* and decisionmaking *jointly* with husband or others has an association of the specified type with area of residence, the wealth index, and community controls: Results of bivariate analysis (except for community controls) and analysis with controls

| Variable | Decisions about the woman's own health care | | Decisions about large household purchases | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | |
|--|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|
| | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint |
| Urban residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 19 | 7 | 15 | 11 | 16 | 5 | 15 | 9 |
| Negative | 0 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 4 |
| Does not vary by place of residence | 4 | 7 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 9 | 8 | 10 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 9 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 7 | 2 |
| Negative | 2 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 5 |
| Does not vary by place of residence | 12 | 19 | 18 | 17 | 12 | 12 | 15 | 16 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 17 | 8 | 11 | 10 | 15 | 7 | 12 | 11 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 3 | 10 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 8 |
| Does not vary by wealth quintile | 3 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 4 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 3 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 8 |
| Significantly higher in top three or four quintiles | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| Significantly higher only in the wealthiest one or two quintiles | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Generally negative | 1 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Significantly lower in top three or four quintiles | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Significantly lower only in wealthiest one or two quintiles | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| Nonlinear | 5 | 10 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Does not vary by wealth quintile | 14 | 9 | 12 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 13 | 7 |

Continued...

Summary Table 2E—Continued

| Variable | Decisions about the woman's own health care | | Decisions about large household purchases | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | |
|---|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|
| | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint | Alone | Joint |
| Community controls | | | | | | | | |
| <i>(Regression only)</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have at least a high school education | | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 5 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 4 | 6 |
| Negative | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Not significant | 16 | 14 | 15 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 18 | 15 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 8 | 3 | 10 | 3 | 10 | 1 | 6 | 4 |
| Negative | 2 | 9 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 6 |
| Not significant | 13 | 11 | 11 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 15 | 13 |

The tables show that in most countries, women's participation in decisionmaking does vary with wealth. Decisionmaking *alone* is not significantly associated with wealth in only 3-7 countries and *joint* decisionmaking is not significantly associated with wealth in only 4-6 countries. The proportion of women making decisions *alone* tends to increase with wealth in 17 countries for decisions about women's own health care, in 15 countries for decisions about purchases for daily needs, and in about half the countries for each of the other two decisions. However, the proportion of women making decisions *jointly* increases with wealth in less than half the countries (8-11); in only slightly fewer countries (7-10), the proportion of women who make *joint* decisions actually decreases with wealth.

In six countries (Bolivia, Cameroon, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Zambia), the richest women are more likely to make all four decisions *alone* than poorer women. In two countries (Malawi and Nigeria), richer women are more likely to make all four decisions *jointly* than poorer women. Only in Morocco are richer women more likely than poorer women to make both decisions *alone* as well as *jointly*. Overall, based on the bivariate analysis, women in wealthier households are more likely to make decisions, particularly decisions *alone*, than women in poorer households in the majority of countries.

Surprisingly, however, the multivariate analysis shows that this positive association of wealth with decisionmaking *alone* is largely spurious and can be explained away by other control variables. In fact, in 12-14 countries, wealth has no net effect on decisionmaking *alone* for decisions about women's own health care, large household purchases, and visits to family or friends; wealth has no net effect on decisionmaking *alone* in 8 countries for the remaining decision (Summary Table 2E). Wealth also does not have a significant net effect on *joint* decisionmaking in 7-10 countries.

Figure 2.5 lists the countries by direction of the significant relationship between wealth and decisionmaking, *alone* and *joint*, for each type of decision. Countries where there is no significant relationship between the type of decision and wealth are not listed.

Figure 2.5 shows little consistency in the relationship between wealth and making each of the four decisions *alone* once controls are introduced. Indonesia, Bolivia, and Kenya are the only three countries where decisionmaking *alone* is positively associated with wealth for at least two decisions. In addition, in Malawi, decisionmaking *alone* is positively related to wealth for decisions about purchases for daily needs but negatively related for decisions about women's own health care.

Figure 2.5. Countries by direction of the significant relationship between the wealth index and decisionmaking, *alone* and *joint*, based on logistic regression results

| Type of participation and decision | Direction of significant association with wealth index | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| | Positive | Negative | Nonlinear |
| Decisionmaking <i>alone</i> | | | |
| Women's own health care | Bolivia, Indonesia, Kenya | Malawi | Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Ghana, Nepal, Zambia |
| Large household purchases | Bolivia | Cambodia, Cameroon, Jordan, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines | Armenia, Indonesia, Zimbabwe |
| Purchases for daily needs | Bolivia, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda | Burkina Faso, Mali | Ghana, Jordan, Nepal, Philippines, Rwanda |
| Visits to family or friends | Nicaragua | Armenia, Jordan | Ghana, Haiti, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia |
| Decisionmaking <i>jointly</i> | | | |
| Women's own health care | Malawi, Zimbabwe | Bolivia, Indonesia | Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Haiti, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Zambia |
| Large household purchases | Jordan, Malawi, Mali, Philippines, Zimbabwe | Burkina Faso | Cambodia, Ghana, Haiti, Indonesia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Zambia |
| Purchases for daily needs | Armenia, Jordan, Malawi, Mali | Bolivia | Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia, Mozambique, Rwanda |
| Visits to family or friends | Armenia, Bolivia, Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Philippines | Mozambique | Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Indonesia, Mali, Rwanda, Zambia, Zimbabwe |

The relationship of wealth with *joint* decisionmaking is marginally more consistent. *Joint* decisionmaking increases with wealth in Malawi for all four decisions and in Armenia, Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Zambia, and Zimbabwe for at least two decisions. However, in Bolivia, wealth is positively related to *joint* decisionmaking for one decision but negatively related to two others. Notably, in Bolivia, Kenya, and Malawi, wealth is positively related to both decisionmaking *alone* and decisionmaking *jointly* for one or more decisions.

Finally, the figure also shows that the odds of richer women making decisions *alone* about large household purchases are lower than the odds for the poorest women in one-third of the countries. The odds of a woman making decisions *alone* about visits to family or friends are higher for richer women only in Nicaragua. Odds of making decisions *alone* about visits to family or friends are lower for richer women in Armenia and Jordan and for the richest women in Malawi and Zambia.

This analysis shows that wealth, net of other factors, does little to consistently enhance women's likelihood of making decisions *alone* or *jointly* in most countries. Purchases for household needs are the only decisions for which the odds of making the decision *alone* are higher for women in the higher wealth quintiles than the lowest quintile in at least one in four countries. Visits to family or friends are the only decisions that are more likely to be made *jointly* by women in the higher wealth quintiles than women in the lowest wealth quintile.

Rural or urban residence. Urban residence can increase exposure to new ideas and ways of doing things. Hence, urban residence is hypothesized to be positively associated with women's empowerment and participation in decisionmaking. The last panel of Appendix Table 2A.1-23 shows results that support this expectation, particularly for decisionmaking *alone*. A higher proportion of women in urban areas than in rural areas make decisions about their own health care *alone* in 19 countries; about purchases for daily needs *alone* in 16 countries; and about the other two decisions *alone* in 15 countries each.

Notably, with the exception of decisions about large household purchases, decisionmaking *alone* is not significantly higher in rural areas than in urban areas in any country for any decision. Furthermore, even decisions about large household purchases are made *alone* by a higher proportion of rural than urban women only in Malawi, Cambodia, and the Philippines.

The relationship of urban residence with *joint* decisionmaking is less consistent across countries than its relationship with decisionmaking *alone*. *Joint* decisionmaking does not vary by residence in 7-10 countries, depending on the decision. In nine countries, urban residence is negatively associated with *joint* decisionmaking about women's own health care, compared with seven countries where the relationship is positive. The association of *joint* decisionmaking about purchases for daily needs with urban residence also shows a similar pattern. However, *joint* decisionmaking for decisions about large household purchases and about visits to family or friends are positively associated with urban living in 11 and 9 countries, respectively, and negatively associated in only 2 and 4 countries, respectively.

Overall, urban women tend to make decisions *alone* more than do rural women. The results with regard to *joint* decisionmaking are less consistent and vary both by country and decision. Cambodia is the only country where decisionmaking, *alone* and *joint*, do not vary significantly by residence for most decisions.

The multivariate analysis (Appendix Table 2B.1-23) suggests that the area of residence has little net effect on decisionmaking. However, in the countries where the association is significant, it tends to be positive.

As shown in Summary Table 2E, the relationship is positive for decisions about women's own health care and purchases for daily needs in 8-9 countries and for the other two decisions in 5 and 7 countries, respectively. With the exception of decisions about purchases for daily needs and visits to family or friends, *joint* decisionmaking is also rarely affected by area of residence. Both types of decisionmaking—*alone* and *joint*—are unaffected by residence in Cambodia, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Philippines for all decisions. Also for all decisions, decisionmaking *alone* is unaffected by residence in Ghana and Zimbabwe and *joint* decisionmaking is unaffected by residence in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Zambia. Morocco is the only country where the odds of making decisions *alone* and *jointly* are higher for all four decisions for women in urban areas, compared with women in rural areas. Armenia, Indonesia, and Uganda are the only countries where the odds of making decisions *alone* are higher for three of the four decisions. Ghana, Indonesia, and Nepal are the only countries where the odds of making *joint* decisions are lower for women living in urban areas than for women living in rural areas for all four decisions.

In summary, the net effect of living in an urban area on women's decisionmaking, compared with living in a rural area is not significant in at least half of the countries. However, when the relationship is significant, the effect tends to be positive.

Community controls. From the last panel of Appendix Table 2B.1-23 and Summary Table 2E, it is evident that women's decisionmaking at the individual level is not affected by the two measures of community social development in a large number of countries. Specifically, decisionmaking *alone* does not vary significantly with the first community measure (the percentage of women in the community whose

husbands have at least secondary education) in 12-18 countries and *joint* decisionmaking does not vary in 9-15 countries, depending on the decision. Decisionmaking *alone* does not vary significantly with the second community measure (the percentage of women in the community who watch television at least once a week) in 11-14 countries and *joint* decisionmaking does not vary with it in 10-13 countries.

Figure 2.6 below lists countries by direction of the relationship of decisionmaking *alone* and *jointly* with each community-level social development variable for each decision. In countries not shown, the association is not significant.

Figure 2.6. Countries by direction of the significant relationship between community-level variables and decisionmaking *alone* and *jointly*, based on logistic regression results

| Type of decision and participation | Direction of significant association with husbands' education level in the community | |
|--------------------------------------|--|---|
| | Positive | Negative |
| Decisionmaking <i>alone</i> | | |
| Women's own health care | Cameroon, Malawi, Mali, Nicaragua, Nigeria | Indonesia |
| Large household purchases | Cameroon, Ghana, Indonesia, Mozambique, Nepal, Zambia | Benin |
| Purchases for daily needs | Cambodia, Cameroon, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria | Armenia, Indonesia, Philippines |
| Visits to family or friends | Cameroon, Malawi, Nicaragua, Uganda | - |
| Decisionmaking <i>jointly</i> | | |
| Women's own health care | Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Indonesia, Morocco, Zambia | Kenya, Nicaragua |
| Large household purchases | Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Indonesia, Morocco, Zambia | Haiti, Kenya |
| Purchases for daily needs | Armenia, Benin, Ghana, Indonesia, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Philippines | Cambodia, Haiti |
| Visits to family or friends | Benin, Ghana, Indonesia, Mali, Morocco, Zambia | Uganda |
| Type of decision and participation | Direction of significant association with regular television viewing by women in the community | |
| | Positive | Negative |
| Decisionmaking <i>alone</i> | | |
| Women's own health care | Bolivia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Uganda, Zimbabwe | Ghana, Nigeria |
| Large household purchases | Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Philippines, Uganda | Indonesia, Jordan |
| Purchases for daily needs | Burkina Faso, Bolivia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Philippines, Uganda, Zimbabwe | - |
| Visits to family or friends | Benin, Bolivia, Cameroon, Mali, Mozambique, Philippines | Indonesia, Malawi |
| Decisionmaking <i>jointly</i> | | |
| Women's own health care | Ghana, Mali, Nigeria | Burkina Faso, Bolivia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Mozambique, Philippines, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe |
| Large household purchases | Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal | Benin, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Philippines, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe |
| Purchases for daily needs | Kenya | Benin, Bolivia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Jordan, Mozambique, Philippines, Uganda, Zimbabwe |
| Visits to family or friends | Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda | Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Philippines, Zambia |

In general, the first community-level social development indicator (education level of husbands in the community) is positively associated across countries with decisionmaking *alone* approximately as often as it is associated with *joint* decisionmaking. However, in any given country where this indicator has a significant relationship, the indicator tends to be more consistently associated across decisions with *joint* decisionmaking than with decisionmaking *alone*. For example, the odds of *joint* decisionmaking increase with the proportion of husbands in the community with secondary education for each of the four decisions in Indonesia, Ghana, and Morocco and for three decisions in Benin and Zambia. In contrast, Cameroon and Malawi are the only countries where decisionmaking *alone* is significantly higher for at least three of the four decisions in more socially developed communities as measured by husbands' education level in the community.

In most countries where the effect on women's participation in decisionmaking of high television exposure among women in the community is significant, decisionmaking *alone* increases but *joint* decisionmaking decreases. The positive effect on decisionmaking *alone* of living in a community where a larger proportion of women watch television regularly is consistent for at least three of the four decisions in Bolivia, Cameroon, Mali, Mozambique, the Philippines, and Uganda. Furthermore, the effect on *joint* decisionmaking is consistently negative for at least three of the four decisions in Benin, Burkina Faso, Bolivia, the Philippines, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Kenya is the only country where *joint* decisionmaking for most decisions is positively related to this community-level variable.

The contrasting effects of the two community-level controls on women's decisionmaking are probably due to the nature of the variables. Although having a higher proportion of educated men in a community suggests a higher overall level of community development, higher levels of television viewing among women, potentially represents a benefit of community development which is accruing directly to women. If this is true, the regression results suggest that when women benefit directly from social development, they are more likely to make decisions *alone* and less likely to make decisions *jointly*. In addition, social development that does not benefit women directly has a positive influence on both types of decisionmaking by women, but the effect on *joint* decisionmaking is more consistent.

2.3 Any Type of Participation in Decisionmaking

This report has shown thus far that the correlates of decisionmaking *alone* and *joint* decisionmaking differ substantively by decision. Thus, a characteristic that is positively associated with decisionmaking *alone* might not enhance the likelihood of *joint* decisionmaking. This gives rise to two questions: What are the correlates of any participation, *alone* or *jointly*, in decisionmaking? Do these correlates differ by decision across countries? To answer these questions, the same explanatory variables discussed above were regressed using logistic regression on "any type of participation in decisionmaking." For this variable, women who participated at all, *alone* or *jointly*, were coded 1 and all others were coded 0 for each type of decision. The results for each country are given in Appendix Table 2B.1-23 with the results by type of decisionmaking. Summary Table 2F provides a summary of the findings.

The results suggest that the only characteristics of women that correlate positively and consistently with a higher likelihood of participating at all in decisionmaking in almost all countries are age and employment for cash. Education level also has a net positive effect in more than half the countries, but it has no effect in 6-7 countries, depending on the decision. Media exposure, age at first marriage, and urban residence are not important correlates of any participation in decisionmaking in most countries. A large spousal age difference is positively associated with women's participation in decisionmaking about large household purchases and purchases for daily needs. In general, if their husband is coresident, women have lower odds of participating, *alone* or *jointly*, in decisionmaking. Residence in an extended family is either not a factor in woman's decisionmaking participation or it reduces the likelihood that women will participate in decisions. In almost half the countries, women living

Summary Table 2F. Number of countries where each variable has the specified relationship (based on logistic regression analysis) with the likelihood that women will participate in decisionmaking (*alone or jointly*), by type of decision

| Variable | Decision | | | |
|--|-------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Women's own health care | Large household purchases | Purchases for daily needs | Visits to family or friends |
| Age | | | | |
| Generally positive | 20 | 23 | 21 | 23 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Does not vary significantly by age | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Children ever born | | | | |
| Generally positive | 7 | 4 | 6 | 5 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 7 | 3 | 6 | 6 |
| Does not vary by number of children ever born | 9 | 16 | 9 | 12 |
| Education | | | | |
| Generally positive | 14 | 15 | 15 | 14 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Does not vary by education level | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
| Works for cash | | | | |
| Positive | 19 | 22 | 18 | 21 |
| Negative | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Does not vary by employment for cash | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| Regular media exposure | | | | |
| Positive | 1 | 4 | 4 | 1 |
| Negative | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| Does not vary by media exposure | 16 | 16 | 13 | 18 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | |
| Generally positive | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 3 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Does not vary by age at first marriage | 16 | 19 | 14 | 16 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | |
| Generally negative | 3 | 8 | 6 | 3 |
| Generally positive or nonlinear | 5 | 5 | 3 | 1 |
| Does not vary by spousal age difference | 15 | 10 | 12 | 19 |
| Husband present in the household | | | | |
| Positive | 0 | 1 | 5 | 2 |
| Negative | 18 | 13 | 13 | 15 |
| Does not vary by husband's presence in the household | 4 | 8 | 2 | 5 |
| Urban residence | | | | |
| Positive | 5 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| Negative | 2 | 3 | 1 | 5 |
| Does not vary by area of residence | 16 | 16 | 15 | 12 |
| Residence in extended family | | | | |
| Positive | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Negative | 7 | 12 | 13 | 9 |
| Does not vary by extended family residence | 15 | 10 | 8 | 14 |
| Wealth index | | | | |
| Generally positive | 3 | 6 | 3 | 7 |
| Generally negative | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Nonlinear | 7 | 5 | 6 | 6 |
| Does not vary by wealth quintile | 12 | 10 | 11 | 9 |
| Community controls | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have at least a high school education | | | | |
| Positive | 8 | 8 | 7 | 7 |
| Negative | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Not significant | 14 | 14 | 12 | 14 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | | | | |
| Positive | 4 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Negative | 2 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| Not significant | 17 | 16 | 13 | 13 |

in extended households have lower odds of participating in decisionmaking. Decisionmaking is unrelated to wealth in about half the countries; in most of the remaining countries, decisionmaking varies nonlinearly with the wealth index. Finally, of the two community-level controls, the percentage of husbands who have at least a secondary education is related positively to women's participation in decisionmaking in 7-9 countries and the percentage of women who watch television regularly is related positively to any decisionmaking in only 4-6 countries.

2.4 Conclusions

The analysis in this chapter very clearly shows that the characteristics of women who participate in the four different decisions considered do not vary greatly by decision across countries. However, the characteristics of women who participate by making decisions *alone* versus those who participate by making them *jointly* do vary across decisions and countries. Furthermore, the correlates of making decisions *alone* about purchases for daily needs and women's own healthcare are similar and tend to contrast with the correlates of making decisions *alone* about large household purchases and visits to family or friends.

Of all the correlates, the two that have a consistently positive relationship with any decisionmaking are age and employment for cash. These variables are also highly correlated with making decisions *alone*. Education level too has a net positive effect on decisionmaking but this effect is far from universal. Furthermore, education level tends to be associated with decisionmaking *alone* for some decisions and *joint* decisionmaking for others. Contrary to expectations, a smaller spousal age difference has a largely negative association with decisionmaking *alone* and a largely positive association with *joint* decisionmaking.

The discussion in this chapter makes clear that participation in decisionmaking is not one undifferentiated variable. For any decision, making the decision *alone*, making it *jointly* with a husband or someone else, or participating at all in the decision (*alone* or *jointly*), constitute unique variables with different correlates. This makes it difficult to treat decisionmaking as a single indicator of empowerment. It also makes it difficult to treat participation of any type in one decision as being similar to participation of the same type in any other decision or, for a given decision, to treat participation of one type as equivalent to participation of another type. Thus, if decisionmaking is to be used as an indicator of empowerment, theory and context must drive the definition of what type of decisionmaking in what type of decisions constitutes empowerment.

Appendix Table 2A.1. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristic: Benin

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 8.6 | 5.9 | 3.9 | 6.0 | 14.7 | 11.2 | 8.1 | 15.8 |
| 20 to 29 | 13.7 | 12.1 | 10.5 | 15.3 | 35.3 | 21.8 | 13.4 | 34.2 |
| 30 to 39 | 23.6 | 19.5 | 18.0 | 23.8 | 45.6 | 26.0 | 19.8 | 35.5 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | <i>30.3</i> | <i>18.8</i> | <i>23.5</i> | <i>23.6</i> | <i>53.5</i> | <i>22.1</i> | <i>23.8</i> | <i>35.5</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 12.2 | 9.5 | 11.7 | 10.8 | 24.3 | 15.0 | 12.7 | 29.1 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>15.1</i> | <i>12.9</i> | <i>12.3</i> | <i>14.9</i> | <i>33.4</i> | <i>21.5</i> | <i>15.0</i> | <i>32.5</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 19.0 | 16.2 | 14.3 | 22.7 | 42.6 | 26.6 | 16.6 | 37.1 |
| 5+ | 24.9 | 18.0 | 18.2 | 21.8 | 48.7 | 22.2 | 20.1 | 33.4 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 18.6 | 15.5 | 13.8 | 18.3 | 40.6 | 21.9 | 15.8 | 32.5 |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>20.9</i> | <i>12.4</i> | <i>17.9</i> | <i>19.0</i> | <i>41.5</i> | <i>21.7</i> | <i>20.1</i> | <i>33.6</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 24.1 | 21.5 | 18.5 | 25.3 | 40.4 | 29.5 | 21.5 | 44.2 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>7.8</i> | <i>5.0</i> | <i>6.8</i> | <i>7.0</i> | <i>21.1</i> | <i>10.4</i> | <i>8.1</i> | <i>24.0</i> |
| Works for cash | 21.4 | 17.1 | 16.3 | 21.1 | 44.0 | 24.6 | 18.6 | 35.3 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>18.5</i> | <i>15.1</i> | <i>14.8</i> | <i>16.4</i> | <i>41.7</i> | <i>18.2</i> | <i>17.2</i> | <i>31.5</i> |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 20.0 | 15.5 | 15.0 | 20.4 | 40.3 | 24.7 | 17.1 | 34.9 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>20.0</i> | <i>13.7</i> | <i>14.8</i> | <i>17.2</i> | <i>41.2</i> | <i>20.4</i> | <i>17.4</i> | <i>30.1</i> |
| 18-24 years | 17.7 | 16.3 | 14.0 | 20.4 | 40.5 | 24.5 | 15.4 | 37.0 |
| 25 years or more | 28.7 | 20.2 | 23.2 | 22.5 | 39.1 | 23.5 | 27.1 | 36.0 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>19.5</i> | <i>17.3</i> | <i>15.6</i> | <i>21.1</i> | <i>42.4</i> | <i>24.0</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>39.5</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 18.0 | 15.7 | 13.5 | 18.9 | 39.1 | 23.1 | 17.0 | 31.9 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 20.5 | 13.7 | 15.4 | 17.7 | 40.8 | 20.9 | 18.2 | 31.1 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| No | 37.7 | 11.1 | 32.3 | 15.3 | 54.8 | 14.7 | 36.3 | 25.9 |
| Yes | 15.5 | 16.4 | 11.2 | 19.9 | 37.9 | 24.2 | 12.9 | 35.5 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>19.5</i> | <i>14.9</i> | <i>13.9</i> | <i>19.4</i> | <i>40.0</i> | <i>22.3</i> | <i>15.5</i> | <i>34.3</i> |
| Urban | 19.5 | 16.3 | 17.0 | 18.4 | 42.1 | 23.0 | 20.1 | 32.5 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>18.6</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>13.5</i> | <i>19.8</i> | <i>41.0</i> | <i>22.7</i> | <i>15.8</i> | <i>34.2</i> |
| Extended | 21.2 | 14.5 | 17.6 | 17.6 | 40.3 | 22.2 | 19.7 | 32.7 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>16.8</i> | <i>14.5</i> | <i>11.3</i> | <i>17.7</i> | <i>39.9</i> | <i>19.3</i> | <i>14.1</i> | <i>27.7</i> |
| Poorer | 19.1 | 15.3 | 14.2 | 19.0 | 39.8 | 20.8 | 16.2 | 32.5 |
| Middle | 20.2 | 14.5 | 13.3 | 19.5 | 39.9 | 24.1 | 13.5 | 33.4 |
| Richer | 20.8 | 14.8 | 18.0 | 19.4 | 41.7 | 23.4 | 20.3 | 35.9 |
| Richest | 20.8 | 18.2 | 18.3 | 19.9 | 42.7 | 25.4 | 22.1 | 40.1 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.2. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Burkina Faso

| Characteristics | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 3.9 | 9.4 | 4.3 | 12.4 | 16.9 | 11.2 | 10.4 | 15.7 |
| 20 to 29 | 7.5 | 10.8 | 8.7 | 13.4 | 23.8 | 13.3 | 14.8 | 16.4 |
| 30 to 39 | 10.7 | 11.1 | 11.6 | 14.5 | 27.6 | 15.6 | 17.6 | 17.6 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | <i>10.5</i> | <i>10.8</i> | <i>12.9</i> | <i>14.3</i> | <i>27.2</i> | <i>15.0</i> | <i>18.9</i> | <i>16.7</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 8.0 | 9.9 | 6.6 | 13.7 | 17.4 | 11.5 | 13.5 | 16.4 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>8.3</i> | <i>10.1</i> | <i>8.2</i> | <i>13.0</i> | <i>24.2</i> | <i>12.5</i> | <i>14.9</i> | <i>15.4</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 9.4 | 11.4 | 10.3 | 13.9 | 27.7 | 14.6 | 16.5 | 17.9 |
| 5+ | 8.9 | 11.0 | 11.5 | 14.4 | 25.5 | 15.7 | 17.3 | 17.1 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 7.4 | 11.0 | 9.5 | 13.7 | 24.6 | 13.8 | 15.4 | 16.5 |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>12.8</i> | <i>7.1</i> | <i>11.8</i> | <i>11.1</i> | <i>24.5</i> | <i>14.1</i> | <i>18.5</i> | <i>15.0</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 30.0 | 13.2 | 17.1 | 21.2 | 35.6 | 21.1 | 26.7 | 25.2 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>6.2</i> | <i>10.7</i> | <i>8.6</i> | <i>12.9</i> | <i>23.5</i> | <i>12.8</i> | <i>14.4</i> | <i>16.8</i> |
| Works for cash | 18.4 | 11.3 | 15.7 | 17.5 | 30.6 | 19.4 | 22.6 | 16.5 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>6.8</i> | <i>12.4</i> | <i>8.9</i> | <i>14.1</i> | <i>24.9</i> | <i>13.3</i> | <i>15.2</i> | <i>19.9</i> |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 10.6 | 9.3 | 11.1 | 13.7 | 25.1 | 15.0 | 17.0 | 13.9 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>7.1</i> | <i>11.0</i> | <i>8.9</i> | <i>13.9</i> | <i>24.0</i> | <i>14.3</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>16.5</i> |
| 18-24 years | 10.7 | 10.4 | 11.6 | 13.8 | 26.0 | 14.0 | 16.1 | 17.0 |
| 25 years or more | 25.7 | 10.7 | 18.8 | 14.0 | 40.8 | 13.1 | 23.8 | 20.3 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>10.6</i> | <i>11.2</i> | <i>10.3</i> | <i>15.2</i> | <i>25.0</i> | <i>15.3</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>17.9</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 8.8 | 12.1 | 9.8 | 15.2 | 25.0 | 14.2 | 15.0 | 17.6 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 7.7 | 10.2 | 8.5 | 12.9 | 23.7 | 14.3 | 15.5 | 16.8 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| No | 26.3 | 5.8 | 24.9 | 8.6 | 42.3 | 7.7 | 27.7 | 14.8 |
| Yes | 7.2 | 11.3 | 8.7 | 14.4 | 23.5 | 14.8 | 15.1 | 16.9 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>6.0</i> | <i>10.9</i> | <i>9.0</i> | <i>13.8</i> | <i>24.2</i> | <i>14.0</i> | <i>14.6</i> | <i>17.0</i> |
| Urban | 24.2 | 9.9 | 16.2 | 14.3 | 29.9 | 15.0 | 24.6 | 15.5 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>7.5</i> | <i>12.9</i> | <i>8.8</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>25.0</i> | <i>14.7</i> | <i>15.5</i> | <i>18.6</i> |
| Extended | 10.7 | 7.5 | 12.0 | 10.7 | 25.1 | 13.3 | 17.1 | 13.9 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>6.4</i> | <i>14.7</i> | <i>8.8</i> | <i>17.0</i> | <i>23.8</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>15.5</i> | <i>21.0</i> |
| Poorer | 4.8 | 11.3 | 8.7 | 14.5 | 23.2 | 14.1 | 15.5 | 17.5 |
| Middle | 6.3 | 10.9 | 9.3 | 13.9 | 25.3 | 14.1 | 14.6 | 17.1 |
| Richer | 7.4 | 7.4 | 8.8 | 9.8 | 24.5 | 11.3 | 12.8 | 11.7 |
| Richest | 2.8 | 9.3 | 15.3 | 13.6 | 28.5 | 15.4 | 23.0 | 16.1 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.3. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Cameroon

| Characteristics | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 6.5 | 8.3 | 4.8 | 10.7 | 12.2 | 12.2 | 13.8 | 17.5 |
| 20 to 29 | 14.7 | 16.1 | 9.9 | 21.6 | 24.0 | 23.5 | 18.3 | 27.7 |
| 30 to 39 | 23.2 | 19.4 | 17.1 | 28.2 | 36.7 | 26.5 | 25.5 | 32.1 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 27.3 | 21.3 | 19.5 | 29.5 | 40.3 | 26.7 | 28.8 | 32.0 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 16.9 | 11.0 | 11.4 | 17.3 | 23.3 | 16.6 | 21.1 | 21.0 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 18.0 | 15.5 | 12.4 | 22.1 | 27.0 | 22.0 | 22.3 | 27.4 |
| 3 or 4 | 18.6 | 18.0 | 12.6 | 24.5 | 31.2 | 24.4 | 20.2 | 29.5 |
| 5+ | 19.3 | 20.1 | 14.6 | 26.9 | 32.0 | 27.2 | 22.4 | 31.7 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 8.5 | 16.4 | 7.2 | 17.1 | 14.4 | 18.8 | 9.4 | 25.4 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 17.6 | 18.9 | 13.0 | 24.8 | 30.1 | 27.1 | 23.5 | 29.8 |
| Secondary or higher | 28.7 | 15.3 | 18.4 | 28.1 | 41.6 | 23.6 | 30.8 | 29.7 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 11.6 | 10.8 | 7.5 | 16.6 | 19.1 | 15.7 | 15.9 | 23.4 |
| Works for cash | 24.8 | 22.9 | 18.3 | 30.2 | 38.6 | 31.0 | 27.1 | 33.4 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 13.3 | 18.4 | 10.4 | 21.5 | 20.9 | 25.0 | 17.6 | 28.3 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 23.6 | 15.7 | 15.7 | 25.7 | 37.5 | 22.2 | 25.8 | 28.7 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 14.2 | 16.0 | 11.1 | 20.2 | 23.6 | 21.4 | 18.1 | 26.4 |
| 18-24 years | 24.2 | 18.7 | 14.9 | 28.3 | 36.2 | 26.8 | 26.4 | 32.2 |
| 25 years or more | 31.9 | 19.5 | 24.3 | 34.6 | 50.3 | 29.2 | 34.9 | 29.9 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 21.2 | 18.2 | 14.5 | 26.4 | 31.3 | 26.6 | 24.8 | 29.2 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 17.9 | 16.3 | 12.7 | 23.7 | 29.4 | 23.2 | 22.2 | 28.7 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 16.7 | 17.0 | 12.1 | 21.7 | 27.4 | 22.0 | 18.7 | 28.0 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No</i> | 36.6 | 8.3 | 25.7 | 13.2 | 40.2 | 13.1 | 45.6 | 15.2 |
| Yes | 13.4 | 19.5 | 9.6 | 26.4 | 26.1 | 26.5 | 15.0 | 32.1 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 11.3 | 18.4 | 10.0 | 21.9 | 20.4 | 25.6 | 16.0 | 28.6 |
| Urban | 25.9 | 15.7 | 16.3 | 25.4 | 38.4 | 21.5 | 27.6 | 28.5 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 16.6 | 17.2 | 12.1 | 22.9 | 27.4 | 23.4 | 19.3 | 28.3 |
| Extended | 20.9 | 16.9 | 14.3 | 24.5 | 31.4 | 23.8 | 24.8 | 28.8 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 9.1 | 20.2 | 8.2 | 21.9 | 15.0 | 25.6 | 10.8 | 30.6 |
| Poorer | 13.0 | 17.1 | 10.8 | 20.1 | 22.2 | 23.9 | 17.5 | 25.7 |
| Middle | 16.0 | 15.8 | 12.2 | 21.9 | 26.7 | 23.8 | 23.4 | 26.1 |
| Richer | 22.9 | 16.1 | 15.6 | 23.6 | 37.6 | 22.2 | 26.5 | 28.3 |
| Richest | 32.2 | 15.6 | 19.1 | 30.4 | 45.9 | 22.4 | 31.6 | 31.3 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.4. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Ghana

| Characteristics | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 24.8 | 16.1 | 11.0 | 18.5 | 14.7 | 19.1 | 12.8 | 23.1 |
| 20 to 29 | 33.2 | 19.9 | 16.5 | 28.1 | 23.1 | 32.1 | 16.4 | 37.6 |
| 30 to 39 | 37.4 | 23.7 | 21.3 | 35.7 | 30.6 | 36.6 | 20.8 | 43.9 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 43.9 | 21.3 | 28.4 | 33.4 | 37.1 | 34.4 | 29.7 | 38.9 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 33.5 | 20.9 | 17.5 | 27.7 | 24.9 | 28.8 | 16.1 | 38.0 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 35.3 | 19.4 | 20.0 | 28.6 | 26.3 | 31.5 | 20.3 | 36.7 |
| 3 or 4 | 38.8 | 22.6 | 19.7 | 34.7 | 29.3 | 34.6 | 20.8 | 40.1 |
| 5+ | 37.9 | 22.9 | 23.6 | 33.3 | 32.2 | 36.5 | 23.1 | 42.6 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 35.1 | 17.5 | 16.1 | 24.6 | 26.0 | 28.8 | 14.8 | 37.1 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 38.9 | 21.9 | 21.6 | 35.4 | 28.0 | 37.0 | 24.7 | 40.1 |
| Secondary or higher | 37.8 | 24.9 | 25.0 | 36.6 | 32.0 | 36.8 | 25.0 | 41.8 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 27.6 | 15.0 | 11.1 | 18.1 | 19.4 | 18.0 | 13.7 | 26.1 |
| Works for cash | 39.2 | 23.0 | 23.2 | 35.0 | 31.0 | 37.4 | 22.7 | 42.8 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 35.2 | 16.7 | 17.4 | 25.8 | 28.0 | 28.6 | 18.1 | 34.7 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 37.6 | 23.0 | 22.0 | 33.7 | 29.1 | 35.5 | 22.0 | 41.2 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 35.9 | 21.9 | 19.7 | 32.4 | 26.7 | 33.9 | 18.5 | 40.4 |
| 18-24 years | 37.7 | 20.8 | 21.4 | 31.1 | 29.7 | 33.8 | 23.1 | 38.4 |
| 25 years or more | 38.5 | 23.4 | 23.7 | 33.3 | 33.8 | 33.1 | 21.1 | 43.6 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 39.3 | 22.5 | 22.4 | 35.6 | 29.4 | 37.9 | 21.7 | 42.2 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 35.4 | 23.1 | 20.1 | 31.4 | 26.7 | 33.0 | 19.1 | 39.6 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 35.8 | 19.0 | 19.9 | 28.0 | 30.4 | 30.1 | 22.1 | 37.0 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| No | 57.2 | 12.7 | 42.7 | 24.1 | 49.7 | 21.6 | 44.3 | 26.2 |
| Yes | 28.6 | 25.2 | 11.8 | 35.1 | 20.0 | 39.0 | 11.2 | 45.4 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 34.7 | 21.2 | 17.7 | 30.9 | 26.1 | 34.3 | 18.5 | 40.7 |
| Urban | 40.4 | 21.9 | 25.6 | 33.1 | 33.0 | 33.0 | 24.8 | 38.0 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 37.2 | 22.5 | 20.6 | 33.7 | 28.4 | 35.9 | 20.4 | 41.9 |
| Extended | 36.4 | 18.8 | 21.8 | 26.7 | 30.0 | 28.2 | 22.7 | 33.4 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 32.0 | 16.5 | 13.7 | 21.3 | 23.9 | 25.6 | 13.4 | 30.9 |
| Poorer | 34.9 | 23.1 | 17.3 | 34.8 | 25.7 | 37.6 | 17.7 | 45.8 |
| Middle | 41.8 | 20.1 | 23.5 | 32.5 | 29.1 | 34.8 | 23.5 | 40.1 |
| Richer | 38.2 | 21.6 | 25.8 | 32.7 | 34.1 | 33.9 | 27.5 | 38.6 |
| Richest | 38.4 | 26.5 | 24.6 | 38.2 | 31.8 | 37.7 | 23.6 | 43.5 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.5. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Kenya

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 20.0 | 14.5 | 3.9 | 15.1 | 23.3 | 11.5 | 13.0 | 25.6 |
| 20 to 29 | 35.9 | 14.3 | 7.3 | 21.1 | 34.5 | 18.3 | 19.3 | 33.1 |
| 30 to 39 | 44.3 | 14.7 | 13.7 | 26.8 | 44.7 | 21.8 | 24.9 | 37.9 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | <i>48.0</i> | <i>15.5</i> | <i>20.8</i> | <i>30.7</i> | <i>52.4</i> | <i>22.1</i> | <i>31.2</i> | <i>41.0</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 5.6 | 14.6 | 5.3 | 20.5 | 27.6 | 17.4 | 18.8 | 29.7 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>42.2</i> | <i>13.7</i> | <i>8.9</i> | <i>23.4</i> | <i>38.3</i> | <i>18.2</i> | <i>21.4</i> | <i>36.5</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 41.2 | 14.6 | 10.8 | 25.5 | 40.3 | 20.8 | 22.2 | 37.4 |
| 5+ | 39.5 | 15.7 | 16.7 | 25.3 | 45.4 | 20.7 | 26.1 | 34.7 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 29.4 | 11.8 | 14.3 | 17.5 | 33.9 | 14.7 | 23.4 | 22.4 |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>37.5</i> | <i>14.7</i> | <i>11.4</i> | <i>22.2</i> | <i>38.4</i> | <i>19.8</i> | <i>22.0</i> | <i>35.0</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 51.7 | 16.4 | 11.2 | 33.6 | 49.5 | 22.5 | 25.3 | 45.2 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>35.2</i> | <i>13.5</i> | <i>8.6</i> | <i>18.4</i> | <i>30.9</i> | <i>16.1</i> | <i>19.9</i> | <i>30.6</i> |
| Works for cash | 44.7 | 15.9 | 15.1 | 30.5 | 50.4 | 23.4 | 26.2 | 40.8 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>35.9</i> | <i>15.1</i> | <i>13.5</i> | <i>20.2</i> | <i>34.0</i> | <i>18.8</i> | <i>23.0</i> | <i>31.1</i> |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 41.1 | 14.5 | 11.3 | 25.7 | 42.5 | 20.0 | 23.1 | 37.0 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>33.9</i> | <i>14.0</i> | <i>12.3</i> | <i>20.3</i> | <i>37.8</i> | <i>1.5</i> | <i>21.8</i> | <i>29.8</i> |
| 18-24 years | 42.5 | 15.1 | 11.0 | 26.0 | 41.4 | 20.3 | 23.3 | 38.6 |
| 25 years or more | 52.6 | 14.8 | 15.1 | 34.5 | 49.3 | 21.6 | 27.3 | 45.3 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>41.4</i> | <i>16.4</i> | <i>11.9</i> | <i>26.1</i> | <i>41.9</i> | <i>20.1</i> | <i>23.2</i> | <i>39.9</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 41.1 | 13.9 | 10.4 | 24.9 | 39.4 | 19.9 | 21.7 | 35.7 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 36.2 | 13.1 | 13.5 | 21.5 | 40.5 | 18.7 | 24.7 | 29.6 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No</i> | <i>56.4</i> | <i>10.4</i> | 23.6 | 19.9 | 62.8 | 11.3 | 39.3 | 25.7 |
| Yes | 35.4 | 15.9 | 8.6 | 25.7 | 34.4 | 22.1 | 18.5 | 38.5 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>38.0</i> | <i>14.1</i> | <i>12.2</i> | <i>22.2</i> | <i>40.1</i> | <i>18.8</i> | <i>21.5</i> | <i>34.7</i> |
| Urban | 46.9 | 16.7 | 10.7 | 32.4 | 42.5 | 22.8 | 28.3 | 39.2 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>39.5</i> | <i>14.4</i> | <i>11.3</i> | <i>24.0</i> | <i>39.0</i> | <i>19.8</i> | <i>22.1</i> | <i>36.4</i> |
| Extended | 40.9 | 15.2 | 12.9 | 25.4 | 43.5 | 19.6 | 24.7 | 34.3 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>28.3</i> | <i>16.3</i> | <i>12.5</i> | <i>18.3</i> | <i>32.6</i> | <i>20.3</i> | <i>20.2</i> | <i>27.1</i> |
| Poorer | 31.1 | 14.5 | 11.7 | 20.6 | 39.3 | 18.3 | 19.8 | 32.0 |
| Middle | 41.5 | 12.0 | 14.5 | 22.0 | 41.4 | 19.1 | 25.5 | 30.6 |
| Richer | 46.7 | 13.1 | 11.0 | 25.5 | 44.7 | 16.3 | 22.3 | 43.4 |
| Richest | 50.2 | 16.9 | 16.9 | 33.9 | 44.2 | 23.9 | 26.7 | 43.4 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.6. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Malawi

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 18.6 | 6.7 | 3.2 | 7.4 | 15.8 | 9.4 | 17.7 | 37.9 |
| 20 to 29 | 20.2 | 6.6 | 5.1 | 10.6 | 18.9 | 11.9 | 16.0 | 46.2 |
| 30 to 39 | 20.6 | 7.5 | 6.6 | 12.5 | 21.3 | 14.1 | 19.1 | 45.5 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 22.5 | 9.0 | 10.2 | 12.4 | 25.5 | 12.9 | 20.4 | 43.8 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 18.9 | 7.7 | 4.5 | 9.7 | 17.9 | 12.0 | 14.8 | 43.7 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 21.0 | 7.2 | 4.7 | 12.2 | 19.4 | 12.2 | 16.8 | 45.7 |
| 3 or 4 | 20.2 | 7.1 | 6.5 | 10.8 | 20.7 | 12.4 | 18.3 | 44.5 |
| 5+ | 20.7 | 7.3 | 7.6 | 10.5 | 21.5 | 12.7 | 18.9 | 44.4 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 18.5 | 7.2 | 6.8 | 8.2 | 16.8 | 9.7 | 15.6 | 40.1 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 20.4 | 6.5 | 5.6 | 10.3 | 20.6 | 12.3 | 18.7 | 45.0 |
| Secondary or higher | 30.1 | 13.5 | 7.4 | 29.6 | 33.8 | 24.1 | 18.8 | 62.7 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 18.8 | 6.0 | 5.3 | 8.4 | 18.4 | 10.0 | 17.1 | 42.6 |
| Works for cash | 26.0 | 10.8 | 8.5 | 19.0 | 26.3 | 19.6 | 19.6 | 51.3 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 21.6 | 6.4 | 7.4 | 8.3 | 19.0 | 11.2 | 18.2 | 40.6 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 19.7 | 7.9 | 5.1 | 13.3 | 21.4 | 13.4 | 17.3 | 48.2 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 20.6 | 7.0 | 6.4 | 9.7 | 20.2 | 11.7 | 18.4 | 42.8 |
| 18-24 years | 20.3 | 7.4 | 5.6 | 13.0 | 20.4 | 13.5 | 16.4 | 48.1 |
| 25 years or more | 22.9 | 9.9 | 8.9 | 11.0 | 22.0 | 10.7 | 24.0 | 36.6 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 19.3 | 7.4 | 5.5 | 10.7 | 18.8 | 12.5 | 17.0 | 45.0 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 21.8 | 7.0 | 6.3 | 11.6 | 21.0 | 11.9 | 17.5 | 45.7 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 20.4 | 7.2 | 6.7 | 10.6 | 22.0 | 12.7 | 19.3 | 42.8 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No</i> | 38.1 | 5.0 | 19.2 | 9.2 | 41.5 | 6.6 | 40.0 | 29.6 |
| Yes | 17.7 | 7.6 | 4.0 | 11.4 | 16.9 | 13.3 | 14.1 | 47.2 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 19.3 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 8.9 | 18.7 | 11.0 | 17.9 | 42.0 |
| Urban | 28.0 | 11.5 | 4.5 | 23.7 | 30.2 | 20.5 | 16.6 | 61.1 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 19.6 | 7.0 | 5.9 | 9.9 | 19.1 | 11.7 | 17.2 | 43.8 |
| Extended | 23.4 | 7.9 | 6.9 | 14.5 | 24.1 | 14.4 | 19.4 | 47.8 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 20.6 | 5.6 | 8.0 | 7.1 | 18.5 | 11.3 | 20.5 | 39.3 |
| Poorer | 18.9 | 6.7 | 5.2 | 8.6 | 18.0 | 10.6 | 16.7 | 41.3 |
| Middle | 20.4 | 6.3 | 6.8 | 7.7 | 18.1 | 9.5 | 18.0 | 42.1 |
| Richer | 19.0 | 5.8 | 5.1 | 9.8 | 19.0 | 10.7 | 17.3 | 44.1 |
| Richest | 24.3 | 12.0 | 5.6 | 22.8 | 28.5 | 20.3 | 16.1 | 57.9 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.7. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Mali

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 5.8 | 4.1 | 7.1 | 5.2 | 12.5 | 5.5 | 13.5 | 7.4 |
| 20 to 29 | 8.8 | 4.5 | 9.4 | 5.1 | 17.8 | 5.9 | 17.4 | 9.9 |
| 30 to 39 | 12.2 | 7.0 | 10.6 | 6.9 | 20.9 | 8.7 | 18.7 | 12.3 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 16.1 | 7.1 | 14.5 | 8.1 | 26.3 | 8.6 | 23.0 | 12.3 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 7.0 | 5.4 | 7.2 | 5.7 | 12.5 | 5.1 | 14.0 | 9.9 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 8.3 | 5.1 | 9.3 | 5.5 | 15.6 | 6.5 | 16.5 | 10.5 |
| 3 or 4 | 11.9 | 4.9 | 10.1 | 6.1 | 20.9 | 7.0 | 18.4 | 10.0 |
| 5+ | 12.7 | 6.7 | 12.1 | 6.8 | 23.1 | 8.2 | 20.4 | 11.6 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 10.5 | 5.6 | 10.3 | 5.8 | 19.3 | 7.0 | 17.9 | 10.2 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 10.4 | 6.5 | 10.4 | 7.5 | 21.3 | 8.9 | 20.0 | 12.0 |
| Secondary or higher | 20.5 | 7.7 | 13.8 | 10.2 | 26.2 | 8.6 | 24.2 | 18.1 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 7.1 | 3.7 | 7.5 | 4.2 | 14.2 | 4.6 | 12.8 | 7.3 |
| Works for cash | 15.3 | 8.2 | 13.9 | 8.5 | 26.2 | 10.3 | 24.8 | 14.9 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 10.9 | 6.2 | 12.7 | 5.8 | 20.8 | 6.8 | 19.3 | 9.1 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 11.0 | 5.6 | 9.3 | 6.5 | 19.3 | 7.5 | 18.0 | 11.9 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 11.1 | 5.4 | 10.9 | 5.7 | 20.5 | 6.8 | 19.0 | 9.6 |
| 18-24 years | 9.9 | 6.7 | 8.7 | 7.7 | 17.3 | 8.4 | 16.8 | 13.4 |
| 25 years or more | 16.9 | 6.9 | 16.0 | 6.6 | 25.8 | 8.2 | 19.5 | 18.2 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 11.1 | 6.2 | 10.0 | 7.4 | 19.9 | 8.2 | 17.2 | 13.2 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 10.8 | 5.6 | 10.1 | 5.7 | 19.4 | 6.9 | 16.6 | 11.2 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 11.1 | 5.8 | 11.0 | 6.2 | 20.3 | 7.2 | 19.8 | 10.1 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No</i> | 21.0 | 4.3 | 17.9 | 5.0 | 26.5 | 5.2 | 25.1 | 8.0 |
| Yes | 9.6 | 6.0 | 9.5 | 6.4 | 19.0 | 7.5 | 17.5 | 11.3 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 10.4 | 5.3 | 10.4 | 5.6 | 20.3 | 6.8 | 17.6 | 9.8 |
| Urban | 12.6 | 7.4 | 10.8 | 8.3 | 18.6 | 8.7 | 21.3 | 14.0 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 10.3 | 5.9 | 10.2 | 6.4 | 19.5 | 7.3 | 17.9 | 10.7 |
| Extended | 13.4 | 5.4 | 11.9 | 5.8 | 21.0 | 7.0 | 20.6 | 11.3 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 9.7 | 6.1 | 10.0 | 5.0 | 21.6 | 6.1 | 15.9 | 13.4 |
| Poorer | 9.1 | 4.5 | 8.7 | 4.6 | 19.0 | 5.8 | 14.7 | 9.5 |
| Middle | 12.1 | 5.2 | 12.1 | 6.4 | 20.3 | 7.8 | 18.4 | 7.5 |
| Richer | 11.4 | 4.9 | 11.1 | 5.8 | 19.2 | 6.8 | 21.6 | 8.8 |
| Richest | 12.7 | 8.5 | 10.6 | 10.0 | 19.0 | 10.1 | 22.3 | 15.5 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.8. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Mozambique

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 33.7 | 20.0 | 1.9 | 26.2 | 22.2 | 23.1 | 12.6 | 38.8 |
| 20 to 29 | 38.6 | 22.2 | 4.0 | 31.8 | 33.3 | 24.2 | 19.0 | 42.0 |
| 30 to 39 | 44.1 | 21.8 | 5.6 | 35.0 | 40.9 | 23.5 | 20.0 | 48.8 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 44.5 | 23.6 | 6.4 | 37.3 | 39.3 | 28.8 | 22.7 | 50.9 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 36.8 | 18.6 | 2.8 | 29.2 | 26.8 | 23.2 | 15.3 | 39.5 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 39.5 | 20.3 | 4.7 | 31.9 | 36.2 | 23.3 | 20.4 | 40.8 |
| 3 or 4 | 39.8 | 24.6 | 4.5 | 35.5 | 36.2 | 25.5 | 19.2 | 44.2 |
| 5+ | 43.8 | 22.8 | 5.3 | 33.6 | 36.7 | 25.7 | 19.3 | 51.7 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 38.1 | 24.8 | 3.8 | 32.4 | 28.1 | 27.3 | 16.3 | 48.1 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 43.1 | 19.5 | 5.1 | 32.6 | 40.8 | 22.6 | 21.5 | 42.7 |
| Secondary or higher | 46.4 | 20.4 | 10.4 | 48.4 | 60.4 | 18.1 | 27.9 | 43.5 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 39.5 | 22.7 | 3.6 | 31.2 | 31.5 | 24.9 | 18.0 | 45.3 |
| Works for cash | 46.9 | 19.5 | 9.9 | 42.0 | 53.8 | 23.6 | 24.9 | 45.5 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 37.8 | 24.0 | 4.3 | 31.6 | 29.6 | 26.6 | 17.8 | 45.6 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 44.1 | 20.1 | 5.1 | 34.8 | 41.9 | 22.7 | 20.8 | 45.1 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 41.3 | 21.9 | 4.1 | 32.2 | 33.4 | 24.2 | 19.1 | 45.6 |
| 18-24 years | 39.7 | 22.5 | 5.7 | 34.4 | 38.5 | 25.7 | 19.4 | 44.6 |
| 25 years or more | 43.4 | 22.5 | 5.9 | 37.3 | 42.4 | 23.8 | 21.3 | 46.9 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 40.5 | 22.1 | 4.0 | 33.1 | 33.6 | 25.0 | 18.6 | 44.8 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 40.9 | 22.6 | 5.0 | 34.3 | 37.3 | 24.4 | 19.6 | 45.9 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 40.8 | 21.9 | 5.1 | 32.2 | 35.8 | 24.8 | 18.9 | 46.1 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No</i> | 59.8 | 7.0 | 19.4 | 20.4 | 58.6 | 11.4 | 48.4 | 18.0 |
| Yes | 38.9 | 23.6 | 3.2 | 34.5 | 33.2 | 26.0 | 16.3 | 48.1 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 39.3 | 23.0 | 3.8 | 31.3 | 29.2 | 26.4 | 18.3 | 46.1 |
| Urban | 44.6 | 19.8 | 6.9 | 37.6 | 50.9 | 20.5 | 21.6 | 43.5 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 41.2 | 24.9 | 4.1 | 35.3 | 32.7 | 27.1 | 18.1 | 49.5 |
| Extended | 40.2 | 17.3 | 5.7 | 29.5 | 40.3 | 20.5 | 21.3 | 37.9 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 37.9 | 28.0 | 3.4 | 33.8 | 28.3 | 30.2 | 15.3 | 49.4 |
| Poorer | 39.6 | 20.2 | 3.6 | 28.7 | 28.3 | 23.2 | 17.7 | 44.4 |
| Middle | 40.6 | 22.8 | 3.0 | 31.8 | 28.3 | 27.2 | 19.3 | 47.5 |
| Richer | 43.1 | 16.5 | 6.6 | 29.5 | 41.3 | 19.2 | 21.3 | 42.3 |
| Richest | 44.9 | 19.9 | 8.1 | 42.5 | 57.9 | 20.3 | 25.0 | 40.3 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.9. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Nigeria

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 1.3 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 4.6 | 12.6 | 11.1 |
| 20 to 29 | 9.8 | 8.7 | 4.3 | 10.1 | 16.4 | 12.9 | 14.7 | 18.7 |
| 30 to 39 | 15.2 | 12.6 | 9.4 | 14.9 | 22.1 | 15.7 | 20.6 | 22.6 |
| 40 to 49 | 19.8 | 14.0 | 11.7 | 18.2 | 26.8 | 18.4 | 21.6 | 26.1 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 5.8 | 7.6 | 2.4 | 6.7 | 9.7 | 10.4 | 10.0 | 19.0 |
| 1 or 2 | 10.8 | 9.9 | 5.7 | 10.8 | 15.8 | 12.7 | 16.0 | 18.0 |
| 3 or 4 | 15.0 | 11.5 | 7.6 | 12.7 | 21.1 | 13.7 | 19.0 | 21.1 |
| 5+ | 14.7 | 11.0 | 8.9 | 15.1 | 22.3 | 16.0 | 20.1 | 22.6 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 8.2 | 6.6 | 4.5 | 7.6 | 9.6 | 9.1 | 17.3 | 13.9 |
| Primary | 17.3 | 12.6 | 11.6 | 16.8 | 29.0 | 17.7 | 20.3 | 24.0 |
| Secondary or higher | 19.2 | 17.3 | 8.8 | 20.0 | 31.0 | 21.7 | 16.2 | 32.8 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 7.5 | 6.4 | 3.8 | 7.3 | 11.3 | 9.0 | 13.2 | 15.1 |
| Works for cash | 16.8 | 13.4 | 9.5 | 16.6 | 24.6 | 17.8 | 20.8 | 24.7 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 12.4 | 8.7 | 6.8 | 10.1 | 16.8 | 12.0 | 19.9 | 17.0 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 13.1 | 11.5 | 7.3 | 14.1 | 20.3 | 15.3 | 16.4 | 22.8 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 9.4 | 8.2 | 5.4 | 10.2 | 13.8 | 11.9 | 17.6 | 16.5 |
| 18-24 years | 18.1 | 13.9 | 10.0 | 16.2 | 27.7 | 17.6 | 17.9 | 27.5 |
| 25 years or more | 26.0 | 19.2 | 12.7 | 21.7 | 36.2 | 21.4 | 18.4 | 34.7 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 15.7 | 11.7 | 9.9 | 15.8 | 26.8 | 15.5 | 18.6 | 25.5 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 13.1 | 11.2 | 6.1 | 13.8 | 19.0 | 16.0 | 17.7 | 21.3 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 11.7 | 9.6 | 6.5 | 10.9 | 16.0 | 12.5 | 17.3 | 8.7 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| No | 32.5 | 11.2 | 28.2 | 12.5 | 50.6 | 13.1 | 35.0 | 21.3 |
| Yes | 10.7 | 10.4 | 5.0 | 12.6 | 15.8 | 14.2 | 16.0 | 20.7 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 11.1 | 8.8 | 6.7 | 10.6 | 16.3 | 12.4 | 17.7 | 17.7 |
| Urban | 16.8 | 14.3 | 8.1 | 16.9 | 25.1 | 17.7 | 17.7 | 27.3 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 12.9 | 10.4 | 7.0 | 12.9 | 18.5 | 14.0 | 17.3 | 20.6 |
| Extended | 12.8 | 10.5 | 7.5 | 11.7 | 20.4 | 14.3 | 18.9 | 20.7 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 11.6 | 7.2 | 6.1 | 9.7 | 12.9 | 11.6 | 19.5 | 16.7 |
| Poorer | 9.0 | 7.1 | 5.8 | 9.1 | 14.6 | 11.0 | 17.7 | 15.2 |
| Middle | 11.2 | 7.4 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 16.1 | 8.9 | 19.3 | 15.4 |
| Richer | 14.7 | 11.2 | 7.9 | 15.1 | 21.5 | 15.4 | 15.0 | 22.2 |
| Richest | 18.7 | 20.6 | 8.5 | 22.4 | 31.6 | 24.6 | 16.6 | 35.7 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.10. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Rwanda

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 9.4 | 29.8 | 8.2 | 24.0 | 16.4 | 23.4 | 8.1 | 52.6 |
| 20 to 29 | 19.3 | 26.8 | 10.9 | 32.5 | 19.0 | 32.0 | 16.0 | 51.1 |
| 30 to 39 | 25.5 | 28.5 | 19.5 | 34.0 | 26.1 | 33.2 | 21.9 | 50.0 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 29.7 | 27.3 | 24.0 | 33.4 | 29.9 | 33.3 | 25.0 | 48.7 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 11.5 | 25.9 | 9.9 | 28.3 | 17.9 | 29.3 | 11.8 | 50.5 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 21.9 | 28.0 | 13.1 | 33.2 | 21.7 | 31.5 | 18.4 | 50.3 |
| 3 or 4 | 22.9 | 24.9 | 15.9 | 30.6 | 22.9 | 30.1 | 19.2 | 49.0 |
| 5+ | 26.5 | 29.2 | 20.7 | 34.9 | 26.5 | 34.5 | 22.2 | 50.9 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 23.1 | 26.9 | 16.3 | 30.9 | 22.2 | 30.5 | 20.6 | 48.8 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 21.4 | 27.9 | 15.4 | 33.0 | 21.5 | 33.1 | 18.6 | 50.7 |
| Secondary or higher | 34.3 | 27.6 | 23.0 | 39.3 | 40.0 | 33.0 | 22.7 | 52.7 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 21.5 | 26.0 | 15.2 | 30.8 | 21.6 | 31.2 | 18.3 | 50.7 |
| Works for cash | 32.9 | 30.7 | 23.6 | 39.4 | 32.7 | 35.4 | 24.9 | 51.4 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Not regular</i> | 23.8 | 27.7 | 17.0 | 32.6 | 21.5 | 32.6 | 20.7 | 49.2 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 22.7 | 27.3 | 16.0 | 33.3 | 26.5 | 31.6 | 18.4 | 51.6 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 24.7 | 26.6 | 19.0 | 30.6 | 25.3 | 31.7 | 22.2 | 48.3 |
| 18-24 years | 22.6 | 28.0 | 15.3 | 33.6 | 22.5 | 32.5 | 18.7 | 51.3 |
| 25 years or more | 25.2 | 27.1 | 19.6 | 33.4 | 27.5 | 31.0 | 20.9 | 47.4 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 20.7 | 28.0 | 14.8 | 33.3 | 21.6 | 32.9 | 18.0 | 51.5 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 23.4 | 28.6 | 15.0 | 35.1 | 24.1 | 32.9 | 19.3 | 51.7 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 28.0 | 25.5 | 21.0 | 29.9 | 26.6 | 30.0 | 22.9 | 46.2 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No</i> | 70.3 | 9.2 | 63.8 | 14.1 | 69.3 | 13.0 | 66.2 | 20.1 |
| Yes | 16.4 | 30.2 | 9.6 | 35.6 | 17.0 | 35.0 | 12.8 | 54.6 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 21.6 | 27.6 | 15.3 | 32.4 | 21.3 | 32.5 | 18.7 | 50.8 |
| Urban | 33.1 | 27.1 | 23.9 | 35.6 | 37.4 | 30.2 | 25.3 | 46.8 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 21.5 | 28.4 | 15.6 | 32.9 | 21.7 | 32.6 | 19.4 | 50.6 |
| Extended | 31.2 | 24.0 | 20.7 | 32.8 | 32.2 | 30.5 | 21.2 | 48.8 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 22.9 | 31.0 | 17.1 | 34.7 | 23.5 | 35.4 | 19.1 | 54.0 |
| Poorer | 23.1 | 24.9 | 16.7 | 30.1 | 21.5 | 29.8 | 20.7 | 47.7 |
| Middle | 18.4 | 29.8 | 13.1 | 33.9 | 17.9 | 35.1 | 15.2 | 54.5 |
| Richer | 21.7 | 26.2 | 14.3 | 31.4 | 21.2 | 31.8 | 19.0 | 49.6 |
| Richest | 31.1 | 28.1 | 22.5 | 36.0 | 35.6 | 30.5 | 24.6 | 47.2 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.11. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Uganda

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 25.6 | 19.1 | 4.3 | 15.6 | 8.2 | 17.7 | 15.3 | 30.4 |
| 20 to 29 | 41.9 | 18.0 | 8.2 | 24.8 | 16.5 | 25.6 | 22.5 | 31.0 |
| 30 to 39 | 48.8 | 17.5 | 16.2 | 30.4 | 24.0 | 29.1 | 29.0 | 32.1 |
| 40 to 49 | 49.9 | 17.2 | 16.2 | 32.6 | 23.4 | 32.9 | 30.8 | 35.6 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 31.7 | 19.0 | 6.1 | 21.2 | 12.4 | 24.0 | 19.7 | 32.4 |
| 1 or 2 | 40.5 | 17.2 | 7.6 | 23.4 | 15.4 | 23.9 | 22.7 | 31.3 |
| 3 or 4 | 45.7 | 17.4 | 12.7 | 24.7 | 21.6 | 24.4 | 25.3 | 31.3 |
| 5+ | 46.2 | 18.4 | 13.9 | 31.1 | 20.7 | 31.1 | 27.1 | 32.7 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 42.0 | 18.4 | 13.0 | 30.0 | 17.4 | 29.4 | 27.7 | 30.0 |
| Primary | 41.6 | 18.1 | 10.4 | 24.3 | 17.9 | 25.4 | 23.7 | 31.3 |
| Secondary or higher | 56.0 | 15.8 | 12.7 | 31.7 | 27.2 | 29.2 | 25.8 | 39.1 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 39.5 | 15.6 | 9.7 | 20.8 | 16.2 | 19.8 | 28.6 | 26.7 |
| Works for cash | 47.3 | 19.8 | 12.9 | 32.1 | 21.5 | 33.4 | 21.7 | 36.6 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 42.9 | 18.4 | 13.3 | 26.4 | 18.7 | 27.8 | 30.1 | 26.7 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 44.2 | 17.4 | 9.6 | 27.1 | 19.2 | 26.2 | 20.2 | 36.8 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 41.6 | 18.4 | 12.3 | 24.5 | 18.8 | 24.8 | 26.1 | 29.2 |
| 18-24 years | 46.0 | 17.0 | 9.6 | 30.0 | 19.1 | 30.0 | 22.7 | 35.7 |
| 25 years or more | 52.7 | 17.8 | 16.0 | 31.9 | 21.2 | 33.6 | 30.1 | 40.4 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 43.7 | 17.6 | 11.5 | 26.7 | 19.7 | 27.0 | 25.5 | 32.0 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 41.4 | 19.0 | 10.0 | 28.1 | 17.1 | 28.5 | 23.2 | 33.4 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 44.8 | 17.3 | 12.0 | 24.7 | 19.3 | 24.7 | 25.0 | 30.5 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| No | 63.0 | 9.6 | 31.5 | 18.8 | 48.0 | 17.5 | 50.4 | 18.5 |
| Yes | 40.4 | 19.2 | 8.1 | 28.1 | 14.3 | 28.5 | 20.9 | 34.1 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 41.2 | 18.4 | 10.7 | 26.8 | 17.3 | 27.5 | 24.7 | 30.7 |
| Urban | 59.3 | 14.2 | 15.7 | 26.3 | 30.1 | 23.6 | 26.9 | 40.4 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 43.7 | 16.7 | 11.4 | 27.0 | 18.3 | 26.7 | 24.6 | 31.8 |
| Extended | 43.2 | 21.0 | 11.3 | 26.3 | 20.9 | 27.8 | 26.0 | 32.4 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 41.4 | 19.8 | 11.3 | 27.5 | 16.5 | 29.3 | 26.2 | 30.2 |
| Poorer | 40.8 | 20.3 | 12.3 | 27.3 | 17.8 | 27.6 | 30.0 | 28.5 |
| Middle | 38.7 | 18.8 | 10.8 | 26.5 | 15.7 | 27.3 | 23.4 | 30.9 |
| Richer | 40.8 | 16.5 | 9.8 | 25.1 | 16.2 | 26.6 | 19.3 | 30.4 |
| Richest | 56.9 | 13.3 | 12.7 | 27.4 | 29.1 | 23.8 | 25.3 | 40.4 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.12. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Zambia

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 23.5 | 10.1 | 7.8 | 17.9 | n/a | n/a | 12.6 | 19.7 |
| 20 to 29 | 27.9 | 11.2 | 10.1 | 24.1 | n/a | n/a | 16.6 | 24.7 |
| 30 to 39 | 34.9 | 11.5 | 12.2 | 29.1 | n/a | n/a | 17.4 | 26.9 |
| 40 to 49 | 31.7 | 12.7 | 14.9 | 26.1 | n/a | n/a | 18.8 | 30.2 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 25.3 | 10.4 | 14.3 | 22.3 | n/a | n/a | 14.6 | 24.1 |
| 1 or 2 | 29.7 | 11.2 | 10.6 | 23.9 | n/a | n/a | 16.6 | 24.7 |
| 3 or 4 | 30.1 | 11.1 | 9.5 | 26.5 | n/a | n/a | 16.2 | 24.6 |
| 5+ | 31.4 | 12.1 | 12.6 | 26.2 | n/a | n/a | 18.0 | 27.8 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 30.5 | 13.6 | 10.6 | 22.6 | n/a | n/a | 17.9 | 24.7 |
| Primary | 27.6 | 11.2 | 10.6 | 21.9 | n/a | n/a | 15.3 | 24.0 |
| Secondary or higher | 36.4 | 10.7 | 13.4 | 35.7 | n/a | n/a | 20.2 | 30.9 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 27.0 | 10.0 | 9.3 | 20.6 | n/a | n/a | 14.9 | 23.1 |
| Works for cash | 35.7 | 14.0 | 14.8 | 33.6 | n/a | n/a | 20.2 | 30.5 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 27.2 | 12.8 | 10.7 | 21.7 | n/a | n/a | 16.9 | 23.6 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 33.4 | 10.0 | 11.9 | 29.4 | n/a | n/a | 16.8 | 28.2 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 27.7 | 11.9 | 10.2 | 23.6 | n/a | n/a | 16.5 | 24.5 |
| 18-24 years | 32.3 | 10.6 | 12.3 | 26.3 | n/a | n/a | 17.0 | 26.5 |
| 25 years or more | 47.7 | 13.4 | 18.8 | 43.0 | n/a | n/a | 21.5 | 39.6 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 28.6 | 10.7 | 10.9 | 24.6 | n/a | n/a | 17.2 | 24.3 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 29.9 | 11.3 | 9.9 | 25.3 | n/a | n/a | 17.1 | 26.2 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 33.3 | 13.1 | 14.4 | 26.4 | n/a | n/a | 15.6 | 27.4 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| No | 38.2 | 6.2 | 22.0 | 20.3 | n/a | n/a | 32.7 | 17.3 |
| Yes | 29.5 | 11.8 | 10.5 | 25.7 | n/a | n/a | 15.7 | 26.4 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 25.8 | 13.4 | 9.5 | 23.2 | n/a | n/a | 15.3 | 23.4 |
| Urban | 38.1 | 7.9 | 14.5 | 29.2 | n/a | n/a | 19.6 | 30.1 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 29.0 | 12.0 | 10.6 | 23.7 | n/a | n/a | 16.5 | 25.2 |
| Extended | 32.0 | 10.6 | 12.4 | 27.9 | n/a | n/a | 17.4 | 26.8 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 27.9 | 11.4 | 9.5 | 19.3 | n/a | n/a | 18.3 | 19.9 |
| Poorer | 25.4 | 15.7 | 9.3 | 23.4 | n/a | n/a | 15.4 | 24.1 |
| Middle | 23.8 | 11.6 | 10.2 | 22.3 | n/a | n/a | 14.3 | 24.5 |
| Richer | 34.4 | 10.1 | 13.6 | 26.8 | n/a | n/a | 18.0 | 24.0 |
| Richest | 40.6 | 7.7 | 13.9 | 34.3 | n/a | n/a | 19.1 | 35.8 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

n/a = Not available

Appendix Table 2A.13. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Zimbabwe

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 35.8 | 17.9 | 13.1 | 34.5 | 39.9 | 23.3 | 19.2 | 43.1 |
| 20 to 29 | 46.9 | 12.6 | 14.3 | 40.8 | 56.1 | 20.6 | 26.8 | 46.3 |
| 30 to 39 | 53.6 | 12.2 | 17.1 | 47.1 | 63.8 | 20.2 | 31.2 | 47.9 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | <i>55.1</i> | <i>11.7</i> | <i>20.7</i> | <i>44.2</i> | <i>60.0</i> | <i>23.9</i> | <i>36.0</i> | <i>45.4</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 38.7 | 18.5 | 15.4 | 38.5 | 45.2 | 21.5 | 25.6 | 40.1 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>49.1</i> | <i>12.4</i> | <i>13.6</i> | <i>43.4</i> | <i>57.1</i> | <i>21.5</i> | <i>25.0</i> | <i>50.1</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 48.8 | 13.0 | 18.6 | 43.6 | 62.1 | 19.3 | 31.9 | 44.8 |
| 5+ | 53.8 | 11.2 | 18.5 | 42.0 | 58.4 | 22.8 | 34.3 | 43.5 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 52.6 | 11.0 | 21.3 | 37.4 | 52.3 | 21.9 | 35.5 | 36.8 |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>47.5</i> | <i>12.8</i> | <i>17.3</i> | <i>38.4</i> | <i>54.6</i> | <i>21.0</i> | <i>30.4</i> | <i>42.7</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 50.5 | 13.1 | 14.1 | 47.9 | 61.7 | 21.5 | 26.4 | 51.9 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>49.2</i> | <i>12.2</i> | <i>15.0</i> | <i>39.7</i> | <i>54.9</i> | <i>21.8</i> | <i>27.5</i> | <i>43.6</i> |
| Works for cash | 49.4 | 13.4 | 17.5 | 45.7 | 60.4 | 20.9 | 30.6 | 49.2 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>47.4</i> | <i>13.1</i> | <i>16.9</i> | <i>38.4</i> | <i>51.7</i> | <i>22.8</i> | <i>29.4</i> | <i>41.6</i> |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 50.7 | 12.6 | 15.6 | 45.8 | 61.8 | 20.2 | 28.8 | 49.7 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>46.8</i> | <i>13.2</i> | <i>17.1</i> | <i>38.9</i> | <i>55.3</i> | <i>22.0</i> | <i>29.2</i> | <i>44.5</i> |
| 18-24 years | 50.6 | 12.0 | 15.5 | 44.5 | 58.7 | 20.8 | 29.0 | 46.9 |
| 25 years or more | 53.6 | 16.3 | 16.7 | 49.8 | 62.4 | 22.1 | 28.1 | 53.4 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>50.6</i> | <i>12.6</i> | <i>15.8</i> | <i>45.0</i> | <i>61.9</i> | <i>20.6</i> | <i>30.3</i> | <i>48.1</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 51.4 | 12.5 | 15.7 | 45.0 | 57.2 | 21.9 | 27.8 | 48.3 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 45.5 | 13.3 | 16.5 | 37.8 | 52.8 | 21.5 | 27.8 | 42.8 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No</i> | <i>58.9</i> | <i>7.4</i> | <i>20.9</i> | <i>35.1</i> | <i>64.6</i> | <i>13.7</i> | <i>43.1</i> | <i>30.9</i> |
| Yes | 45.7 | 14.8 | 14.4 | 45.3 | 55.0 | 24.0 | 23.8 | 52.0 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>47.4</i> | <i>13.2</i> | <i>16.7</i> | <i>38.4</i> | <i>54.6</i> | <i>20.4</i> | <i>29.6</i> | <i>41.2</i> |
| Urban | 52.6 | 12.1 | 15.4 | 50.2 | 62.8 | 22.9 | 28.0 | 55.3 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>49.8</i> | <i>12.8</i> | <i>16.2</i> | <i>42.5</i> | <i>57.8</i> | <i>22.6</i> | <i>29.2</i> | <i>47.4</i> |
| Extended | 48.4 | 12.7 | 16.2 | 42.9 | 57.3 | 19.0 | 28.7 | 44.3 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>46.8</i> | <i>10.5</i> | <i>18.0</i> | <i>34.6</i> | <i>51.5</i> | <i>20.9</i> | <i>29.2</i> | <i>39.5</i> |
| Poorer | 45.7 | 13.3 | 16.8 | 37.7 | 55.6 | 18.4 | 30.6 | 39.1 |
| Middle | 51.2 | 13.9 | 15.3 | 41.0 | 57.8 | 19.7 | 31.7 | 41.4 |
| Richer | 46.4 | 14.6 | 16.9 | 43.4 | 56.4 | 24.6 | 25.9 | 52.4 |
| Richest | 55.9 | 11.6 | 14.2 | 54.1 | 65.6 | 21.7 | 28.9 | 55.4 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.14. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Armenia

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 16.2 | 38.8 | 1.0 | 31.3 | 5.1 | 22.4 | 3.1 | 41.4 |
| 20 to 29 | 25.0 | 40.6 | 4.0 | 41.6 | 22.9 | 26.5 | 5.8 | 61.7 |
| 30 to 39 | 34.6 | 43.8 | 10.8 | 54.8 | 49.1 | 27.8 | 10.5 | 70.1 |
| 40 to 49 | 41.4 | 39.6 | 14.0 | 60.0 | 53.5 | 28.5 | 15.4 | 70.4 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 25.6 | 41.2 | 6.5 | 46.3 | 25.1 | 24.5 | 8.4 | 62.3 |
| 1 or 2 | 35.7 | 39.5 | 9.3 | 52.0 | 40.0 | 27.3 | 10.6 | 67.1 |
| 3 or 4 | 33.0 | 43.5 | 10.0 | 53.8 | 47.3 | 27.9 | 11.1 | 68.3 |
| 5+ | 29.3 | 44.2 | 12.2 | 52.5 | 44.8 | 30.9 | 11.7 | 64.6 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| <i>None or Primary</i> | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Secondary or higher | 33.8 | 41.3 | 9.7 | 52.4 | 42.4 | 27.5 | 10.7 | 67.3 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 30.3 | 42.5 | 8.8 | 50.3 | 40.3 | 26.9 | 9.7 | 65.4 |
| Works for cash | 45.8 | 37.7 | 12.9 | 59.6 | 49.2 | 29.9 | 14.0 | 73.4 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 33.4 | 38.3 | 12.0 | 44.0 | 38.9 | 25.5 | 14.7 | 55.7 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 33.9 | 41.7 | 9.6 | 53.2 | 42.7 | 27.7 | 10.3 | 68.4 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 26.0 | 41.5 | 8.1 | 47.1 | 35.5 | 27.4 | 9.1 | 60.7 |
| 18-24 years | 35.0 | 41.6 | 10.0 | 52.8 | 43.6 | 27.6 | 11.1 | 68.0 |
| 25 years or more | 42.3 | 39.1 | 12.1 | 61.4 | 48.0 | 27.3 | 11.8 | 75.9 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 35.1 | 40.9 | 9.9 | 54.8 | 43.7 | 28.1 | 11.3 | 68.2 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 32.3 | 41.8 | 9.8 | 50.1 | 41.3 | 27.1 | 9.7 | 66.3 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 31.4 | 42.3 | 8.9 | 45.5 | 37.7 | 25.5 | 10.8 | 64.2 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No</i> | 54.8 | 27.4 | 31.1 | 38.3 | 63.2 | 15.8 | 35.6 | 44.9 |
| Yes | 31.5 | 42.9 | 7.4 | 53.9 | 40.1 | 28.8 | 8.0 | 69.6 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 25.6 | 44.7 | 8.3 | 46.9 | 36.4 | 28.8 | 10.8 | 60.7 |
| Urban | 39.8 | 38.9 | 10.9 | 56.4 | 46.6 | 26.6 | 10.7 | 71.9 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 37.3 | 42.4 | 12.4 | 57.1 | 51.8 | 28.3 | 12.7 | 70.9 |
| Extended | 31.0 | 40.5 | 7.6 | 48.6 | 34.7 | 26.9 | 9.2 | 64.2 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 25.0 | 42.9 | 9.1 | 46.7 | 36.6 | 27.7 | 11.7 | 56.4 |
| Poorer | 26.6 | 46.0 | 7.0 | 48.0 | 37.0 | 28.0 | 9.8 | 63.7 |
| Middle | 36.3 | 43.7 | 11.9 | 54.9 | 46.7 | 26.8 | 12.5 | 67.1 |
| Richer | 38.9 | 36.9 | 10.2 | 52.0 | 46.2 | 25.5 | 10.6 | 71.2 |
| Richest | 41.4 | 37.8 | 10.6 | 59.5 | 44.7 | 29.7 | 9.2 | 76.3 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

* Number of unweighted cases is less than 25

Appendix Table 2A.15. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Jordan

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 46.4 | 31.8 | 2.0 | 40.5 | 18.3 | 29.2 | 1.3 | 58.9 |
| 20 to 29 | 56.4 | 29.6 | 6.1 | 53.4 | 30.2 | 28.2 | 12.8 | 64.3 |
| 30 to 39 | 64.2 | 25.0 | 11.0 | 55.2 | 41.3 | 27.7 | 15.6 | 69.8 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | <i>65.0</i> | <i>24.2</i> | <i>16.4</i> | <i>52.7</i> | <i>42.6</i> | <i>26.4</i> | <i>20.6</i> | <i>65.9</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 44.9 | 37.6 | 8.8 | 52.4 | 24.3 | 32.9 | 8.0 | 71.0 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>58.6</i> | <i>28.7</i> | <i>6.9</i> | <i>55.0</i> | <i>30.1</i> | <i>30.7</i> | <i>12.8</i> | <i>64.9</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 61.9 | 26.1 | 9.1 | 57.4 | 38.9 | 28.3 | 14.9 | 70.1 |
| 5+ | 66.2 | 23.0 | 14.2 | 50.0 | 43.5 | 24.0 | 19.3 | 64.4 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 59.9 | 23.1 | 10.8 | 40.4 | 33.7 | 21.3 | 18.5 | 52.9 |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>61.8</i> | <i>23.2</i> | <i>11.8</i> | <i>46.2</i> | <i>40.0</i> | <i>24.1</i> | <i>16.3</i> | <i>58.6</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 61.4 | 27.1 | 10.3 | 55.5 | 37.3 | 28.5 | 15.2 | 68.8 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>61.2</i> | <i>26.2</i> | <i>9.8</i> | <i>53.0</i> | <i>37.5</i> | <i>27.2</i> | <i>15.5</i> | <i>66.1</i> |
| Works for cash | 63.0 | 29.1 | 17.0 | 59.2 | 36.8 | 31.5 | 16.1 | 72.9 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>61.6</i> | <i>23.0</i> | <i>9.3</i> | <i>52.2</i> | <i>32.4</i> | <i>33.3</i> | <i>20.3</i> | <i>63.0</i> |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 61.4 | 26.8 | 10.6 | 53.8 | 37.9 | 27.0 | 15.0 | 67.2 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>61.6</i> | <i>24.7</i> | <i>10.6</i> | <i>49.0</i> | <i>39.3</i> | <i>25.6</i> | <i>17.9</i> | <i>61.8</i> |
| 18-24 years | 61.3 | 27.2 | 10.4 | 54.7 | 37.5 | 27.4 | 14.3 | 68.4 |
| 25 years or more | 61.1 | 26.9 | 10.8 | 58.2 | 32.9 | 32.7 | 15.9 | 69.5 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>62.1</i> | <i>27.1</i> | <i>9.1</i> | <i>55.7</i> | <i>38.8</i> | <i>27.9</i> | <i>15.3</i> | <i>67.7</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 61.6 | 25.8 | 11.2 | 52.4 | 38.3 | 26.3 | 15.3 | 67.1 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 59.5 | 26.2 | 12.3 | 51.4 | 32.8 | 29.4 | 16.5 | 64.5 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| No | 71.5 | 20.6 | 21.6 | 43.9 | 56.2 | 14.9 | 37.0 | 45.7 |
| Yes | 60.8 | 26.8 | 9.9 | 54.2 | 36.3 | 28.4 | 14.3 | 68.0 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>59.7</i> | <i>26.6</i> | <i>8.7</i> | <i>54.1</i> | <i>30.2</i> | <i>28.1</i> | <i>11.5</i> | <i>65.4</i> |
| Urban | 61.8 | 26.4 | 11.0 | 53.5 | 39.2 | 27.5 | 16.5 | 67.1 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>61.9</i> | <i>26.2</i> | <i>11.0</i> | <i>54.5</i> | <i>39.0</i> | <i>27.6</i> | <i>16.1</i> | <i>67.4</i> |
| Extended | 58.4 | 27.8 | 7.6 | 48.3 | 27.9 | 27.3 | 12.3 | 63.0 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>61.8</i> | <i>24.3</i> | <i>11.0</i> | <i>47.4</i> | <i>36.9</i> | <i>24.5</i> | <i>15.5</i> | <i>56.9</i> |
| Poorer | 58.4 | 28.0 | 9.6 | 52.6 | 36.6 | 28.4 | 16.6 | 65.6 |
| Middle | 60.9 | 28.5 | 9.3 | 55.6 | 37.5 | 28.8 | 14.8 | 67.9 |
| Richer | 63.4 | 24.3 | 10.7 | 53.1 | 37.9 | 25.5 | 13.6 | 73.1 |
| Richest | 63.2 | 26.9 | 12.4 | 60.3 | 38.3 | 31.0 | 17.2 | 71.6 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.16. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Morocco

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 2.9 | 28.5 | 2.3 | 27.3 | 4.4 | 21.8 | 2.3 | 36.7 |
| 20 to 29 | 6.2 | 39.2 | 3.7 | 40.6 | 8.5 | 33.2 | 4.6 | 48.1 |
| 30 to 39 | 13.1 | 48.1 | 8.9 | 49.1 | 16.5 | 40.1 | 9.0 | 57.4 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 17.3 | 47.2 | 13.5 | 48.6 | 21.5 | 39.3 | 12.5 | 56.5 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 7.6 | 36.4 | 4.6 | 39.6 | 7.0 | 33.1 | 5.2 | 46.7 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 10.4 | 46.0 | 7.6 | 47.0 | 14.6 | 37.2 | 7.6 | 54.7 |
| 3 or 4 | 14.4 | 47.1 | 9.9 | 49.0 | 18.1 | 39.5 | 10.1 | 56.3 |
| 5+ | 13.6 | 42.9 | 10.2 | 42.8 | 16.7 | 36.1 | 9.8 | 52.2 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 10.7 | 40.7 | 7.6 | 39.9 | 13.2 | 33.8 | 7.6 | 49.4 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 13.2 | 45.3 | 9.9 | 47.9 | 18.7 | 36.3 | 9.8 | 54.4 |
| Secondary or higher | 15.8 | 56.1 | 11.1 | 62.4 | 19.5 | 48.7 | 11.1 | 66.7 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 10.4 | 43.0 | 7.2 | 43.6 | 13.8 | 35.4 | 7.5 | 51.9 |
| Works for cash | 24.9 | 55.2 | 19.3 | 61.1 | 27.3 | 49.6 | 17.2 | 66.1 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 8.7 | 37.8 | 6.7 | 34.5 | 9.3 | 31.3 | 6.5 | 47.7 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 12.7 | 45.7 | 9.0 | 47.6 | 16.5 | 38.2 | 9.0 | 54.7 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 11.4 | 41.7 | 8.0 | 42.4 | 14.9 | 34.7 | 8.1 | 49.8 |
| 18-24 years | 11.8 | 44.5 | 8.8 | 45.0 | 15.1 | 37.0 | 8.8 | 54.0 |
| 25 years or more | 15.2 | 51.9 | 10.0 | 56.5 | 17.6 | 44.0 | 9.7 | 62.6 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 12.3 | 44.6 | 8.7 | 45.4 | 14.9 | 37.3 | 8.2 | 54.1 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 10.9 | 46.5 | 7.6 | 47.2 | 15.8 | 37.5 | 8.2 | 54.1 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 13.2 | 42.3 | 9.8 | 44.3 | 15.5 | 36.6 | 9.6 | 52.8 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| No | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Yes | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 6.4 | 35.1 | 4.6 | 33.3 | 6.3 | 29.4 | 4.8 | 44.1 |
| Urban | 16.4 | 51.6 | 11.7 | 54.9 | 22.2 | 43.0 | 11.5 | 60.8 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 14.4 | 50.0 | 10.7 | 51.5 | 18.9 | 41.5 | 9.9 | 59.5 |
| Extended | 8.7 | 36.2 | 5.6 | 36.9 | 10.1 | 30.6 | 6.8 | 44.8 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 6.2 | 34.5 | 4.5 | 32.4 | 6.0 | 29.3 | 5.0 | 45.1 |
| Poorer | 7.9 | 38.2 | 6.0 | 36.1 | 8.3 | 31.4 | 5.8 | 45.4 |
| Middle | 13.0 | 45.5 | 9.4 | 45.5 | 18.3 | 36.3 | 9.1 | 51.9 |
| Richer | 16.7 | 47.5 | 12.1 | 51.6 | 22.6 | 40.3 | 12.1 | 58.0 |
| Richest | 16.6 | 56.0 | 11.2 | 61.8 | 21.2 | 47.9 | 11.1 | 67.0 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

n/a = Not available

Appendix Table 2A.17. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Cambodia

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 23.4 | 58.9 | 18.7 | 52.3 | 50.0 | 28.3 | 9.6 | 75.2 |
| 20 to 29 | 33.8 | 55.5 | 22.3 | 60.8 | 64.5 | 27.0 | 14.7 | 79.6 |
| 30 to 39 | 38.1 | 52.7 | 28.7 | 61.0 | 72.9 | 24.1 | 15.5 | 82.6 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 41.9 | 53.6 | 29.7 | 60.0 | 76.3 | 22.5 | 19.7 | 78.2 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 27.6 | 58.2 | 13.7 | 60.1 | 47.4 | 33.6 | 15.4 | 75.0 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 37.5 | 52.0 | 24.8 | 60.0 | 69.4 | 22.9 | 17.5 | 77.1 |
| 3 or 4 | 36.8 | 54.9 | 28.7 | 61.6 | 70.5 | 27.0 | 16.5 | 82.2 |
| 5+ | 39.1 | 54.2 | 29.3 | 59.4 | 75.5 | 22.6 | 14.9 | 82.1 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 33.4 | 58.0 | 29.8 | 58.8 | 65.9 | 28.8 | 17.2 | 79.0 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 37.5 | 53.3 | 27.2 | 59.8 | 72.1 | 23.4 | 15.5 | 81.1 |
| Secondary or higher | 45.1 | 47.5 | 18.0 | 65.7 | 74.4 | 19.9 | 16.8 | 79.4 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 33.4 | 56.9 | 26.7 | 60.4 | 67.8 | 27.0 | 14.1 | 82.2 |
| Works for cash | 43.9 | 49.1 | 27.1 | 60.0 | 75.1 | 20.6 | 19.5 | 77.0 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 32.0 | 58.5 | 30.6 | 58.4 | 66.1 | 28.8 | 16.4 | 80.4 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 39.9 | 51.8 | 24.9 | 61.1 | 72.7 | 22.6 | 16.0 | 80.1 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 36.2 | 54.4 | 29.4 | 58.0 | 70.9 | 24.1 | 14.8 | 81.6 |
| 18-24 years | 37.9 | 53.5 | 26.4 | 60.4 | 70.5 | 24.4 | 16.1 | 80.4 |
| 25 years or more | 36.5 | 55.7 | 20.3 | 67.5 | 68.7 | 28.0 | 20.8 | 74.0 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 36.5 | 54.8 | 26.5 | 61.1 | 71.1 | 24.3 | 15.1 | 81.7 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 36.5 | 53.3 | 26.2 | 59.1 | 69.5 | 25.4 | 15.8 | 79.0 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 42.0 | 52.5 | 29.8 | 57.6 | 67.8 | 27.0 | 21.0 | 76.5 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No</i> | 60.2 | 30.1 | 48.0 | 31.1 | 79.6 | 8.7 | 38.8 | 48.5 |
| Yes | 36.1 | 55.2 | 25.8 | 61.7 | 70.0 | 25.4 | 15.0 | 81.8 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 36.8 | 54.0 | 27.6 | 60.6 | 69.9 | 25.5 | 15.6 | 80.6 |
| Urban | 39.9 | 53.8 | 22.5 | 58.3 | 74.0 | 19.8 | 19.4 | 78.1 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 37.3 | 54.3 | 28.0 | 61.7 | 73.1 | 24.7 | 15.7 | 81.5 |
| Extended | 27.2 | 53.5 | 24.3 | 57.3 | 65.1 | 24.7 | 17.0 | 77.7 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 29.0 | 60.9 | 32.7 | 54.5 | 67.1 | 29.0 | 16.8 | 79.5 |
| Poorer | 36.4 | 54.4 | 28.5 | 61.5 | 65.9 | 29.2 | 13.1 | 82.8 |
| Middle | 34.2 | 59.5 | 25.9 | 63.7 | 72.1 | 25.3 | 14.5 | 82.9 |
| Richer | 40.2 | 47.9 | 25.4 | 61.9 | 68.6 | 24.0 | 17.9 | 76.0 |
| Richest | 46.5 | 47.0 | 21.3 | 59.4 | 78.7 | 15.3 | 18.5 | 79.4 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.18. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Indonesia

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 41.3 | 39.6 | 11.3 | 62.3 | 73.4 | 17.6 | 10.5 | 70.7 |
| 20 to 29 | 52.3 | 33.9 | 13.0 | 66.6 | 81.8 | 14.3 | 12.3 | 75.8 |
| 30 to 39 | 56.6 | 30.9 | 14.7 | 68.2 | 84.3 | 13.4 | 12.6 | 76.8 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | <i>55.4</i> | <i>32.1</i> | <i>14.5</i> | <i>67.2</i> | <i>83.4</i> | <i>13.5</i> | <i>13.7</i> | <i>75.5</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 45.9 | 38.6 | 12.1 | 66.6 | 74.3 | 19.0 | 10.6 | 76.1 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>54.9</i> | <i>32.8</i> | <i>13.2</i> | <i>69.3</i> | <i>83.5</i> | <i>14.0</i> | <i>12.4</i> | <i>76.8</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 55.3 | 31.8 | 14.2 | 67.8 | 83.8 | 12.9 | 12.6 | 76.1 |
| 5+ | 55.2 | 29.7 | 17.1 | 59.7 | 83.5 | 12.9 | 15.2 | 72.4 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 52.9 | 29.7 | 15.2 | 61.0 | 82.0 | 13.2 | 16.1 | 71.4 |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>54.4</i> | <i>31.7</i> | <i>13.7</i> | <i>65.8</i> | <i>83.8</i> | <i>12.9</i> | <i>13.2</i> | <i>74.4</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 54.6 | 34.2 | 14.3 | 70.4 | 81.9 | 15.3 | 11.5 | 78.8 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>57.4</i> | <i>33.1</i> | <i>13.1</i> | <i>66.5</i> | <i>82.4</i> | <i>13.7</i> | <i>12.1</i> | <i>75.0</i> |
| Works for cash | 58.9 | 31.3 | 16.1 | 68.9 | 83.9 | 14.2 | 14.3 | 78.1 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>53.4</i> | <i>33.1</i> | <i>13.0</i> | <i>66.0</i> | <i>80.2</i> | <i>15.6</i> | <i>13.5</i> | <i>74.3</i> |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 54.6 | 32.4 | 14.2 | 67.5 | 83.5 | 13.5 | 12.6 | 76.3 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>54.7</i> | <i>31.3</i> | <i>14.2</i> | <i>64.4</i> | <i>83.5</i> | <i>13.0</i> | <i>13.3</i> | <i>73.8</i> |
| 18-24 years | 54.2 | 33.1 | 13.7 | 68.9 | 82.8 | 14.1 | 12.8 | 76.7 |
| 25 years or more | 54.0 | 34.9 | 14.8 | 71.5 | 80.3 | 16.7 | 9.6 | 81.2 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>53.3</i> | <i>33.4</i> | <i>13.0</i> | <i>69.0</i> | <i>82.0</i> | <i>14.8</i> | <i>12.2</i> | <i>77.3</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 54.2 | 32.8 | 14.2 | 66.7 | 83.5 | 13.6 | 12.4 | 75.7 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 58.1 | 28.6 | 16.3 | 62.6 | 84.4 | 11.5 | 15.2 | 72.1 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| No | 81.3 | 12.7 | 37.0 | 49.9 | 88.8 | 7.2 | 45.2 | 48.2 |
| Yes | 53.2 | 33.3 | 13.0 | 67.9 | 82.6 | 14.2 | 11.4 | 77.1 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>51.1</i> | <i>35.3</i> | <i>11.3</i> | <i>69.2</i> | <i>81.8</i> | <i>14.4</i> | <i>12.7</i> | <i>76.0</i> |
| Urban | 58.2 | 29.2 | 17.2 | 64.9 | 84.2 | 13.2 | 12.8 | 75.8 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>54.4</i> | <i>32.4</i> | <i>13.8</i> | <i>67.0</i> | <i>84.2</i> | <i>13.1</i> | <i>12.8</i> | <i>75.5</i> |
| Extended | 54.2 | 32.7 | 14.3 | 67.6 | 80.5 | 15.4 | 12.8 | 76.7 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>48.0</i> | <i>36.7</i> | <i>12.0</i> | <i>68.6</i> | <i>79.0</i> | <i>16.6</i> | <i>13.2</i> | <i>76.0</i> |
| Poorer | 53.1 | 32.4 | 12.8 | 67.4 | 83.9 | 12.4 | 13.0 | 73.6 |
| Middle | 53.7 | 32.7 | 13.3 | 66.7 | 84.2 | 12.8 | 12.6 | 74.5 |
| Richer | 57.5 | 30.7 | 16.7 | 64.8 | 85.2 | 12.2 | 13.3 | 76.2 |
| Richest | 59.6 | 29.9 | 15.2 | 68.6 | 82.3 | 15.3 | 11.8 | 79.2 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.19. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Nepal

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 2.7 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 4.7 | 2.9 | 7.3 |
| 20 to 29 | 12.4 | 12.8 | 10.9 | 15.4 | 22.8 | 14.1 | 12.4 | 20.7 |
| 30 to 39 | 17.5 | 15.3 | 17.6 | 23.7 | 35.9 | 19.5 | 20.1 | 28.2 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 15.3 | 19.7 | 16.4 | 27.0 | 33.0 | 23.4 | 19.3 | 32.8 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 4.5 | 6.2 | 4.0 | 8.2 | 8.8 | 6.7 | 4.3 | 10.2 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 13.2 | 12.1 | 11.9 | 15.1 | 23.7 | 12.5 | 12.7 | 19.9 |
| 3 or 4 | 17.6 | 15.1 | 17.8 | 21.5 | 34.9 | 18.8 | 19.8 | 26.7 |
| 5+ | 12.7 | 18.1 | 12.7 | 25.2 | 28.5 | 22.6 | 16.4 | 30.6 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 12.2 | 14.5 | 11.9 | 19.3 | 24.9 | 17.7 | 14.3 | 24.6 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 16.9 | 10.9 | 15.9 | 15.9 | 29.8 | 13.1 | 17.0 | 20.9 |
| Secondary or higher | 16.4 | 14.7 | 16.1 | 21.2 | 33.7 | 14.3 | 16.5 | 23.0 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 12.3 | 13.2 | 11.5 | 18.1 | 24.1 | 16.3 | 13.9 | 23.0 |
| Works for cash | 22.2 | 20.5 | 25.4 | 26.4 | 47.7 | 18.4 | 23.2 | 30.3 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 11.2 | 14.2 | 10.2 | 18.4 | 22.1 | 17.0 | 13.2 | 23.6 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 15.9 | 13.8 | 16.0 | 19.8 | 31.7 | 16.1 | 16.9 | 24.0 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 12.6 | 14.0 | 12.4 | 18.9 | 26.1 | 16.7 | 14.1 | 23.9 |
| 18-24 years | 15.8 | 13.9 | 15.0 | 19.2 | 28.5 | 16.0 | 17.2 | 23.5 |
| 25 years or more | 13.1 | 16.5 | 10.7 | 26.2 | 29.5 | 18.2 | 15.6 | 28.7 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 12.8 | 13.9 | 11.3 | 18.1 | 24.4 | 15.8 | 13.6 | 22.7 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 13.7 | 13.6 | 14.7 | 19.4 | 29.2 | 16.8 | 15.9 | 24.8 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 16.4 | 15.1 | 17.8 | 22.9 | 32.8 | 19.2 | 19.4 | 27.0 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No</i> | 34.5 | 8.9 | 29.0 | 10.2 | 42.7 | 6.4 | 35.6 | 10.2 |
| Yes | 7.8 | 15.4 | 8.7 | 21.5 | 22.5 | 19.3 | 9.3 | 27.6 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 12.7 | 13.7 | 12.0 | 18.8 | 25.0 | 16.7 | 13.9 | 23.7 |
| Urban | 21.1 | 16.5 | 23.0 | 21.4 | 44.2 | 15.4 | 25.3 | 24.9 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 18.2 | 17.0 | 18.0 | 25.1 | 36.4 | 19.9 | 21.1 | 30.1 |
| Extended | 9.0 | 11.1 | 8.4 | 13.3 | 17.7 | 13.3 | 9.2 | 17.8 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 13.3 | 13.3 | 12.4 | 17.2 | 23.8 | 17.0 | 15.8 | 22.1 |
| Poorer | 12.1 | 13.0 | 10.3 | 19.0 | 23.6 | 16.3 | 12.1 | 24.6 |
| Middle | 10.6 | 13.8 | 10.3 | 18.0 | 22.8 | 16.7 | 12.5 | 22.9 |
| Richer | 13.1 | 13.5 | 12.1 | 18.1 | 24.5 | 15.7 | 13.8 | 23.5 |
| Richest | 18.3 | 16.5 | 20.3 | 23.4 | 39.8 | 17.0 | 20.6 | 26.2 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.20. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Philippines

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 67.5 | 18.6 | 15.7 | 42.6 | 37.7 | 29.7 | 26.3 | 47.0 |
| 20 to 29 | 73.9 | 18.9 | 20.8 | 51.9 | 49.8 | 32.3 | 26.9 | 58.3 |
| 30 to 39 | 76.2 | 18.9 | 21.1 | 59.8 | 59.5 | 30.3 | 25.5 | 62.8 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | <i>77.1</i> | <i>18.1</i> | <i>24.5</i> | <i>58.7</i> | <i>63.4</i> | <i>27.7</i> | <i>30.8</i> | <i>60.3</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 71.1 | 19.6 | 18.5 | 51.8 | 46.7 | 32.4 | 25.9 | 58.7 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>76.2</i> | <i>18.0</i> | <i>20.0</i> | <i>56.3</i> | <i>54.8</i> | <i>30.3</i> | <i>26.8</i> | <i>59.9</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 75.8 | 19.2 | 23.3 | 56.9 | 60.9 | 29.1 | 28.6 | 60.1 |
| 5+ | 75.7 | 18.6 | 24.0 | 58.3 | 58.8 | 30.5 | 27.5 | 61.7 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 62.8 | 30.4 | 9.5 | 72.1 | 39.2 | 50.7 | 22.4 | 70.7 |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>75.0</i> | <i>18.0</i> | <i>25.7</i> | <i>55.1</i> | <i>56.4</i> | <i>31.1</i> | <i>29.9</i> | <i>58.8</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 76.1 | 18.6 | 20.6 | 56.8 | 57.8 | 29.2 | 26.8 | 60.7 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>76.1</i> | <i>17.3</i> | <i>20.8</i> | <i>55.5</i> | <i>55.8</i> | <i>30.1</i> | <i>27.4</i> | <i>59.0</i> |
| Works for cash | 74.8 | 20.4 | 23.3 | 58.0 | 58.6 | 30.1 | 27.5 | 61.9 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>72.2</i> | <i>21.0</i> | <i>20.1</i> | <i>61.5</i> | <i>48.3</i> | <i>38.5</i> | <i>26.7</i> | <i>63.5</i> |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 75.9 | 18.4 | 22.0 | 56.1 | 57.9 | 29.3 | 27.5 | 60.0 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>73.3</i> | <i>19.2</i> | <i>23.6</i> | <i>55.3</i> | <i>54.6</i> | <i>32.2</i> | <i>27.2</i> | <i>59.5</i> |
| 18-24 years | 75.9 | 18.4 | 21.7 | 55.4 | 57.6 | 29.0 | 27.7 | 59.8 |
| 25 years or more | 76.8 | 18.6 | 20.3 | 61.6 | 58.3 | 31.1 | 27.0 | 62.7 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>75.6</i> | <i>18.4</i> | <i>21.1</i> | <i>57.0</i> | <i>57.2</i> | <i>30.0</i> | <i>27.2</i> | <i>60.7</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 75.4 | 19.6 | 24.2 | 56.6 | 56.7 | 31.1 | 27.0 | 60.5 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 75.0 | 18.4 | 21.0 | 54.8 | 56.2 | 29.2 | 28.0 | 57.5 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| No | 85.5 | 8.6 | 37.7 | 34.8 | 67.8 | 13.7 | 51.6 | 32.0 |
| Yes | 74.8 | 19.4 | 20.7 | 58.1 | 56.3 | 31.3 | 25.8 | 62.3 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>73.5</i> | <i>20.0</i> | <i>23.0</i> | <i>57.2</i> | <i>54.9</i> | <i>32.8</i> | <i>26.7</i> | <i>62.0</i> |
| Urban | 77.3 | 17.5 | 20.9 | 56.1 | 58.9 | 27.8 | 28.1 | 58.8 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>74.8</i> | <i>19.7</i> | <i>21.7</i> | <i>58.8</i> | <i>58.9</i> | <i>30.8</i> | <i>26.5</i> | <i>62.2</i> |
| Extended | 77.1 | 16.3 | 22.3 | 51.8 | 53.1 | 28.8 | 29.6 | 56.2 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>71.3</i> | <i>21.2</i> | <i>23.4</i> | <i>57.0</i> | <i>49.5</i> | <i>36.5</i> | <i>25.1</i> | <i>63.0</i> |
| Poorer | 75.7 | 18.1 | 25.2 | 53.9 | 58.9 | 29.2 | 28.1 | 59.2 |
| Middle | 75.3 | 18.7 | 21.3 | 56.4 | 60.1 | 27.6 | 29.0 | 58.3 |
| Richer | 76.0 | 19.0 | 20.2 | 57.0 | 58.6 | 29.1 | 26.4 | 61.7 |
| Richest | 79.2 | 16.2 | 19.2 | 58.8 | 57.8 | 28.5 | 28.5 | 59.3 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.21. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Bolivia

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 41.1 | 43.3 | 3.5 | 63.3 | 40.8 | 35.2 | 16.6 | 63.7 |
| 20 to 29 | 51.4 | 37.0 | 7.2 | 68.4 | 53.8 | 34.3 | 16.7 | 69.5 |
| 30 to 39 | 53.4 | 34.8 | 9.6 | 69.3 | 58.8 | 33.3 | 18.4 | 68.2 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 56.4 | 32.7 | 13.6 | 67.2 | 61.9 | 30.9 | 23.8 | 63.9 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 44.8 | 41.6 | 7.9 | 64.8 | 41.3 | 36.7 | 19.4 | 65.2 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 54.2 | 35.4 | 9.5 | 69.5 | 58.9 | 31.4 | 18.9 | 69.8 |
| 3 or 4 | 53.8 | 35.9 | 9.3 | 69.0 | 60.7 | 31.6 | 18.2 | 69.1 |
| 5+ | 52.2 | 33.7 | 10.0 | 66.6 | 54.2 | 36.0 | 20.3 | 63.1 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 51.3 | 31.2 | 8.6 | 66.1 | 45.2 | 39.2 | 21.5 | 59.4 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 48.6 | 38.3 | 8.0 | 68.4 | 54.2 | 36.1 | 16.8 | 67.8 |
| Secondary or higher | 60.3 | 31.7 | 12.3 | 68.5 | 64.8 | 26.9 | 22.3 | 68.5 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 47.4 | 39.4 | 6.1 | 68.8 | 49.2 | 38.3 | 15.9 | 68.7 |
| Works for cash | 57.5 | 32.1 | 12.3 | 67.8 | 63.5 | 29.0 | 21.7 | 66.2 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 47.2 | 36.9 | 6.7 | 64.0 | 39.0 | 44.3 | 16.4 | 63.4 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 53.7 | 35.2 | 9.9 | 68.7 | 59.2 | 31.8 | 19.4 | 67.8 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 50.6 | 36.5 | 9.0 | 66.9 | 54.5 | 34.4 | 19.9 | 64.7 |
| 18-24 years | 53.3 | 35.2 | 9.7 | 68.3 | 57.6 | 32.8 | 18.3 | 68.2 |
| 25 years or more | 57.5 | 33.0 | 10.5 | 71.2 | 61.8 | 31.3 | 20.3 | 69.9 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 52.7 | 35.4 | 9.5 | 69.1 | 57.4 | 33.2 | 18.7 | 67.8 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 53.4 | 35.8 | 8.6 | 68.0 | 58.4 | 31.5 | 17.8 | 67.1 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 53.8 | 34.8 | 11.2 | 63.7 | 53.3 | 35.9 | 23.3 | 65.2 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No</i> | 78.6 | 14.4 | 38.1 | 41.3 | 74.4 | 13.0 | 59.5 | 31.4 |
| Yes | 51.2 | 36.8 | 7.5 | 70.2 | 55.9 | 34.6 | 16.2 | 9.9 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 45.6 | 39.8 | 6.2 | 69.9 | 42.0 | 44.5 | 15.2 | 68.3 |
| Urban | 57.0 | 32.9 | 11.3 | 67.3 | 65.5 | 26.9 | 21.3 | 66.8 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 53.1 | 35.3 | 9.6 | 69.3 | 58.2 | 33.6 | 18.5 | 68.1 |
| Extended | 52.5 | 35.6 | 9.5 | 62.4 | 51.5 | 30.3 | 22.4 | 63.1 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 43.6 | 40.6 | 4.4 | 67.5 | 31.4 | 50.8 | 13.6 | 66.8 |
| Poorer | 46.7 | 40.2 | 8.2 | 71.2 | 50.8 | 39.5 | 18.7 | 66.6 |
| Middle | 51.4 | 35.9 | 8.7 | 67.7 | 64.0 | 28.4 | 18.0 | 68.1 |
| Richer | 55.3 | 33.9 | 11.9 | 67.3 | 69.0 | 24.6 | 21.4 | 67.0 |
| Richest | 67.0 | 26.7 | 13.7 | 67.6 | 66.1 | 25.4 | 23.2 | 68.1 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.22. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Haiti

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 29.6 | 12.2 | 23.1 | 18.7 | 39.0 | 17.6 | 45.3 | 25.3 |
| 20 to 29 | 48.0 | 28.3 | 28.2 | 37.6 | 42.4 | 33.8 | 55.4 | 35.1 |
| 30 to 39 | 36.7 | 37.7 | 36.0 | 37.9 | 51.2 | 33.6 | 51.1 | 39.6 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 47.3 | 36.5 | 39.0 | 44.2 | 49.5 | 40.7 | 48.5 | 44.8 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 41.0 | 17.4 | 25.3 | 20.6 | 39.3 | 16.5 | 50.9 | 25.2 |
| 1 or 2 | 44.7 | 31.4 | 28.3 | 42.1 | 41.6 | 38.7 | 52.7 | 37.7 |
| 3 or 4 | 43.2 | 36.2 | 37.3 | 37.2 | 51.3 | 33.7 | 50.9 | 40.5 |
| 5+ | 40.8 | 35.7 | 37.6 | 40.2 | 51.5 | 35.9 | 51.1 | 41.6 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 40.7 | 33.0 | 36.3 | 39.8 | 48.4 | 36.5 | 46.6 | 40.9 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 46.7 | 30.5 | 31.8 | 37.8 | 46.4 | 33.8 | 53.9 | 38.4 |
| Secondary or higher | 38.0 | 36.5 | 29.9 | 35.3 | 45.5 | 31.3 | 57.6 | 33.0 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 38.9 | 35.0 | 23.8 | 38.4 | 36.3 | 35.1 | 48.0 | 39.1 |
| Works for cash | 45.0 | 31.2 | 38.9 | 38.1 | 53.5 | 34.1 | 53.8 | 38.2 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 40.4 | 32.6 | 35.8 | 39.3 | 48.4 | 35.7 | 46.5 | 42.3 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 44.2 | 32.6 | 31.6 | 37.4 | 46.2 | 33.6 | 54.9 | 36.0 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 42.1 | 29.0 | 33.3 | 36.8 | 44.9 | 33.6 | 51.5 | 36.8 |
| 18-24 years | 45.1 | 33.6 | 34.3 | 37.0 | 48.8 | 33.4 | 52.5 | 38.2 |
| 25 years or more | 34.4 | 37.3 | 29.0 | 46.4 | 45.3 | 40.5 | 48.1 | 43.4 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 40.4 | 34.3 | 31.8 | 37.1 | 47.4 | 33.4 | 50.4 | 38.2 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 42.3 | 32.4 | 31.3 | 42.3 | 43.7 | 35.6 | 49.6 | 39.6 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 47.4 | 29.5 | 38.6 | 35.8 | 50.1 | 35.5 | 55.9 | 38.0 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| No | 59.6 | 16.0 | 46.1 | 18.5 | 53.9 | 15.9 | 75.6 | 13.7 |
| Yes | 36.1 | 39.0 | 28.4 | 45.7 | 44.4 | 41.5 | 42.4 | 48.0 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 42.5 | 30.2 | 34.0 | 38.2 | 47.0 | 34.1 | 46.7 | 41.4 |
| Urban | 43.0 | 36.8 | 32.1 | 38.3 | 47.0 | 34.9 | 59.7 | 33.6 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 43.0 | 33.6 | 33.8 | 40.3 | 48.5 | 35.5 | 50.9 | 40.2 |
| Extended | 42.3 | 31.3 | 32.7 | 35.7 | 45.3 | 33.2 | 52.3 | 36.4 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 38.9 | 32.8 | 30.4 | 39.6 | 41.8 | 34.5 | 50.3 | 35.6 |
| Poorer | 42.8 | 34.5 | 30.7 | 45.7 | 45.7 | 39.1 | 41.7 | 47.8 |
| Middle | 43.9 | 26.3 | 38.1 | 31.5 | 50.4 | 30.4 | 43.2 | 43.6 |
| Richer | 45.8 | 29.8 | 31.6 | 36.4 | 48.3 | 33.7 | 62.4 | 28.9 |
| Richest | 41.3 | 40.6 | 34.9 | 38.9 | 48.3 | 35.1 | 59.4 | 37.2 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

Appendix Table 2A.23. Percentage of currently married women who make decisions by themselves and who make decisions *jointly*, by background characteristics: Nicaragua

| Characteristic | Own health care | | Large household purchases | | Purchases for daily needs | | Visits to family or friends | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone | Jointly |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 41.8 | 39.8 | 9.6 | 48.7 | n/a | n/a | 21.1 | 51.4 |
| 20 to 29 | 45.1 | 43.3 | 10.9 | 54.4 | n/a | n/a | 22.1 | 58.3 |
| 30 to 39 | 48.8 | 41.3 | 15.0 | 57.5 | n/a | n/a | 24.7 | 58.1 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 48.8 | 38.9 | 16.8 | 53.3 | n/a | n/a | 27.4 | 55.4 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 37.7 | 44.9 | 12.7 | 50.5 | n/a | n/a | 20.3 | 58.7 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 49.9 | 40.6 | 13.1 | 57.1 | n/a | n/a | 25.0 | 57.8 |
| 3 or 4 | 48.2 | 40.8 | 14.9 | 55.0 | n/a | n/a | 24.4 | 59.7 |
| 5+ | 43.4 | 42.0 | 12.4 | 52.0 | n/a | n/a | 23.1 | 52.6 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 38.0 | 42.2 | 8.8 | 47.9 | n/a | n/a | 17.7 | 53.2 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 43.5 | 42.6 | 12.1 | 50.5 | n/a | n/a | 22.4 | 55.0 |
| Secondary or higher | 54.7 | 39.5 | 16.9 | 62.4 | n/a | n/a | 28.8 | 61.2 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 39.2 | 45.9 | 8.4 | 53.8 | n/a | n/a | 18.6 | 58.5 |
| Works for cash | 58.1 | 34.7 | 20.7 | 56.0 | n/a | n/a | 32.1 | 54.8 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 39.3 | 41.6 | 8.7 | 48.8 | n/a | n/a | 17.5 | 53.2 |
| Regular (weekly) exposure | 47.5 | 41.4 | 13.8 | 55.2 | n/a | n/a | 24.6 | 57.4 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 45.8 | 40.6 | 13.3 | 52.0 | n/a | n/a | 23.8 | 54.2 |
| 18-24 years | 48.1 | 42.3 | 12.7 | 58.5 | n/a | n/a | 24.2 | 60.5 |
| 25 years or more | 48.4 | 43.2 | 19.5 | 57.4 | n/a | n/a | 24.9 | 63.6 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 47.7 | 41.1 | 14.0 | 56.5 | n/a | n/a | 23.9 | 58.6 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 46.4 | 42.3 | 12.2 | 54.5 | n/a | n/a | 24.8 | 55.4 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 44.2 | 41.0 | 12.5 | 49.2 | n/a | n/a | 22.9 | 54.9 |
| Husband coresident | | | | | | | | |
| No | 68.5 | 24.8 | 41.0 | 36.4 | n/a | n/a | 55.6 | 31.8 |
| Yes | 45.0 | 42.8 | 11.1 | 56.3 | n/a | n/a | 21.4 | 59.1 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 37.4 | 45.1 | 8.3 | 51.0 | n/a | n/a | 16.2 | 56.9 |
| Urban | 53.7 | 38.6 | 17.0 | 57.2 | n/a | n/a | 29.8 | 57.1 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 45.1 | 43.3 | 11.7 | 54.8 | n/a | n/a | 22.7 | 57.6 |
| Extended | 49.4 | 38.3 | 16.0 | 54.4 | n/a | n/a | 26.1 | 56.1 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 34.8 | 44.1 | 6.9 | 47.4 | n/a | n/a | 14.0 | 54.8 |
| Poorer | 41.5 | 44.2 | 9.2 | 52.5 | n/a | n/a | 18.8 | 56.7 |
| Middle | 45.5 | 43.1 | 13.2 | 52.5 | n/a | n/a | 21.7 | 57.0 |
| Richer | 51.4 | 40.5 | 15.8 | 59.0 | n/a | n/a | 29.8 | 58.9 |
| Richest | 58.6 | 35.9 | 20.2 | 60.1 | n/a | n/a | 33.9 | 57.3 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.
n/a = Not available

Appendix Table 2B.1. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Benin

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.13*** | 0.38** | 0.16*** | 0.11*** | 0.30*** | 0.14*** | 0.20*** | 0.62 | 0.16*** | 0.35*** | 0.46*** | 0.30*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.40*** | 0.64** | 0.40*** | 0.34*** | 0.60*** | 0.38*** | 0.55*** | 0.93 | 0.45*** | 0.58*** | 0.91 | 0.65*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.68*** | 1.06 | 0.78** | 0.68*** | 0.96 | 0.76** | 0.73*** | 1.22 | 0.79* | 0.81 | 0.94 | 0.81* |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.91 | 0.91 | 0.88 | 1.18 | 0.83 | 0.98 | 0.82 | 0.77 | 0.72* | 0.91 | 1.02 | 0.96 |
| 3 or 4 | 1.04 | 1.00 | 1.02 | 0.91 | 1.24 | 1.12 | 1.24* | 1.06 | 1.35** | 1.05 | 1.05 | 1.07 |
| 5+ | 1.09 | 0.99 | 1.05 | 0.88 | 1.00 | 0.92 | 1.24* | 0.81 | 1.06 | 1.15 | 0.94 | 1.01 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.94 | 1.33* | 1.14 | 0.85 | 0.94 | 0.87 | 1.00 | 1.12 | 1.10 | 0.97 | 1.06 | 1.06 |
| Secondary or higher | 1.06 | 1.64** | 1.42* | 0.83 | 1.39* | 1.15 | 0.88 | 1.36* | 1.17 | 0.87 | 1.35* | 1.24 |
| Works for cash | 2.33*** | 3.46*** | 3.31*** | 1.99*** | 2.95*** | 2.86*** | 2.54*** | 2.51*** | 4.00*** | 2.20*** | 1.69*** | 2.26*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 1.05 | 0.93 | 0.99 | 0.92 | 1.26** | 1.12 | 0.91 | 1.39*** | 1.17* | 0.88 | 1.00 | 0.92 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0.76** | 1.10 | 0.88 | 0.80* | 1.09 | 0.93 | 0.87 | 1.13 | 0.96 | 0.76** | 1.19* | 1.00 |
| 25 years or more | 1.12 | 1.13 | 1.19 | 1.04 | 1.06 | 1.08 | 0.66** | 0.91 | 0.57*** | 1.24 | 0.91 | 1.09 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 0.89 | 0.93 | 0.87 | 0.83 | 0.90 | 0.83* | 0.83* | 1.00 | 0.81* | 1.08 | 0.74*** | 0.78** |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.01 | 0.76** | 0.85* | 0.94 | 0.80* | 0.82* | 0.85* | 0.88 | 0.75*** | 1.19 | 0.73*** | 0.82** |
| Husband coresident | 0.29*** | 1.59*** | 0.48*** | 0.27*** | 1.40** | 0.50*** | 0.45*** | 2.05*** | 0.68*** | 0.26*** | 1.75*** | 0.60*** |
| Urban residence | 0.79* | 0.95 | 0.82* | 0.88 | 0.86 | 0.84* | 1.01 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.93 | 0.62*** | 0.62*** |
| Extended family residence | 1.03 | 0.89 | 0.94 | 1.17 | 0.88 | 1.01 | 0.92 | 1.00 | 0.91 | 1.07 | 0.90 | 0.95 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 1.11 | 1.00 | 1.08 | 1.23 | 1.01 | 1.12 | 0.97 | 1.02 | 0.97 | 1.07 | 1.19 | 1.21* |
| Middle | 1.09 | 0.94 | 1.02 | 1.09 | 0.98 | 1.03 | 0.92 | 1.19 | 1.04 | 0.83 | 1.17 | 1.04 |
| Richer | 0.96 | 0.91 | 0.92 | 1.32 | 0.90 | 1.09 | 0.91 | 1.07 | 0.95 | 1.14 | 1.20 | 1.27* |
| Richest | 1.06 | 0.95 | 1.01 | 1.32 | 0.84 | 1.05 | 1.04 | 1.08 | 1.13 | 1.15 | 1.23 | 1.30 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01* | 0.99*** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 0.99 | 1.02*** | 1.02*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 0.99** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99* | 0.99** | 1.01*** | 0.99*** | 1.00 |
| Constant | 0.31*** | 0.06*** | 0.44*** | 0.31*** | 0.09*** | 0.49*** | 0.65*** | 0.08*** | 0.92 | 0.35*** | 0.16*** | 0.74* |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.2. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Burkina Faso

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.41*** | 1.03 | 0.67* | 0.42*** | 0.89 | 0.64** | 0.65** | 0.96 | 0.71** | 0.41*** | 1.06 | 0.64** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.51*** | 1.10 | 0.76** | 0.62** | 1.04 | 0.82* | 0.73** | 1.06 | 0.81* | 0.66*** | 1.10 | 0.83* |
| 30 to 39 | 0.82 | 1.04 | 0.92 | 0.80* | 0.99 | 0.89 | 0.93 | 1.04 | 0.96 | 0.83* | 1.08 | 0.94 |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 1.00 | 0.89 | 0.93 | 0.82 | 1.08 | 0.98 | 0.71** | 0.99 | 0.78* | 1.09 | 0.96 | 1.03 |
| 3 or 4 | 1.14 | 1.17 | 1.20* | 1.15 | 1.08 | 1.13 | 1.15 | 1.13 | 1.19* | 1.05 | 1.15 | 1.13 |
| 5+ | 1.07 | 1.24 | 1.19 | 1.13 | 1.25 | 1.23* | 0.95 | 1.37** | 1.13 | 0.96 | 1.14 | 1.06 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.98 | 1.15 | 1.08 | 1.13 | 0.99 | 1.06 | 1.12 | 0.90 | 1.03 | 0.96 | 0.78* | 0.84* |
| Secondary or higher | 1.53* | 1.55* | 1.72*** | 1.25 | 1.60** | 1.53** | 1.23 | 1.33 | 1.38* | 1.26 | 1.84*** | 1.75*** |
| Works for cash | 1.93*** | 1.29** | 1.64 | 1.39 | 1.73*** | 1.70*** | 1.25** | 1.72*** | 1.61*** | 1.37*** | 1.02 | 1.24*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 1.05 | 0.88 | 0.93 | 1.14 | 1.09 | 1.12* | 0.96 | 1.17* | 1.05 | 1.02 | 0.66*** | 0.77*** |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 1.20* | 1.00 | 1.07 | 1.24 | 0.96 | 1.07 | 1.04 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 0.86* | 1.04 | 0.94 |
| 25 years or more | 1.59* | 1.24 | 1.55* | 1.47 | 1.03 | 1.25 | 1.56* | 1.04 | 1.49* | 1.05 | 1.53* | 1.41* |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 0.95 | 0.99 | 0.96 | 0.97 | 0.92 | 0.93 | 0.97 | 0.92 | 0.93 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 0.97 | 0.87 | 0.90 | 0.91 | 0.79** | 0.82** | 0.98 | 0.94 | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.98 | 0.96 |
| Husband coresident | 0.23*** | 1.52** | 0.46*** | 0.32*** | 1.81*** | 0.66*** | 0.44*** | 2.08*** | 0.66*** | 0.49*** | 1.27* | 0.70*** |
| Urban residence | 1.89*** | 1.00 | 1.43 | 1.06 | 0.95 | 0.99 | 0.96 | 0.87 | 0.89 | 1.32* | 1.10 | 1.27* |
| Extended family residence | 1.08 | 0.64*** | 0.79 | 1.05 | 0.75*** | 0.84** | 0.88* | 0.95 | 0.88** | 0.97 | 0.77*** | 0.83*** |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.68* | 0.81 | 0.75** | 0.90 | 0.81* | 0.82* | 0.97 | 0.84 | 0.89 | 0.87 | 0.95 | 0.89 |
| Middle | 0.95 | 0.70* | 0.76** | 1.01 | 0.72** | 0.79** | 1.04 | 0.82* | 0.93 | 0.97 | 0.88 | 0.90 |
| Richer | 0.80 | 0.56*** | 0.61*** | 0.85 | 0.66*** | 0.69*** | 0.92 | 0.77* | 0.82* | 0.87 | 0.71*** | 0.73*** |
| Richest | 0.83 | 0.81 | 0.77 | 0.81 | 0.78 | 0.75* | 0.73* | 1.01 | 0.80* | 1.10 | 1.08 | 1.11 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.01* | 1.01** | 1.00 | 1.01* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.00 | 0.99* | 1.00 | 1.01** | 0.99*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.00 | 0.99*** | 0.99*** |
| Constant | 0.43*** | 0.09*** | 0.65*** | 0.25*** | 0.12*** | 0.51*** | 0.61*** | 0.10*** | 0.99 | 0.41*** | 0.28*** | 1.10 |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.3. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Cameroon

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.13*** | 0.53*** | 0.22*** | 0.16*** | 0.44*** | 0.23*** | 0.22*** | 0.63** | 0.23*** | 0.23*** | 0.60*** | 0.28*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.32*** | 0.81* | 0.43*** | 0.40*** | 0.72*** | 0.47*** | 0.41*** | 1.05 | 0.45*** | 0.42*** | 0.83* | 0.48*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.67*** | 0.92 | 0.72*** | 0.79* | 0.90 | 0.79** | 0.73*** | 1.04 | 0.76** | 0.74*** | 0.96 | 0.78** |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.90 | 0.82 | 0.83 | 1.03 | 0.95 | 0.96 | 0.91 | 0.97 | 0.90 | 0.87 | 0.85 | 0.79** |
| 3 or 4 | 0.94 | 0.97 | 0.96 | 0.83 | 1.00 | 0.92 | 1.06 | 1.01 | 1.10 | 0.87 | 0.98 | 0.92 |
| 5+ | 0.89 | 0.94 | 0.88 | 0.91 | 1.01 | 0.95 | 1.03 | 1.12 | 1.14 | 0.97 | 0.98 | 0.96 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.84 | 0.81* | 0.84* | 0.89 | 0.69*** | 0.74*** | 0.65*** | 0.57*** | 0.52*** | 0.58*** | 0.74*** | 0.63*** |
| Secondary or higher | 1.24* | 0.95 | 1.11 | 1.19 | 1.15 | 1.23** | 1.13 | 1.09 | 1.25** | 0.99 | 1.17* | 1.13 |
| Works for cash | 1.95*** | 2.13*** | 2.48*** | 2.13*** | 1.83*** | 2.35*** | 2.22*** | 2.00*** | 3.43*** | 1.53*** | 1.38*** | 1.73*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 1.01 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 1.12 | 1.01 | 1.06 | 1.31*** | 0.85* | 1.09 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.89 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 1.09 | 1.16 | 1.17* | 0.86 | 1.21** | 1.09 | 1.02 | 1.21** | 1.22** | 1.02 | 1.19** | 1.18** |
| 25 years or more | 0.92 | 1.24 | 1.12 | 0.98 | 1.39** | 1.40** | 1.12 | 1.38* | 1.73*** | 1.00 | 1.04 | 1.09 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 0.92 | 0.96 | 0.92 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.05 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.03 | 1.03 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.07 | 0.96 | 1.00 | 1.08 | 0.91 | 0.96 | 1.17* | 0.85* | 0.98 | 0.98 | 0.97 | 0.96 |
| Husband coresident | 0.24*** | 2.44*** | 0.58*** | 0.31*** | 2.65*** | 1.01 | 0.55*** | 2.54*** | 1.19* | 0.21*** | 2.64*** | 0.59*** |
| Urban residence | 1.29* | 0.86 | 1.05 | 0.92 | 0.87 | 0.85 | 1.09 | 0.81* | 0.89 | 1.03 | 1.00 | 1.01 |
| Extended family residence | 1.02 | 1.04 | 1.03 | 1.05 | 1.01 | 1.03 | 0.90 | 1.05 | 0.95 | 1.09 | 1.03 | 1.07 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 1.00 | 0.92 | 0.91 | 1.00 | 0.87 | 0.88 | 1.16 | 0.92 | 1.00 | 1.20 | 0.84* | 0.92 |
| Middle | 0.84 | 0.86 | 0.78** | 0.80 | 0.86 | 0.78** | 1.02 | 0.94 | 0.89 | 1.21 | 0.80* | 0.89 |
| Richer | 0.76 | 1.00 | 0.81 | 0.67* | 0.90 | 0.74** | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.92 | 1.04 | 0.99 | 0.96 |
| Richest | 0.82 | 1.01 | 0.90 | 0.59** | 1.07 | 0.80 | 0.97 | 1.01 | 0.95 | 1.03 | 1.12 | 1.11 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.01*** | 1.00* | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.00* |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.01*** | 0.99** | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.01*** | 0.99** | 1.00** | 1.01** | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Constant | 0.21*** | 0.09*** | 0.46*** | 0.12*** | 0.10*** | 0.29*** | 0.25*** | 0.14*** | 0.57*** | 0.41*** | 0.19*** | 1.19 |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.4. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Ghana

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.37*** | 1.25 | 0.48** | 0.28*** | 0.89 | 0.40*** | 0.25*** | 0.93 | 0.34*** | 0.23*** | 0.86 | 0.37*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.61*** | 1.09 | 0.66** | 0.50*** | 0.90 | 0.57*** | 0.55*** | 0.98 | 0.58*** | 0.37*** | 1.04 | 0.55*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.74** | 1.20 | 0.85 | 0.74* | 1.12 | 0.89 | 0.82 | 1.08 | 0.87 | 0.62*** | 1.21* | 0.86 |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 1.04 | 1.01 | 1.05 | 0.96 | 1.09 | 1.04 | 1.02 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.76 | 1.21 | 1.01 |
| 3 or 4 | 1.21 | 1.13 | 1.30* | 0.99 | 1.19 | 1.19 | 1.08 | 1.04 | 1.11 | 0.94 | 0.98 | 0.98 |
| 5+ | 1.01 | 1.20 | 1.13 | 1.16 | 1.13 | 1.21 | 1.23 | 1.07 | 1.25 | 0.98 | 1.09 | 1.07 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.97 | 0.97 | 0.94 | 0.97 | 0.81* | 0.81* | 1.09 | 0.87 | 0.92 | 0.74* | 1.04 | 0.87 |
| Secondary or higher | 0.76** | 1.09 | 0.82* | 0.91 | 0.90 | 0.84 | 1.12 | 0.88 | 0.95 | 0.88 | 0.94 | 0.85 |
| Works for cash | 1.71*** | 1.46** | 1.96*** | 1.97*** | 2.09*** | 2.58*** | 1.46*** | 2.53*** | 2.66*** | 1.25 | 2.02*** | 2.12*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 1.08 | 1.10 | 1.13 | 1.06 | 1.10 | 1.10 | 0.86 | 1.16 | 1.00 | 0.91 | 1.13 | 1.04 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0.93 | 1.02 | 0.95 | 0.86 | 0.92 | 0.84* | 0.97 | 1.01 | 0.98 | 1.11 | 0.92 | 0.98 |
| 25 years or more | 0.88 | 1.00 | 0.89 | 0.80 | 0.84 | 0.74 | 0.99 | 0.82 | 0.81 | 0.80 | 1.00 | 0.86 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 0.90 | 1.06 | 0.95 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.90 | 0.88 | 0.86 | 0.78** | 0.90 | 0.93 | 0.88 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 0.83* | 0.90 | 0.79** | 0.95 | 0.84 | 0.83* | 1.05 | 0.80* | 0.84 | 1.09 | 0.84 | 0.89 |
| Husband coresident | 0.28*** | 2.35*** | 0.49*** | 0.18*** | 1.92*** | 0.47*** | 0.25*** | 2.56*** | 0.60*** | 0.16*** | 2.45*** | 0.56*** |
| Urban residence | 1.25 | 0.66** | 0.91 | 1.07 | 0.72** | 0.77* | 1.10 | 0.74* | 0.80 | 0.96 | 0.62*** | 0.58*** |
| Extended family residence | 0.91 | 0.79* | 0.79** | 0.96 | 0.74*** | 0.75*** | 1.04 | 0.71*** | 0.77** | 1.13 | 0.69*** | 0.75*** |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.98 | 1.02 | 0.99 | 0.92 | 1.33* | 1.17 | 0.91 | 1.29* | 1.14 | 0.95 | 1.56*** | 1.44*** |
| Middle | 1.33* | 0.76 | 1.09 | 1.27 | 1.12 | 1.25 | 1.07 | 1.14 | 1.18 | 1.26 | 1.33* | 1.48** |
| Richer | 1.11 | 0.96 | 1.08 | 1.16 | 1.23 | 1.28 | 1.41* | 1.19 | 1.60** | 1.53* | 1.49* | 1.97*** |
| Richest | 1.40 | 0.98 | 1.37 | 1.18 | 1.41 | 1.47* | 1.38 | 1.37 | 1.80** | 1.34 | 1.82** | 2.19*** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.01** | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.01*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 0.99** | 1.01* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Constant | 1.10 | 0.05*** | 1.04 | 0.29*** | 0.08*** | 0.40*** | 0.90 | 0.08*** | 0.92 | 0.44*** | 0.13*** | 0.78 |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.5. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Kenya

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.28*** | 1.14 | 0.35*** | 0.19*** | 0.70 | 0.38*** | 0.48*** | 0.48** | 0.31*** | 0.40*** | 0.58** | 0.30*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.48*** | 0.96 | 0.47*** | 0.33*** | 0.72** | 0.45*** | 0.57*** | 0.75* | 0.43*** | 0.54*** | 0.64*** | 0.37*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.73*** | 1.00 | 0.72*** | 0.62*** | 0.83* | 0.64*** | 0.72*** | 0.95 | 0.64*** | 0.79* | 0.79* | 0.62*** |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.57*** | 1.13 | 0.65** | 0.63 | 0.94 | 0.82 | 0.73* | 1.28 | 0.87 | 0.99 | 0.84 | 0.83 |
| 3 or 4 | 0.85 | 1.17 | 0.95 | 0.77 | 1.24* | 1.08 | 0.98 | 1.06 | 1.05 | 0.86 | 1.02 | 0.93 |
| 5+ | 0.73** | 1.40* | 0.87 | 0.85 | 1.35* | 1.20 | 1.11 | 1.10 | 1.16 | 0.91 | 1.01 | 0.90 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.65*** | 0.69** | 0.58*** | 1.11 | 0.94 | 0.99 | 0.93 | 0.68** | 0.74** | 1.16 | 0.59*** | 0.72** |
| Secondary or higher | 1.13 | 1.25* | 1.32*** | 0.79 | 1.36*** | 1.18 | 1.19* | 1.07 | 1.31** | 0.88 | 1.22* | 1.15 |
| Works for cash | 1.24** | 1.17 | 1.33*** | 1.82*** | 1.62*** | 1.93*** | 1.92*** | 1.53*** | 2.61*** | 1.33*** | 1.27*** | 1.58*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 0.81* | 0.93 | 0.79** | 0.90 | 0.93 | 0.89 | 1.13 | 0.91 | 1.05 | 0.92 | 0.88 | 0.83* |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 1.10 | 1.06 | 1.13 | 0.89 | 1.11 | 1.03 | 1.04 | 0.97 | 1.02 | 1.06 | 1.17* | 1.19* |
| 25 years or more | 1.20 | 0.97 | 1.18 | 0.95 | 1.31 | 1.23 | 1.19 | 0.80 | 1.04 | 1.13 | 1.12 | 1.26 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 1.15 | 0.79* | 1.00 | 0.92 | 1.06 | 1.01 | 1.02 | 1.02 | 1.04 | 1.06 | 0.89 | 0.92 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.00 | 0.80* | 0.88 | 1.04 | 0.96 | 0.99 | 1.11 | 1.00 | 1.11 | 1.17 | 0.79** | 0.89 |
| Husband coresident | 0.38*** | 1.72*** | 0.49*** | 0.32*** | 1.45*** | 0.69*** | 0.32*** | 2.18*** | 0.45*** | 0.33*** | 1.90*** | 0.65*** |
| Urban residence | 0.70*** | 1.26 | 0.79* | 1.23 | 1.12 | 1.21 | 1.01 | 1.05 | 1.03 | 1.51*** | 0.64*** | 0.88 |
| Extended family residence | 0.86* | 1.06 | 0.90 | 0.98 | 0.96 | 0.95 | 0.89 | 1.05 | 0.93 | 0.96 | 0.86* | 0.84** |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.94 | 0.89 | 0.88 | 1.02 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.18 | 0.97 | 1.12 | 0.90 | 1.17 | 1.03 |
| Middle | 1.34* | 0.74* | 1.09 | 1.23 | 1.01 | 1.11 | 1.16 | 0.95 | 1.07 | 1.19 | 1.01 | 1.09 |
| Richer | 1.54*** | 0.73* | 1.24 | 0.89 | 1.08 | 1.00 | 1.31* | 0.80 | 1.08 | 1.00 | 1.61*** | 1.53*** |
| Richest | 1.43* | 0.92 | 1.32 | 0.73 | 1.22 | 1.04 | 1.36* | 0.97 | 1.33 | 1.11 | 1.43* | 1.45* |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 0.99** | 1.00** | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.02*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.01** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.01*** |
| Constant | 0.71** | 0.13*** | 1.36** | 0.22*** | 0.22*** | 0.68*** | 1.36** | 0.10*** | 2.33*** | 0.77* | 0.21*** | 1.64*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.6. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Malawi

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.58*** | 0.66 | 0.55*** | 0.26*** | 0.47*** | 0.34*** | 0.45*** | 0.57** | 0.41*** | 0.70* | 0.79* | 0.63*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.80* | 0.71* | 0.73*** | 0.46*** | 0.63*** | 0.52*** | 0.64*** | 0.81 | 0.63*** | 0.70*** | 1.01 | 0.80** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.84* | 0.78* | 0.79** | 0.61*** | 0.88 | 0.74*** | 0.81** | 0.98 | 0.84* | 0.93 | 0.97 | 0.93 |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 1.05 | 0.95 | 1.02 | 1.15 | 0.84 | 0.93 | 0.99 | 1.09 | 1.03 | 0.87 | 0.94 | 0.87 |
| 3 or 4 | 0.97 | 1.04 | 0.99 | 1.18 | 0.91 | 1.01 | 1.04 | 1.08 | 1.08 | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.02 |
| 5+ | 0.90 | 1.04 | 0.93 | 1.12 | 0.84 | 0.93 | 0.99 | 1.04 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.88* | 1.06 | 0.92 | 1.03 | 0.87 | 0.93 | 0.80*** | 0.80** | 0.76*** | 0.75*** | 0.91 | 0.77*** |
| Secondary or higher | 1.26* | 1.46** | 1.43*** | 1.35 | 1.70*** | 1.74*** | 1.54*** | 1.36** | 1.79*** | 1.00 | 1.32** | 1.45*** |
| Works for cash | 1.41*** | 1.75*** | 1.63*** | 1.74*** | 1.94*** | 1.98*** | 1.38*** | 1.96*** | 1.85*** | 1.23** | 1.23*** | 1.44*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 0.79*** | 0.90 | 0.80*** | 0.73** | 1.01 | 0.89 | 0.95 | 0.84* | 0.88* | 0.98 | 1.08 | 1.07 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0.91 | 1.04 | 0.93 | 0.79* | 1.10 | 0.98 | 0.89 | 1.06 | 0.95 | 0.89 | 1.13* | 1.05 |
| 25 years or more | 0.92 | 1.04 | 0.95 | 1.04 | 0.80 | 0.88 | 0.86 | 0.82 | 0.81 | 1.12 | 0.74* | 0.80 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 1.13* | 0.90 | 1.06 | 1.00 | 1.15 | 1.11 | 1.11 | 1.00 | 1.08 | 1.05 | 1.00 | 1.03 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.08 | 0.91 | 1.03 | 1.14 | 0.92 | 1.00 | 1.15 | 1.03 | 1.13 | 1.21* | 0.86* | 0.96 |
| Husband coresident | 0.39*** | 1.52** | 0.48*** | 0.19*** | 1.32* | 0.48*** | 0.30*** | 2.20*** | 0.47*** | 0.29*** | 1.97*** | 0.73*** |
| Urban residence | 1.28** | 0.94 | 1.19* | 0.85 | 1.26* | 1.16 | 1.21* | 0.93 | 1.11 | 0.86 | 1.31*** | 1.23* |
| Extended family residence | 1.05 | 1.08 | 1.07 | 1.06 | 1.14 | 1.14 | 1.04 | 1.07 | 1.07 | 1.07 | 1.03 | 1.09 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.92 | 1.13 | 0.96 | 0.76 | 1.23 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.74*** | 1.10 | 0.91 |
| Middle | 1.03 | 1.10 | 1.05 | 1.06 | 1.15 | 1.09 | 1.10 | 0.86 | 1.00 | 0.87 | 1.11 | 1.01 |
| Richer | 0.86 | 1.03 | 0.89 | 0.82 | 1.17 | 0.98 | 0.98 | 0.93 | 0.94 | 0.77** | 1.15 | 0.97 |
| Richest | 0.78* | 1.73*** | 0.99 | 0.89 | 2.05*** | 1.58*** | 1.25* | 1.31* | 1.35** | 0.66*** | 1.36*** | 1.08 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01** | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.98*** | 1.01* | 1.00 |
| Constant | 0.63*** | 0.06*** | .84 | 0.24*** | 0.10*** | 0.45*** | 0.78* | 0.06*** | 1.01 | 0.55*** | 0.45*** | 2.25*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.7. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Mali

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.31*** | 0.49** | 0.33*** | 0.46*** | 0.61* | 0.48*** | 0.51*** | 0.68* | 0.51*** | 0.53*** | 0.62** | 0.50*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.47*** | 0.66** | 0.49*** | 0.60*** | 0.62*** | 0.57*** | 0.68*** | 0.71** | 0.65*** | 0.64*** | 0.85 | 0.66*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.67*** | 0.88 | 0.71*** | 0.71*** | 0.84 | 0.73*** | 0.79*** | 0.98 | 0.82** | 0.75*** | 0.92 | 0.77*** |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.80 | 1.08 | 0.89 | 0.83 | 1.02 | 0.89 | 0.90 | 0.82 | 0.86 | 0.76* | 1.00 | 0.83* |
| 3 or 4 | 1.41*** | 0.84 | 1.18* | 1.18 | 0.98 | 1.11 | 1.29** | 0.94 | 1.20* | 1.10 | 0.88 | 1.00 |
| 5+ | 1.21 | 0.89 | 1.08 | 1.20 | 0.94 | 1.10 | 1.32*** | 0.95 | 1.23** | 1.04 | 0.89 | 0.97 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 1.10 | 0.89 | 1.02 | 1.14 | 0.83 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.85 | 0.90 | 1.12 | 0.97 | 1.07 |
| Secondary or higher | 2.06*** | 0.80 | 1.55** | 1.42* | 0.86 | 1.16 | 1.42* | 0.74 | 1.18 | 1.21 | 0.96 | 1.14 |
| Works for cash | 2.21*** | 2.26*** | 2.40*** | 1.71*** | 2.10*** | 1.97*** | 2.05*** | 2.38*** | 2.41*** | 1.93*** | 2.17*** | 2.32*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 0.80** | 0.73*** | 0.75*** | 0.71*** | 0.87 | 0.75*** | 0.84** | 0.84* | 0.81*** | 0.70*** | 1.10 | 0.81*** |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0.74*** | 1.14 | 0.86* | 0.73*** | 1.23* | 0.90 | 0.72*** | 1.26** | 0.85** | 0.81** | 1.24** | 0.96 |
| 25 years or more | 0.84 | 1.20 | 0.96 | 1.06 | 1.15 | 1.12 | 0.84 | 1.31 | 0.98 | 0.75 | 1.62** | 1.10 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 0.99 | 0.94 | 0.97 | 1.05 | 0.85 | 0.96 | 0.91 | 0.98 | 0.92 | 0.99 | 0.94 | 0.96 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.06 | 1.01 | 1.05 | 1.20 | 0.92 | 1.08 | 1.03 | 1.02 | 1.03 | 1.23* | 0.88 | 1.08 |
| Husband coresident | 0.31*** | 1.48* | 0.45*** | 0.38*** | 1.63** | 0.57*** | 0.51*** | 1.79*** | 0.67*** | 0.48*** | 1.56*** | 0.67*** |
| Urban residence | 1.05 | 0.87 | 0.98 | 1.02 | 0.86 | 0.95 | 0.91 | 0.88 | 0.89 | 0.68*** | 1.03 | 0.76** |
| Extended family residence | 1.12 | 0.72** | 0.96 | 1.04 | 0.70*** | 0.88 | 1.03 | 0.76** | 0.93 | 0.97 | 0.85 | 0.90 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 1.06 | 0.89 | 0.99 | 1.06 | 1.12 | 1.09 | 0.95 | 1.14 | 1.00 | 0.92 | 0.84 | 0.87 |
| Middle | 1.14 | 1.05 | 1.11 | 1.10 | 1.58*** | 1.29** | 0.85* | 1.59*** | 1.03 | 1.12 | 0.70*** | 0.92 |
| Richer | 1.07 | 0.88 | 1.00 | 1.07 | 1.47** | 1.23* | 0.78** | 1.35* | 0.90 | 1.08 | 0.68*** | 0.88 |
| Richest | 0.90 | 1.04 | 0.94 | 0.99 | 1.91*** | 1.32* | 0.67** | 1.51* | 0.84 | 1.03 | 0.88 | 0.96 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.01* | 1.00 | 1.01* | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01** | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.00* | 1.01** | 1.00 | 1.01** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.02*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** |
| Constant | 0.28*** | 0.03*** | 0.34*** | 0.22*** | 0.04*** | 0.30*** | 0.35*** | 0.04*** | 0.44*** | 0.20*** | 0.08*** | 0.37*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.8. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Mozambique

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.55*** | 0.96 | 0.54*** | 0.29*** | 0.53*** | 0.44*** | 0.33*** | 0.78* | 0.32*** | 0.34*** | 0.72** | 0.37*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.78** | 0.88 | 0.70*** | 0.56*** | 0.68*** | 0.60*** | 0.62*** | 0.78** | 0.51*** | 0.64*** | 0.74*** | 0.53*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.94 | 0.88 | 0.85* | 0.79 | 0.81** | 0.77*** | 0.99 | 0.75*** | 0.78*** | 0.79** | 0.91 | 0.75*** |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.85 | 0.86 | 0.79** | 0.77 | 0.99 | 0.95 | 0.76** | 1.04 | 0.82* | 0.81 | 0.94 | 0.84* |
| 3 or 4 | 0.99 | 1.09 | 1.05 | 0.91 | 0.94 | 0.93 | 0.97 | 0.98 | 0.97 | 0.90 | 0.98 | 0.92 |
| 5+ | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 0.90 | 0.89 | 0.87 | 0.82** | 0.97 | 0.80** | 0.86 | 1.10 | 1.00 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.83*** | 1.18** | 0.94 | 1.27 | 0.96 | 1.01 | 0.78*** | 0.99 | 0.80*** | 0.81** | 1.03 | 0.91 |
| Secondary or higher | 1.14 | 1.06 | 1.19 | 1.46 | 1.19 | 1.36** | 1.05 | 0.80 | 0.92 | 1.16 | 1.14 | 1.29* |
| Works for cash | 1.25*** | 0.99 | 1.27*** | 2.39*** | 1.40*** | 1.73*** | 1.61*** | 1.18* | 2.01*** | 1.19* | 1.23** | 1.42*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 1.07 | 1.04 | 1.10 | 0.86 | 1.12* | 1.08 | 1.18** | 0.97 | 1.13* | 1.07 | 1.01 | 1.05 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0.87** | 1.11 | 0.94 | 1.01 | 0.97 | 0.96 | 1.03 | 1.04 | 1.05 | 0.89 | 0.99 | 0.92 |
| 25 years or more | 0.88 | 1.06 | 0.92 | 1.07 | 1.00 | 1.02 | 1.17 | 0.87 | 1.04 | 0.84 | 1.02 | 0.90 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 0.98 | 1.04 | 1.00 | 1.30* | 1.08 | 1.13* | 1.21*** | 0.95 | 1.14* | 1.01 | 1.10 | 1.10 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 0.96 | 0.94 | 0.92 | 1.44** | 0.99 | 1.06 | 1.20** | 0.92 | 1.10 | 1.02 | 0.96 | 0.97 |
| Husband coresident | 0.39*** | 3.74*** | 0.70*** | 0.14*** | 2.01*** | 0.86 | 0.35*** | 2.59*** | 0.64*** | 0.22*** | 3.54*** | 0.77*** |
| Urban residence | 1.06 | 1.08 | 1.11 | 1.30 | 1.14 | 1.17* | 1.34*** | 1.00 | 1.28** | 0.97 | 1.06 | 1.03 |
| Extended family residence | 0.87** | 0.76*** | 0.73*** | 1.05 | 0.71*** | 0.73*** | 0.93 | 0.86* | 0.82*** | 1.01 | 0.75*** | 0.76*** |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 1.01 | 0.80** | 0.86* | 1.05 | 0.89 | 0.90 | 0.98 | 0.85* | 0.85* | 1.09 | 0.89 | 0.93 |
| Middle | 1.05 | 0.82* | 0.91 | 0.90 | 1.04 | 1.01 | 0.93 | 1.00 | 0.92 | 1.15 | 1.00 | 1.08 |
| Richer | 0.97 | 0.70*** | 0.76*** | 1.12 | 0.93 | 0.93 | 1.31** | 0.75** | 1.00 | 1.05 | 0.84* | 0.87 |
| Richest | 0.88 | 0.91 | 0.82 | 0.91 | 1.07 | 1.01 | 1.34* | 0.85 | 1.17 | 1.06 | 0.72** | 0.74** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.01* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.01*** | 0.99** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 0.99** | 1.01** | 1.01** | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Constant | 1.47*** | 0.08*** | 2.13*** | 0.26*** | 0.26*** | 0.75** | 1.47*** | 0.12*** | 2.52*** | 0.87 | 0.23*** | 2.12*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.9. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Nigeria

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.24*** | 0.23*** | 0.20*** | 0.34** | 0.24*** | 0.24*** | 0.26*** | 0.31*** | 0.22*** | 0.71 | 0.47*** | 0.49*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.36*** | 0.51*** | 0.34*** | 0.40*** | 0.45*** | 0.37*** | 0.50*** | 0.61*** | 0.43*** | 0.69** | 0.53*** | 0.49*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.56*** | 0.78* | 0.58*** | 0.70* | 0.72** | 0.67*** | 0.61*** | 0.79* | 0.58*** | 0.92 | 0.71*** | 0.72*** |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.82 | 0.81 | 0.77 | 0.75 | 0.87 | 0.81 | 0.93 | 0.90 | 0.89 | 0.56*** | 1.15 | 0.81 |
| 3 or 4 | 1.30* | 0.99 | 1.21 | 1.21 | 1.10 | 1.17 | 1.20 | 1.08 | 1.23* | 1.11 | 1.22 | 1.25* |
| 5+ | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.95 | 1.09 | 1.15 | 1.16 | 1.34* | 1.17 | 1.40** | 0.95 | 1.25 | 1.15 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.84 | 0.52*** | 0.62*** | 0.74 | 0.46*** | 0.49*** | 0.42*** | 0.46*** | 0.34*** | 1.09 | 0.46*** | 0.61*** |
| Secondary or higher | 1.13 | 1.05 | 1.12 | 1.01 | 1.04 | 1.03 | 0.95 | 1.04 | 0.99 | 0.95 | 1.12 | 1.07 |
| Works for cash | 1.83*** | 1.66*** | 1.96*** | 1.96*** | 1.95*** | 2.14*** | 1.60*** | 1.89*** | 2.08*** | 1.41*** | 1.47*** | 1.64*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 0.80* | 0.75** | 0.73*** | 1.04 | 0.91 | 0.95 | 0.99 | 0.84 | 0.88 | 0.83* | 0.91 | 0.83** |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 1.47*** | 1.36** | 1.55*** | 1.61*** | 1.33** | 1.52*** | 1.42*** | 1.21* | 1.48*** | 0.98 | 1.45*** | 1.32*** |
| 25 years or more | 1.72** | 1.27 | 1.69*** | 1.64* | 1.14 | 1.36* | 1.65*** | 1.10 | 1.60*** | 0.95 | 1.53** | 1.39* |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 1.03 | 0.94 | 0.97 | 0.74 | 0.88 | 0.80* | 0.84 | 0.94 | 0.83 | 0.96 | 0.90 | 0.88 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.02 | 0.85 | 0.91 | 0.93 | 0.76* | 0.77* | 0.87 | 0.76* | 0.73** | 0.94 | 0.82* | 0.82* |
| Husband coresident | 0.36*** | 1.28 | 0.52*** | 0.18*** | 1.31 | 0.45*** | 0.32*** | 1.55** | 0.46*** | 0.36*** | 1.42** | 0.60*** |
| Urban residence | 0.95 | 1.00 | 0.97 | 0.79 | 1.01 | 0.91 | 0.73** | 1.03 | 0.80* | 0.92 | 1.03 | 0.97 |
| Extended family residence | 0.75** | 0.96 | 0.81** | 0.64** | 0.94 | 0.80* | 0.93 | 1.02 | 0.96 | 0.95 | 1.03 | 0.99 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.85 | 0.91 | 0.86 | 0.76 | 0.96 | 0.88 | 1.02 | 0.92 | 0.97 | 0.89 | 0.91 | 0.87 |
| Middle | 0.87 | 0.98 | 0.90 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.79 | 0.95 | 0.82 | 0.85 | 0.93 | 0.98 | 0.95 |
| Richer | 1.21 | 0.92 | 1.08 | 0.72 | 0.88 | 0.80 | 0.98 | 0.91 | 0.92 | 0.64** | 1.09 | 0.82 |
| Richest | 1.07 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 0.55* | 0.86 | 0.70 | 1.00 | 0.91 | 0.96 | 0.75 | 1.18 | 0.98 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.02*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.00* | 1.01** | 1.00 | 1.01* | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Constant | 0.20*** | 0.09*** | 0.41*** | 0.17*** | 0.11*** | 0.41*** | 0.40*** | 0.12*** | 0.88 | 0.41*** | 0.28*** | 1.25 |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.10. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Rwanda

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.24*** | 1.22 | 0.61* | 0.26** | 0.74 | 0.42*** | 0.43* | 0.70 | 0.44*** | 0.15*** | 1.38 | 0.61* |
| 20 to 29 | 0.54*** | 1.01 | 0.67** | 0.28*** | 0.98 | 0.53*** | 0.46*** | 1.05 | 0.62*** | 0.44*** | 1.23 | 0.75* |
| 30 to 39 | 0.76* | 1.11 | 0.90 | 0.64*** | 0.98 | 0.76** | 0.73** | 1.01 | 0.79* | 0.78* | 1.08 | 0.91 |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.58* | 0.86 | 0.68* | 0.79 | 0.89 | 0.84 | 0.79 | 0.99 | 0.88 | 0.73 | 0.99 | 0.86 |
| 3 or 4 | 0.94 | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.92 | 0.95 | 0.93 | 0.88 | 1.01 | 0.94 | 0.77 | 1.13 | 0.99 |
| 5+ | 1.06 | 1.03 | 1.06 | 0.96 | 1.14 | 1.09 | 0.97 | 1.22 | 1.16 | 0.76 | 1.30* | 1.13 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.96 | 0.95 | 0.94 | 0.78* | 0.92 | 0.83* | 0.93 | 0.84* | 0.81** | 0.96 | 0.92 | 0.88 |
| Secondary or higher | 1.58** | 0.96 | 1.43* | 1.08 | 1.31 | 1.40* | 1.51** | 1.20 | 1.88*** | 0.73 | 1.51** | 1.31 |
| Works for cash | 1.64*** | 1.23* | 1.68*** | 1.73*** | 1.32** | 1.74*** | 1.31* | 1.20* | 1.48*** | 1.59*** | 1.04 | 1.43*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 0.74** | 1.01 | 0.84* | 0.95 | 0.91 | 0.89 | 1.31** | 0.91 | 1.08 | 0.79* | 1.19* | 1.06 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0.98 | 1.09 | 1.06 | 0.82 | 1.08 | 0.98 | 0.96 | 0.99 | 0.97 | 0.80* | 1.12 | 0.99 |
| 25 years or more | 0.87 | 1.09 | 0.97 | 0.86 | 1.08 | 0.99 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.91 | 0.73 | 1.04 | 0.85 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 1.24* | 1.11 | 1.23* | 1.12 | 1.09 | 1.12 | 1.16 | 1.00 | 1.09 | 1.13 | 1.04 | 1.11 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.63*** | 0.91 | 1.26** | 1.70*** | 0.88 | 1.13 | 1.34** | 0.90 | 1.08 | 1.22 | 0.85* | 0.93 |
| Husband coresident | 0.08*** | 4.81*** | 0.23*** | 0.06*** | 3.69*** | 0.22*** | 0.08*** | 3.85*** | 0.22*** | 0.07*** | 4.97*** | 0.32*** |
| Urban residence | 1.34 | 1.04 | 1.24 | 1.56* | 1.09 | 1.35 | 1.89*** | 0.91 | 1.56** | 1.16 | 0.83 | 0.88 |
| Extended family residence | 1.22 | 0.71** | 0.87 | 0.95 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 1.19 | 0.88 | 1.02 | 0.86 | 0.94 | 0.85 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 1.11 | 0.70** | 0.80* | 1.04 | 0.74** | 0.77* | 0.88 | 0.73** | 0.69** | 1.32 | 0.71** | 0.80 |
| Middle | 0.91 | 0.86 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.89 | 0.83 | 0.69* | 0.97 | 0.78* | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.95 |
| Richer | 1.13 | 0.75* | 0.84 | 0.79 | 0.81 | 0.74* | 0.71* | 0.82 | 0.67*** | 1.30 | 0.71** | 0.80 |
| Richest | 1.20 | 0.87 | 0.97 | 1.03 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.93 | 0.77 | 0.77 | 1.46 | 0.65** | 0.77 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.01 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Constant | 2.49*** | 0.08*** | 4.39*** | 2.33*** | 0.15*** | 4.53*** | 3.73*** | 0.13*** | 7.04*** | 1.42 | 0.24*** | 5.91*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.11. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Uganda

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.39*** | 1.14 | 0.43*** | 0.28*** | 0.46*** | 0.32*** | 0.35*** | 0.51*** | 0.32*** | 0.31*** | 0.94 | 0.40*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.64*** | 1.21 | 0.70** | 0.41*** | 0.74* | 0.52*** | 0.51*** | 0.79 | 0.51*** | 0.60*** | 0.82 | 0.54*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.85 | 1.12 | 0.90 | 0.87 | 0.89 | 0.84 | 0.91 | 0.83 | 0.79* | 0.89 | 0.83 | 0.75** |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.84 | 1.09 | 0.89 | 1.12 | 0.97 | 1.00 | 0.94 | 1.08 | 1.00 | 1.16 | 0.94 | 1.05 |
| 3 or 4 | 1.15 | 0.91 | 1.10 | 1.34* | 0.99 | 1.11 | 1.31* | 0.95 | 1.16 | 1.06 | 0.99 | 1.04 |
| 5+ | 1.03 | 1.10 | 1.10 | 1.13 | 1.12 | 1.14 | 0.98 | 1.18 | 1.12 | 0.87 | 1.10 | 0.97 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.97 | 1.03 | 0.98 | 1.26 | 1.22* | 1.30** | 1.01 | 1.11 | 1.09 | 1.08 | 1.04 | 1.09 |
| Secondary or higher | 1.18 | 1.14 | 1.32** | 1.20 | 1.56*** | 1.58*** | 1.20 | 1.43*** | 1.53*** | 1.12 | 1.12 | 1.23* |
| Works for cash | 1.43*** | 1.37*** | 1.79*** | 1.43*** | 1.98*** | 2.09*** | 1.29** | 2.33*** | 2.36*** | 0.71*** | 1.74*** | 1.29*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 0.86* | 1.04 | 0.88 | 0.69** | 0.97 | 0.84* | 0.82* | 0.92 | 0.83* | 0.66*** | 1.34*** | 0.95 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 1.04 | 0.98 | 1.03 | 0.67*** | 1.29*** | 1.07 | 0.88 | 1.26** | 1.13 | 0.78** | 1.28*** | 1.04 |
| 25 years or more | 1.13 | 0.97 | 1.14 | 0.78 | 1.29 | 1.14 | 0.74 | 1.46* | 1.14 | 0.82 | 1.48* | 1.31 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 0.95 | 1.09 | 1.01 | 0.89 | 1.11 | 1.04 | 0.87 | 1.08 | 0.97 | 0.93 | 1.08 | 1.01 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.01 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.85* | 0.89 | 0.91 | 0.85* | 1.01 | 0.91 | 0.92 |
| Husband coresident | 0.43*** | 2.46*** | 0.63*** | 0.19*** | 1.94*** | 0.61*** | 0.18*** | 2.29*** | 0.41*** | 0.24*** | 2.64*** | 0.55*** |
| Urban residence | 1.30* | 1.20 | 1.50*** | 1.87*** | 1.10 | 1.41** | 1.28 | 1.32* | 1.47*** | 1.48** | 0.96 | 1.29* |
| Extended family residence | 0.97 | 1.34*** | 1.20* | 1.08 | 0.96 | 0.99 | 1.14 | 1.02 | 1.11 | 1.14 | 1.00 | 1.11 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.97 | 0.98 | 0.96 | 1.07 | 1.01 | 1.05 | 1.02 | 0.95 | 0.96 | 1.25 | 0.85 | 1.05 |
| Middle | 0.91 | 0.85 | 0.81 | 1.09 | 0.90 | 0.95 | 1.08 | 0.88 | 0.93 | 1.07 | 0.81 | 0.88 |
| Richer | 0.95 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.85 | 0.82 | 0.79* | 0.96 | 0.85 | 0.83 | 0.75* | 0.84 | 0.70** |
| Richest | 1.25 | 0.73 | 1.03 | 0.82 | 0.97 | 0.90 | 1.69** | 0.74 | 1.10 | 0.77 | 1.07 | 0.89 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01* | 1.00* | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.01*** | 0.99*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 0.99* | 1.00 | 1.01** | 0.99*** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01** | 1.01* |
| Constant | 1.68*** | 0.12*** | 3.11*** | 0.49*** | 0.24*** | 1.19 | 0.87 | 0.24*** | 2.49*** | 1.12 | 0.24*** | 2.96*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.12. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Zambia

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.82 | 0.86 | 0.79 | 0.43** | 0.76 | 0.56*** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.64* | 0.78 | 0.65** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.90 | 0.91 | 0.87 | 0.64** | 0.98 | 0.80 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.84 | 0.91 | 0.83 |
| 30 to 39 | 1.17 | 0.93 | 1.12 | 0.77 | 1.18 | 1.02 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.89 | 0.95 | 0.89 |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.88 | 0.99 | 0.89 | 1.63* | 0.96 | 1.21 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.01 | 0.92 | 0.95 |
| 3 or 4 | 1.02 | 0.92 | 0.98 | 0.91 | 1.10 | 1.05 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
| 5+ | 1.03 | 0.90 | 0.98 | 1.04 | 1.09 | 1.09 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.11 | 1.13 | 1.17 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 1.30** | 1.13 | 1.33** | 1.04 | 1.17 | 1.16 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.15 | 1.22* | 1.27** |
| Secondary or higher | 1.05 | 1.17 | 1.12 | 1.04 | 1.59*** | 1.53*** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.28* | 1.09 | 1.24* |
| Works for cash | 1.30*** | 1.62*** | 1.55*** | 1.49*** | 1.76*** | 1.93*** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.39*** | 1.40*** | 1.60*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 0.97 | 0.93 | 0.94 | 0.84 | 1.08 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.89 | 0.92 | 0.88 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 1.14 | 0.92 | 1.08 | 1.12 | 0.95 | 1.01 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.98 | 1.01 | 1.00 |
| 25 years or more | 1.98*** | 1.02 | 1.96*** | 1.52 | 1.50* | 1.87*** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.19 | 1.35 | 1.48* |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 1.02 | 1.08 | 1.05 | 0.95 | 1.03 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.99 | 1.08 | 1.06 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.12 | 1.21 | 1.20* | 1.42** | 1.08 | 1.24* | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.87 | 1.09 | 0.99 |
| Husband coresident | 0.64*** | 2.15** | 0.86 | 0.37*** | 1.35* | 0.74* | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.38*** | 1.67*** | 0.73* |
| Urban residence | 1.36** | 0.77 | 1.16 | 1.13 | 0.84 | 0.90 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.30 | 0.99 | 1.15 |
| Extended family residence | 0.93 | 0.94 | 0.92 | 1.14 | 1.03 | 1.09 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.98 | 0.96 | 0.96 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.89 | 1.43* | 1.06 | 0.81 | 1.37** | 1.18 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.73* | 1.39** | 1.08 |
| Middle | 0.74** | 1.16 | 0.82 | 0.81 | 1.14 | 1.01 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.66** | 1.27* | 0.95 |
| Richer | 0.97 | 1.30 | 1.10 | 0.90 | 1.39* | 1.25 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.74 | 1.19 | 0.96 |
| Richest | 1.07 | 1.84* | 1.39 | 0.63 | 1.86** | 1.38 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.54* | 2.43*** | 1.49* |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.01* | 1.00* | 1.01* | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.01*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.00 | 0.98*** | 1.00* | 1.01 | 0.99** | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.00 | 0.99*** | 0.99** |
| Constant | 0.86 | 0.07*** | 1.12 | 0.25*** | 0.27*** | 0.81 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.46*** | 0.22*** | 1.06 |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

n/a = Not available

Appendix Table 2B.13. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Zimbabwe

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.54** | 1.15 | 0.58** | 0.61 | 0.51*** | 0.38*** | 0.41*** | 0.91 | 0.26*** | 0.52** | 0.78 | 0.37*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.78 | 0.83 | 0.71* | 0.74 | 0.64*** | 0.52*** | 0.66** | 0.81 | 0.40*** | 0.74* | 0.82 | 0.51*** |
| 30 to 39 | 1.01 | 0.91 | 0.96 | 0.80 | 0.95 | 0.81 | 0.96 | 0.80 | 0.72* | 0.82 | 1.03 | 0.78 |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.66** | 1.49* | 0.82 | 1.31 | 0.83 | 0.96 | 0.72* | 0.93 | 0.62** | 1.12 | 0.70* | 0.73* |
| 3 or 4 | 0.89 | 1.09 | 0.92 | 1.18 | 0.99 | 1.08 | 1.02 | 0.95 | 0.99 | 1.21 | 0.80* | 0.93 |
| 5+ | 1.00 | 0.88 | 0.94 | 1.12 | 0.88 | 0.92 | 0.93 | 1.06 | 0.93 | 1.16 | 0.84 | 0.91 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 1.17 | 0.91 | 1.13 | 1.31 | 0.87 | 1.03 | 0.91 | 0.87 | 0.74* | 1.35* | 0.74* | 0.94 |
| Secondary or higher | 1.05 | 1.12 | 1.11 | 0.91 | 1.29** | 1.23* | 1.23* | 1.15 | 1.56*** | 0.85 | 1.26** | 1.12 |
| Works for cash | 0.94 | 1.25* | 1.05 | 1.25* | 1.10 | 1.26** | 1.10 | 1.00 | 1.17 | 1.12 | 1.18* | 1.45*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 1.04 | 0.79 | 0.93 | 1.03 | 0.99 | 1.01 | 1.32** | 0.71*** | 1.07 | 1.08 | 0.97 | 1.05 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 1.04 | 0.97 | 1.03 | 0.87 | 1.10 | 1.01 | 0.92 | 1.02 | 0.90 | 0.96 | 1.00 | 0.95 |
| 25 years or more | 1.05 | 1.27 | 1.23 | 0.85 | 1.09 | 0.99 | 0.87 | 1.03 | 0.85 | 0.78 | 1.16 | 0.92 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 1.07 | 0.99 | 1.07 | 1.04 | 1.05 | 1.08 | 0.92 | 0.99 | 0.87 | 0.92 | 1.00 | 0.89 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 0.89 | 1.09 | 0.92 | 1.11 | 0.85 | 0.90 | 0.81* | 1.00 | 0.72** | 0.88 | 0.89 | 0.73** |
| Husband coresident | 0.48*** | 2.64*** | 0.68*** | 0.60*** | 1.40*** | 1.03 | 0.56*** | 2.13*** | 0.87 | 0.36*** | 2.45*** | 0.92 |
| Urban residence | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.94 | 0.92 | 1.42* | 1.41 | 0.94 | 1.30 | 1.22 | 1.36 | 1.17 | 1.91** |
| Extended family residence | 0.98 | 1.01 | 0.98 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.07 | 0.88 | 0.96 | 0.80* | 0.99 | 0.96 | 0.95 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.88 | 1.49* | 1.04 | 0.76 | 1.23 | 1.03 | 0.99 | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.88 | 1.09 | 0.98 |
| Middle | 1.04 | 1.58** | 1.27* | 0.75* | 1.36** | 1.14 | 1.05 | 1.16 | 1.22 | 0.96 | 1.21 | 1.21 |
| Richer | 0.84 | 1.83*** | 1.09 | 0.87 | 1.43* | 1.32 | 0.85 | 1.38 | 1.08 | 0.81 | 1.39* | 1.21 |
| Richest | 0.89 | 2.27** | 1.30 | 0.64 | 2.04*** | 1.67* | 0.86 | 1.45 | 1.25 | 0.86 | 1.42 | 1.43 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.01** | 0.99* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99* | 1.00 | 1.01** | 0.99* | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Constant | 1.48* | 0.08*** | 2.19*** | 0.26*** | 0.74 | 1.88*** | 1.59** | 0.18*** | 3.75*** | 1.09 | 0.38*** | 4.26*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.14. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Armenia

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.37*** | 1.02 | 0.45*** | 0.06** | 0.41*** | 0.24*** | 0.07*** | 0.82 | 0.15*** | 0.20** | 0.48** | 0.25*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.52*** | 1.03 | 0.53*** | 0.23*** | 0.51*** | 0.33*** | 0.30*** | 0.92 | 0.28*** | 0.29*** | 0.79* | 0.42*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.78** | 1.20* | 0.94 | 0.70** | 0.86 | 0.71*** | 0.83* | 1.02 | 0.77** | 0.57*** | 1.09 | 0.76** |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.80 | 1.07 | 0.87 | 1.23 | 1.04 | 1.09 | 0.82 | 1.02 | 0.87 | 1.13 | 1.05 | 1.09 |
| 3 or 4 | 0.84* | 1.10 | 0.93 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.90 | 0.99 | 1.02 | 1.01 | 0.82 | 1.06 | 0.96 |
| 5+ | 0.69* | 1.00 | 0.67* | 0.97 | 0.79 | 0.75 | 0.82 | 1.05 | 0.79 | 0.75 | 0.87 | 0.69* |
| Education (No or primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Secondary or higher | 0.47 | 1.17 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 1.48 | 1.03 | 2.27 | 1.06 | 2.08 | 1.34* | 1.17 | 1.56*** |
| Works for cash | 1.50*** | 0.89 | 1.46*** | 1.21 | 1.16 | 1.32** | 1.12 | 1.12 | 1.35** | 1.34* | 1.17 | 1.56*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 0.79 | 1.08 | 0.87 | 0.78 | 1.19 | 1.10 | 1.12 | 1.02 | 1.16 | 0.68* | 1.29* | 1.10 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 1.15 | 1.06 | 1.20* | 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 1.03 | 0.95 | 0.98 | 1.03 | 1.05 | 1.07 |
| 25 years or more | 1.23 | 1.03 | 1.28 | 0.85 | 1.06 | 1.02 | 0.92 | 0.91 | 0.80 | 0.77 | 1.39* | 1.36 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 1.06 | 1.05 | 1.13 | 1.15 | 0.93 | 0.97 | 1.12 | 0.94 | 1.05 | 1.00 | 1.03 | 1.03 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.06 | 1.05 | 1.13 | 1.19 | 0.76* | 0.79 | 1.08 | 0.89 | 0.97 | 1.22 | 0.99 | 1.08 |
| Husband coresident | 0.37*** | 1.88*** | 0.61*** | 0.17*** | 2.08*** | 0.73** | 0.37*** | 2.22*** | 0.61*** | 0.15*** | 3.14*** | 0.89 |
| Urban residence | 1.52*** | 0.95 | 1.47*** | 1.39* | 1.14 | 1.29** | 1.57*** | 0.71*** | 1.16 | 1.20 | 1.06 | 1.18 |
| Extended family residence | 1.02 | 0.91 | 0.90 | 0.83 | 0.87* | 0.80** | 0.73*** | 0.95 | 0.65*** | 0.96 | 0.84* | 0.78** |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.93 | 1.16 | 1.10 | 0.68* | 0.98 | 0.87 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.81 | 1.25* | 1.18 |
| Middle | 1.07 | 1.20 | 1.35* | 0.91 | 1.15 | 1.15 | 1.16 | 1.11 | 1.31* | 0.85 | 1.43** | 1.45** |
| Richer | 1.14 | 0.93 | 1.01 | 0.66 | 0.99 | 0.84 | 0.98 | 1.19 | 1.16 | 0.56** | 1.80*** | 1.54** |
| Richest | 1.09 | 0.96 | 1.01 | 0.69 | 1.19 | 1.07 | 0.88 | 1.36* | 1.18 | 0.48** | 2.05*** | 1.70** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.01* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01* |
| Constant | 1.26 | 0.27** | 4.01* | 0.13* | 0.18*** | 0.56 | 1.93 | 0.04*** | 1.75 | 0.53 | 0.25** | 1.34 |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.15. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Jordan

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.74 | 1.15 | 0.74 | 0.19** | 0.57** | 0.35*** | 0.39*** | 0.97 | 0.44*** | 0.13*** | 0.70 | 0.23*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.84 | 1.14 | 0.87 | 0.37*** | 0.88 | 0.59*** | 0.64*** | 0.96 | 0.63*** | 0.51*** | 0.93 | 0.48*** |
| 30 to 39 | 1.03 | 0.97 | 1.03 | 0.62*** | 0.97 | 0.77** | 0.88 | 0.98 | 0.87 | 0.67*** | 1.06 | 0.72** |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.59*** | 1.55*** | 0.76 | 1.08 | 1.05 | 1.06 | 0.72* | 1.13 | 0.87 | 0.67* | 1.25 | 1.09 |
| 3 or 4 | 1.04 | 0.96 | 1.04 | 1.07 | 0.96 | 0.99 | 1.16 | 0.86 | 1.01 | 1.17 | 0.98 | 1.11 |
| 5+ | 1.22* | 0.86 | 1.20 | 1.33 | 0.79* | 0.86 | 1.19 | 0.78* | 0.95 | 1.24 | 0.86 | 0.96 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.88 | 1.05 | 0.87 | 0.60* | 0.86 | 0.72** | 0.75* | 0.88 | 0.71** | 0.98 | 0.85 | 0.79 |
| Secondary or higher | 1.10 | 1.18 | 1.55*** | 1.06 | 1.37*** | 1.43*** | 1.10 | 1.26* | 1.33** | 1.33* | 1.37*** | 1.95*** |
| Works for cash | 1.08 | 1.02 | 1.28 | 2.07*** | 1.09 | 1.60*** | 1.01 | 1.17 | 1.16 | 1.17 | 1.20 | 1.66*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 1.08 | 1.16 | 1.42** | 1.10 | 1.10 | 1.14 | 1.37** | 0.84 | 1.15 | 0.77* | 1.15 | 0.97 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0.99 | 1.03 | 1.04 | 1.01 | 1.06 | 1.07 | 0.82** | 0.98 | 0.81** | 0.75** | 1.10 | 0.91 |
| 25 years or more | 1.11 | 0.90 | 1.04 | 0.80 | 1.08 | 0.99 | 0.63*** | 1.13 | 0.72** | 0.67** | 1.05 | 0.77 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 1.02 | 0.89 | 0.84 | 1.12 | 0.95 | 0.99 | 0.92 | 0.96 | 0.89 | 1.01 | 0.98 | 0.98 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.03 | 0.85 | 0.81 | 1.41** | 0.89 | 1.01 | 0.77** | 1.05 | 0.82** | 1.13 | 0.87 | 0.91 |
| Husband coresident | 0.61*** | 1.41* | 0.62* | 0.29*** | 1.59*** | 0.85 | 0.41*** | 1.93*** | 0.66** | 0.23*** | 2.86*** | 0.98 |
| Urban residence | 1.04 | 0.96 | 1.01 | 1.19 | 0.89 | 0.94 | 1.45*** | 0.86* | 1.25*** | 1.42*** | 0.94 | 1.19* |
| Extended family residence | 0.99 | 0.97 | 0.94 | 0.87 | 0.68*** | 0.65*** | 0.69*** | 0.90 | 0.67*** | 0.87 | 0.82* | 0.71*** |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.92 | 1.12 | 1.00 | 0.76* | 1.29** | 1.18* | 0.89 | 1.17 | 1.02 | 0.91 | 1.39*** | 1.43*** |
| Middle | 0.92 | 1.23* | 1.18 | 0.66** | 1.37*** | 1.19* | 0.84* | 1.12 | 0.94 | 0.85 | 1.47*** | 1.47*** |
| Richer | 0.96 | 1.07 | 1.01 | 0.69* | 1.29** | 1.13 | 0.83* | 1.01 | 0.84 | 0.68** | 1.93*** | 1.87*** |
| Richest | 0.97 | 1.22 | 1.35 | 0.64** | 1.64*** | 1.45*** | 0.82 | 1.26* | 1.01 | 0.71* | 1.96*** | 2.07*** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99* | 0.99** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Constant | 1.51 | 0.29*** | 5.51*** | 0.47* | 0.45*** | 1.61* | 0.62* | 0.34*** | 2.31*** | 0.40** | 0.45*** | 2.19** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
n/a = Not available

Appendix Table 2B.16. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Morocco

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.21*** | 0.61** | 0.41*** | 0.23*** | 0.57*** | 0.41*** | 0.29*** | 0.63** | 0.42*** | 0.25*** | 0.65** | 0.47*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.43*** | 0.81** | 0.57*** | 0.28*** | 0.88 | 0.60*** | 0.42*** | 0.94 | 0.61*** | 0.38*** | 0.82** | 0.59*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.75*** | 1.05 | 0.89* | 0.62*** | 1.02 | 0.83** | 0.70*** | 1.08 | 0.86* | 0.67*** | 1.04 | 0.88* |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.91 | 0.80** | 0.76** | 0.78 | 0.91 | 0.85 | 0.56*** | 0.98 | 0.79** | 0.84 | 0.84* | 0.79** |
| 3 or 4 | 1.14 | 0.94 | 1.02 | 0.99 | 1.04 | 1.06 | 0.95 | 1.08 | 1.08 | 1.05 | 0.97 | 1.00 |
| 5+ | 1.11 | 0.89 | 0.90 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 0.96 | 0.90 | 1.09 | 1.01 | 0.96 | 0.94 | 0.90 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.84 | 0.93 | 0.86* | 0.70** | 0.87* | 0.77*** | 0.81* | 0.99 | 0.87* | 0.75* | 0.94 | 0.84* |
| Secondary or higher | 0.91 | 1.26** | 1.26** | 0.89 | 1.39*** | 1.40*** | 0.85 | 1.32*** | 1.21* | 0.89 | 1.34*** | 1.36*** |
| Works for cash | 2.40*** | 1.11 | 2.23*** | 2.62*** | 1.27** | 2.37*** | 1.86*** | 1.25** | 2.15*** | 2.16*** | 1.16 | 1.95*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 0.93 | 0.99 | 0.97 | 0.84 | 1.12 | 1.08 | 0.96 | 0.98 | 0.97 | 0.98 | 0.96 | 0.96 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0.96 | 0.98 | 0.97 | 1.06 | 0.93 | 0.94 | 0.92 | 0.96 | 0.93 | 1.06 | 1.04 | 1.06 |
| 25 years or more | 0.85 | 0.98 | 0.92 | 0.71* | 1.07 | 0.96 | 0.71** | 1.03 | 0.86 | 0.76 | 1.12 | 1.02 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 0.92 | 1.10 | 1.07 | 0.91 | 1.08 | 1.06 | 1.09 | 1.03 | 1.07 | 1.08 | 1.00 | 1.02 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.29** | 0.89* | 0.96 | 1.36** | 0.92 | 1.00 | 1.16 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 1.40** | 0.94 | 1.03 |
| Husband coresident | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Urban residence | 1.93*** | 1.44*** | 1.86*** | 2.13*** | 1.48*** | 1.84*** | 2.72*** | 1.27** | 2.00*** | 2.28*** | 1.32*** | 1.68*** |
| Extended family residence | 0.78** | 0.64*** | 0.57*** | 0.66*** | 0.63*** | 0.56*** | 0.65*** | 0.72*** | 0.60*** | 0.85 | 0.63*** | 0.58*** |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.85 | 1.19* | 1.13 | 0.88 | 1.15 | 1.12 | 0.91 | 1.05 | 1.01 | 0.96 | 1.09 | 1.09 |
| Middle | 0.90 | 1.24* | 1.20 | 0.83 | 1.24* | 1.18 | 1.19 | 1.03 | 1.11 | 0.97 | 1.14 | 1.13 |
| Richer | 0.88 | 1.12 | 1.05 | 0.83 | 1.21 | 1.14 | 1.19 | 0.96 | 1.03 | 0.95 | 1.21 | 1.18 |
| Richest | 0.75 | 1.30* | 1.17 | 0.60* | 1.43** | 1.24 | 1.00 | 0.98 | 0.96 | 0.74 | 1.45** | 1.36* |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.00** | 1.00 | 1.00** | 1.00** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.00** | 1.00** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.01** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01* | 1.00* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00** | 0.99*** |
| Constant | 0.06*** | 0.79* | 1.40** | 0.05*** | 0.89 | 1.45** | 0.09*** | 0.47*** | 0.91 | 0.09*** | 1.45** | 2.59*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

n/a = Not available

Appendix Table 2B.17. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Cambodia

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.53* | 1.14 | 0.34** | 0.48* | 1.01 | 0.38** | 0.52* | 1.33 | 0.29* | 0.30** | 1.29 | 0.16** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.77 | 0.99 | 0.47** | 0.60** | 0.99 | 0.45*** | 0.71* | 1.12 | 0.33** | 0.59* | 1.19 | 0.31** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.88 | 0.97 | 0.61* | 0.92 | 1.00 | 0.86 | 0.88 | 1.07 | 0.64 | 0.77 | 1.23 | 0.88 |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.85 | 0.99 | 0.76 | 0.63 | 0.99 | 0.69 | 0.66* | 1.19 | 0.60 | 0.67 | 1.05 | 0.65 |
| 3 or 4 | 0.93 | 1.00 | 0.85 | 0.96 | 1.07 | 1.11 | 0.97 | 1.10 | 1.33 | 0.73 | 1.38* | 1.40 |
| 5+ | 0.89 | 1.02 | 0.79 | 0.79 | 1.05 | 0.75 | 1.11 | 0.91 | 1.18 | 0.68 | 1.37 | 0.95 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.89 | 1.08 | 0.97 | 0.86 | 1.04 | 0.85 | 0.76* | 1.18 | 0.59* | 0.99 | 1.01 | 1.01 |
| Secondary or higher | 1.17 | 0.92 | 1.20 | 0.71 | 1.29 | 1.07 | 0.92 | 1.12 | 1.15 | 0.93 | 1.10 | 1.09 |
| Works for cash | 1.30** | 0.82* | 1.15 | 1.11 | 0.97 | 1.11 | 1.21 | 0.83 | 1.08 | 1.51** | 0.67*** | 0.81 |
| Has regular media exposure | 1.18 | 0.88 | 1.02 | 0.90 | 1.09 | 0.98 | 1.37** | 0.75* | 1.23 | 0.94 | 0.96 | 0.67 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 1.01 | 0.94 | 0.85 | 0.91 | 1.02 | 0.91 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 0.97 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.74 |
| 25 years or more | 0.83 | 1.06 | 0.72 | 0.55** | 1.28 | 0.67 | 0.81 | 1.24 | 0.95 | 0.85 | 0.92 | 0.39* |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 0.94 | 1.01 | 0.89 | 1.02 | 0.98 | 1.00 | 0.85 | 1.17 | 0.97 | 1.04 | 0.92 | 0.81 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.24 | 0.83 | 1.00 | 1.06 | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.72* | 1.26 | 0.56 | 1.41 | 0.73 | 0.86 |
| Husband coresident | 0.41*** | 2.24*** | 0.87 | 0.36*** | 3.04*** | 1.43 | 0.50* | 3.58*** | 1.98 | 0.27*** | 4.26*** | 3.01** |
| Urban residence | 0.80 | 1.12 | 0.79 | 1.04 | 0.87 | 0.82 | 1.06 | 0.96 | 1.14 | 1.25 | 0.85 | 1.17 |
| Extended family residence | 0.88 | 1.04 | 0.84 | 0.97 | 0.83 | 0.68** | 0.75** | 0.98 | 0.28*** | 1.10 | 0.92 | 1.03 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 1.33* | 0.86 | 1.24 | 0.83 | 1.35* | 1.34 | 0.83 | 1.33* | 1.35 | 0.79 | 1.10 | 0.72 |
| Middle | 1.25 | 1.03 | 1.85* | 0.75 | 1.51** | 1.46 | 1.19 | 1.00 | 2.44* | 0.80 | 1.28 | 1.33 |
| Richer | 1.46* | 0.73* | 0.98 | 0.69* | 1.37* | 1.03 | 0.80 | 1.17 | 0.66 | 0.92 | 0.95 | 0.66 |
| Richest | 1.61** | 0.73 | 1.32 | 0.61* | 1.38 | 0.90 | 1.18 | 0.80 | 0.79 | 0.70 | 1.48 | 1.70 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01* | 1.00* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Constant | 0.86 | 0.64 | 7.11*** | 0.67 | 0.49** | 3.07*** | 2.83*** | 0.12*** | 6.56*** | 0.49* | 0.99 | 6.50*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.18. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Indonesia

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.73*** | 1.02 | 0.56*** | 0.91 | 0.67*** | 0.54*** | 0.64*** | 1.12 | 0.32*** | 0.78 | 0.80* | 0.55*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.89** | 0.99 | 0.75*** | 0.91 | 0.83*** | 0.70*** | 0.96 | 0.94 | 0.62*** | 0.86* | 1.01 | 0.85* |
| 30 to 39 | 0.98 | 0.97 | 0.90* | 0.97 | 0.96 | 0.92* | 1.07 | 0.92* | 0.98 | 0.97 | 1.02 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.79*** | 1.12* | 0.78*** | 0.88 | 0.97 | 0.87* | 0.75*** | 1.21** | 0.61*** | 0.84* | 0.99 | 0.81** |
| 3 or 4 | 1.05 | 0.91** | 0.91 | 1.12* | 0.89** | 0.92 | 1.08 | 0.86*** | 0.77** | 1.03 | 0.95 | 0.93 |
| 5+ | 0.98 | 0.86*** | 0.71*** | 1.34*** | 0.67*** | 0.71*** | 1.08 | 0.84** | 0.71** | 1.19** | 0.82*** | 0.83* |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.84*** | 1.03 | 0.74*** | 0.88 | 0.88* | 0.77*** | 0.88* | 0.98 | 0.59*** | 1.02 | 0.90 | 0.84* |
| Secondary or higher | 1.01 | 1.08* | 1.20*** | 1.01 | 1.15*** | 1.24*** | 1.00 | 1.04 | 1.17 | 0.89* | 1.14*** | 1.12* |
| Works for cash | 1.18*** | 0.96 | 1.37*** | 1.19*** | 1.07* | 1.30*** | 1.10* | 0.99 | 1.54*** | 1.24*** | 1.04 | 1.46*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 0.93* | 1.01 | 0.86** | 1.08 | 1.03 | 1.10* | 1.19*** | 0.82*** | 1.03 | 1.04 | 1.01 | 1.06 |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0.96 | 1.03 | 0.98 | 0.96 | 1.05 | 1.04 | 0.91* | 1.12** | 1.04 | 0.99 | 1.04 | 1.07 |
| 25 years or more | 0.87** | 1.14* | 0.97 | 0.91 | 1.10 | 1.08 | 0.83** | 1.25*** | 1.03 | 0.80** | 1.21** | 1.08 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 0.97 | 1.04 | 1.03 | 1.06 | 0.95 | 0.97 | 1.03 | 0.99 | 1.11 | 0.97 | 1.00 | 0.97 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.08 | 0.92* | 0.99 | 1.27*** | 0.82*** | 0.91* | 1.03 | 0.95 | 0.94 | 1.17** | 0.86*** | 0.91 |
| Husband coresident | 0.29*** | 3.35*** | 0.55*** | 0.20*** | 2.85*** | 0.74** | 0.72*** | 1.79*** | 1.55** | 0.15*** | 4.50*** | 0.83 |
| Urban residence | 1.28*** | 0.79*** | 1.07 | 1.52*** | 0.78*** | 0.97 | 1.17*** | 0.84*** | 1.04 | 1.08 | 0.85*** | 0.81*** |
| Extended family residence | 0.98 | 1.01 | 0.98 | 1.13** | 0.99 | 1.09* | 0.80*** | 1.18*** | 0.69*** | 1.12** | 0.95 | 1.04 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 1.04 | 0.97 | 1.02 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.86** | 1.14** | 0.86** | 1.00 | 1.03 | 0.91* | 0.87* |
| Middle | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.03 | 0.86* | 0.97 | 0.85** | 1.19** | 0.84** | 1.12 | 1.08 | 0.88* | 0.87* |
| Richer | 1.13** | 0.92 | 1.10 | 0.96 | 0.88** | 0.80*** | 1.26*** | 0.81*** | 1.22 | 1.14 | 0.88* | 0.93 |
| Richest | 1.30*** | 0.84** | 1.32*** | 0.84* | 0.95 | 0.82** | 1.17* | 0.88 | 1.28 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.98 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00*** | 1.00*** | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.00** | 1.01*** | 1.00*** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00*** | 1.00*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.00*** | 1.00*** | 1.00 | 1.00*** | 1.00*** | 1.00 | 1.00*** | 1.00*** | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.00*** | 1.00* |
| Constant | 2.99*** | 0.19*** | 11.01*** | 0.92 | 0.48*** | 3.75*** | 4.44*** | 0.12*** | 12.40*** | 1.13 | 0.48*** | 5.97*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.19. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Nepal

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.17*** | 0.32*** | 0.20*** | 0.16*** | 0.23*** | 0.15*** | 0.16*** | 0.29*** | 0.14*** | 0.13*** | 0.26*** | 0.16*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.51*** | 0.72** | 0.55*** | 0.44*** | 0.53*** | 0.40*** | 0.48*** | 0.69*** | 0.43*** | 0.43*** | 0.62*** | 0.44*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.92 | 0.79** | 0.82** | 0.85 | 0.80** | 0.77*** | 0.94 | 0.82* | 0.83** | 0.82* | 0.79** | 0.74*** |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.48*** | 0.69* | 0.54*** | 0.60** | 0.78 | 0.67** | 0.56*** | 0.71* | 0.57*** | 0.58** | 0.65** | 0.58*** |
| 3 or 4 | 1.31** | 1.02 | 1.20* | 1.43*** | 1.07 | 1.28*** | 1.46*** | 1.15 | 1.49*** | 1.50*** | 1.04 | 1.28*** |
| 5+ | 0.98 | 1.14 | 1.08 | 1.07 | 1.08 | 1.08 | 1.11 | 1.17 | 1.17 | 1.29* | 1.02 | 1.13 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.69*** | 1.12 | 0.85 | 0.75** | 0.95 | 0.81** | 0.71*** | 1.08 | 0.78** | 0.78* | 0.90 | 0.79** |
| Secondary or higher | 0.85 | 1.42** | 1.12 | 0.86 | 1.50*** | 1.22 | 1.10 | 1.19 | 1.18 | 0.90 | 1.16 | 1.03 |
| Works for cash | 1.95*** | 1.50*** | 1.95*** | 2.19*** | 1.27** | 1.95*** | 2.13*** | 1.11 | 2.18*** | 1.69*** | 1.18* | 1.56*** |
| Has regular media exposure | 1.34*** | 0.90 | 1.09 | 1.36*** | 1.05 | 1.20** | 1.29*** | 1.03 | 1.23*** | 1.23* | 1.02 | 1.12* |
| Age at first marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18 years or more | 1.17* | 0.91 | 1.03 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.96 | 0.89 | 0.96 | 0.89* | 1.16 | 0.93 | 1.02 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 1.04 | 0.91 | 0.96 | 1.30** | 1.06 | 1.18** | 1.22** | 1.04 | 1.18** | 1.16 | 1.07 | 1.13* |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.25* | 0.92 | 1.07 | 1.50*** | 1.11 | 1.33*** | 1.24* | 1.05 | 1.21* | 1.38** | 1.03 | 1.20* |
| Husband coresident | 0.09*** | 1.57*** | 0.25*** | 0.12*** | 1.86*** | 0.37*** | 0.20*** | 2.83*** | 0.40*** | 0.09*** | 2.92*** | 0.41*** |
| Urban residence | 1.50** | 0.78* | 1.08 | 0.98 | 0.66*** | 0.73*** | 1.02 | 0.77* | 0.90 | 1.58*** | 0.80* | 1.11 |
| Extended family residence | 0.42*** | 0.71*** | 0.51*** | 0.44*** | 0.56*** | 0.43*** | 0.41*** | 0.75*** | 0.42*** | 0.39*** | 0.59*** | 0.42*** |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.93 | 1.03 | 0.99 | 0.71** | 1.12 | 0.94 | 0.92 | 0.98 | 0.94 | 0.78* | 1.14 | 1.00 |
| Middle | 0.78* | 1.17 | 1.00 | 0.69** | 1.14 | 0.93 | 0.88 | 1.08 | 0.96 | 0.82 | 1.14 | 1.02 |
| Richer | 0.88 | 1.12 | 1.01 | 0.67** | 1.06 | 0.86 | 0.77** | 1.01 | 0.83* | 0.80 | 1.19 | 1.04 |
| Richest | 1.05 | 1.27 | 1.23 | 0.71* | 1.23 | 1.01 | 0.85 | 1.22 | 1.01 | 0.98 | 1.26 | 1.22 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.01** | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.01** | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00* |
| Constant | 0.76 | 0.08*** | 0.94 | 0.33*** | 0.10*** | 0.66*** | 0.77* | 0.06*** | 1.12 | 0.78 | 0.10*** | 1.21 |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.20. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Philippines

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.70* | 1.08 | 0.51* | 0.56** | 0.55*** | 0.30*** | 0.40*** | 0.97 | 0.23*** | 0.88 | 0.59*** | 0.33*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.89 | 1.05 | 0.77 | 0.82* | 0.82** | 0.61*** | 0.57*** | 1.32*** | 0.49*** | 0.83* | 0.98 | 0.65*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.96 | 1.05 | 0.98 | 0.82** | 1.05 | 0.85* | 0.82*** | 1.16* | 0.82* | 0.77*** | 1.13* | 0.77** |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.82* | 1.06 | 0.63** | 0.97 | 0.84 | 0.78* | 0.83* | 1.02 | 0.77* | 0.99 | 0.97 | 0.91 |
| 3 or 4 | 0.99 | 1.04 | 1.11 | 1.19* | 0.88* | 0.99 | 1.10 | 0.95 | 1.12 | 1.12 | 0.92 | 1.03 |
| 5+ | 1.05 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 1.07 | 0.93 | 0.97 | 0.96 | 0.98 | 0.86 | 1.01 | 0.97 | 0.95 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.67* | 1.56* | 0.94 | 0.33*** | 1.80*** | 0.93 | 0.61** | 1.79*** | 1.27 | 0.86 | 1.33 | 1.60 |
| Secondary or higher | 0.94 | 1.16* | 1.19 | 0.85* | 1.09 | 0.95 | 1.09 | 0.96 | 1.10 | 0.85* | 1.15* | 1.02 |
| Works for cash | 0.88* | 1.29*** | 1.33** | 1.18** | 1.06 | 1.30*** | 1.10* | 1.02 | 1.29*** | 0.98 | 1.15** | 1.33*** |
| Regular media exposure | 1.08 | 0.87 | 0.88 | 1.30** | 0.82* | 0.97 | 1.20* | 0.84* | 1.05 | 0.94 | 0.97 | 0.82 |
| Age at marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Between 18 and 24 years | 1.11 | 0.98 | 1.32* | 0.97 | 0.96 | 0.91 | 0.98 | 0.95 | 0.86 | 1.05 | 0.98 | 1.04 |
| 25 or more years | 1.10 | 1.02 | 1.46* | 0.91 | 1.15 | 1.11 | 0.89 | 1.11 | 0.93 | 0.99 | 1.08 | 1.16 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 1.07 | 1.04 | 1.44** | 1.15* | 1.05 | 1.25** | 1.04 | 1.02 | 1.14 | 1.04 | 1.01 | 1.10 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.02 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 1.04 | 0.93 | 0.94 | 1.11 | 0.86 | 0.89 |
| Husband coresident | 0.54*** | 2.34*** | 1.05 | 0.41*** | 2.59*** | 1.37** | 0.62*** | 2.74*** | 1.58*** | 0.31*** | 3.54*** | 1.37* |
| Urban residence | 1.07 | 0.98 | 1.21 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 1.04 | 0.91 | 0.93 | 0.99 | 0.97 | 0.93 |
| Extended family structure | 1.11 | 0.83** | 0.87 | 1.14* | 0.76*** | 0.78*** | 0.83*** | 0.93 | 0.59*** | 1.17** | 0.81*** | 0.84* |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 1.16 | 0.90 | 1.22 | 0.97 | 1.02 | 1.00 | 1.19* | 0.91 | 1.22 | 0.99 | 1.03 | 1.06 |
| Middle | 1.08 | 0.98 | 1.22 | 0.74** | 1.21* | 0.96 | 1.13 | 0.93 | 1.16 | 1.00 | 1.05 | 1.12 |
| Richer | 1.10 | 1.03 | 1.52* | 0.68*** | 1.28** | 0.96 | 1.06 | 1.04 | 1.23 | 0.83 | 1.31** | 1.28 |
| Richest | 1.23 | 0.89 | 1.41 | 0.59*** | 1.50*** | 1.05 | 0.96 | 1.13 | 1.16 | 0.86 | 1.28* | 1.30 |
| Community level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.00** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch TV regularly | 1.00 | 1.00* | 0.99** | 1.00*** | 0.99*** | 1.00** | 1.01*** | 0.99*** | 1.00 | 1.01*** | 0.99*** | 0.99*** |
| Constant | 4.32*** | 0.14*** | 20.87*** | 0.31*** | 0.83 | 3.09*** | 1.00 | 0.30*** | 4.11*** | 0.79 | 0.71* | 8.75*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.21. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Bolivia

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.75* | 1.09 | 0.67* | 0.28*** | 0.79 | 0.46*** | 0.60*** | 0.95 | 0.31*** | 0.52*** | 0.97 | 0.44*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.95 | 0.99 | 0.85 | 0.53*** | 0.95 | 0.67*** | 0.75*** | 1.03 | 0.47*** | 0.62*** | 1.14 | 0.67*** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.92 | 1.05 | 0.91 | 0.65*** | 1.09 | 0.87* | 0.87* | 1.06 | 0.79* | 0.73*** | 1.11 | 0.80** |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.72** | 1.21 | 0.73* | 0.92 | 0.82 | 0.75* | 0.62*** | 1.15 | 0.53*** | 1.10 | 0.79* | 0.73* |
| 3 or 4 | 1.07 | 0.92 | 0.98 | 0.88 | 0.88* | 0.82** | 1.11 | 0.89* | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.97 | 0.87 |
| 5+ | 1.10 | 0.82** | 0.81* | 0.98 | 0.77*** | 0.71*** | 0.99 | 0.90 | 0.71** | 0.99 | 0.82** | 0.68*** |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 1.30*** | 0.70*** | 0.88 | 1.06 | 0.93 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.92 | 0.69** | 1.33** | 0.76*** | 0.84 |
| Secondary or higher | 1.17** | 0.97 | 1.38*** | 1.12 | 1.10 | 1.19** | 0.90 | 1.09 | 0.91 | 1.13 | 1.12 | 1.46*** |
| Works for cash | 1.21*** | 0.85*** | 1.08 | 1.66*** | 0.97 | 1.21*** | 1.31*** | 0.86*** | 1.44*** | 1.19** | 0.94 | 1.12 |
| Regular media exposure | 0.93 | 1.08 | 1.01 | 0.84 | 1.25** | 1.21* | 1.08 | 1.04 | 1.24* | 0.97 | 1.16 | 1.19 |
| Age at marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Between 18 and 24 years | 1.10* | 0.93 | 1.05 | 0.86 | 1.05 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 0.97 | 0.84** | 1.11* | 0.97 |
| 25 or more years | 1.22** | 0.83* | 1.07 | 0.78* | 1.16 | 1.07 | 1.02 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.77** | 1.25** | 1.10 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 1.06 | 1.01 | 1.19* | 0.99 | 0.95 | 0.94 | 1.03 | 0.99 | 1.05 | 1.02 | 0.97 | 0.97 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 0.92 | 1.09 | 0.99 | 1.27* | 0.79*** | 0.84* | 0.77*** | 1.19* | 0.79* | 1.15 | 0.97 | 1.13 |
| Husband coresident | 0.30*** | 3.09*** | 0.53*** | 0.13*** | 3.45*** | 0.93 | 0.43*** | 3.71*** | 1.53*** | 0.13*** | 5.41*** | 0.71** |
| Urban residence | 1.10 | 0.97 | 1.16 | 1.22 | 0.87 | 0.93 | 1.17* | 0.86* | 1.06 | 1.28** | 0.87 | 1.07 |
| Extended family structure | 0.91 | 1.03 | 0.85 | 1.04 | 0.73*** | 0.70*** | 0.76*** | 0.91 | 0.47*** | 1.16* | 0.84** | 0.89 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 1.07 | 0.98 | 1.07 | 1.71*** | 1.09 | 1.28** | 1.83*** | 0.72*** | 1.67*** | 1.18 | 1.08 | 1.27* |
| Middle | 1.15 | 0.87 | 1.01 | 1.51* | 1.06 | 1.17 | 2.21*** | 0.60*** | 1.86*** | 0.94 | 1.27* | 1.29* |
| Richer | 1.24* | 0.86 | 1.18 | 1.71** | 1.10 | 1.31* | 2.57*** | 0.55*** | 2.40*** | 0.99 | 1.34** | 1.54** |
| Richest | 1.86*** | 0.64*** | 1.78*** | 1.79** | 1.03 | 1.27 | 2.24*** | 0.53*** | 1.50* | 1.03 | 1.31* | 1.67** |
| Community level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch TV regularly | 1.00* | 1.00* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00*** | 1.00*** | 1.00 | 1.00** | 1.00** | 1.00 |
| Constant | 2.82*** | 0.22*** | 13.14*** | 0.45*** | 0.54*** | 2.74*** | 1.41** | 0.20*** | 3.25*** | 1.31* | 0.42*** | 8.63*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.22. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Haiti

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.40*** | 0.44** | 0.18*** | 0.20*** | 0.85 | 0.21*** | 0.29*** | 0.93 | 0.21*** | 0.45*** | 0.98 | 0.18*** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.69** | 0.86 | 0.49*** | 0.47*** | 1.05 | 0.45*** | 0.59*** | 1.05 | 0.42*** | 0.95 | 0.82 | 0.45** |
| 30 to 39 | 0.85 | 0.91 | 0.71** | 0.84 | 1.02 | 0.78 | 0.87 | 0.99 | 0.69* | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.57** |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.97 | 0.63* | 0.64** | 0.83 | 0.59** | 0.56*** | 0.76 | 0.62** | 0.52*** | 0.90 | 0.88 | 0.70 |
| 3 or 4 | 1.04 | 0.89 | 0.93 | 1.15 | 0.89 | 1.03 | 1.15 | 0.97 | 1.23 | 0.91 | 1.18 | 1.24 |
| 5+ | 0.99 | 0.80 | 0.74 | 1.04 | 0.90 | 0.93 | 1.13 | 0.93 | 1.15 | 0.98 | 1.03 | 1.03 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.81* | 1.14 | 0.90 | 1.04 | 1.05 | 1.11 | 0.95 | 1.02 | 0.93 | 1.10 | 0.84 | 0.79 |
| Secondary or higher | 0.79 | 1.18 | 0.87 | 0.74* | 1.12 | 0.85 | 0.84 | 1.16 | 0.98 | 0.85 | 0.93 | 0.59** |
| Works for cash | 1.40*** | 0.86 | 1.27* | 1.56*** | 1.10 | 1.77*** | 1.63*** | 0.97 | 2.09*** | 1.39*** | 0.81* | 1.42** |
| Regular media exposure | 1.12 | 0.83* | 0.93 | 0.97 | 0.83* | 0.78* | 0.95 | 0.89 | 0.79* | 1.03 | 0.93 | 0.93 |
| Age at marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Between 18 and 24 years | 0.92 | 1.07 | 0.97 | 0.81* | 1.06 | 0.86 | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.90 | 0.94 | 1.02 | 0.89 |
| 25 or more years | 0.74* | 1.12 | 0.78 | 0.79 | 1.39* | 1.13 | 0.95 | 1.27 | 1.36 | 0.81 | 1.21 | 0.89 |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 0.95 | 1.21* | 1.18 | 0.98 | 1.29** | 1.33** | 0.86 | 1.30** | 1.14 | 0.95 | 1.07 | 1.03 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 1.19 | 1.03 | 1.29* | 1.12 | 0.97 | 1.09 | 1.06 | 1.03 | 1.12 | 1.34** | 0.84 | 1.41 |
| Husband coresident | 0.30*** | 2.93*** | 0.65*** | 0.37*** | 3.15*** | 1.20 | 0.63*** | 2.99*** | 1.88*** | 0.22*** | 5.79*** | 0.92 |
| Urban residence | 1.18 | 1.01 | 1.25 | 0.88 | 1.03 | 0.91 | 1.01 | 1.06 | 1.12 | 0.82 | 1.02 | 0.64* |
| Extended family structure | 1.05 | 1.01 | 1.07 | 0.89 | 0.91 | 0.80* | 0.94 | 0.93 | 0.81* | 1.02 | 1.01 | 1.08 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 0.83 | 1.38** | 1.16 | 0.83 | 1.43** | 1.30 | 1.04 | 1.17 | 1.37* | 0.94 | 1.26 | 1.56* |
| Middle | 0.90 | 1.17 | 1.04 | 1.08 | 1.01 | 1.11 | 1.16 | 1.01 | 1.29 | 1.03 | 1.06 | 1.27 |
| Richer | 1.06 | 1.04 | 1.14 | 1.03 | 1.29 | 1.42 | 1.28 | 1.13 | 1.76** | 1.58** | 0.76 | 1.74* |
| Richest | 0.87 | 1.28 | 1.14 | 1.18 | 1.40 | 1.80* | 1.41 | 1.05 | 1.84* | 1.40 | 1.12 | 3.34** |
| Community level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99** | 0.99* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch TV regularly | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01 |
| Constant | 1.32* | 0.20*** | 3.26*** | 0.58*** | 0.31*** | 2.02*** | 0.87 | 0.25*** | 2.89*** | 2.36*** | 0.18*** | 7.71*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix Table 2B.23. Odds ratios (estimated using logistic regression) for correlates of the likelihood that a currently married woman will participate in making a specific decision: Nicaragua

| Variables | Decisions about woman's own health care | | | Decisions about large household purchases | | | Decisions about purchases for daily needs | | | Decisions about visits to family or friends | | |
|---|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|---|---------|------------------|
| | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly | Alone | Jointly | Alone or jointly |
| Age group (ref: 40 to 49) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 0.79 | 1.11 | 0.78 | 0.50** | 0.91 | 0.65** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.82 | 0.83 | 0.62** |
| 20 to 29 | 0.86 | 1.13 | 0.91 | 0.57*** | 0.97 | 0.74*** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.84 | 1.00 | 0.81* |
| 30 to 39 | 0.90 | 1.15* | 1.11 | 0.83 | 1.09 | 1.01 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.89 | 1.04 | 0.92 |
| Children ever born (ref: 1 or 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.68*** | 1.13 | 0.59*** | 1.01 | 0.81* | 0.78* | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.84 | 1.12 | 0.99 |
| 3 or 4 | 0.92 | 1.04 | 0.89 | 1.08 | 0.94 | 0.97 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.95 | 1.12 | 1.15 |
| 5+ | 0.96 | 1.01 | 0.88 | 1.02 | 0.91 | 0.88 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.14 | 0.88 | 0.90 |
| Education (ref: Primary) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 0.92 | 0.97 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.99 | 0.94 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.89 | 0.94 | 0.86* |
| Secondary or higher | 1.16* | 1.08 | 2.02*** | 1.03 | 1.59*** | 1.78*** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.98 | 1.26*** | 1.49*** |
| Works for cash | 1.62*** | 0.68*** | 1.31** | 2.38*** | 0.96 | 1.54*** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.71*** | 0.78*** | 1.31*** |
| Regular media exposure | 0.99 | 1.06 | 1.08 | 0.92 | 0.98 | 0.93 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.98 | 1.04 | 1.02 |
| Age at marriage (ref: Less than 18 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Between 18 and 24 years | 0.92 | 1.10 | 1.04 | 0.79** | 1.08 | 0.97 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.89 | 1.15* | 1.09 |
| 25 or more years | 0.84 | 1.19 | 1.03 | 0.73 | 1.11 | 0.99 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.85 | 1.33* | 1.47* |
| Spousal age difference (ref: Less than 5 years) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 1.06 | 0.96 | 1.03 | 1.01 | 0.94 | 0.93 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.13 | 0.91 | 0.98 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 0.95 | 0.96 | 0.81* | 0.96 | 0.85* | 0.82** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.01 | 0.96 | 0.95 |
| Husband coresident | 0.42*** | 2.31*** | 0.81 | 0.19*** | 2.70*** | 0.83 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.22*** | 3.23*** | 0.68** |
| Urban residence | 1.03 | 1.05 | 1.21 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.01 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.08 | 1.02 | 1.10 |
| Extended family structure | 1.12* | 0.82*** | 0.82* | 1.48*** | 0.93 | 1.11 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.14* | 0.91 | 0.99 |
| Wealth index (ref: Poorest) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorer | 1.05 | 1.07 | 1.19 | 0.86 | 1.21* | 1.13 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.14 | 1.14 | 1.24* |
| Middle | 0.88 | 1.20 | 1.02 | 0.86 | 1.16 | 1.06 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.17 | 1.11 | 1.19 |
| Richer | 0.84 | 1.28* | 1.12 | 0.77 | 1.42** | 1.30* | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.35* | 1.21 | 1.77*** |
| Richest | 1.03 | 1.13 | 1.67* | 0.86 | 1.32* | 1.36* | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.50* | 1.08 | 1.87*** |
| Community level variables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | 1.00** | 1.00** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.00* | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch TV regularly | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00* | 1.01** | 1.00 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Constant | 1.26 | 0.41*** | 7.80*** | 0.35*** | 0.51*** | 2.42*** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.91 | 0.51*** | 7.06*** |

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001


n/a = Not available

3 Gender Roles

3.1 Introduction

A fundamental element of empowerment is the rejection of the ascription of seemingly immutable and essentially unequal rights and privileges on the basis of a person's sex. One such normatively ascribed "right" of husbands is to regulate and control their wives' behavior and bodies through whatever actions necessary, including the use of violence. Acceptance of this normatively prescribed power of men *over* women reflects an acceptance of unequal gender roles, on the one hand, and a lack of conscientization about women's entitlement to bodily security and integrity, on the other. Hence, women who perceive as justified the control of husbands *over* their wives can be considered to be less empowered than women who think otherwise (Correa and Petchesky, 1994; Sen and Batliwala, 2000; United Nations, 1995; United Nations, 1996). Although such attitudes do not necessarily signify approval of these rights for men, they do signify women's *acceptance of norms* that give men these rights.

Notably, the importance of conscientization regarding gender inequality—that is, the ability to recognize gender inequality and to acknowledge that gender relations can and should be altered to achieve greater equality—was recognized as a critical step in the Women's Equality and Empowerment (WEEF) model adopted by UNICEF in 1993 for gender mainstreaming in its country programs. The WEEF is based on the analytical framework shown below. Longwe (1991) developed the WEEF, which assumes the following successive steps in the process of women's empowerment:



The WEEF has been criticized as being too analytical because the different stages are not defined empirically (UNICEF, 2000). Furthermore, each stage of the model subsumes the earlier stage; however, little evidence is available to show that the different stages, particularly conscientization and control, are necessarily sequential in the way that the model assumes. Nonetheless, the model was pioneering in its very early explicit recognition of conscientization as a critical element of women's empowerment.

In the DHS, conscientization regarding gender equality is recognized, along with women's participation in decisionmaking, as *evidence* of empowerment. Accordingly, to measure conscientization, DHS uses two sets of questions:

- The first set of questions asks respondents whether they think that a husband is justified in beating his wife if she goes out without telling him, if she neglects the children, if she argues with him, if she refuses to have sex with him, or if she burns the food. These reasons, which range from reasons that involve suspicions about a wife's moral character to those that may be considered more trivial, such as not cooking properly, were deliberately chosen to provide variation in the perceived seriousness of behavioral-norm violations.
- The second set of questions asks if the respondent thinks that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband when she knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted

disease, she knows her husband has sex with other women, she has recently given birth, or she is tired or not in the mood.

Agreement with any of the reasons justifying wife beating and *disagreement* with any of the reasons for a woman's refusal to have sex with her husband indicate a low level of women's empowerment because these attitudes imply an acceptance of men's exercise of power over women.

This chapter first describes and analyzes women's acceptance of the right of husbands to beat their wives, followed by a description and analysis of women's acceptance of the right of women to refuse sex to their husbands. In each case, the proportions of currently married women who agree with the different statements in different countries are compared, and a bivariate and multivariate examination is conducted of the correlates of agreement by reason. Finally, the correlates of two summary indicators of attitudes regarding gender roles are discussed: women's disagreement with all specified reasons for wife beating and agreement with all specified reasons justifying a wife refusing her husband sex.

From an empowerment perspective, what is important is that women not agree with *any* reason justifying wife beating and agree with *all* specified reasons justifying a woman's right to refuse her husband sex. If women agree with even one reason for wife beating and disagree with even one of the specified reasons for which a wife is justified in refusing her husband sex, or both, they are effectively agreeing with norms that sustain gender inequality by putting the control and discipline of wives in the hands of their husbands.

3.1A Dependent Variables

Attitudes towards wife beating. Acceptance of wife beating as justified for each of the five reasons—if the wife goes out without telling her husband, if the wife neglects the children, if the wife argues with her husband, if the wife refuses to have sex with her husband, and if she burns the food—is analyzed using six different variables:

- The first five dependent variables correspond to the five reasons included in the DHS to justify wife beating. For each reason, a response of “yes” (that is, agreement that the reason justifies the husband beating his wife) is scored as 1 and any other response is scored as 0. Note that each of these variables is *negatively* associated with empowerment and conscientization in favor of gender equality.
- The sixth dependent variable is “agreement with none of the five reasons to justify wife beating.” For this variable, a code of 1 is assigned only if the woman has a response of “no” to each of the five specified reasons to justify wife beating; otherwise, a code of 0 is assigned. This indicator is positively associated with empowerment and conscientization in favor of gender equality.

Attitudes towards a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband. Acceptance of a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband for four different reasons—when she knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease, when she knows that her husband has sex with other women, when she has recently given birth, and when she is tired or not in the mood—is analyzed using five different variables:

- The first four dependent variables correspond to each of the four reasons justifying a woman's right to refuse her husband sex. For each reason, a response of “yes” (agreement) is scored as 1, and any other response is scored as 0. Each of these variables is positively associated with empowerment and conscientization regarding gender equality.

- The fifth variable is “agreement with a woman’s right to refuse sex with her husband for all of the four specified reasons.” For this variable, a code of 1 is assigned only if the woman has a response of “yes” to each of the four specified reasons for a woman refusing her husband sex; otherwise, a code of 0 is assigned. This variable is also positively related to empowerment and conscientization regarding gender equality.

Two additional variables are used in discussions of the distribution of women by gender-role attitudes across countries: the percentage of women who agree with *all* specified reasons to justify wife beating and the percentage who agree with *none* of the specified reasons to justify a wife’s right to refuse her husband sex. These two variables are not examined in the analyses of correlates.

3.1B Independent Variables

The explanatory variables include most of the different individual, husband, union, and household variables described in Chapter 1: age in years, number of children ever born, education level, employment for cash, regular media exposure, age at first marriage, spousal age difference, residence in an extended family, residence in an urban area, and household wealth.

These characteristics are all known correlates of women’s empowerment and gender-role attitudes (Hindin, 2003). In particular, age, education, media exposure, and employment for cash are all potential *sources* of empowerment, whereas marital and household characteristics, such as age at first marriage, spousal age difference, nuclear family and urban residence, and wealth, are aspects of the *setting* for empowerment because they reflect the opportunities available to women (Kishor, 2000). The expected relationship of each of these variables with gender-role attitudes and conscientization regarding gender equality are explored below.

Age. In most regions of the world, a woman’s age is positively correlated with her level of empowerment when empowerment is measured by indicators such as having a role in household decisions. Because marriage and childbearing are highly valued and synonymous with responsibility, women gain more respect, rights, and freedoms with age and number of children. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether empowerment, as measured by gender-role attitudes, varies positively with age or not. Women who are younger are more likely to benefit from and adapt to changes in societal values and attitudes and, thus, might be more likely than older women to have less rigid views on women’s roles. However, women who have already passed through the various life-cycle stages might benefit from their experience, particularly in matters of sex. Being able to successfully negotiate life at the individual, family, and societal levels is likely to positively influence women’s attitudes towards their own rights and entitlements. Accordingly, it is hypothesized here that older women, due to the higher levels of wisdom and experience that age potentially accords, are more likely to question unequal gender norms, particularly the norms concerning the requirement that women be subservient to their husbands with regard to sex.

Number of children ever born. As with age, more status and empowerment is accorded to women who bear children. However, also as with age, it is difficult to predict whether the number of children a woman has will have a positive, negative, or nonlinear effect on gender-role attitudes. This is because, although having children can differentiate women in terms of status from married women who have no children, women who have 1 or 2 children are also likely to have a different world view from women who have 5 or more children. Women who have a large number of children might be more likely to support the status quo, whereas women who have no children or only a few children might have broken with tradition. However, because bearing and rearing children provide women with greater net status, self-esteem, and agency, it is expected that women with children will disapprove of wife beating and approve of women’s right to refuse sex with their husband.

Education and media exposure. An important aspect of education, particularly higher education, is that it provides access to new ideas and alternative gender norms and behaviors. As a result, education is a critical *source* of empowerment. Thus, the expectation is that women with more education are more likely to have a gender-egalitarian view of the world and less likely to believe that wife beating is ever justified. They are also more likely to agree that women have a right to refuse sex with their husband.

Employment for cash. Employment has the potential to expose women to nontraditional gender roles. Most employment environments base respect, prestige, and seniority on knowledge, experience, and skills, and not on the employee's sex. In addition, earning cash is likely to empower women in ways that favor conscientization and promote gender-egalitarian attitudes. Such empowerment, for example, could potentially flow from women's increased bargaining power within the household or increased sense of personal achievement and knowledge that they, like the men in their lives, can support their families financially. Thus, it is hypothesized here that women who work for cash are less likely to agree with gender norms that promote wife beating or a husband's sexual control of his wife.

Media exposure. Access to the media (television, newspapers, or radio), like access to education, is likely to expose women to more gender-egalitarian roles and ideals. This suggests that women who have regular media exposure should be less likely to agree that wife beating is justified for any reason and also less likely to agree that a husband has a right to control his wife sexually.

Age at first marriage. Research conducted in Benin, Colombia, India, and Turkey suggests that women who marry at a younger age are more likely than women who marry at an older age to agree that wife beating is justified (Jenson and Thornton, 2003). This is not surprising because a woman's age at first marriage is typically inversely related to access to *sources* of empowerment, such as education. Young ages at first marriage for women typically reflect a low status of women and a predominance of gender-inegalitarian norms at the community level. Furthermore, women who marry at a younger age do not have time to develop their own identity and opinions. Thus, it is expected that disagreement with wife beating and agreement with a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband is likely to increase as women's age at first marriage increases.

Spousal age difference. Since age, with its ascriptions of status, experience, and seniority, is a potential resource for empowerment, the age difference between spouses is considered to be a measure of gender inequity within the household. Also, large spousal age differences are associated with younger ages at first marriage and lower education for women (Tiemoko, 2001). It is thus hypothesized that women who are much younger than their husband are more likely to agree that wife beating is justified for the specified reasons and disagree that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband.

Urban residence. Urban areas typically have a concentration of people from many different backgrounds who are engaged largely in nonagricultural work; widespread availability of services, including educational and media-related services; and a variety of nontraditional living arrangements and lifestyles. The demands of urban living are likely to undermine the notion, as well as the practice, of rigidly defined gender roles. It is thus hypothesized that urban living promotes gender-egalitarian views. More specifically, urban women are more likely than rural women to disagree that wife beating is ever justified and agree that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband.

Living in a nonnuclear/extended family. It is expected that women who live in extended families (families that are typically multigenerational) are likely to be less empowered than women who live in a nuclear family (families that are typically smaller than extended families). Women living in an extended family must consider other adults in the household with regard to decisionmaking or personal autonomy, whereas, women in nuclear households only need to negotiate with their partners. Thus, residence in an extended family might not be a setting that enhances empowerment. Also important for gender

socialization is the fact that coresidence with members of older generations will probably reinforce more traditional gender norms.

Wealth. The effect of household wealth on gender-role attitudes is difficult to predict. On the one hand, household wealth can provide the means for exposure to better education, media, and other sources of empowerment, such as networks of educated persons and books. On the other hand, wealthier households can afford to more effectively adhere to patriarchal gender norms. Such gender norms typically limit women's exposure to the outside world, often by encouraging practices such as "purdah" and limiting women's labor-force participation and exposure to nonfamilial gender roles. In countries that already have son preference and where only sons carry forward the family name and inherit property, wealthier households have a stronger incentive to perpetuate gender-inegalitarian beliefs. Ultimately, however, it is hypothesized that the role of wealth in enabling exposure to gender-egalitarian beliefs and lifestyles promotes egalitarian gender-role attitudes at the individual level. Specifically, it is expected that women in wealthier households will be less likely to agree that wife beating is justified and more likely to accept a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband than women in poorer households.

Community-level indicators. Logistic regression equations control for the socioeconomic development of the community using two indicators: the percentage of women in the community whose husbands have at least a secondary education and the percentage of women in the community who watch television at least once a week. It is expected that the more socioeconomically developed a community is, the more egalitarian the views of its women will be. Hence, both community-level indicators are hypothesized to have a positive association with disagreement that wife beating is ever justified and agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband. Note that although both indicators are positively correlated with development, one measures socioeconomic advancement using men as the gauge and the other uses women as the gauge. It is thus expected that women's attitudes will be more strongly affected by the second indicator than by the first one.

In the sections that follow, the distribution across countries of each of the dependent variables and relevant correlates are discussed.

3.2A Agreement That Husbands Have a Right to Beat Their Wives across Countries

Table 3.1 shows the percentage of all women who said yes to each of the five separate reasons justifying a husband beating his wife, as well as the percentages that agree with all of the reasons and with none of the reasons. Agreement with none of the reasons is a key empowerment indicator because it signifies women's rejection of the idea that men have the right to beat their wives for at least these, if not all, reasons.

Table 3.1 shows that in all sub-Saharan African countries except Malawi, as well as in Jordan and Morocco, a minority of women (from 10 percent in Mali to 49 percent in Ghana) disagree with all the specified reasons justifying wife beating. In contrast, in Armenia, Malawi, and all of the Asian and Latin American/Caribbean countries, the majority of currently married women (from 58 percent in Haiti to 83 percent in Nicaragua) do not agree that any of the specified reasons justifies wife beating. Nonetheless, these results attest to a high level of socialization regarding men's "right" to control women in most of the countries included in this report.


These data are summarized in Figure 3.1, which shows the mean and the ranges across regions in the percentages of women who agree with none of the five reasons for wife beating. By region, agreement with none of the reasons justifying wife beating is highest in the Latin America/Caribbean region, closely followed by the Asia region and lowest in the sub-Saharan Africa region. Notably, less than one out of every two women in all countries together reject the notion that a husband is justified in beating his wife.

Table 3.1. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reasons

| Country | Percentage of women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | Agree with none of the reasons | Agree with all of the reasons |
|--------------------------------------|---|---------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | She goes out without her husband's permission | She neglects the children | She argues with him | She refuses sex with him | She burns the food | | |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | | | | | | | |
| Benin | 46.6 | 54.0 | 42.0 | 18.5 | 30.9 | 36.1 | 11.7 |
| Burkina Faso | 55.5 | 56.9 | 54.1 | 39.9 | 26.8 | 27.1 | 15.8 |
| Cameroon | 36.0 | 46.2 | 29.1 | 23.7 | 20.7 | 42.8 | 10.8 |
| Ghana | 36.6 | 39.9 | 33.1 | 23.0 | 15.8 | 48.9 | 9.5 |
| Kenya | 42.3 | 58.6 | 49.3 | 33.0 | 17.5 | 28.5 | 10.1 |
| Malawi | 16.8 | 21.6 | 18.8 | 18.2 | 16.6 | 64.0 | 5.2 |
| Mali | 76.9 | 72.6 | 63.3 | 76.7 | 34.1 | 9.6 | 26.9 |
| Mozambique | 38.7 | 39.1 | 34.8 | 37.4 | 24.7 | 44.2 | 14.6 |
| Nigeria | 59.2 | 52.7 | 47.4 | 43.5 | 34.3 | 30.8 | 26.1 |
| Rwanda | 39.1 | 58.8 | 12.2 | 38.0 | 22.7 | 33.6 | 6.5 |
| Uganda | 57.5 | 69.2 | 39.2 | 26.4 | 22.6 | 22.7 | 9.9 |
| Zambia | 82.1 | 62.6 | 55.1 | 50.7 | 46.8 | 12.4 | 28.1 |
| Zimbabwe | 28.7 | 31.1 | 33.7 | 25.9 | 12.2 | 47.9 | 5.9 |
| North Africa/West Asia/Europe | | | | | | | |
| Armenia | 22.1 | 29.5 | 15.8 | 7.6 | 5.0 | 65.0 | 2.2 |
| Jordan | 23.9 | 36.3 | 4.0 | n/a | 59.5 | 34.7 | 3.2 |
| Morocco | 55.0 | 53.4 | 55.9 | 48.5 | 25.7 | 31.6 | 21.8 |
| Asia | | | | | | | |
| Cambodia | 26.7 | 29.3 | 19.3 | 9.4 | 11.3 | 60.0 | 2.9 |
| Indonesia | 18.3 | 19.8 | 5.2 | 6.9 | 2.9 | 74.9 | 1.6 |
| Nepal | 12.1 | 25.1 | 8.7 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 71.3 | 1.3 |
| Philippines | 9.9 | 21.5 | 5.7 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 74.5 | 1.0 |
| Latin America/Caribbean | | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 10.1 | 17.1 | 7.2 | 3.1 | 5.5 | 77.1 | 1.5 |
| Haiti | 31.5 | 27.9 | 10.9 | 16.3 | 9.9 | 58.3 | 3.2 |
| Nicaragua | 8.3 | 12.4 | 6.0 | 4.0 | 6.3 | 83.0 | 2.2 |

n/a = Not available

Figure 3.1. Percentage of women who agree with none of the five specified reasons justifying a husband beating his wife: Ranges and means by region and for all countries



The percentages of women who agree with all reasons are also low (less than 5 percent) in all Latin American/Caribbean and Asian countries, as well as in Armenia and Jordan. In fact, Jordan is the only country where very few women agree with all the reasons justifying wife beating and yet, only a minority agree with none of the reasons. The highest levels of agreement with all five reasons are in

Zambia (28 percent), Mali (27 percent), Nigeria (26 percent), and Morocco (22 percent). In the remaining countries, between 5 and 16 percent of women agree with all reasons. Together, these results reveal a very high level of socialization to unequal power relations between husbands and wives in most sub-Saharan African countries, Morocco, and, to some extent, Jordan.





An examination of the pattern of agreement with reasons justifying wife beating shows a high level of consistency across regions, although the extent of agreement varies greatly between regions (Figure 3.2). The range in the extent of agreement with each reason is highest in sub-Saharan Africa for most of the reasons. The average level of agreement with each of the reasons is also highest in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by North Africa/West Asia/Europe. The average level of agreement is very similar across the other two regions.

The reason agreed to most often as justifying wife beating in all regions is if the wife neglects the children; 51 percent of women, on average, agreed with this reason in the sub-Saharan Africa region, 40 percent in the North Africa/West Asia/Europe region, 24 percent in the Asia region, and 19 percent in the Latin America/Caribbean region. The second most commonly accepted reason across the different regions is when the wife goes out without telling her husband. In all regions except North Africa/West Asia/Europe, the third most common reason is when the wife argues with her husband, followed by if she refuses sex with him and, finally, if she burns the food. Only in North Africa/West Asia/Europe is agreement that burning the food justifies wife beating more common than agreement that arguing with her husband or refusing to have sex with him justifies wife beating. This result is largely due to the fact that Jordan, one of the three countries whose results are included in the average for this region, has the highest proportion of women (60 percent) agreeing that this reason justifies wife beating. The pattern of women's agreement that different reasons justify wife beating also suggests that women are thinking about gender roles and duties when answering these questions.

An analysis by country shows that in 16 of the 23 countries, the reason that women are most likely to agree justifies wife beating is if the wife neglects the children; in another five countries, this is the second most common reason with which women agree. In only Mali and Morocco does this reason generate less agreement than some of the other reasons. Furthermore, in all countries except Kenya and Jordan, the second most common reason generating agreement is if the wife goes out without telling her husband. The reason least likely to receive agreement is if the wife burns the food. However, the level of agreement even with this least agreed with reason ranges from as high as 60 percent in Jordan, 47 percent in Zambia, and 31-34 percent in Benin, Mali, and Nigeria to as low as 3-6 percent in Indonesia, the Philippines, Nepal, Armenia, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. Overall, the average level of agreement with all five reasons is highest, at 60-65 percent, in Mali and Zambia; followed by 40-48 percent in Morocco, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Kenya; and lowest, at 7-9 percent, in Nicaragua, Bolivia, and the Philippines.

Table 3.1 and Figures 3.1 and 3.2 all attest to the fact that even among different types of gender-role violations, the one that appears to respondents to be most egregious and, hence, most likely to deserve beatings is a woman's neglect of her children. Even in countries where women are least likely to agree with any reason, such as in Armenia, the four Asian countries, and the three Latin American/Caribbean countries, levels of agreement with this reason tend to be at least twice as high as with most other reasons.

Figure 3.2 Percentage of women who agree with each reason justifying a husband beating his wife, by reason according to region: Ranges and means



3.2B Correlates of Agreement with Justifications for Wife Beating, by Reason

Bivariate and multivariate tools of analysis are used to understand how agreement with wife beating for specific reasons varies by women's characteristics and those of their husbands and communities. In addition to providing a better understanding of the differences in gender attitudes in various contexts, analyzing the level of agreement with the five justifications for wife beating makes it possible to separate women's attitudes towards the female roles of wife, mother, and domestic partner.

The bivariate distributions and odds ratios from multivariate logistic regressions are given by reason and country in Appendix Table 3A.1-23. The bivariate analysis shows whether different categories of women have different attitudes towards wife beating. The multivariate analysis shows the relationship of women's agreement with wife beating and specific characteristics, net of other confounding characteristics. The dependent variables analyzed in this section are each of the five reasons justifying wife beating. In each case, a woman's response is coded as 1 when she agrees that the reason justifies wife beating and as 0 otherwise.

The explanatory factors included are those described earlier: women's age in years, number of children ever born, education level, employment for cash, regular media exposure, age at first marriage, spousal age difference, residence in an urban area, residence in an extended family, and household wealth. In addition, all the logistic regression equations include the two community-level variables.

Given that this analysis includes 23 countries and five dependent variables for each country, the results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses are provided in summary form for ease of understanding in Summary Tables 3A-D.

Women's Characteristics

Age. Age can imply maturity of ideas as well as inflexibility. However, the bivariate and multivariate results show that women's age has a generally negative relationship with agreement with four of the five justifications for wife beating. That is, older women are less likely than younger women to agree that wife beating is justified when the wife goes out without her husband's permission, neglects her children, argues with her husband, and burns the food. However, contrary to expectations, agreement with wife beating if the wife refuses to have sex with her husband does not decline with age but, rather, tends to increase or vary nonlinearly.

The bivariate results show that for four of the five justifications for wife beating, agreement varies significantly by age in more than half of the countries (Summary Table 3A). In most of these countries, agreement is negatively associated with age. This negative relationship is generally due to the fact that women age 15-19 agree more often with the justifications for wife beating than older women.

Notably, even after the analysis controls for women's other demographic, marital, and residential characteristics, the number of countries where age is significantly and negatively related to inequitable gender beliefs remains the same or increases slightly. However, once women's individual and other characteristics are controlled for, the generally negative relationship between age and agreement with inequitable beliefs is not dominated only by the greater agreement among the youngest women. Instead, agreement tends to decrease more uniformly with age in a larger number of countries. Armenia is the only country where attitudes towards wife beating are not related at all to a woman's age, with or without controls.

Summary Table 3A. Number of countries where agreement with the specified justification for wife beating has an association of the specified type with the respondent's age and number of children ever born: Results of bivariate analysis and analysis with controls

| Variable | Wife goes out without telling husband | Wife neglects children | Wife argues with husband | Wife refuses sex with husband | Wife burns food |
|---|---------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|
| Age | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | |
| Generally negative | 11 | 11 | 8 | 1 | 8 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 4 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 4 |
| Does not vary significantly by age | 8 | 9 | 10 | 12 | 11 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | |
| Generally negative | 12 | 14 | 8 | 2 | 13 |
| Decreases with age | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Decreases with age to age 20-29 years | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 7 |
| Significantly higher only for women age 15-19 years | 4 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 6 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 1 | 0 | 4 | 11 | 2 |
| Does not vary significantly by age | 10 | 9 | 11 | 9 | 8 |
| Children ever born | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 9 | 9 | 7 | 14 | 9 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 5 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 3 |
| Does not vary significantly by number of children ever born | 9 | 9 | 11 | 6 | 11 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 6 | 12 | 7 | 4 | 6 |
| Increases with number of children ever born | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Significantly higher only for women with 5 or more children | 1 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Significantly lower only for women with no children | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 8 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Does not vary by number of children ever born | 9 | 8 | 12 | 14 | 13 |

The relationship between age and agreement with wife beating if the wife refuses sex with her husband is different from the relationships with agreement that wife beating is justified for the other reasons. Age is significantly related to agreement that wife beating is justified when the wife refuses sex with her husband in 10 countries in the bivariate analysis, but 13 in the multivariate analysis. In only two countries, Nigeria and Indonesia, is the likelihood of agreement higher in the younger groups than the older ones. In two countries, Cameroon and Mali, the youngest women (age 15-19) are less likely than the oldest women to agree that beating wife beating is justified if she refuses sex. In the remaining countries, age has a nonlinear relationship with attitudes towards wife beating for this reason. In particular, in Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe, the youngest and oldest women do not have significantly different beliefs. However, women in the middle age groups (20-29 and 30-39 years) are more likely to agree that refusal of sex is justification for wife beating. Similarly, women age 30-39 in Burkina Faso, Haiti, Rwanda, and Zambia and women age 20-29 in Cambodia and Morocco, are less likely than women in the oldest group to agree with this justification for wife beating, whereas the younger groups have similar beliefs to the oldest group.

In summary, a woman's age is significantly related to agreement with one or more justifications for wife beating in all countries except Armenia. Furthermore, in almost all of the countries where age has a strong relationship with agreement, older women are less likely to believe that wife beating is justified for almost all the reasons than younger women. However, the relationship between age and agreement that husbands are justified in being violent when their wives refuse to have sex with them varies greatly between countries but tends not to be positive.

Number of children ever born. It was hypothesized that agreement with equitable gender beliefs will increase with the number of children a woman has. This hypothesis is not supported by the data.

The bivariate results show that agreement that wife beating is justified for each of the five reasons varies significantly by number of children ever born in 12-16 countries. In most of these countries, the proportion agreeing with each reason tends to be higher among women with more children, particularly women who have had 5 or more children. Furthermore, in 12 of the 22 countries for which data on this reason are available, the proportion of women agreeing that wife beating is justified when the wife refuses sex is significantly higher only among women with 5 or more children.

The effect of including controls for age and other factors on the relationship of agreement with wife beating and number of children ever born is not the same across reasons. Agreement that a wife's going out without her husband's permission justifies wife beating increases with number of children in six countries but decreases or varies nonlinearly in eight countries. In Armenia, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, and Nigeria, women who have more than 1 or 2 children (the reference group is 1-2 children) are more likely to believe that wife beating is justified for this reason.

Among the countries where a nonlinear relationship is found between number of children ever born and agreement that wife beating is justified when the wife goes out without permission, women who have 3 or 4 children are the only group to be significantly different from the reference group in four countries (Nicaragua, the Philippines, Haiti, and Uganda). The relationship is U-shaped in three countries (Kenya, Jordan, and Morocco) where women who have no children and women who have more children are more likely than women with 1 or 2 children to believe that wife beating for this reason is justified.

Agreement that wife beating is justified if the wife argues with her husband, refuses sex with her husband, or burns the food is also positively associated with number of children ever born in 4-7 countries each. However, the level of agreement does not vary by number of children born in 12-14 countries. In particular, agreement that wife beating is justified if the wife refuses sex with her husband, which increases with number of children in the bivariate analysis in 14 countries, is positive in the multivariate analysis in only 4 countries.

Finally, with the addition of controls, the relationship between number of children ever born and women's attitudes towards wife beating when the wife neglects her children stands out. This relationship is not significant in only eight countries. In 12 of the remaining 15 countries, the relationship is generally positive but not linear. Specifically:

- In Mozambique and Zambia, agreement is significantly lower only among women with no children.
- In Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe, agreement is significantly higher only among women with 5 or more children.
- In Indonesia and Kenya, women with no children do not have different beliefs from women with 1-2 children, but women with 3 or more children are significantly more likely to agree that wife beating is justified by child neglect.
- Armenia and the Philippines are the only two countries where agreement increases more or less uniformly with number of children ever born.

In societies that value motherhood highly, women who have children gain status within the family and society, and thus, are likely to be more empowered after going through this stage in the life-cycle. Furthermore, bearing children and envisioning the children's futures might influence women to want and seek more equitable outcomes for their children. However, this analysis shows that women who have more children are more likely to accept inequitable gender roles than women with fewer children. It must be noted that the association between number of children and acceptance of unequal gender roles

could be endogenous; that is, women's attitudes towards gender roles might influence the number of children they bear.

Education. The expectation that women with more education are more likely to have gender-egalitarian views and less likely to believe that wife beating is justified is upheld by both the bivariate and multivariate analyses (Appendix Tables 3A.1-3A.23 and Summary Table 3B).

Summary Table 3B. Number of countries where agreement with the specified justification for wife beating has an association of the specified type with the respondent's education level, employment for cash, and media exposure: Results of bivariate analysis and analysis with controls

| Variable | Wife goes out without telling husband | Wife neglects children | Wife argues with husband | Wife refuses sex with husband | Wife burns food |
|---|--|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Education | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | |
| Generally negative | 21 | 18 | 21 | 21 | 22 |
| Decreases monotonically | 12 | 12 | 15 | 15 | 14 |
| Less likely only for women with secondary or higher education | 9 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 7 |
| More likely only for women with no education | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 2 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Does not vary by education level | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | |
| Generally negative | 19 | 16 | 19 | 19 | 20 |
| Decreases monotonically | 10 | 6 | 11 | 12 | 9 |
| Less likely only for women with secondary or higher education | 9 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 11 |
| More likely only for women with no education | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 4 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Does not vary by education level | 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Works for cash | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | |
| Negative | 15 | 12 | 12 | 14 | 13 |
| Positive | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Does not vary by employment for cash | 6 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 9 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | |
| Negative | 8 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 |
| Positive | 4 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 3 |
| Does not vary by employment for cash | 11 | 10 | 11 | 13 | 14 |
| Regular media exposure | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | |
| Negative | 19 | 16 | 20 | 21 | 20 |
| Positive | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Does not vary by media exposure | 3 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | |
| Negative | 9 | 9 | 13 | 13 | 13 |
| Positive | 3 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Does not vary by media exposure | 11 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 8 |

In most of the 23 countries, the bivariate analysis reveals that lower percentages of educated women agree that wife beating is justified for each of the five reasons compared with women with no education. This is true in at least 18 countries for each of the five justifications for wife beating. In slightly more than half the countries, the percentage of women who agree that wife beating is justified decreases almost linearly as the level of education increases. In most of the remaining countries, the strong association between education level and agreement with the various justifications for wife beating only holds for women with secondary or higher education.

Controls for confounding factors, including urban residence and household wealth, marginally reduce the number of countries where education and inequitable gender attitudes are significantly related.

Nonetheless, the only countries where education is not significantly related to attitudes towards wife beating for at least two of the five reasons are Cambodia (for all reasons except if the wife goes out without permission), Uganda (for all reasons except when the wife goes out without her husband's permission or neglects the children), and the Philippines (when the wife neglects the children or refuses to have sex with him). Notably, education is significantly related to agreement with the first reason in all countries.

Furthermore, even with controls, in almost all countries and for almost all reasons education remains negatively associated with inequitable gender roles. The only exception is Indonesia, where for three of the five reasons, the likelihood of a woman agreeing that wife beating is justified actually falls with education level. In contrast, in Armenia, Jordan, Morocco, and Rwanda, the multivariate analysis reveals a largely negative linear relationship between level of education and agreement with each of the five reasons. In most other countries, the association between education and women's agreement that wife beating is justified is only negative for women with secondary or higher education for one or more reasons, as shown in Figure 3.3 below.

Figure 3.3. Countries where only women with secondary or higher education are less likely to agree that wife beating is justified, based on logistic regression results*

| Wife goes out without telling her husband | Wife neglects the children | Wife argues with her husband | Wife refuses sex with her husband | The wife burns the food |
|---|---|---|---|--|
| Bolivia, Cambodia, Ghana, Haiti, Mali, Nepal, Philippines, Uganda, Zimbabwe | Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe | Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Haiti, Mali, Nepal, Zambia | Bolivia, Haiti, Malawi, Mali, Nicaragua, Zambia, Zimbabwe | Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Nepal, Philippines, Zambia |

* The reference category is women with primary education.

The figure shows that women with secondary or higher education have lower odds of agreeing with three of the five reasons in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nepal, and Zimbabwe; with four of the five reasons in Mali and Zambia; and with all of the reasons in Bolivia and Haiti.

These results suggest that lack of education is an important factor that is associated with women's acceptance of unequal gender roles. In a significant number of countries, the more education a woman has, the less likely she is to agree that wife beating is justified in any situation. However, in certain contexts, simply having primary education is not enough to empower women; at least secondary education is required. In many countries, the beliefs of women who have only primary education regarding a husband's right to beat his wife are no different from those of women who have no education.

Employment for cash. The expectation that employment for cash will be related to greater exposure to nontraditional gender roles, financial empowerment, and decreased dependency on the husband as the breadwinner underlies the hypothesis that women who work for cash are less likely to accept gender norms that justify wife beating. This hypothesis is supported by the bivariate results (Summary Table B and Appendix Table 3A.1-23) that show that a much lower percentage of women employed for cash, than women not employed for cash, agree with wife beating for any of the five reasons in the majority of countries. However, the addition of controls for education and wealth of the household reduces the significance of the relationship in some cases, and converts the relationship to a positive one in some others.

Specifically, with the introduction of controls, the relationship between employment and agreement with wife beating is not significant in 10-14 countries, depending on the reason. The relationship is negative in 6-8 countries for all reasons except if the wife refuses sex with her husband. For this latter reason, the odds of women agreeing are significantly lower for women employed for cash only in four countries and significantly higher in five.

The association between employment and agreement with wife beating shows great variation across countries. In Bolivia, Haiti, Kenya, and Zambia, employment for cash is not related to agreement with each of the reasons for wife beating. In Cameroon, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, and the Philippines, the relationship is not significant for four of the five reasons. In contrast, women employed for cash, compared with women not employed for cash, have a significantly lower likelihood of agreeing with each of the reasons in Ghana, Jordan, Rwanda, and Uganda and with four of the five reasons in Morocco and Zimbabwe. In Cambodia, Indonesia, and Mozambique, they have a significantly higher likelihood of agreeing with at least four of the five reasons.

Overall, the results suggest that women employed for cash do have more gender-egalitarian attitudes in most countries. However, in many countries, it is not their employment status that is directly responsible for these attitudes. Instead, controls for education and wealth appear to mediate the relationship between employment for cash and agreement that wife beating is justified.

Regular media exposure. Regular exposure to mass media (exposure at least once a week to television, newspapers, or radio), like access to education, is hypothesized to negatively affect the likelihood that women will agree with wife beating for any of the specified reasons. This expectation is largely upheld by the results of both the bivariate and multivariate analyses.

The distributions of women who agree with the various justifications for wife beating by their regular exposure to one or more forms of media are shown in Summary Table 3B and Appendix Table 3A.1-23. The results show that, in the vast majority of countries (16-21) and for each of the reasons, the percentage of women who agree with wife beating is much lower among women who are regularly exposed to media than among those who are not.

In the multivariate analysis, however, the relationship becomes insignificant in 8-11 countries. Nonetheless, in almost all of the countries where exposure to media is significantly associated with women's attitudes towards wife beating, the relationship remains negative. That is, women who have regular exposure to at least one of three types of media are less likely to believe that wife beating is justified. This pattern is consistent for all five justifications, suggesting that exposure to media has the effect of broadening women's attitudes towards gender roles. In this context, it is notable that the influence of media exposure is least likely to be negative on agreement with two justifications, neglecting the children and going out without permission.

The results by country show that in Armenia, Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Zambia, regular media exposure appears to directly influence and result in more gender-egalitarian beliefs, as reflected by attitudes towards wife beating. In contrast, in Jordan, Nicaragua, and the Philippines, media exposure does not have a significant direct relationship with agreement with wife beating. In the remaining countries, the relationship varies by reason but is rarely positive, except in Benin and Mali.

Union Characteristics

Age at first marriage. Age at first marriage for the individual woman is typically related inversely to *sources* of empowerment, such as higher education and paid, formal employment. It is therefore hypothesized that the lower a woman's age is at first marriage, the more likely she will be to agree that wife beating is justified.

Summary Table 3C. Number of countries where agreement with the specified justification for wife beating has an association of the specified type with the respondent's age at first marriage and spousal age difference: Results of bivariate analysis and analysis with controls

| Variable | Wife goes out without telling husband | Wife neglects children | Wife argues with husband | Wife refuses sex with husband | Wife burns food |
|---|--|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Age at first marriage | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | |
| Generally negative | 16 | 18 | 15 | 12 | 15 |
| Generally positive | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Varies only for women first married at age 18-24 years | 3 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Does not vary by age at first marriage | 4 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 5 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | |
| Generally negative | 9 | 12 | 8 | 9 | 6 |
| Monotonically negative | 6 | 7 | 4 | 8 | 5 |
| Less likely only for women married after age 25 years | 3 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| Generally positive | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Different only for women first married at age 18-24 years | 2 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 9 |
| Does not vary by age at marriage | 10 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 7 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 5 |
| Monotonically positive | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| More likely only for women who are at least 10 years younger than their husband | 6 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 5 |
| Different only for women who are 5-9 years younger than their husband | 5 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Generally negative | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Does not vary by spousal age difference | 9 | 12 | 17 | 12 | 17 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | |
| Generally positive | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| Different only for women who are 5-9 years younger than their husband | 6 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 3 |
| Generally negative | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Does not vary by spousal age difference | 15 | 18 | 15 | 15 | 18 |

Appendix Table 3A.1-23 and Summary Table 3C show that in a majority of countries (16-19), the proportion of women agreeing with each of the five reasons for wife beating declines as age at first marriage increases. In a few countries (1-4), only women who were first married at age 18-24 years are less likely to agree that wife beating is justified for most of the reasons; women married after age 24 in these countries are no different in their agreement with wife beating than women married before age 18.

Once controls are introduced into the analysis, agreement with wife beating no longer varies significantly by age at first marriage in five countries when the wife neglects the children and in 8-10 countries for the other reasons. Haiti is the only country where women's agreement with wife beating does not vary by age at first marriage for all five reasons.

Notably, however, in countries where the relationship is significant, it continues to be largely negative or nonlinear (i.e., the attitudes of women married at age 18-24 years are different). Figure 3.4 below lists the countries with different types of negative and nonlinear relationships between age at first marriage and agreement that wife beating is justified for each of the five reasons.

Figure 3.4. Countries where age at first marriage is negatively or nonlinearly associated with agreement with justifications for wife beating, based on logistic regression results*

| Relationship | Wife goes out without telling her husband | Wife neglects the children | Wife argues with her husband | Wife refuses sex with her husband | Wife burns the food |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| Increasing age at first marriage associated with decreasing agreement with wife beating | Armenia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria | Armenia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Mali, Nigeria, Philippines | Armenia, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria | Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe | Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria |
| Only women married after age 24 years are less likely to agree with wife beating | Indonesia, Morocco, Philippines | Bolivia, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco | Morocco, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe | Philippines | Malawi |
| Only women married between ages 18 and 24 years are less likely to agree with wife beating | Mali, Nepal | Nepal, Rwanda | Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Ghana, Mali, Nepal | Armenia, Cambodia, Ghana, Uganda | Armenia, Bolivia, Nepal, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe |
| Only women married between age 18 and 24 years are more likely to agree with wife beating | | Benin, Indonesia, Mozambique, Nicaragua | Nicaragua | | Indonesia, Mozambique, Nicaragua |

*Reference category is women who were first married before age 18 years.

It is notable that in some countries, only an age at first marriage between 18 and 24 years is associated with attitudes indicating empowerment. This is particularly true in Nepal, where women in this group are less likely than those married at a younger or older age to agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for four of the five reasons. Nicaragua is unique in that age at first marriage appears to bear a positive relationship with agreement that wife beating is justified for two of the five reasons; for the remaining three reasons, women first married between ages 18 and 24 years are more likely to agree than women married at a younger or older age.

In summary, age at first marriage is associated with women's attitudes towards gender roles. In general, women who first marry after age 18 years are less likely to agree that wife beating is justified in the majority of countries.

Spousal age difference. The bivariate results generally show only mixed support for the hypothesis that women who are much younger than their husbands will be more likely to agree that wife beating is justified. Furthermore, in the multivariate analysis results for most countries and reasons, the effect of spousal age difference is largely explained away.

The bivariate results in Appendix Table 3A.1-23 and Summary Table 3C show that the percentage of women agreeing with wife beating varies by spousal age difference in only some countries (6-14). Furthermore, where significant variation exists, the relationship is largely nonlinear or positive.

A significant relationship becomes even less common with the introduction of controls. In addition, in most countries where the relationship is significant, women who are 10 or more years younger than their husbands tend not to have different attitudes from those of women who are less than 5 years younger than their husband.

Only in a few countries is spousal age difference consistently related to women's acceptance of wife beating. In Benin and Mali, women 10 years or more younger than their husband are more likely than other women to agree that at least four of the five reasons justify wife beating, even when the

analysis controls for all other confounding variables. In Morocco, for three of the five reasons, the highest age difference is associated with a reduced likelihood of agreement. In contrast, in Kenya, women who are 5-9 years younger than their husbands are less likely than others to agree that wife beating is justified. Finally, in Nicaragua, women who are 5-9 years younger than their husbands are more likely to agree that wife beating is justified for four of the five reasons.

In summary, in a majority of countries, women's attitudes towards wife beating do not vary by spousal age difference. In the countries where the association is significant, the direction of the relationship is not consistent.

Household Characteristics

Urban residence. Living in an urban area is thought to be associated with less traditional, more gender-egalitarian views. Results of the bivariate analysis presented in Appendix Table 3A.1-23 and Summary Table 3D support this hypothesis.

In at least 20 of the 23 countries, women in urban areas are less likely to believe that wife beating is justified than women in rural areas. However, when controls for women's characteristics and those of their households are added, the significance of the relationship between place of residence and women's attitude towards wife beating disappears for many countries. Ultimately, urban residence contributes significantly to women's attitudes towards wife beating in 9-15 countries, depending on the reason. Bolivia, Cameroon, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Rwanda are the only countries where attitudes towards wife beating do not vary by place of residence for any of the five reasons. In a few countries, with the addition of controls, the relationship becomes positive.

Overall, however, in the majority of countries where place of residence is significantly associated with women's attitudes towards wife beating, women who live in urban areas are less likely than women who live in rural areas to agree that wife beating is justified if the wife goes out without telling her husband (in 9 of 12 countries), neglects the children (10 of 13 countries), and burns the food (12 of 15 countries). However, urban women are less likely than rural women to agree that wife beating is justified when a wife argues with her husband or refuses sex with him in only a few more countries than the number of countries where urban women are more likely than rural women to agree.

Only four countries (Jordan, Mali, Morocco, and Mozambique) show a consistent pattern of urban women being less likely to hold gender-inegalitarian attitudes compared with their rural counterparts. In each of these countries, women who live in urban areas are significantly less likely than women who live in rural areas to agree that wife beating is justified for each reason asked about. Additionally, in Armenia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malawi, Philippines, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, this is true for at least three of the five reasons for wife beating.

On the other hand, in a few countries, women in urban areas are more likely than women in rural areas to agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife. In Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia, women in urban areas are significantly more likely than women in rural areas to agree with at least four out of the five justifications for wife beating; whereas, in Nepal and Kenya, the positive relationship holds for two of the five reasons. In all, there are six countries where for at least one reason, agreement that wife beating is justified is higher among urban than rural women.

In summary, urban residence is more often positively associated with more gender-egalitarian attitudes than rural residence, as measured by attitudes towards wife beating. However, in a significant number of countries, women's attitudes towards wife beating do not vary by their place of residence.

Summary Table 3D. Number of countries where agreement with the specified justification for wife beating has an association of the specified type with the respondent's area of residence, residence in an extended family, wealth index, and community controls: Results of bivariate analysis (except for community controls) and analysis with controls

| Variable | Wife goes out without telling husband | Wife neglects children | Wife argues with husband | Wife refuses sex with husband | Wife burns food |
|--|--|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Urban residence | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | |
| Negative | 21 | 22 | 22 | 20 | 21 |
| Positive | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Does not vary by area of residence | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | |
| Negative | 9 | 10 | 7 | 5 | 12 |
| Positive | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 |
| Does not vary by area of residence | 11 | 10 | 11 | 13 | 8 |
| Residence in extended family | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | |
| Positive | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Negative | 9 | 8 | 11 | 11 | 8 |
| Does not vary by extended family residence | 11 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 12 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | |
| Positive | 2 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 |
| Negative | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Does not vary by extended family residence | 19 | 14 | 17 | 18 | 16 |
| Wealth index | | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | | |
| Generally negative | 18 | 16 | 18 | 16 | 20 |
| Significantly lower in top three or four quintiles | 8 | 10 | 14 | 15 | 14 |
| Significantly lower only in wealthiest one or two | 12 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 6 |
| Positive or nonlinear | 4 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| Does not vary by wealth quintile | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | | |
| Generally negative | 11 | 13 | 15 | 14 | 12 |
| Significantly lower in top three or four quintiles | 7 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 6 |
| Significantly lower only in wealthiest one or two | 4 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 6 |
| Generally positive | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Nonlinear | 7 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 8 |
| Does not vary by wealth quintile | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Community controls | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have at | | | | | |
| Negative | 8 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 6 |
| Positive | 4 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 |
| Not significant | 10 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 12 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at | | | | | |
| Negative | 7 | 10 | 8 | 12 | 10 |
| Positive | 4 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 5 |
| Not significant | 12 | 8 | 13 | 6 | 8 |

The multivariate analysis results show that household structure does not directly influence agreement with wife beating in 14-19 countries. In 11 of these countries, the relationship is not significant for any of the five reasons. Importantly, however, the addition of controls tends to reverse the bivariate relationship; in countries where the relationship is significant, it is more likely to be positive with the addition of controls (i.e., the odds of agreeing are higher for women in extended families) than negative. Figure 3.5 below lists the countries with a significant relationship between living in an extended family and agreement with wife beating by type of relationship and reason justifying wife beating.

Figure 3.5. Countries where the relationship between living in an extended family and agreement with specific reasons justifying wife beating is significant, by type of relationship and reason for wife beating, based on logistic regression results

| Relationship with living in an extended family | Wife goes out without telling her husband | Wife neglects the children | Wife argues with her husband | Wife refuses sex with her husband | Wife burns the food |
|--|---|---|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Positive | Burkina Faso, Jordan | Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco | Burkina Faso, Ghana, Jordan, Mali, Morocco | Bolivia, Ghana, Morocco | Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Jordan, Mali, Morocco |
| Negative | Haiti, Uganda | Armenia, Haiti, Indonesia, Rwanda | Haiti | Indonesia | Mozambique, Rwanda |

Figure 3.5 shows that in Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Jordan, Mali, and Morocco, when the relationship between extended family living and attitudes towards wife beating is significant for any of the justifications, it is women who live in extended families who are more likely than women who live in nuclear families to agree with wife beating. This is also true for almost all of the reasons in Burkina Faso, Jordan, and Morocco. The reverse is true in six countries (Armenia, Haiti, Indonesia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda) where women living in extended families are less likely to agree with wife beating for one or more of the reasons asked about.

In general, in the majority of the 23 countries in this study, women’s attitudes towards unequal gender roles do not vary by whether they live in an extended family or a nuclear family. In the few countries where this association is significant, the direction is almost evenly distributed between negative and positive when the justifications are that the wife goes out without permission or she neglects the children; more countries have a positive relationship than a negative one for the remaining reasons.

Household wealth. Although it is, a priori, difficult to predict the effect of household wealth on gender-role attitudes, the data reveal that wealth is positively associated with gender-egalitarian beliefs.

In particular, Appendix Table 3A.1-23 and Summary Table 3C show that in the bivariate analysis, the association of wealth and agreement with wife beating is negative in 16-20 countries. In several of the remaining countries, the relationship is nonlinear, with agreement with wife beating not varying unidirectionally with increased wealth.

The largely negative association of wealth with women’s agreement with wife beating remains significant even after controls are introduced into the analysis. In fact, despite the controls, there is no country where wealth does not have a significant influence on women’s attitudes towards wife beating for at least two of the five reasons. Figure 3.6 below lists the countries by type of relationship between wealth and agreement with wife beating according to the different reasons justifying wife beating.

Figure 3.6 shows that there are only six countries where wealth is not significantly related to attitudes towards wife beating; in Cambodia, this is true for a majority of the reasons. Cambodia is also unique, along with Mozambique and Rwanda, because in these countries, the likelihood of agreement with wife beating increases with wealth for one or more reasons. Furthermore, there are a few countries where women in the middle wealth quintiles are more likely to agree with wife beating. This is true for most of the reasons in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Zambia. However, with these few exceptions, it is evident that for most reasons and in most countries, the richest groups are least likely to agree with wife beating. Notably, in several countries, women in the lower middle wealth quintiles appear to hold more traditional gender-role attitudes than women in the poorest or richer quintiles.

Figure 3.6. Countries by relationship between wealth and women’s agreement that specific reasons justify wife beating based on the logistic regression results*

| Relationship with wife beating | Wife goes out without telling her husband | Wife neglects the children | Wife argues with her husband | Wife refuses sex with her husband | Wife burns the food |
|---|--|---|---|---|---|
| Negative | | | | | |
| Women in top three or four quintiles are less likely to agree that wife beating is justified for the specified reason | Armenia, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Nicaragua, Philippines | Armenia, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Rwanda, Zimbabwe | Armenia, Bolivia, Jordan, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Zimbabwe | Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Haiti, Morocco, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Zimbabwe | Armenia, Bolivia, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria |
| Women in top one or two quintiles are less likely to agree that wife beating is justified for the specified reason | Benin, Bolivia, Malawi, Uganda | Bolivia, Cambodia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nicaragua | Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Philippines, Uganda | Indonesia, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda | Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Indonesia, Malawi, Uganda, Zimbabwe |
| Positive | | | | | |
| Women in top three or four quintiles are more likely to agree that wife beating is justified for the specified reason | Mozambique | Rwanda | | Rwanda | |
| Women in highest quintile are most likely to agree that wife beating is justified for the specified reason | | | | | Cambodia |
| Nonlinear | | | | | |
| Women in middle 1-3 quintiles are more likely to agree that wife beating is justified for the specified reason | Burkina Faso, Mali, Zambia | Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Mozambique, Zambia | Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda, Zambia | Kenya, Mali, Nepal, Zambia | Mali, Mozambique, Nepal |
| S- or inverted U-shaped relationship between wealth and agreement that the specified reason justifies wife beating, but women in the richest quintile are least likely to agree | Cameroon, Haiti, Nigeria, Zimbabwe | Haiti | Haiti | Cameroon, Mozambique, Philippines | Benin, Haiti, Nicaragua, Philippines, Zambia |
| No significant relationship between wealth and agreement that the specified reason justifies wife beating | Cambodia, Kenya, Nepal, Rwanda | Benin, Nepal, Uganda | Cambodia | Cambodia | Kenya, Rwanda |

*Reference category is the first wealth quintile.

Community-level Characteristics

Both variables used to measure community characteristics—the percentage of women in the community whose husbands have secondary or higher education and the percentage of women in the community who watch television regularly—are expected to positively influence individual women’s empowerment and gender conscientization, and therefore be negatively associated with women’s agreement that wife beating is justified. Both community indicators measure the socioeconomic status of the communities in which women live.

The results provided in Appendix Table 3A.1-23 and summarized in Summary Table 3D show that in 10-12 countries, living in communities where a higher proportion of husbands have secondary or higher education does not significantly affect women's attitudes towards wife beating for one or more of the reasons. In fact, this relationship is not significant for all five reasons in Nicaragua and Rwanda; for four of the reasons in Armenia, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and the Philippines; and for three of the reasons in Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

In several countries, the relationship is positive, contrary to expectations; that is, women who live in communities where men are more educated are more likely to agree that wife beating is justified for the specified reasons. This is particularly true in Uganda, where this community characteristic is positively associated with agreement with all five reasons for wife beating and in Bolivia and Indonesia, where the relationship is positive for four of the five reasons. Furthermore, in Armenia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia, the relationship is either positive for 1-2 reasons or not significant.

Nonetheless, in a majority of the countries (6-9) where the relationship is significant, the direction of the association is negative. For example, it is negative in Benin and Ghana for all five reasons; in Cambodia, Haiti, Morocco, and Nepal for four reasons; and in Burkina Faso for three reasons. Overall, in about half the countries (11), the relationship is negative for at least one of the reasons.

The second indicator of the community's socioeconomic status, the percentage of women in the community with regular exposure to television, is also not consistently related to women's agreement with wife beating. Specifically, this indicator is unrelated in 12-13 countries to agreement that wife beating is justified if the wife goes out without telling her husband and if the wife argues with her husband. The indicator is also unrelated to agreement that wife beating is justified if the wife neglects the children and if she burns the food in eight countries each. Agreement that wife beating is justified if the wife refuses sex with her husband is unrelated to women's television exposure in the community in six countries.

Nonetheless, where a significant relationship exists between agreement with wife beating and living in a community where a large proportion of women are exposed to television, the relationship tends to be negative more often than positive. Benin and Nepal are the only countries where agreement that wife beating is justified is higher for all five reasons for women who live in communities with greater television exposure for women. In addition, in Burkina Faso, Jordan, and Zimbabwe, the relationship is positive or not significant for each of the five reasons. In most of the remaining countries (15 of 23), the relationship is negative for one or more reasons.

In Armenia, Kenya, Indonesia, and Uganda, women's higher media exposure in the community is associated with a lower likelihood of agreement that each of the five reasons justifies wife beating. In Cameroon, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Zambia, this is true for at least three of the five reasons. Cambodia and Mali are exceptions in that, in these countries, the relationship between community-level television exposure and agreement with wife beating is significant and negative for some reasons but significant and positive for others.

In summary, agreement with wife beating is either not influenced at all by the socioeconomic status of the community or it is often negatively related to this status. However, it is worth noting that the relationship can vary greatly by country and reason. In addition, the data suggest that the negative association hypothesized between community socioeconomic development and gender conscientization is upheld more consistently for the factor that is more directly associated with the empowerment of women themselves—the level of women's media exposure in the community.

3.3A Women's Agreement That a Wife Has the Right to Refuse Sex with Her Husband across Countries

A woman's ability to control her own sexual life is an important aspect of her empowerment and bodily integrity. This ability is also essential for a woman's health, particularly for her ability to avoid sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Accordingly, to gauge women's rejection of norms that prevent women from being able to freely decide when to have sex, respondents are asked if they think that a wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: a) she knows her husband has an STD, b) she knows her husband has sex with other women, c) she has recently given birth, and d) she is tired or not in the mood.

Agreement with all of the reasons justifying a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband is positively associated with empowerment because it challenges gender inequitable norms that emphasize men's control over women's sexual lives. However, the different reasons for justifying a woman's refusing sex with her husband asked about do vary in the extent to which they challenge sexual norms. For example, refusing sex after a woman has recently given birth might be far more normatively acceptable (because a woman's health after birth can be delicate) than refusing sex for any of the other reasons; in addition, many cultures recommend against sexual activity soon after a birth. It is expected that for a person socialized into believing that a husband should never be refused sex, the reason that would be most difficult to accept is when the wife is tired or not in the mood because this suggests that it is acceptable that the choice about having sex can rest with women.

Table 3.2 shows the percentages of currently married women who say "yes" to each reason justifying a wife's refusal of sex with her husband by country and reason. In addition, it shows the percentage who agree with all four reasons and with none of the reasons. Note that data are not available for Zimbabwe for the justification "when she knows that the husband has an STD" and for Jordan for the justification "when she knows the husband has sex with other women."

Table 3.2 shows that among the 23 countries in this study, agreement with all four reasons justifying a woman refusing sex with her husband ranges from 10 percent in Mali to 90 percent in Nepal.

Figure 3.7 provides a summary of these data for all countries by region. The mean across all countries is 55 percent and more than half of the women agree with all four reasons in 15 of the 23 countries. Nonetheless, there is great variation in this indicator across countries and particularly across regions. As the figure shows, agreement with all four reasons is lowest in the sub-Saharan Africa region and highest in the Asia region, closely followed by the Latin America/Caribbean region. Notably, the range of agreement is also greatest in the sub-Saharan Africa region.

Some countries where agreement levels are particularly low are Mali (10 percent), Morocco (28 percent), and Zimbabwe (36 percent). In contrast, levels of agreement are high in Nepal (90 percent), the Philippines (85 percent), and Nicaragua (81 percent).

Table 3.2. Percentages of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reasons, by reason


| Country | Percentage of women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | Agree with none of the reasons |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | She has recently given birth | She is tired or not in the mood | Agree with all of the reasons | |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | | | | | | |
| Benin | 88.0 | 56.6 | 87.3 | 74.3 | 47.4 | 4.5 |
| Burkin/a Faso | 79.6 | 63.5 | 84.4 | 62.9 | 44.9 | 6.2 |
| Cameroon | 87.9 | 70.6 | 85.9 | 76.0 | 54.2 | 3.3 |
| Ghan/a | 85.8 | 77.8 | 84.1 | 74.4 | 61.8 | 7.5 |
| Kenya | 88.6 | 79.0 | 86.6 | 60.5 | 51.2 | 5.7 |
| Malawi | 75.3 | 70.2 | 80.0 | 62.6 | 51.0 | 13.8 |
| Mali | 45.2 | 32.2 | 56.2 | 29.1 | 9.7 | 24.2 |
| Mozambique | 80.0 | 51.9 | 86.3 | 62.7 | 42.8 | 8.3 |
| Nigeria | 86.0 | 70.6 | 69.7 | 52.8 | 43.4 | 9.4 |
| Rwanda | 89.2 | 69.0 | 77.2 | 58.2 | 42.5 | 5.1 |
| Uganda | 91.7 | 75.8 | 90.6 | 80.7 | 65.0 | 3.2 |
| Zambia | 87.5 | 73.8 | 92.1 | 69.3 | 54.3 | 3.6 |
| Zimbabwe | n/a | 61.7 | 84.6 | 51.6 | 36.2 | 8.4 |
| North Africa/West Asia/ Europe | | | | | | |
| Armenia | 92.8 | 85.8 | 86.8 | 71.2 | 63.0 | 4.3 |
| Jordan | 94.4 | n/a | 95.3 | 68.8 | 65.8 | 1.3 |
| Morocco | 94.3 | 90.9 | 38.4 | 58.8 | 27.9 | 2.5 |
| Asia | | | | | | |
| Cambodia | 68.8 | 67.8 | 70.8 | 68.5 | 62.1 | 25.7 |
| Indonesia | 85.0 | 83.6 | 91.0 | 69.3 | 61.5 | 6.5 |
| Nepal | 95.3 | 93.9 | 97.4 | 96.7 | 90.1 | 1.1 |
| Philippines | 95.5 | 90.8 | 95.5 | 91.4 | 85.0 | 2.6 |
| Latin America/Caribbean | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 86.9 | 90.7 | 91.3 | 79.7 | 68.2 | 2.6 |
| Haiti | 88.5 | 76.9 | 87.4 | 74.5 | 64.3 | 7.6 |
| Nicaragua | 93.1 | 91.1 | 94.6 | 86.7 | 80.6 | 3.2 |

n/a = Not available

The proportion of women who agree with none of the reasons is less than 5 percent in 11 countries and less than 10 percent in all countries except Cambodia, Mali, and Malawi. Cambodia is particularly interesting, with 26 percent of women agreeing with none of the four reasons and 62 percent agreeing with all four reasons. This implies that only 12 percent of Cambodian women agree with at least one but not all reasons. The only other countries with such low percentages of women agreeing with at least one but not all reasons are Nepal, Nicaragua, and the Philippines, where the vast majority of women, as noted above, agree with all four reasons.

An examination of the percentages of women agreeing with each of the reasons justifying women's refusal of sex with their husbands yields both expected and unexpected findings (Table 3.2 and Figure 3.7). As expected, the reason justifying women refusing sex with their husbands with which women are least likely to agree in 15 of the 23 countries is being tired or not in the mood. Nonetheless, levels of agreement even with this reason range from 97 percent in Nepal and 91 percent in the Philippines to 52 percent in Zimbabwe and 29 percent in Mali. The average level of agreement with this reason across all countries is 69 percent.

Figure 3.7. Percentage of women who agree with all four specified reasons justifying a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband: Ranges and means by region and for all countries




Unexpectedly, there is no one reason with which women are most likely to agree. In fact, there are 10 countries where women are most likely to agree that a woman is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband when she has recently given birth and another 10 countries where women are most likely to agree that a woman is justified when she knows that her husband has an STD. The average agreement level for the first of these two reasons is 83 percent, with a range of 38 percent in Morocco to 97 percent in Nepal. The average percentage of women who agree with the second reason is marginally higher, at 85 percent, with a range of 45 percent in Mali to 96 percent in the Philippines. Furthermore, in countries where these two reasons do not generate the highest levels of agreement, they tend to generate the second highest agreement levels.


Also unexpected is the fact that there are very few countries where women do not think that the wife's knowing that her husband has sex with other women justifies a wife refusing sex with her husband. In 7 countries, this is the reason least likely to generate agreement and in 12 countries, it generates the second lowest agreement level. Specifically, the range of agreement with this reason has a mean across all countries of 74 percent and a range of 31 percent in Mali to 94 percent in the Philippines.

Finally, Figure 3.8 shows how agreement with the different reasons varies by region. On average, the proportion of women agreeing that knowing that her husband has an STD justifies a wife refusing sex with her husband is lowest in the sub-Saharan African region and highest in the North Africa/West Asia/Europe region. However, the range of variation in the average level of agreement with this reason across regions is only 12 percentage points, lower than for any other reason. Agreement is also lowest, at only 66 percent on average, in sub-Saharan Africa that refusing sex is justified when a woman knows that her husband has sex with other women; in the other regions, the average level of agreement with this reason ranges from 84 to 88 percent.


Figure 3.8. Percentage of women who agree with specified reasons justifying a wife's refusal of sex with her husband, by reason, according to region: Ranges and means




Sub-Saharan Africa



North Africa/West Asia/Europe



Asia



Latin America/Caribbean

For refusing sex when the woman has recently given birth, however, agreement is lowest in the North Africa/West Asia/Europe region at only 74 percent and highest in the Latin America/Caribbean region at 91 percent; the level of agreement with this reason in the sub-Saharan Africa region, at an average of 82 percent, is similar to the average level in the Asia region, at 89 percent. The range in the average agreement level with this reason across regions is 17 percentage points, even though the expectation had been that there would be a uniformly high level of agreement with this reason.

Finally, with regard to agreement that refusal of sex is justified when the woman is tired or not in the mood, the regions cluster into two groups: sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa/West Asia/Europe, where the average agreement level is 63-66 percent, and Asia and Latin America/Caribbean regions, where the average agreement level is 80-82 percent. Notably, the agreement level is, as expected, lower for this reason than any other reason in all regions. However, in the Asia and Latin America/Caribbean regions, agreement levels with this reason are not much lower than for any other reason. In the sub-Saharan Africa region, the average agreement level with this reason is about the same as the average agreement level with a woman's refusal to have sex because her husband has sex with other women, suggesting perhaps that these two reasons are perceived similarly in this part of the world.

3.3B Correlates of Women's Agreement with a Wife's Right to Refuse Sex with Her Husband

This section examines the variations in women's agreement with each of the four reasons justifying a wife refusing sex with her husband according to women's, marital, and household characteristics. In addition, to assess the direct effects of each of the explanatory variables, logistic regressions are run with controls for the socioeconomic development of the community. The dependent variables are those defined earlier, with a response being coded as 1 when the woman agrees that the specific reason justifies a wife refusing sex with her husband and as 0 otherwise.

Detailed results of the analyses for each of the 23 countries are shown in Appendix Tables 3B.1-23. Bivariate and multivariate relationships are summarized across countries to facilitate comparison in Summary Tables 3E-H.

Women's Characteristics

Age. In most countries, women's agreement with the different reasons justifying a wife's refusal of sex with her husband does not vary significantly with age. While this is true for each reason, it is particularly true for the reasons she has recently given birth and is tired or not in the mood. There is insignificant variation in agreement levels between age groups for these two reasons in 17 and 18 countries, respectively. Also, when the question refers to a wife's right to refuse her husband sex when she knows her husband has sex with other women, women in the age group 20-29 or 30-39 years are more likely to agree than women aged 40 and over in all eight countries where the relationship is significant.

Summary Table 3E. Number of countries where agreement with the specified justification for a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband has an association of the specified type with the respondent's age and number of children ever born: Results of bivariate analysis and analysis with controls

| Variable | Husband has a sexually transmitted disease | Husband has sex with other women | Wife has recently given birth | Wife is tired or not in the mood |
|---|---|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| Age | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 5 | 8 | 3 | 4 |
| Generally positive | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Does not vary significantly by age | 14 | 14 | 17 | 18 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | |
| Generally negative | 1 | 5 | 2 | 0 |
| Nonlinear | 3 | 7 | 8 | 6 |
| Generally positive | 6 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Does not vary significantly by age | 12 | 10 | 12 | 15 |
| Children ever born | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | |
| Generally positive | 2 | 2 | 8 | 4 |
| Generally negative | 6 | 6 | 2 | 5 |
| Nonlinear | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Does not vary by number of children ever born | 12 | 11 | 11 | 12 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | |
| Generally positive | 4 | 10 | 15 | 6 |
| Increases with number of children ever born | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Significantly higher only for women with 5 or more children | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Significantly lower only for women with no children | 3 | 7 | 11 | 3 |
| Generally negative | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Nonlinear | 0 | 2 | 0 | 6 |
| Does not vary by number of children ever born | 16 | 9 | 8 | 9 |

The importance of age in women's agreement that a wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband under different circumstances becomes more evident in some countries when the analysis controls for other individual and background characteristics. The summary results of the logistic regression in Summary Table 3E show that the variation in agreement with age is significant in about half the countries for all reasons except when the wife is tired or not in the mood. Furthermore, the significant relationships vary greatly in the direction of association by reason. The relationship of age with agreement that refusal of sex is justified when the woman knows that her husband has an STD is positive in 6 of the 10 countries where the relationship is significant. However, the relationship is negative or nonlinear in 12 countries for the reason "when the woman knows that her husband has sex with other women" and mostly nonlinear, when significant, for the remaining two reasons.

In particular, women in the youngest age groups in Bolivia, Mali, Nicaragua, and Zambia are less likely to agree that a wife has the right to refuse sex with her husband when she knows that he has an STD compared with women age 40-49; in Cameroon and Jordan, women age 15-29 years are less likely than their oldest counterparts to agree. The opposite relationship is dominant when women are asked about a wife's right to refuse sex when she knows that her husband has sex with other women. In Indonesia, the likelihood of agreeing that this reason justifies refusal of sex decreases with each age group; in Nepal and Uganda, the youngest age group is the most likely to agree that this reason justifies refusal of sex; and in Mali and Burkina Faso, women age 15-29 years are more likely to agree that this reason justifies refusal of sex than women in the oldest group.

In general, the results of the logistic regression of women's attitudes towards a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband indicate that, typically, age does not directly influence women's opinions in this matter and that, when it does, the women least likely to agree that most reasons justify a woman's refusal of sex with her husband are often the youngest and oldest women.

Number of children ever born. In many countries, bearing children is associated with increased status for women within the marriage, which suggests that having children might increase women's support for the right of women to decide when to have sex with their husbands.

However, the bivariate analysis results (Appendix Tables 3B.1-23 and Summary Table 3E) show that, although women's agreement levels do vary significantly with the number of children women have in about half the countries, the relationship is not always positive. In fact, for three of the four reasons (knowing that the husband has an STD, knowing that he has sex with other women, and being tired or not in the mood), the percentage of women agreeing generally decreases with the number of children in the majority of countries where agreement varies by parity. The percentage of women agreeing that women who have recently given birth are justified in refusing sex with their husbands is significantly higher only among women with higher parity.

The multivariate analysis shows that in some countries, there is no association between parity and a woman's opinion about whether a wife has the right to refuse sex with her husband. Notably, of the 23 countries in the study, there are nine (Cameroon, Ghana, Haiti, Jordan, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Zambia) where women's responses do not vary by the number of children they have for three of the four reasons; in Cambodia, the relationship is not significant for any reason.

Furthermore, the introduction of controls reduces the number of countries where women's agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex when the husband has an STD varies significantly with number of children. In the six countries where this relationship is significant, in three (Malawi, Mozambique, and Uganda) women who have no children are less likely to agree than women with children, in one (Burkina Faso) only women with 5 or more children are more likely to agree, and in two (Indonesia and Morocco), only women with 5 or more children are less likely to agree than other women. However, for the remaining reasons, the association between parity and women's agreement becomes significant in a few more countries when controls are introduced into the analysis.

Specifically, the multivariate analysis shows that the relationship between parity and agreeing that a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband is justified when she knows that her husband has sex with other women and when she has recently given birth is primarily positive in the majority of countries (10 and 15, respectively). In most of these countries, women with no children are less likely to agree than women with children. This is particularly true in Armenia, Benin, Kenya, Indonesia, and Malawi, where agreement follows this pattern for both reasons.

The association between number of children and women's agreement with a wife's right to refuse sex when she is tired or not in the mood stands out because of the almost equal numbers of countries where the direction of association is positive and in which the direction is negative or nonlinear. The countries where the relationship tends to be positive are Armenia, Malawi, and Mozambique (where women with no children are significantly less likely to agree); Bolivia and the Philippines (where women with 3-4 or more children are most likely to agree); and Burkina Faso (where only women with 5 or more children are most likely to agree). In contrast, in Ghana and Nigeria, the relationship is generally negative. In Benin, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe, the relationship is nonlinear.

In sum, the multivariate results support the hypothesis that women who have children are more likely to agree that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband. However, there are only three countries (Burkina Faso, Malawi, and Mozambique) where this is true for all four reasons. Notably, too,

in a significant number of countries, this positive association is dominated by the difference between women who have no children and the reference category (women who have 1-2 children) and does not increase linearly with the number of children.

Education. In general, the bivariate and multivariate results support the hypothesis that education level is positively associated with women's attitudes towards a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband. In 12-17 countries, the percentage of women who agree that women have this right either increases monotonically with education level, is lower only for women with no education, or is highest among women with secondary or higher education for three of the four reasons. The only reason for which the percentage of women agreeing varies significantly by education level in only about half the countries is when the woman has recently given birth. However, even for this reason the relationship is generally positive when it is significant.

Summary Table 3F. Number of countries where agreement with the specified justification for a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband has an association of the specified type with the respondent's education level, employment for cash, and media exposure: Results of bivariate analysis and analysis with controls

| Variable | Husband has a sexually transmitted disease | Husband has sex with other women | Wife has recently given birth | Wife is tired or not in the mood |
|---|--|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Education | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | |
| Generally positive | 17 | 15 | 11 | 16 |
| Generally negative | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Does not vary by education level | 5 | 6 | 11 | 7 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | |
| Generally positive | 17 | 17 | 14 | 16 |
| Increases monotonically | 10 | 6 | 5 | 3 |
| More likely only for women with secondary or higher education | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Less likely only for women with no education | 5 | 9 | 7 | 9 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Does not vary by education level | 5 | 4 | 7 | 5 |
| Works for cash | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | |
| Positive | 12 | 14 | 14 | 15 |
| Negative | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Does not vary by employment for cash | 10 | 7 | 7 | 5 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | |
| Positive | 8 | 11 | 10 | 12 |
| Negative | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Does not vary by employment for cash | 12 | 9 | 11 | 10 |
| Regular media exposure | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | |
| Positive | 19 | 17 | 13 | 14 |
| Negative | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Does not vary by media exposure | 3 | 5 | 10 | 9 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | |
| Positive | 14 | 10 | 12 | 11 |
| Negative | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Does not vary by media exposure | 8 | 12 | 10 | 11 |

When controls are added, the number of countries where there is a significant relationship remains the same for three of the four reasons and increases for the reason if the woman has recently given birth. The only country where education level is not associated with women's attitudes towards a wife's refusal of sex for all reasons is Cambodia; Benin and Nepal are the only countries where education level has a significant relationship with agreement that wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband only for one of the reasons. Furthermore, education level is negatively associated with women's agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband when she knows that her husband has

sex with other women in the Philippines and is negatively related to agreement when the woman has recently given birth in both Benin and the Philippines.

Figure 3.9 lists countries by the type of positive relationship between education level and agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband by reason. Only countries where the relationship is positive are included.

Figure 3.9. Countries where a positive relationship exists between education level and agreement that a wife has the right to refuse sex with her husband, by reason, based on logistic regression results*

| Relationship | Wife knows that her husband has an STD | Wife knows that her husband has sex with other women | Wife has recently given birth | Wife is tired or not in the mood |
|--|--|---|---|--|
| Increases linearly | Armenia, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Indonesia, Jordan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Zambia | Armenia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe | Armenia, Bolivia, Indonesia, Jordan, Nicaragua | Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Nicaragua |
| Only women with secondary or higher education are more likely to agree | Nigeria, Ghana | Bolivia, Indonesia | Burkina Faso, Mozambique | Mali, Indonesia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe |
| Only women with no education are less likely to agree | Haiti, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nepal | Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia | Cameroon, Haiti, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda | Cameroon, Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia |

*Reference category is women with only primary-level education

Overall, education level increases the likelihood that women will support more gender-egalitarian sex roles. Countries differ greatly, however, in whether what matters is level of education or whether women have or have not received any education at all.

Employment for cash. As expected, a higher percentage of women employed for cash agree that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband for each of the four reasons than women not employed for cash in the majority (12-15) of countries. However, in 10 countries, the percentage agreeing does not vary significantly with employment for cash when the wife knows that her husband has an STD and in 5-7 countries it does not vary significantly for the remaining three reasons.

These results are largely mirrored by the multivariate analysis results. The multivariate results show only a small reduction in the number of countries where the relationship between employment and attitudes towards refusal of sex for each reason is significant. Of particular note are the following results:

- Armenia, Bolivia, Jordan, and the Philippines are the only countries where agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband does not vary by women's employment status for all four reasons.
- Ghana, Indonesia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe are the only countries where the relationship is significant for only one reason. Notably, in Nepal and Zimbabwe, the relationship is negative when it is significant.

- In Cambodia and the three sub-Saharan African countries (Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia), women's employment is positively associated with their agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband for all four reasons.
- In Mali, although the relationship is significant for all four reasons, women employed for cash are more likely to agree that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband for only two of the four reasons, namely, when the wife knows that her husband has sex with other women and when she is tired or not in the mood.
- In Benin, Haiti, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda, the association is positive and significant for three of the four reasons.
- In Burkina Faso, the association is negative and significant for three of the four reasons.

In summary, employment for cash is an important correlate of women's attitudes towards a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband in a large number of countries. Women employed for cash are more likely to agree that a woman has a right to refuse sex for each of the four reasons.

Media exposure. The expectation that women who have regular exposure to media will have nontraditional gender-role attitudes is largely upheld by both the bivariate and multivariate analyses.

The percentages of women agreeing that a wife has the right to refuse sex for each of the four reasons are significantly higher among women who are regularly exposed to the media than women without such exposure. This is true in 19 countries when the wife knows that her husband has an STD, 17 countries when the wife knows that her husband has sex with other women, but only 13 countries when the wife has recently given birth and 14 when the wife is tired or not in the mood. There are no countries where women not regularly exposed to the media are more likely to agree with each of the reasons.

The introduction of controls tends to reduce some of the positive effects of media on attitudes, however. After controls are introduced, the positive association between media exposure and support for a woman's right to refuse sex is restricted to only 14 countries when the woman knows that her husband has an STD and 10-12 countries for the other reasons.

In Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, and Morocco, regular media exposure is positively associated with agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex for each of the four reasons. In Armenia, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Rwanda, media exposure is positively associated with agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex for at least three of the four reasons. In Benin, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Nigeria, and Uganda, the association is positive for one or two reasons. In Ghana, the Philippines, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, media exposure is unrelated to women's attitudes towards refusal of sex by wives for all reasons. Haiti and Malawi are the only countries where the relationship is negative for one reason (when the wife is tired or not in mood in Haiti and after a recent birth in Malawi); for all other reasons, there is no significant relationship in these countries.

In summary, by and large, women who are exposed regularly to the media tend to have more liberal gender-role attitudes than those who are not regularly exposed.

Union Characteristics

Age at first marriage. A higher age at first marriage is hypothesized to be positively associated with an egalitarian outlook on gender roles. Appendix Table 3B.1-23 and Summary Table 3G show only mixed support for this hypothesis, however. The percentage of women agreeing that each of the reasons justifies a wife refusing sex with her husband generally increases with age at first marriage in only 5-8 countries,

depending on the reason. Notably, for the reason the wife has recently given birth, the relationship is negative or nonlinear in nine countries.

The inclusion of controls weakens the association between attitudes towards refusal of sex and age at first marriage. With controls, age at marriage is no longer relevant to women's agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex when she is tired or not in the mood in 16 countries and for the remaining three reasons in 11-13 countries. Age at first marriage is unrelated to women's agreement that refusal of sex is justified for all four reasons in Kenya, Jordan, Morocco, Rwanda, and Uganda, and for three of the four reasons in Ghana, Indonesia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Zambia. Furthermore, the direction of the relationship is no longer predominantly positive, as suggested by the bivariate analysis; in fact, it is negative or nonlinear in 6-8 countries and positive in only 1-4 countries.

Summary Table 3G. Number of countries where agreement with the specified justification for a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband has an association of the specified type with the respondent's age at first marriage and spousal age difference: Results of bivariate analysis and analysis with controls

| Variable | Husband has a sexually transmitted disease | Husband has sex with other women | Wife has recently given birth | Wife is tired or not in the mood |
|---|--|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Age at first marriage | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | |
| Generally positive | 8 | 6 | 5 | 5 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 4 | 4 | 9 | 4 |
| Does not vary by age at first marriage | 10 | 12 | 9 | 14 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | |
| Generally positive | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| Monotonically positive | 2 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| More likely only for women married after age 25 years | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Generally negative or nonlinear | 7 | 5 | 8 | 6 |
| Does not vary by age at first marriage | 11 | 13 | 12 | 16 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | |
| Generally negative | 7 | 5 | 3 | 5 |
| Generally positive or nonlinear | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Does not vary by spousal age difference | 14 | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | |
| Generally negative | 5 | 7 | 4 | 6 |
| Monotonically negative | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Less likely only for women who are at least 10 years younger than their husband | 2 | 6 | 3 | 6 |
| Generally positive or nonlinear | 3 | 0 | 5 | 6 |
| Does not vary by spousal age difference | 14 | 15 | 14 | 11 |

Overall, there are only three countries (Mali, Nepal, and Nigeria) where age at first marriage is significantly associated with women's agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex for each of the four reasons; however, in none of these countries is the nature of the significant relationship identical for all reasons. In Mali, the relationship is linear and negative for two of the reasons and for two, only women who were married between the ages of 18 and 24 years are more likely to agree. In Nepal, the relationship is linear but positive for two reasons and nonlinear for the other two. In Nigeria, the relationship is negative for two reasons and nonlinear for the other two.

Benin and Malawi are the only countries where the relationship is significant for three of the four reasons. In Benin, the significant relationships are nonlinear, with women married between the ages of 18 and 24 years being most likely to agree that a wife's refusal of sex is justified for all reasons other than knowing that her husband has an STD. In Malawi, the significant relationships are also nonlinear, except

that women married between ages 18 and 24 years are less likely to agree than other women. In the remaining countries, the relationship is significant for only two or fewer of the reasons.

These results show that although age at first marriage does affect women’s gender-role attitudes in several countries, marriage at ages older than 24 years is not necessarily associated with an increased likelihood of holding gender-egalitarian beliefs. In many countries, it is women married between ages 18 and 24 years who are most likely to agree with statements about the right of women to refuse sex with their husbands if they do not want sex.

Spousal age gap. A large spousal age difference is likely to put the younger partner at a disadvantage with respect to control, rights, and resources. Hence, women with husbands much older than themselves are hypothesized to be less likely to agree that women are justified in refusing sex with their husband. However, the bivariate results show that in the majority of countries (14 when the wife knows that her husband has an STD and 17 each for the other reasons), the proportion of women agreeing that women have a right to refuse sex with their husbands does not vary significantly by spousal age difference. However, when the relationship is significant, it tends to be negative (Appendix Tables 3B.1-23 and Summary Table 3G).

The inclusion of controls in the multivariate analysis increases the number of countries where the spousal age gap is significantly associated with women’s attitudes towards a wife’s refusal of sex. This is especially true for the reason when the wife is tired or not in the mood; with controls, spousal age difference has a significant association with agreement with a woman’s right to refuse sex for this reason in half the countries, more than for any other reason. Benin and Haiti are the only two countries where the relationship is significant for all four reasons. Armenia, Cameroon, Jordan, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Rwanda are the only countries where no significant relationship exists between spousal age difference and agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex for any of the four reasons.

Figure 3.10 lists countries according to type of relationship between agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband and spousal age difference by reason. Only countries where the relationship is significant are listed.

Figure 3.10. Countries where a significant relationship exists between spousal age difference and agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband, by reason, based on logistic regression results*

| Relationship | Wife knows that her husband has an STD | Wife knows that her husband has sex with other women | Wife has recently given birth | Wife is tired or not in the mood |
|---|--|--|-------------------------------|--|
| Negative | | | | |
| Agreement tends to decrease linearly | Burkina Faso, Haiti, Mali | Mozambique | Mali | |
| Only women at least 10 years younger than their husbands are less likely to agree | Benin, Cambodia | Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Haiti, Kenya, Uganda | Benin, Kenya, Zimbabwe | Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Haiti, Mozambique, Nigeria, Zambia |
| Nonlinear | | | | |
| Only women 5-9 years younger than their husbands are less likely to agree | Uganda | | Haiti | |
| Only women 5-9 years younger are significantly more likely to agree | Nepal | | | Benin, Ghana, Indonesia |
| Positive | | | | |
| Agreement tends to increase linearly with spousal age difference | Bolivia | | Malawi, Mozambique | Malawi, Nepal |
| Agreement is higher among women at least 10 years younger than their husbands | | | Bolivia, Morocco | Morocco |

*Reference category is wife is less than 4 years younger than her husband

The figure shows great variation by reason between and within countries in the relationship between spousal age difference and agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband.

Household Characteristics

Urban residence. Urban living is expected to encourage nontraditional beliefs and attitudes, including attitudes regarding gender roles. In keeping with this expectation, in about half or more of the countries, higher percentages of women in urban areas than rural areas agree that a woman has a right to refuse sex for each of the four reasons (Appendix Table 3B.1-23 and Summary Table 3H). However, once controls are added to the analysis, area of residence has a less significant impact on the likelihood that a woman will agree with each of the specified reasons in 12-14 of the 23 countries. Notably, in countries where urban residence is significantly correlated with agreement, the relationship is not necessarily positive.

Summary Table 3H. Number of countries where agreement with the specified justification for a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband has an association of the specified type with the respondent's area of residence, residence in an extended family, wealth index, and community controls: Results of bivariate analysis (except for community controls) and analysis with controls

| Variable | Husband has a sexually transmitted disease | Husband has sex with other women | Wife has recently given birth | Wife is tired or not in the mood |
|--|--|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Urban residence | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | |
| Positive | 16 | 12 | 10 | 11 |
| Negative | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Does not vary by area of residence | 4 | 7 | 9 | 7 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | |
| Positive | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| Negative | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 |
| Does not vary by area of residence | 12 | 14 | 14 | 14 |
| Residence in extended family | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | |
| Positive | 9 | 6 | 5 | 8 |
| Negative | 0 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Does not vary by extended family residence | 13 | 14 | 15 | 12 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | |
| Positive | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| Negative | 1 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| Does not vary by extended family residence | 17 | 15 | 18 | 17 |
| Wealth index | | | | |
| <i>Bivariate</i> | | | | |
| Generally positive | 15 | 13 | 9 | 12 |
| Nonlinear or negative | 2 | 3 | 6 | 5 |
| Does not vary by wealth quintile | 5 | 6 | 8 | 7 |
| <i>With controls</i> | | | | |
| Generally positive | 9 | 5 | 4 | 3 |
| Significantly higher in top three or four quintiles | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| Significantly higher only in wealthiest one or two quintiles | 6 | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| Generally negative | 2 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Nonlinear | 6 | 3 | 9 | 10 |
| Does not vary by wealth quintile | 5 | 10 | 7 | 5 |
| Community controls | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have at least a high school education | | | | |
| Positive | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| Negative | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Not significant | 15 | 15 | 14 | 14 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | | | | |
| Positive | 9 | 6 | 9 | 6 |
| Negative | 5 | 3 | 8 | 5 |
| Not significant | 8 | 13 | 6 | 12 |

Specifically, agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex does not vary significantly by area of residence for any of the reasons in Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Jordan, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Philippines, or Zimbabwe and for three of the reasons in Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Nepal. Furthermore, in Armenia, Benin, Haiti, Malawi, Nepal, Rwanda, and Zambia, the relationship with urban living, when significant, is negative; in Uganda, the relationship negative for each of the four reasons. In other words, in these countries, the net effect of urban living is a reduced likelihood that women will agree that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband. In fact, the multivariate analysis shows that the only countries where urban living is consistently and positively associated with women's agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex for each of the four reasons are Mali, Morocco, and Nicaragua and for some of the reasons in Cameroon, Ghana, Indonesia, and Kenya. Thus, in only 7 of the 23 countries does urban living have a net positive effect on women's acceptance of a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband for one or more reasons.

This analysis suggests that although urban women in most countries are more likely than rural women to agree that a wife should have the right to refuse sex with her husband for the specified reasons, this effect is largely explained away when controls are included in the analysis. In seven countries, the net effect of urban living appears to be a reduction in the likelihood that women will agree that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband.

Residence in an extended family. Residence in an extended family is expected to be more compatible with accepting patriarchal and traditional gender roles than residence in a nuclear family. However, the bivariate results in Appendix Table 3B.1-23, summarized in Summary Table 3H, do not support this expectation. In the majority of countries (12-15), in fact, agreement that the different reasons justify a woman in refusing sex with her husband does not vary significantly by type of household structure. When the variation is significant, a higher proportion of women in an extended family tends to agree that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband than those living in a nuclear family.

Residence in an extended family also appears to have no significant net effect in most countries (15-18). Furthermore, in Ghana, Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, for the reasons for which the relationship of agreement with family structure is significant at all, women in extended families are more likely to agree that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband than women in nuclear families. Only in Armenia, Bolivia, Cameroon, Jordan, Mali, and Mozambique are women in extended families less likely to agree that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband for even one reason.

Thus, overall, it can be concluded that extended family living does not significantly influence women's attitudes towards a wife's sexual rights in most countries. In countries where living in an extended family does have a significant effect on women's attitudes towards a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband, the relationship is not always as predicted.

Wealth. Household wealth is, on balance, hypothesized as being positively associated with the likelihood of having gender-egalitarian beliefs. Indeed, Appendix Table 3B.1-23 and Summary Table 3H show that in the majority of countries, women in the top wealth quintiles are more likely than women in the lower quintiles to agree that women should have the right to refuse sex with their husband for most of the specified reasons. In only 5-8 countries does agreement not vary by wealth quintile.

Household wealth status remains an important variable influencing attitudes regarding women's refusal of sex with their husband even when controls are introduced into the analysis. The relationship is significant in all but 5-10 countries. Furthermore, there is no country where the relationship is not significant for all four reasons. However, with the introduction of controls, the complexity of the relationship increases by reason across countries.

Figure 3.11 lists countries by relationship between wealth and women’s agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband for each of the specified reasons based on the multivariate analysis.

Figure 3.11. Countries according to the association between household wealth and agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband for specified reasons, based on logistic regression results*

| Relationship | Wife knows that her husband has an STD | Wife knows that her husband has sex with other women | Wife has recently given birth | Wife is tired or not in the mood |
|----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| Generally positive | Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Jordan, Mozambique, Philippines, Zambia | Cameroon, Haiti, Indonesia, Philippines, Uganda | Indonesia, Mozambique, Philippines, Uganda | Haiti, Jordan, Uganda |
| Generally negative | Burkina Faso, Morocco | Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Rwanda | Burkina Faso, Morocco, Nigeria | Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria |
| Nonlinear | Cambodia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nepal, Rwanda | Benin, Kenya, Nigeria | Benin, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Zimbabwe | Benin, Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Zimbabwe |
| Does not vary by wealth quintile | Haiti, Mali, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Uganda | Armenia, Cambodia, Bolivia, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Zambia, Zimbabwe | Armenia, Bolivia, Haiti, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, Zambia | Armenia, Bolivia, Cameroon, Philippines, Zambia |

*Reference category is women in households in the lowest wealth quintile.

The figure shows clearly that there is great variation within and across countries in the relationship between wealth and agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband, depending on the reason provided as justification. In fact, there is no country where the relationship is positive for all four reasons. However, in Armenia, Bolivia, Haiti, Jordan, the Philippines, Uganda, and Zambia, when the relationship is significant for one or more reasons, it is always positive. Only in Burkina Faso is the relationship negative for all four reasons.

Notably too, the relationship is positive in the largest number of countries (9) when the reason for refusing sex is that the wife knows that her husband has an STD. The relationship is negative (5 countries) or nonlinear (10 countries) in the largest number of countries when the woman is tired or not in the mood. Finally, wealth is unrelated to agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex when she knows that her husband has sex with other women in 10 countries, more than for any other reason.

In summary, the results of the multivariate analysis suggest that more egalitarian attitudes towards gender roles do not typically have a monotonic positive relationship with wealth in most countries. Although wealth does have a significant net effect on such attitudes, its effect tends to vary in most countries by reason. Notably, too, the effect is least likely to be positive for the reason the woman is tired or not in the mood.

Community-level Characteristics

The two variables used in this study to measure the level of community influence on women’s empowerment are (1) percentage of women in the community whose husbands have secondary or higher education and (2) the percentage of women in the community with regular exposure to television. These variables are expected to have a generally positive association with women’s agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband.

The multivariate results shown in Appendix Table 3B.1-23 and summarized in Table 3H reveal that this expectation is upheld more consistently for the second variable, which more directly captures individual women’s access to development benefits, than for the first variable. In fact, the first community-level variable is unrelated to agreement with a wife refusing her husband sex in 14-15 countries depending on the reason. In contrast, the second variable is unrelated to agreement in 6-8 countries when the wife knows that her husband has an STD or she has recently given birth. However, for the remaining two reasons, even this community variable is unrelated to agreement in about half the countries.

Also, the first community-level variable is unrelated to agreement in five countries (Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Kenya, Nicaragua, and Zambia) for all four reasons and nine countries (Armenia, Ghana, Haiti, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, the Philippines, Rwanda, and Uganda) for three of the four reasons. The second community-level variable is not related to agreement for all four reasons in only Jordan, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe, and for three reasons in an additional five countries (Cameroon, Malawi, Morocco, Nicaragua, and Zambia).

Countries where the relationship is significant are listed in Figure 3.12 by community-level variable and reason.

Figure 3.12. Countries according to association between community-level variables and acceptance of wives’ right to refuse sex with their husbands, based on results from multivariate logistic regression

| Relationship | Wife knows that her husband has an STD | Wife knows that her husband has sex with other women | Wife has recently given birth | Wife is tired or not in the mood |
|--|---|---|--|--|
| Percentage of women whose husbands have secondary or higher education | | | | |
| Positive | Benin, Mali, Indonesia, Nepal | Benin, Indonesia, Mozambique, Uganda | Benin, Indonesia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Morocco | Armenia, Benin, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda |
| Negative | Cameroon, Ghana | Cameroon, Malawi, Philippines | Bolivia, Cameroon, Zimbabwe | Bolivia, Haiti, Zimbabwe |
| Percentage of women who watch television regularly | | | | |
| Positive | Bolivia, Cambodia, Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Uganda | Bolivia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Philippines | Bolivia, Cambodia, Ghana, Haiti, Indonesia, Nigeria, Philippines, Uganda, Zambia | Bolivia, Cambodia, Ghana, Haiti, Indonesia, Uganda |
| Negative | Armenia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique | Armenia, Mali, Mozambique | Armenia, Benin, Cameroon, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua | Armenia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Nepal |

It is apparent from Figure 3.12 that Benin and Indonesia are the only countries where the relationship between the variable measuring male education levels in the community and women’s agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband is positive for at least three of the four reasons. Cameroon is the only country where the relationship is negative for three of the four reasons, whereas Bolivia and Zimbabwe are the only countries where the relationship is negative for two reasons. Notably, however, when the relationship is significant, it is more likely to be positive than negative.

In contrast, the second community-level variable—the percentage of women in the community who watch television regularly—has a significant relationship with women’s acceptance of egalitarian gender roles in more countries, mirroring the results for the other measures of empowerment in this study. In fact, the relationship is positive for all four reasons in Bolivia, Cambodia, and Indonesia and positive for three reasons in the Philippines, Nigeria, Haiti, and Uganda.

Among countries where the relationship is significant, it is positive more often than it is negative when the wife knows that her husband has an STD and when the husband has sex with other women. The relationship is equally positive and negative in approximately equal numbers of countries for the other two reasons. Notably, in Armenia, Benin, Mali, and Mozambique, the relationship is negative for at least three of the four reasons.

These results suggest that community-level development has an impact on women's gender-role attitudes, particularly when the nature of development involves women directly. However, whether such development leads to more gender-egalitarian attitudes depends on the country.

3.4 Correlates of Summary Indicators of Gender-role Attitudes

In this final section, the correlates of the two summary indicators for gender-role attitudes (defined in Section 3.1) are examined, namely agreement that none of the five reasons justifies wife beating (if the wife goes out without asking the husband, if the wife neglects the children, if the wife argues with her husband, if the wife refuses sex with her husband, and if the wife burns the food) and agreement with all of the four reasons for a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband (when the wife knows that her husband has an STD, when she knows that her husband has sex with other women, when she has recently given birth, and when she is tired or not in the mood).

If a woman agrees that even one reason justifies wife beating, she is agreeing that a husband has a right to beat his wife. Similarly, when she disagrees with even one of the four reasons that justify a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband, she is agreeing with the idea that sexual intercourse in marriage does not require mutual consent and that there are circumstances in which a wife should not refuse sex with her husband. True conscientization with regard to gender equality, and hence true empowerment, should involve the total rejection of wife beating for any reason and agreement that in a couple, the wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband when she is not ready for it for any reason.

The conceptual importance of the two summary indicators suggests the need to better understand the factors that influence them. In addition, because attitudes towards wife beating and refusal of sex are both hypothesized to be measures of gender-role attitudes, it is relevant to examine the extent of overlap among the correlates of the two indicators.

The correlates of the summary indicators cannot be easily derived, however, from the analysis thus far because the correlates of acceptance of wife beating and acceptance of a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband vary substantively by type of justification for the behavior. Accordingly, logistic regressions are run separately for the two summary indicators. The results are given in Appendices Tables 3C and 3D.

Summary Table 3I provides a summary of the findings as well as the list of countries where the two summary indicators are related in the same way to the specified explanatory variable. (The bivariate results in Appendix Tables 3C and 3D are not discussed in the text).

Summary Table 3I. Number of countries where each variable has the specified relationship with women's disagreement with all five of the specified reasons justifying wife beating and agreement with all four of the specified reasons justifying a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband: Results of analysis with controls

| Variable and type of association | Wife beating: agreement with none of the five specified reasons | Wife's refusal to have sex: agreement with all four specified reasons | Countries where the variable has the same relationship with both types of gender-role attitudes |
|---|--|--|---|
| Age | | | |
| Generally positive | 17 | 0 | None |
| Nonlinear | 1 | 11 | None |
| Does not vary significantly by age | 5 | 12 | Cambodia |
| Children Ever born | | | |
| Generally negative | 12 | 0 | None |
| Generally positive | 2 | 8 | Malawi |
| Nonlinear | 2 | 7 | None |
| Does not vary by number of children ever born | 7 | 8 | Cambodia, Cameroon, Ghana, Rwanda |
| Education | | | |
| Generally positive | 16 | 19 | Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Haiti, Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe |
| Generally negative | 2 | 0 | None |
| Nonlinear | 3 | 0 | None |
| Does not vary by education level | 2 | 4 | Nepal, Philippines |
| Works for cash | | | |
| Positive | 5 | 13 | Ghana, Morocco, Rwanda, Uganda |
| Negative | 7 | 3 | Burkina Faso, Philippines |
| Does not vary by employment for cash | 11 | 7 | Haiti, Indonesia, Mali, Zimbabwe |
| Regular media exposure | | | |
| Positive | 8 | 11 | Armenia, Cameroon, Morocco, Mozambique, Rwanda |
| Negative | 5 | 1 | None |
| Does not vary by media exposure | 10 | 11 | Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria, Philippines, Uganda |
| Age at first marriage | | | |
| Generally positive | 10 | 5 | Cameroon, Philippines, Zimbabwe |
| Generally negative | 0 | 2 | None |
| Different (nonlinear) only for women first married at age 18-24 years | 3 | 2 | None |
| Does not vary by age at first marriage | 10 | 14 | Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Haiti, Mali, Mozambique, Uganda, Zambia |
| Spousal age difference | | | |
| Generally negative | 2 | 8 | None |
| Generally positive | 1 | 3 | None |
| Nonlinear | 3 | 2 | None |
| Does not vary by spousal age difference | 17 | 10 | Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Nicaragua, Philippines, Zimbabwe |

Continued...

Summary Table 3I—Continued

| Variable and type of association | Wife beating: agreement with none of the five specified reasons | Wife's refusal to have sex: agreement with all four specified reasons | Countries where the variable has the same relationship with both types of gender-role attitudes |
|--|--|--|--|
| Urban residence | | | |
| Positive | 9 | 5 | Mali |
| Negative | 4 | 4 | Zambia |
| Does not vary by area of residence | 10 | 14 | Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Nigeria, Zimbabwe |
| Residence in extended family | | | |
| Negative | 4 | 2 | None |
| Positive | 5 | 5 | Indonesia |
| Does not vary by extended family residence | 14 | 16 | Benin, Bolivia, Cameroon, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Nicaragua, Philippines, Zambia |
| Wealth index | | | |
| Generally positive | 14 | 7 | Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Uganda, Zimbabwe |
| Generally negative | 1 | 6 | None |
| Nonlinear | 7 | 6 | Mozambique |
| Does not vary by wealth quintile | 1 | 4 | Cambodia |
| Community controls | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have at least a high school education | | | |
| Positive | 7 | 7 | Benin, Morocco, Nigeria |
| Negative | 6 | 2 | Cameroon |
| Not significant | 9 | 13 | Armenia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Philippines |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | | | |
| Positive | 9 | 6 | Indonesia, Philippines |
| Negative | 4 | 6 | Benin, Mali, Nepal |
| Not significant | 10 | 11 | Burkina Faso, Malawi, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Rwanda, Zimbabwe |

Age. In most countries (17 of 23), rejection of wife beating for all reasons is negatively associated with age. Thus, the older a woman is, the more likely she is to reject wife beating for all reasons. In five of these countries, the youngest women (age 15-19 years) are less likely than women in the other age groups to reject wife beating.

In contrast, countries are divided into two groups with respect to the relationship of age with women's agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband. In about half the countries, acceptance does not vary significantly by age. In all but one of the remaining countries, the relationship is nonlinear—the likelihood of acceptance among the younger group is similar to that of the oldest age group; however, women in the middle age groups differ significantly. For example, in Bolivia, Indonesia, Malawi, Mali, and the Philippines, women age 20-29 years, those age 30-39 years, or both are more likely to agree that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband for all reasons. In contrast, in Armenia, Ghana, Haiti, Jordan, and Kenya, women age 20-29 years, those age 30-39 years, or both are less likely to agree that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband for all reasons than women age 40-49 years. In Burkina Faso alone, older women are less likely than younger women to agree that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband. Summary Table 3I also shows that, with the exception of Cambodia, there are no countries where age has the same effect, significant or not, on the two gender-role attitudes.

Number of children ever born. The extent of women's rejection of wife beating for all reasons does not vary by the number of children they have in seven countries (Cambodia, Cameroon, Ghana, Nepal, Nicaragua, Rwanda, and Uganda). In 12 of the remaining 16 countries, women are less likely to disagree that wife beating is justified the more children they have, particularly if they have 5 or more children.

Similarly, in eight countries (Cambodia, Cameroon, Ghana, Haiti, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Zambia), agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband does not differ by number of children. However, unlike the relationship between number of children and rejection of wife beating, the relationship between number of children and agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband, where significant, is either nonlinear or generally positive.

There are very few countries where the relationship of number of children, like age, with both gender-role attitudes is the same.

Education. Education level is significantly related to both gender-role attitudes in almost all countries. The only exceptions are Nepal and the Philippines, where education level is not significantly associated with both gender-role attitudes, and Benin and Cambodia, where it is not significantly related to women's attitudes towards a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband.

However, in some countries, even when the relationship is significant, education level is not positively associated with more egalitarian gender-role attitudes. For example, in Armenia and Indonesia, women with a higher education level have higher odds of agreeing that wife beating is justified; and in Cameroon, Malawi, and Zambia, the odds of women disagreeing that wife beating is justified are higher for both women with no education and women with secondary or higher education than for women with only primary education. In the remaining 16 countries where the relationship is significant, rejection of wife beating increases with the level of education.

In contrast, there are no countries where education is negatively associated with agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband. In all countries where the relationship is significant, the relationship is generally positive including eight countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Zambia) where only women with no education are less likely than other women to agree that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband.

Notably, education is the only variable that has a similar relationship with both gender-role attitudes in more than half (16) of the countries.

Employment for cash. Being employed for cash has the hypothesized effect on women's agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband more often than on women's disagreement that wife beating is justified. In fact, employment for cash is positively related to agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband in 13 countries, whereas women employed for cash have significantly higher odds of disagreeing that wife beating is justified in only 5 countries (Ghana, Jordan, Morocco, Rwanda, and Uganda). Among these countries, Jordan is the only one where the relationship is not the same for both gender-role attitudes.

Notably too, there are more countries where employment for cash is negatively associated with the likelihood that women will disagree that wife beating is justified than that a wife does not have a right to refuse sex with her husband. These countries include Burkina Faso and the Philippines, where cash employment is negatively associated with both types of gender-egalitarian attitudes.

Overall, however, there are only 10 countries where the relationship of employment for cash is the same with the two gender-role attitudes.

Media exposure. Women's regular media exposure is unrelated to both the likelihood that women will reject wife beating and that they will agree that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband in similar numbers of countries (10 and 11, respectively). In addition, media exposure increases the likelihood that women will have both attitudes in a majority of the remaining countries.

Notably, however, there are only five countries where media exposure is positively associated with both attitudes and five where it is not significantly associated with both attitudes. The only countries where regular media exposure has a negative effect on the likelihood that women will reject wife beating are Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, and Mali. The only country where media exposure has a negative effect on acceptance of a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband is Haiti.

Age at first marriage. A higher age at first marriage has a positive relationship with the rejection of wife beating in 10 countries. In contrast, higher age at first marriage has a positive relationship with a woman's acceptance that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband in only five countries. Cameroon, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe are the only three countries where women married at older ages are more likely than women married at younger ages to not agree with all five reasons for wife beating and all four reasons for a woman to refuse sex with her husband.

In two countries (Indonesia and Nicaragua), women first married between age 18 and 24 are less likely to reject all reasons for wife beating than women married before age 18 or after age 24. In Nepal only, women married between age 18 and 24 are more likely than women married at a younger or older age to reject all the reasons for wife beating. The relationship between age at first marriage and the other gender-role attitude is also nonlinear in Bolivia and Malawi but is negative in Cambodia and Nigeria. Among all countries where the relationship is not significant, there are, however, only eight where it is not significant for both types of attitudes.

Spousal age difference. This variable has a significant association with the rejection of wife beating in only 6 of the 23 countries. Even in these six countries, there is no consistency in the direction of the relationship. There are only two countries (Benin and Mali) where a smaller age difference between spouses is consistently associated with an increased likelihood of rejecting wife beating. In contrast, spousal age difference has a significant relationship with women's acceptance of a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband in 13 of the 23 countries; the relationship is negative in 8 of these countries.

Thus, spousal age difference has little effect on women's attitudes towards wife beating. However, a greater age difference is associated with a lower likelihood of acceptance of a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband. Notably, there are no countries where the relationship of spousal age difference with the two gender-role attitudes is significant and similar. However, there are six countries where the relationship with both types of attitudes is not significant.

Urban residence. Urban versus rural residence makes a significant difference in attitudes towards wife beating in 13 of the 23 countries. In nine of these (Benin, Cambodia, Indonesia, Jordan, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, the Philippines, and Uganda), the relationship is positive, i.e., urban women are more likely to reject wife beating than rural women. The opposite is true, however, in Ghana, Haiti, Nepal, and Zambia.

In contrast, urban residence is significantly related to acceptance of a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband in only nine countries, and the relationship is positive in only five (Bolivia, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, and Nicaragua). The countries where the relationship is negative are Armenia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia. Mali is the only country where the relationship of urban residence with both gender-role attitudes is positive. Zambia is the only country where the relationship is negative for both attitudes. Furthermore, urban residence is not significantly associated with both gender-role attitudes in four countries.

Thus, overall, urban residence has dissimilar effects, if any, on the two gender-role attitudes in 17 of the 23 countries.

Residence in an extended family. Extended family residence has a significant effect on the likelihood that women will reject wife beating in only nine countries; in these countries, the relationship is negative in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Jordan, and Morocco and positive in Armenia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Rwanda, and Uganda. Extended family residence has a significant effect on the likelihood that women will accept a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband in only seven countries; the relationship is negative in Mozambique and Nigeria and positive in Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco and Zimbabwe.

In countries where the relationship is significant, Indonesia is the only one where the relationship is in the same direction for both gender-role attitudes. In Indonesia, women living in an extended family are more likely not to agree that wife beating is justified and more likely to agree that a woman has the right to refuse sex with her husband.

There are nine countries where the relationship is not significant for both gender-role attitudes.

Wealth. The wealth of a woman's household has a significant relationship with both types of gender-role attitudes in most countries. However, wealth has a more consistently positive association with the rejection of wife beating (the relationship is positive in 14 countries) than with agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband (the relationship is positive in only 7 countries). In addition, wealth is negatively associated with the acceptance of a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband in six countries, compared with only one country (Rwanda) in which it is negatively associated with the rejection of wife beating.

Despite the strongly significant effect of wealth, this variable has a similar effect on both gender-role attitudes in only seven countries.

Community-level controls. The two indicators of the socioeconomic status of the communities in which women live do not have a consistent relationship with the two gender-role attitudes in most countries. However, both indicators are significantly related to women's rejection of wife beating more often (13 countries for the level of husbands' education in the community and 13 countries for the exposure of women in the community to television) than with women's acceptance of a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband (9 countries and 12 countries, respectively).

The first community socioeconomic status indicator, the percentage of women whose husbands have at least high school education, is positively associated with women's rejection of wife beating and acceptance of a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband in seven countries each. The relationship is positive with both gender-role attitudes in three countries (Benin, Morocco, and Nigeria). In six countries, (Bolivia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia), women living in a community with a higher level of male education are less likely than others to reject wife beating. The negative association is evident for the other gender-role attitude in only two countries, Cameroon and Zimbabwe.

In contrast, women living in a community in which, on average, a higher proportion of women is exposed to television are more likely to reject wife beating in nine countries and more likely to accept it in four countries. Women in such communities are also more likely to accept the right of a wife to refuse sex with her husband in six countries and reject this right in six countries. Indonesia and the Philippines are the only countries where the relationship of this community-level variable is positive for both gender-role attitudes. Benin, Mali, and Nepal are the only countries where the relationship is negative for both.

Overall, in about half the countries (11 for both community-level indicators), the relationship of each community-level indicator to both gender-role attitudes is the same.

Thus, overall, the community-level indicators are relevant to understanding women's gender-role attitudes. However, their effect is not necessarily in the expected direction. For example, the level of male education in the community is positively associated with women's rejection of wife beating in about the same number of countries as countries where the association is negative. Women's regular exposure to television in the community is positively associated with the acceptance of a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband in the same number of countries as the number where the association is negative.

3.5 Conclusions

The extensive analysis presented in this chapter points to one overarching conclusion: although the two sets of questions on women's attitudes towards wife beating and women's right to refuse sex with their husbands are theorized to be two aspects of women's levels of conscientization through their gender-role attitudes, they do not appear to measure the same thing. In fact, the two sets of attitudes vary greatly in terms of the characteristics of women, households and communities where they are manifested. Many of the explanatory variables that have a positive relationship with one type of attitude have a negative relationship with the other. The same characteristic has a similar relationship to both types of attitudes in only a few countries. In fact, as the analysis of the summary indicators of the two attitudes shows, with the exception of education level, no other characteristic is similarly related to both gender-role attitudes in a majority of the 23 countries studied.

Appendix Table 3A.1. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Benin

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 49.1 | 1.18 | 58.3 | 1.34 | 43.9 | 1.27 | 20.9 | 1.09 | 36.1 | 1.38+ |
| 20 to 29 | 47.4 | 1.13 | 54.2 | 1.18 | 43.0 | 1.37** | 19.0 | 1.08 | 31.1 | 1.22 |
| 30 to 39 | 44.4 | 0.95 | 52.3 | 1.01 | 40.3 | 1.08 | 16.8 | 0.89 | 30.5 | 1.14 |
| 40 to 49 | 47.6 | 1.00 | 55.1 | 1.00 | 42.1 | 1.00 | 19.7 | 1.00 | 29.8 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 41.0 | 0.89 | 49.9 | 0.96 | 39.9 | 1.13 | 17.4 | 1.05 | 28.9 | 1.03 |
| 1 or 2 | 44.1 | 1.00 | 50.4 | 1.00 | 38.5 | 1.00 | 17.1 | 1.00 | 28.2 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 46.2 | 1.09 | 52.1 | 1.11 | 40.1 | 1.11 | 17.7 | 1.10 | 30.5 | 1.13 |
| 5+ | 49.9 | 1.15 | 59.0 | 1.37** | 46.5 | 1.39** | 20.5 | 1.16 | 33.8 | 1.20 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 51.4 | 1.21* | 59.1 | 1.18+ | 46.7 | 1.19* | 21.4 | 1.26* | 34.8 | 1.14 |
| Primary | 40.9 | 1.00 | 47.7 | 1.00 | 35.5 | 1.00 | 13.6 | 1.00 | 25.3 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 18.2 | 0.44*** | 24.9 | 0.52*** | 16.9 | 0.51*** | 5.2 | 0.51* | 10.9 | 0.57** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 41.1 | 1.00 | 52.3 | 1.00 | 38.4 | 1.00 | 19.5 | 1.00 | 31.6 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 47.5 | 1.28** | 54.3 | 1.02 | 42.6 | 1.22* | 18.4 | 0.95 | 30.8 | 0.95 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 49.1 | 1.00 | 53.9 | 1.00 | 43.5 | 1.00 | 22.5 | 1.00 | 31.9 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 45.3 | 1.08 | 54.1 | 1.35*** | 41.2 | 1.19** | 16.5 | 0.86+ | 30.5 | 1.23** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 49.9 | 1.00 | 57.1 | 1.00 | 45.8 | 1.00 | 21.0 | 1.00 | 34.8 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 45.3 | 1.03 | 53.4 | 1.14+ | 40.0 | 1.02 | 16.7 | 0.93 | 28.6 | 0.95 |
| 25 years or more | 32.5 | 0.99 | 37.3 | 1.00 | 29.9 | 1.05 | 14.3 | 1.22 | 20.8 | 1.03 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 44.2 | 1.00 | 50.6 | 1.00 | 36.8 | 1.00 | 16.1 | 1.00 | 27.5 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 45.6 | 1.04 | 53.2 | 1.11 | 41.6 | 1.22* | 18.1 | 1.16 | 29.6 | 1.08 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 49.1 | 1.07 | 57.4 | 1.14+ | 46.1 | 1.31*** | 20.6 | 1.19+ | 34.6 | 1.22* |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 51.0 | 1.00 | 60.0 | 1.00 | 45.7 | 1.00 | 20.1 | 1.00 | 35.5 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 38.2 | 0.96 | 42.7 | 0.81* | 35.0 | 1.07 | 15.5 | 1.26* | 22.4 | 0.86 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 48.0 | 1.00 | 55.6 | 1.00 | 44.2 | 1.00 | 19.9 | 1.00 | 32.8 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 43.9 | 1.01 | 51.1 | 1.01 | 37.9 | 0.93 | 16.1 | 0.94 | 27.5 | 0.94 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 53.7 | 1.00 | 60.6 | 1.00 | 49.9 | 1.00 | 25.8 | 1.00 | 38.4 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 52.9 | 0.98 | 61.2 | 1.04 | 51.5 | 1.10 | 25.0 | 1.02 | 40.3 | 1.08 |
| Middle | 48.9 | 0.88 | 60.6 | 1.07 | 44.4 | 0.90 | 16.2 | 0.65*** | 31.5 | 0.80* |
| Richer | 48.2 | 1.05 | 52.8 | 1.00 | 37.9 | 0.80* | 15.9 | 0.74* | 28.9 | 0.84 |
| Richest | 26.6 | 0.68* | 32.3 | 0.77 | 24.2 | 0.63** | 8.4 | 0.47*** | 13.5 | 0.49*** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.98*** | n/a | 0.98*** | n/a | 0.97*** | n/a | 0.98*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.01* | n/a | 1.01** | n/a | 1.02*** | n/a | 1.01*** |
| Constant | n/a | 0.70*** | n/a | 1.07 | n/a | 0.63*** | n/a | 0.23*** | n/a | 0.41*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.2. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Burkina Faso

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 53.9 | 1.11 | 52.5 | 0.97 | 51.7 | 1.02 | 39.6 | 0.85 | 30.4 | 1.05 |
| 20 to 29 | 54.2 | 1.07 | 56.2 | 1.08 | 53.6 | 1.03 | 39.0 | 0.95 | 25.2 | 0.97 |
| 30 to 39 | 55.4 | 0.93 | 57.0 | 0.99 | 52.5 | 0.91 | 39.2 | 0.87* | 27.1 | 1.05 |
| 40 to 49 | 58.8 | 1.00 | 59.7 | 1.00 | 58.1 | 1.00 | 42.9 | 1.00 | 27.6 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 49.2 | 0.96 | 51.6 | 1.01 | 47.4 | 0.87 | 38.4 | 1.12 | 29.2 | 1.25* |
| 1 or 2 | 51.7 | 1.00 | 53.4 | 1.00 | 51.3 | 1.00 | 38.3 | 1.00 | 25.0 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 55.9 | 1.15* | 56.6 | 1.08 | 53.6 | 1.09 | 38.6 | 1.02 | 26.5 | 1.02 |
| 5+ | 59.2 | 1.31*** | 60.6 | 1.28** | 57.7 | 1.26** | 42.3 | 1.08 | 27.7 | 0.92 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 57.7 | 1.18* | 58.5 | 1.05 | 55.9 | 1.01 | 41.6 | 1.17+ | 27.8 | 0.99 |
| Primary | 49.7 | 1.00 | 52.7 | 1.00 | 50.9 | 1.00 | 35.0 | 1.00 | 24.7 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 22.2 | 0.35*** | 32.5 | 0.49*** | 22.4 | 0.36*** | 14.7 | 0.29*** | 10.1 | 0.42*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 56.4 | 1.00 | 57.2 | 1.00 | 54.4 | 1.00 | 39.7 | 1.00 | 27.4 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 52.2 | 1.08 | 55.7 | 1.15* | 52.7 | 1.18** | 41.0 | 1.35*** | 24.2 | 1.08 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 57.3 | 1.00 | 57.8 | 1.00 | 55.0 | 1.00 | 41.2 | 1.00 | 30.5 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 53.8 | 1.01 | 56.1 | 1.04 | 53.2 | 1.10* | 38.8 | 1.03 | 23.4 | 0.82*** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 57.8 | 1.00 | 58.8 | 1.00 | 56.5 | 1.00 | 43.1 | 1.00 | 29.4 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 52.3 | 0.93 | 54.4 | 0.90* | 50.6 | 0.92+ | 35.0 | 0.78*** | 22.8 | 0.79*** |
| 25 years or more | 38.8 | 0.93 | 40.3 | 0.63** | 38.6 | 0.82 | 28.2 | 0.65* | 15.5 | 0.63* |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 54.2 | 1.00 | 55.9 | 1.00 | 51.8 | 1.00 | 36.7 | 1.00 | 25.8 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 54.2 | 0.99 | 55.6 | 0.96 | 52.7 | 1.03 | 39.9 | 1.03 | 26.0 | 0.98 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 56.1 | 1.00 | 57.1 | 1.01 | 53.6 | 1.03 | 40.1 | 1.07 | 26.4 | 0.97 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 58.0 | 1.00 | 58.6 | 1.00 | 56.3 | 1.00 | 41.2 | 1.00 | 28.6 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 41.4 | 0.94 | 47.1 | 0.99 | 41.8 | 0.89 | 32.9 | 0.97 | 16.8 | 0.63*** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 54.5 | 1.00 | 54.9 | 1.00 | 52.7 | 1.00 | 40.0 | 1.00 | 26.0 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 57.0 | 1.17*** | 59.9 | 1.22*** | 56.2 | 1.19*** | 39.8 | 1.03 | 28.0 | 1.19*** |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 56.5 | 1.00 | 58.0 | 1.00 | 55.6 | 1.00 | 45.8 | 1.00 | 30.8 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 54.6 | 0.99 | 54.8 | 0.92 | 54.5 | 0.99 | 39.8 | 0.86* | 28.7 | 0.92 |
| Middle | 58.7 | 1.18* | 60.3 | 1.13+ | 56.7 | 1.11 | 39.5 | 0.84* | 29.7 | 0.98 |
| Richer | 62.4 | 1.40*** | 61.5 | 1.18* | 58.5 | 1.21* | 40.9 | 0.87+ | 23.6 | 0.78** |
| Richest | 43.9 | 1.05 | 48.4 | 0.88 | 43.4 | 0.96 | 33.6 | 0.79* | 19.1 | 0.70** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.01** |
| Constant | n/a | 0.88 | n/a | 0.97 | n/a | 0.91 | n/a | 0.38*** | n/a | 0.20*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.3. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Cameroon

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 39.3 | 1.06 | 49.4 | 1.08 | 34.8 | 1.10 | 25.0 | 0.76* | 26.4 | 1.31+ |
| 20 to 29 | 36.3 | 1.03 | 46.9 | 1.06 | 29.3 | 1.07 | 23.2 | 0.94 | 20.4 | 1.15 |
| 30 to 39 | 35.0 | 1.00 | 44.6 | 1.02 | 26.3 | 0.93 | 23.0 | 0.95 | 19.3 | 1.06 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>35.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>45.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>29.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>25.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 32.4 | 0.86 | 45.0 | 0.95 | 29.3 | 1.08 | 22.0 | 1.11 | 19.4 | 1.02 |
| 1 or 2 | <i>36.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>46.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>21.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>20.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 36.2 | 0.93 | 46.1 | 0.94 | 27.5 | 0.88+ | 23.7 | 0.92 | 20.7 | 0.96 |
| 5+ | 36.9 | 0.88 | 46.0 | 0.93 | 30.4 | 0.95 | 26.5 | 0.89 | 21.9 | 0.92 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 42.2 | 0.85* | 45.2 | 0.70*** | 36.8 | 0.94 | 37.9 | 1.41*** | 31.6 | 1.17+ |
| Primary | <i>39.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>51.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>31.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>23.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>21.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 26.0 | 0.78*** | 40.9 | 0.86* | 18.5 | 0.71*** | 10.3 | 0.60*** | 10.3 | 0.71*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | <i>37.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>46.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>30.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>26.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>23.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 34.8 | 1.00 | 46.2 | 1.02 | 28.0 | 1.05 | 21.3 | 0.93 | 17.8 | 0.88+ |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | <i>41.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>50.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>35.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>31.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>27.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 30.5 | 0.86* | 42.1 | 0.81*** | 22.4 | 0.81** | 16.4 | 0.85* | 14.0 | 0.85* |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | <i>40.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>48.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>33.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>25.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 30.3 | 0.80*** | 43.4 | 0.85** | 23.6 | 0.84** | 16.2 | 0.75*** | 13.7 | 0.72*** |
| 25 years or more | 23.1 | 0.70** | 35.8 | 0.72** | 14.8 | 0.63** | 11.7 | 0.68* | 9.9 | 0.71* |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | <i>34.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>45.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>26.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>20.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 35.0 | 0.98 | 45.9 | 0.98 | 27.3 | 1.00 | 21.3 | 1.02 | 19.5 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 38.2 | 0.98 | 46.7 | 0.92 | 32.2 | 1.04 | 28.1 | 1.08 | 22.9 | 0.92 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | <i>41.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>49.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>34.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>30.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>26.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 30.2 | 0.96 | 42.7 | 0.98 | 23.4 | 1.09 | 17.2 | 1.08 | 14.2 | 0.95 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | <i>37.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>46.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>30.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>25.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>22.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 34.6 | 1.00 | 45.7 | 1.01 | 27.1 | 1.00 | 20.9 | 1.01 | 18.6 | 1.04 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | <i>41.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>47.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>36.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>33.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>30.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 42.9 | 1.15+ | 52.3 | 1.27** | 36.3 | 1.11 | 32.0 | 1.23* | 29.1 | 1.10 |
| Middle | 39.3 | 1.16+ | 50.3 | 1.28** | 30.4 | 1.11 | 26.0 | 1.29** | 21.2 | 0.94 |
| Richer | 34.0 | 1.15 | 45.4 | 1.20+ | 26.2 | 1.07 | 18.0 | 1.09 | 14.4 | 0.82 |
| Richest | 21.9 | 0.79+ | 36.3 | 0.93 | 15.0 | 0.76+ | 8.7 | 0.75+ | 7.9 | 0.60** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 0.99** |
| Constant | n/a | 0.54*** | n/a | 0.76*** | n/a | 0.41*** | n/a | 0.31*** | n/a | 0.22*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.4. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Ghana

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 51.1 | 1.48+ | 51.8 | 1.54+ | 47.4 | 1.58+ | 26.3 | 1.13 | 22.6 | 1.02 |
| 20 to 29 | 39.2 | 1.28+ | 43.9 | 1.43** | 35.9 | 1.23 | 24.1 | 1.26 | 16.9 | 1.22 |
| 30 to 39 | 34.7 | 1.06 | 38.8 | 1.19+ | 31.6 | 1.17 | 23.6 | 1.19 | 16.3 | 1.23 |
| 40 to 49 | 33.1 | 1.00 | 33.8 | 1.00 | 28.8 | 1.00 | 19.8 | 1.00 | 12.1 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 38.0 | 1.04 | 38.5 | 0.90 | 32.6 | 0.92 | 22.6 | 1.03 | 16.7 | 1.10 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 36.1 | 1.00 | 39.8 | 1.00 | 34.1 | 1.00 | 21.7 | 1.00 | 16.3 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 35.9 | 1.08 | 38.9 | 1.04 | 30.4 | 0.86 | 21.9 | 1.02 | 14.1 | 0.78+ |
| 5+ | 37.4 | 1.09 | 41.4 | 1.05 | 34.5 | 0.97 | 25.4 | 1.09 | 16.5 | 0.86 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 47.9 | 1.11 | 52.9 | 1.09 | 44.6 | 1.34** | 34.3 | 1.27* | 24.7 | 1.04 |
| <i>Primary</i> | 37.3 | 1.00 | 42.3 | 1.00 | 31.6 | 1.00 | 21.3 | 1.00 | 14.7 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 23.1 | 0.63*** | 23.1 | 0.56*** | 21.2 | 0.70** | 11.5 | 0.60*** | 6.4 | 0.53*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 46.7 | 1.00 | 53.6 | 1.00 | 41.5 | 1.00 | 31.5 | 1.00 | 23.0 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 34.3 | 0.82* | 36.8 | 0.66*** | 31.2 | 0.84* | 21.0 | 0.74** | 14.1 | 0.76** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 49.7 | 1.00 | 56.0 | 1.00 | 44.0 | 1.00 | 33.6 | 1.00 | 25.0 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 32.4 | 0.84* | 34.8 | 0.74*** | 29.6 | 0.85+ | 19.6 | 0.85+ | 12.8 | 0.83+ |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 39.4 | 1.00 | 43.4 | 1.00 | 37.4 | 1.00 | 25.7 | 1.00 | 17.4 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 34.8 | 0.96 | 38.4 | 0.91 | 31.0 | 0.86+ | 21.0 | 0.82* | 15.0 | 0.88 |
| 25 years or more | 33.4 | 1.35+ | 32.8 | 1.12 | 24.7 | 0.85 | 22.0 | 1.14 | 13.0 | 0.99 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 33.4 | 1.00 | 36.3 | 1.00 | 31.6 | 1.00 | 19.7 | 1.00 | 13.6 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 36.5 | 0.99 | 40.7 | 0.94 | 32.4 | 0.84* | 23.1 | 1.08 | 15.4 | 0.95 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 40.3 | 1.02 | 43.1 | 0.89 | 35.7 | 0.91 | 26.6 | 1.08 | 18.6 | 0.96 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 41.5 | 1.00 | 45.3 | 1.00 | 37.4 | 1.00 | 26.2 | 1.00 | 19.9 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 29.2 | 1.30* | 32.0 | 1.45** | 26.7 | 1.33* | 18.2 | 1.65*** | 9.7 | 1.34+ |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 36.1 | 1.00 | 39.4 | 1.00 | 32.5 | 1.00 | 21.8 | 1.00 | 15.3 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 37.8 | 1.01 | 41.4 | 1.19* | 34.7 | 1.19* | 26.3 | 1.27** | 17.1 | 1.03 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 51.5 | 1.00 | 57.1 | 1.00 | 46.8 | 1.00 | 38.2 | 1.00 | 30.2 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 43.2 | 0.97 | 44.0 | 0.97 | 36.2 | 0.89 | 25.2 | 0.85 | 18.3 | 0.86 |
| Middle | 35.5 | 0.77* | 40.2 | 0.93 | 33.5 | 0.82 | 20.5 | 0.71* | 14.7 | 0.70* |
| Richer | 31.0 | 0.64** | 35.8 | 0.83 | 29.8 | 0.73* | 19.3 | 0.62** | 10.5 | 0.54** |
| Richest | 21.2 | 0.43*** | 21.9 | 0.60** | 18.6 | 0.43*** | 11.0 | 0.41*** | 4.3 | 0.26*** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 1.22+ | n/a | 1.96*** | n/a | 0.98 | n/a | 0.58*** | n/a | 0.37*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.5. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Kenya

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 57.7 | 1.96*** | 69.4 | 1.91*** | 61.3 | 1.78*** | 33.3 | 0.99 | 23.1 | 1.45+ |
| 20 to 29 | 44.3 | 1.60*** | 60.4 | 1.46*** | 52.9 | 1.67*** | 33.0 | 1.14 | 17.8 | 1.25 |
| 30 to 39 | 38.3 | 1.17+ | 55.5 | 1.13 | 43.5 | 1.02 | 30.3 | 0.93 | 16.1 | 1.06 |
| 40 to 49 | 39.7 | 1.00 | 56.0 | 1.00 | 47.0 | 1.00 | 37.0 | 1.00 | 17.4 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 52.5 | 1.54** | 59.2 | 1.01 | 54.4 | 1.30+ | 25.3 | 0.89 | 18.8 | 1.24 |
| 1 or 2 | 37.1 | 1.00 | 53.1 | 1.00 | 44.9 | 1.00 | 27.2 | 1.00 | 15.0 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 40.9 | 1.17+ | 59.0 | 1.25** | 46.5 | 1.13 | 32.5 | 1.16+ | 16.2 | 1.03 |
| 5+ | 46.6 | 1.43** | 63.1 | 1.40** | 54.8 | 1.48*** | 40.1 | 1.44** | 20.8 | 1.38* |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 61.5 | 1.43*** | 69.9 | 1.07 | 64.9 | 1.21+ | 50.1 | 1.34** | 25.8 | 0.92 |
| Primary | 46.2 | 1.00 | 63.5 | 1.00 | 54.4 | 1.00 | 35.7 | 1.00 | 19.2 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 22.2 | 0.43*** | 40.7 | 0.54*** | 28.4 | 0.48*** | 16.6 | 0.49*** | 8.9 | 0.54*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 47.1 | 1.00 | 62.9 | 1.00 | 54.0 | 1.00 | 36.5 | 1.00 | 19.6 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 37.6 | 0.91 | 54.2 | 0.94 | 44.6 | 0.98 | 29.4 | 0.96 | 15.4 | 0.95 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 54.7 | 1.00 | 69.1 | 1.00 | 62.7 | 1.00 | 45.1 | 1.00 | 24.1 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 38.8 | 0.87+ | 55.5 | 0.88 | 45.4 | 0.82* | 29.5 | 0.76** | 15.6 | 0.92 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 51.9 | 1.00 | 65.3 | 1.00 | 58.8 | 1.00 | 40.7 | 1.00 | 21.8 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 37.6 | 0.83** | 56.7 | 0.96 | 45.3 | 0.87+ | 29.4 | 0.87+ | 15.6 | 0.95 |
| 25 years or more | 27.2 | 0.70* | 38.0 | 0.63*** | 28.8 | 0.64** | 18.9 | 0.59*** | 10.2 | 0.77 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 39.9 | 1.00 | 56.5 | 1.00 | 46.7 | 1.00 | 32.1 | 1.00 | 17.6 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 42.8 | 0.94 | 58.0 | 0.91 | 47.7 | 0.88+ | 30.4 | 0.82** | 15.9 | 0.76** |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 45.4 | 0.89 | 62.4 | 0.95 | 55.3 | 0.98 | 38.1 | 0.91 | 20.0 | 0.89 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 44.7 | 1.00 | 62.5 | 1.00 | 53.0 | 1.00 | 35.7 | 1.00 | 18.9 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 34.1 | 1.25* | 44.9 | 0.86 | 36.3 | 1.19+ | 23.6 | 1.18 | 12.7 | 1.21 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 43.5 | 1.00 | 60.5 | 1.00 | 50.6 | 1.00 | 34.9 | 1.00 | 18.7 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 40.2 | 0.99 | 55.0 | 0.90 | 46.7 | 0.97 | 29.3 | 0.94 | 15.3 | 0.89 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 55.4 | 1.00 | 70.4 | 1.00 | 65.0 | 1.00 | 42.3 | 1.00 | 24.1 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 46.2 | 0.91 | 62.7 | 0.87 | 56.9 | 0.96 | 38.8 | 1.23* | 21.8 | 1.16 |
| Middle | 43.4 | 0.97 | 61.5 | 0.98 | 49.5 | 0.85 | 35.6 | 1.26* | 16.5 | 0.87 |
| Richer | 38.6 | 0.90 | 58.4 | 0.96 | 45.5 | 0.91 | 30.1 | 1.19 | 15.7 | 0.90 |
| Richest | 30.5 | 0.78 | 42.9 | 0.78+ | 32.9 | 0.76+ | 20.7 | 1.01 | 10.9 | 0.85 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99*** |
| Constant | n/a | 0.90 | n/a | 1.34*** | n/a | 1.20* | n/a | 0.55*** | n/a | 0.23*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.6. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Malawi

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 23.9 | 1.33* | 27.5 | 1.19 | 24.1 | 1.13 | 20.6 | 0.85 | 21.0 | 1.01 |
| 20 to 29 | 16.7 | 0.90 | 22.1 | 0.93 | 19.3 | 0.97 | 18.3 | 0.87 | 17.2 | 0.95 |
| 30 to 39 | 14.9 | 0.90 | 20.0 | 0.98 | 16.4 | 0.90 | 17.1 | 0.87 | 14.3 | 0.89 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>16.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>18.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>18.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>15.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 21.2 | 1.12 | 23.3 | 0.88 | 22.6 | 1.09 | 20.3 | 1.14 | 19.5 | 1.10 |
| 1 or 2 | <i>17.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>23.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>20.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>17.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 16.9 | 1.01 | 22.3 | 0.95 | 17.5 | 0.87+ | 17.7 | 0.91 | 15.7 | 0.88+ |
| 5+ | 14.9 | 0.87 | 19.2 | 0.80** | 17.6 | 0.82* | 17.3 | 0.79* | 15.2 | 0.83* |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 15.3 | 0.84** | 19.3 | 0.80*** | 17.3 | 0.80*** | 18.3 | 0.91 | 15.5 | 0.86* |
| Primary | <i>18.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>23.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>20.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>18.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 9.5 | 0.57*** | 15.3 | 0.68** | 8.8 | 0.57*** | 9.5 | 0.63*** | 8.1 | 0.70** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | <i>17.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>21.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>18.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>17.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>16.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 15.9 | 1.03 | 22.4 | 1.09 | 19.0 | 1.08 | 19.2 | 1.12+ | 16.5 | 1.06 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | <i>18.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>23.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>21.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>20.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>20.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 15.6 | 0.92 | 20.1 | 0.89* | 17.0 | 0.82*** | 16.3 | 0.83** | 13.8 | 0.76*** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | <i>17.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>22.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>18.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>17.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 16.6 | 1.03 | 21.5 | 0.96 | 18.5 | 0.98 | 17.6 | 0.92 | 16.3 | 0.93 |
| 25 years or more | 12.0 | 0.81 | 14.4 | 0.74+ | 14.4 | 0.83 | 15.8 | 0.82 | 12.0 | 0.70+ |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | <i>16.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>21.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>18.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>17.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 18.0 | 1.06 | 22.2 | 0.99 | 19.0 | 0.99 | 18.0 | 1.00 | 16.4 | 0.94 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 14.3 | 0.89 | 20.2 | 0.99 | 17.7 | 0.97 | 17.8 | 0.99 | 14.7 | 0.89 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | <i>17.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>23.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>20.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>18.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 11.9 | 0.92 | 13.4 | 0.82* | 9.6 | 0.65*** | 10.9 | 0.94 | 7.6 | 0.82+ |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | <i>17.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>22.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>18.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>17.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 15.7 | 0.96 | 20.0 | 0.92 | 17.1 | 0.92 | 17.4 | 0.98 | 15.1 | 0.98 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | <i>18.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>23.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>20.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>20.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 18.1 | 0.92 | 22.9 | 0.94 | 20.0 | 0.91 | 20.4 | 1.04 | 17.6 | 0.94 |
| Middle | 18.8 | 0.96 | 23.9 | 0.97 | 21.8 | 0.94 | 20.6 | 0.91 | 18.6 | 0.93 |
| Richer | 16.2 | 0.84+ | 21.5 | 0.93 | 19.2 | 0.96 | 17.1 | 0.86+ | 17.0 | 1.01 |
| Richest | 12.2 | 0.72** | 16.1 | 0.82+ | 12.0 | 0.75** | 11.9 | 0.75** | 9.5 | 0.73** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 0.99* |
| Constant | n/a | 0.17*** | n/a | 0.23*** | n/a | 0.17*** | n/a | 0.21*** | n/a | 0.16*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.7. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Mali

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 78.0 | 1.11 | 76.1 | 1.23+ | 64.3 | 1.03 | 74.2 | 0.81+ | 34.1 | 0.92 |
| 20 to 29 | 76.4 | 1.07 | 71.6 | 1.16* | 62.8 | 1.07 | 75.6 | 0.93 | 34.0 | 0.99 |
| 30 to 39 | 77.6 | 1.13+ | 73.6 | 1.17* | 63.7 | 1.08 | 78.6 | 1.11 | 34.5 | 1.02 |
| 40 to 49 | 76.3 | 1.00 | 70.7 | 1.00 | 62.9 | 1.00 | 76.9 | 1.00 | 33.6 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 74.1 | 1.01 | 70.0 | 0.95 | 59.9 | 1.03 | 69.6 | 0.86+ | 31.7 | 1.02 |
| 1 or 2 | 74.9 | 1.00 | 71.5 | 1.00 | 62.4 | 1.00 | 75.7 | 1.00 | 33.6 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 76.5 | 1.07 | 71.4 | 1.07 | 62.0 | 1.10 | 75.4 | 1.02 | 33.9 | 1.04 |
| 5+ | 78.8 | 1.13 | 74.2 | 1.18* | 65.0 | 1.12+ | 79.2 | 1.06 | 34.9 | 0.94 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 78.3 | 1.00 | 72.7 | 0.79** | 64.6 | 0.91 | 77.9 | 1.00 | 34.7 | 0.93 |
| Primary | 77.1 | 1.00 | 77.3 | 1.00 | 63.7 | 1.00 | 77.6 | 1.00 | 36.2 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 54.4 | 0.50*** | 60.2 | 0.61*** | 41.7 | 0.58*** | 54.9 | 0.60*** | 19.3 | 0.65*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 77.7 | 1.00 | 73.0 | 1.00 | 64.4 | 1.00 | 77.4 | 1.00 | 32.6 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 76.1 | 0.96 | 72.1 | 0.95 | 62.0 | 0.94 | 75.9 | 0.96 | 35.7 | 1.15** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 76.7 | 1.00 | 70.0 | 1.00 | 68.3 | 1.00 | 78.5 | 1.00 | 34.2 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 77.1 | 1.36*** | 74.0 | 1.43*** | 60.4 | 0.96 | 75.6 | 1.04 | 34.0 | 1.20*** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 79.0 | 1.00 | 74.9 | 1.00 | 65.7 | 1.00 | 78.6 | 1.00 | 36.6 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 72.7 | 0.84** | 67.4 | 0.82*** | 58.3 | 0.92+ | 72.9 | 0.90+ | 28.5 | 0.82*** |
| 25 years or more | 62.6 | 0.80 | 60.1 | 0.80+ | 47.8 | 0.88 | 61.9 | 0.76* | 21.0 | 0.69** |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 71.3 | 1.00 | 65.2 | 1.00 | 55.8 | 1.00 | 73.8 | 1.00 | 29.1 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 76.0 | 1.25** | 70.8 | 1.23** | 60.4 | 1.13+ | 74.2 | 1.01 | 31.6 | 1.08 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 78.7 | 1.39*** | 75.2 | 1.40*** | 66.6 | 1.41*** | 78.8 | 1.28*** | 36.5 | 1.33*** |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 79.5 | 1.00 | 74.0 | 1.00 | 66.7 | 1.00 | 78.4 | 1.00 | 36.2 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 69.1 | 0.64*** | 68.1 | 0.61*** | 52.7 | 0.77*** | 71.5 | 0.81* | 27.4 | 0.72*** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 78.3 | 1.00 | 73.1 | 1.00 | 64.0 | 1.00 | 77.6 | 1.00 | 34.3 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 72.1 | 0.95 | 70.6 | 0.96 | 60.5 | 1.10+ | 73.2 | 1.04 | 33.3 | 1.09+ |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 77.4 | 1.00 | 69.8 | 1.00 | 62.4 | 1.00 | 75.4 | 1.00 | 33.1 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 79.9 | 1.32*** | 74.8 | 1.30*** | 66.0 | 1.29*** | 79.9 | 1.30*** | 34.7 | 1.12+ |
| Middle | 79.2 | 1.37*** | 74.3 | 1.25*** | 68.3 | 1.38*** | 78.0 | 1.27** | 36.7 | 1.22** |
| Richer | 79.7 | 1.36*** | 74.8 | 1.27*** | 68.0 | 1.48*** | 81.3 | 1.37*** | 37.4 | 1.33*** |
| Richest | 67.3 | 0.91 | 68.8 | 1.02 | 50.1 | 0.93 | 67.9 | 0.89 | 27.8 | 1.03 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00** | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 1.95*** | n/a | 1.63*** | n/a | 1.47*** | n/a | 2.20*** | n/a | 0.37*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.8. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Mozambique

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 42.3 | 1.12 | 40.5 | 1.05 | 39.6 | 1.26* | 38.8 | 1.15 | 27.7 | 1.42** |
| 20 to 29 | 38.8 | 1.02 | 39.2 | 0.98 | 35.6 | 1.10 | 37.1 | 1.13 | 24.2 | 1.17+ |
| 30 to 39 | 36.5 | 0.94 | 37.7 | 0.90 | 32.1 | 1.01 | 36.9 | 1.05 | 24.2 | 1.00 |
| 40 to 49 | 39.9 | 1.00 | 40.1 | 1.00 | 34.7 | 1.00 | 38.4 | 1.00 | 24.8 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 39.4 | 0.96 | 35.2 | 0.79** | 35.3 | 0.98 | 37.7 | 1.03 | 24.0 | 0.93 |
| 1 or 2 | 40.4 | 1.00 | 40.9 | 1.00 | 36.1 | 1.00 | 36.9 | 1.00 | 25.5 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 38.1 | 0.92 | 40.0 | 0.95 | 35.6 | 1.02 | 36.9 | 0.93 | 23.9 | 0.93 |
| 5+ | 37.5 | 0.88+ | 37.9 | 0.92 | 33.0 | 0.95 | 38.3 | 0.97 | 24.7 | 0.96 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 42.2 | 1.15** | 41.2 | 1.05 | 37.3 | 1.16** | 41.5 | 1.18** | 27.6 | 1.11+ |
| Primary | 36.6 | 1.00 | 38.2 | 1.00 | 33.6 | 1.00 | 35.4 | 1.00 | 22.9 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 22.8 | 0.64*** | 25.4 | 0.74* | 20.4 | 0.60*** | 15.1 | 0.52*** | 11.1 | 0.59** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 39.1 | 1.00 | 38.9 | 1.00 | 34.8 | 1.00 | 37.7 | 1.00 | 24.7 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 37.0 | 1.21** | 40.2 | 1.29*** | 35.1 | 1.34*** | 36.3 | 1.33*** | 24.8 | 1.41*** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 42.2 | 1.00 | 41.5 | 1.00 | 37.5 | 1.00 | 40.7 | 1.00 | 27.4 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 35.0 | 0.77*** | 36.5 | 0.83*** | 32.0 | 0.84*** | 34.0 | 0.90* | 21.7 | 0.87* |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 39.4 | 1.00 | 39.0 | 1.00 | 35.0 | 1.00 | 38.4 | 1.00 | 24.8 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 37.9 | 1.03 | 39.4 | 1.09+ | 34.6 | 1.04 | 35.3 | 0.99 | 24.6 | 1.12+ |
| 25 years or more | 34.6 | 0.90 | 38.1 | 0.97 | 34.0 | 1.00 | 39.9 | 1.07 | 23.3 | 1.01 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 39.0 | 1.00 | 39.6 | 1.00 | 36.0 | 1.00 | 37.5 | 1.00 | 25.1 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 38.5 | 1.03 | 38.3 | 0.96 | 34.0 | 0.97 | 37.1 | 1.03 | 25.3 | 1.01 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 38.5 | 1.05 | 39.2 | 0.98 | 33.9 | 0.98 | 38.0 | 1.04 | 23.3 | 0.93 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 41.6 | 1.00 | 41.6 | 1.00 | 37.4 | 1.00 | 41.3 | 1.00 | 27.7 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 31.7 | 0.75*** | 33.0 | 0.82** | 28.5 | 0.82* | 28.0 | 0.79** | 17.3 | 0.77** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 39.2 | 1.00 | 39.1 | 1.00 | 35.4 | 1.00 | 38.7 | 1.00 | 26.2 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 38.0 | 0.97 | 39.1 | 1.06 | 33.8 | 0.95 | 35.3 | 0.98 | 22.0 | 0.83** |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 38.1 | 1.00 | 37.5 | 1.00 | 34.5 | 1.00 | 37.8 | 1.00 | 25.9 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 43.9 | 1.33*** | 43.4 | 1.33*** | 38.4 | 1.21** | 43.0 | 1.16* | 28.0 | 1.17+ |
| Middle | 42.5 | 1.37*** | 43.0 | 1.41*** | 39.6 | 1.34*** | 43.3 | 1.29*** | 30.2 | 1.35*** |
| Richer | 37.9 | 1.33*** | 40.5 | 1.39*** | 33.6 | 1.20* | 36.6 | 1.13 | 21.8 | 0.99 |
| Richest | 30.1 | 1.23+ | 30.4 | 1.10 | 26.4 | 1.03 | 24.3 | 0.82+ | 14.9 | 0.84 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00+ |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 0.99** |
| Constant | n/a | 0.52*** | n/a | 0.60*** | n/a | 0.48*** | n/a | 0.52*** | n/a | 0.27** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.9. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Nigeria

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 74.7 | 1.94*** | 59.3 | 1.43* | 54.4 | 1.25 | 53.9 | 1.40* | 41.1 | 1.32+ |
| 20 to 29 | 59.2 | 1.55*** | 52.7 | 1.40*** | 47.0 | 1.22* | 43.0 | 1.34** | 33.1 | 1.29* |
| 30 to 39 | 55.1 | 1.20* | 50.0 | 1.13 | 44.7 | 1.08 | 38.9 | 1.04 | 32.0 | 1.09 |
| 40 to 49 | 57.8 | 1.00 | 53.5 | 1.00 | 48.5 | 1.00 | 46.0 | 1.00 | 36.5 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 61.0 | 1.00 | 49.4 | 1.00 | 45.7 | 1.00 | 47.2 | 1.00 | 31.7 | 1.00 |
| 1 or 2 | 57.0 | 0.95 | 50.9 | 0.91 | 46.1 | 0.94 | 37.4 | 1.32* | 31.5 | 0.84 |
| 3 or 4 | 58.8 | 1.20+ | 52.7 | 1.12 | 46.4 | 1.05 | 43.5 | 1.29** | 33.6 | 1.13 |
| 5+ | 60.6 | 1.25* | 54.7 | 1.18+ | 49.2 | 1.02 | 46.7 | 1.30** | 37.3 | 1.10 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 72.9 | 1.59*** | 61.3 | 1.11 | 56.4 | 1.21* | 55.5 | 1.35*** | 43.3 | 1.17+ |
| Primary | 53.6 | 1.00 | 52.0 | 1.00 | 46.3 | 1.00 | 38.7 | 1.00 | 31.8 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 33.8 | 0.66*** | 34.0 | 0.66*** | 28.2 | 0.68*** | 21.0 | 0.75** | 16.4 | 0.70** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 66.3 | 1.00 | 56.2 | 1.00 | 50.3 | 1.00 | 48.9 | 1.00 | 38.4 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 54.0 | 0.85* | 50.0 | 1.02 | 45.0 | 1.06 | 39.4 | 0.98 | 31.0 | 0.95 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 66.0 | 1.00 | 62.5 | 1.00 | 58.5 | 1.00 | 54.3 | 1.00 | 46.8 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 55.2 | 1.09 | 46.8 | 0.79*** | 40.6 | 0.72*** | 37.0 | 0.79*** | 26.7 | 0.64** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 68.1 | 1.00 | 58.2 | 1.00 | 52.6 | 1.00 | 51.3 | 1.00 | 40.1 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 44.8 | 0.68*** | 44.0 | 0.81** | 39.9 | 0.84* | 30.7 | 0.65*** | 24.7 | 0.70*** |
| 25 years or more | 27.6 | 0.50*** | 32.0 | 0.58*** | 23.8 | 0.51*** | 15.8 | 0.41*** | 13.9 | 0.48*** |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 51.8 | 1.00 | 49.6 | 1.00 | 45.1 | 1.00 | 36.1 | 1.00 | 30.6 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 56.5 | 1.07 | 50.8 | 1.07 | 46.0 | 1.02 | 42.8 | 1.19+ | 33.5 | 1.08 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 63.4 | 1.16 | 55.2 | 1.15 | 49.2 | 1.05 | 46.6 | 1.22* | 36.2 | 1.06 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 64.0 | 1.00 | 57.0 | 1.00 | 51.4 | 1.00 | 48.1 | 1.00 | 38.3 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 48.4 | 1.18* | 42.9 | 1.11 | 38.3 | 1.23** | 33.0 | 1.31*** | 25.2 | 1.35*** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 59.7 | 1.00 | 52.9 | 1.00 | 48.4 | 1.00 | 44.8 | 1.00 | 35.0 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 57.9 | 1.04 | 52.2 | 1.09 | 44.5 | 0.96 | 39.8 | 0.94 | 32.2 | 1.09 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 69.5 | 1.00 | 64.0 | 1.00 | 57.8 | 1.00 | 56.4 | 1.00 | 46.5 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 71.1 | 0.99 | 61.9 | 0.86+ | 57.7 | 0.99 | 54.1 | 0.96 | 43.9 | 0.88 |
| Middle | 64.5 | 0.84+ | 53.8 | 0.68*** | 50.4 | 0.82* | 47.9 | 0.87 | 38.5 | 0.78** |
| Richer | 59.0 | 0.97 | 49.6 | 0.77* | 41.2 | 0.73** | 37.7 | 0.81+ | 25.8 | 0.62*** |
| Richest | 28.5 | 0.59*** | 31.0 | 0.62** | 26.4 | 0.62** | 17.3 | 0.62** | 12.8 | 0.47*** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 0.99** |
| Constant | n/a | 1.27** | n/a | 0.95 | n/a | 0.72*** | n/a | 0.67*** | n/a | 0.45*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.10. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Rwanda

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 43.0 | 1.29 | 64.0 | 1.70* | 12.8 | 1.44 | 33.1 | 0.85 | 29.1 | 1.66+ |
| 20 to 29 | 36.5 | 0.98 | 58.1 | 1.21 | 11.2 | 1.04 | 35.3 | 0.86 | 20.5 | 0.93 |
| 30 to 39 | 39.5 | 0.96 | 57.8 | 0.98 | 12.4 | 0.95 | 36.9 | 0.76** | 22.4 | 0.85 |
| 40 to 49 | 42.8 | 1.00 | 61.1 | 1.00 | 13.8 | 1.00 | 45.7 | 1.00 | 26.2 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 38.8 | 0.89 | 57.7 | 1.01 | 8.3 | 0.68 | 32.7 | 0.86 | 21.9 | 0.92 |
| 1 or 2 | 36.2 | 1.00 | 55.7 | 1.00 | 11.2 | 1.00 | 35.0 | 1.00 | 20.7 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 36.8 | 1.01 | 57.1 | 1.11 | 12.2 | 1.10 | 35.1 | 0.97 | 21.0 | 1.07 |
| 5+ | 42.8 | 1.06 | 62.4 | 1.26+ | 13.7 | 1.18 | 43.1 | 1.07 | 25.3 | 1.15 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 47.8 | 1.37*** | 65.1 | 1.16* | 15.7 | 1.35** | 46.6 | 1.36*** | 27.5 | 1.16+ |
| Primary | 37.8 | 1.00 | 59.5 | 1.00 | 11.2 | 1.00 | 36.1 | 1.00 | 21.9 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 16.0 | 0.42*** | 33.3 | 0.41*** | 6.1 | 0.60+ | 18.4 | 0.50*** | 9.8 | 0.55** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 43.8 | 1.00 | 61.5 | 1.00 | 14.9 | 1.00 | 42.7 | 1.00 | 25.1 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 30.1 | 0.74** | 48.6 | 0.86+ | 6.3 | 0.43*** | 26.5 | 0.59*** | 16.3 | 0.74** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 43.7 | 1.00 | 63.8 | 1.00 | 14.6 | 1.00 | 42.7 | 1.00 | 25.8 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 33.0 | 0.85* | 52.3 | 0.84* | 9.1 | 0.61*** | 31.9 | 0.81** | 18.4 | 0.83* |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 42.8 | 1.00 | 64.0 | 1.00 | 13.7 | 1.00 | 40.6 | 1.00 | 25.5 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 37.8 | 0.89 | 57.7 | 0.84* | 11.7 | 0.91 | 37.4 | 0.89 | 21.4 | 0.83* |
| 25 years or more | 39.1 | 1.03 | 53.5 | 0.88 | 12.5 | 1.21 | 35.6 | 0.86 | 24.1 | 1.16 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 40.4 | 1.00 | 60.3 | 1.00 | 12.2 | 1.00 | 39.1 | 1.00 | 22.7 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 34.4 | 0.82* | 55.4 | 0.83* | 11.5 | 1.12 | 34.0 | 0.90 | 21.2 | 1.01 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 40.5 | 1.10 | 58.6 | 0.96 | 13.6 | 1.25+ | 39.5 | 1.14 | 23.7 | 1.14 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 41.6 | 1.00 | 61.6 | 1.00 | 13.1 | 1.00 | 40.6 | 1.00 | 24.5 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 24.6 | 1.05 | 42.9 | 0.78 | 7.6 | 0.89 | 22.9 | 0.80 | 12.0 | 0.87 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 41.6 | 1.00 | 61.6 | 1.00 | 13.0 | 1.00 | 40.4 | 1.00 | 24.4 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 27.9 | 0.85 | 46.6 | 0.77** | 8.9 | 0.86 | 27.5 | 0.89 | 15.0 | 0.78* |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 42.2 | 1.00 | 57.7 | 1.00 | 11.8 | 1.00 | 36.6 | 1.00 | 24.9 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 44.9 | 1.10 | 66.6 | 1.50*** | 14.2 | 1.18 | 45.7 | 1.47*** | 27.7 | 1.13 |
| Middle | 43.9 | 1.09 | 63.5 | 1.36** | 14.0 | 1.41* | 41.6 | 1.33* | 24.2 | 1.01 |
| Richer | 38.0 | 0.97 | 57.9 | 1.24+ | 12.6 | 1.50* | 37.6 | 1.28* | 23.2 | 1.12 |
| Richest | 26.6 | 1.11 | 46.8 | 1.53** | 7.9 | 1.43 | 26.7 | 1.44* | 12.8 | 1.01 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.98*** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 0.51*** | n/a | 0.97 | n/a | 0.09*** | n/a | 0.38*** | n/a | 0.25*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.11. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Uganda

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 63.1 | 1.38* | 69.5 | 1.00 | 46.1 | 1.07 | 30.7 | 1.21 | 30.0 | 1.66** |
| 20 to 29 | 58.5 | 1.18 | 70.0 | 1.13 | 36.3 | 0.84 | 25.3 | 1.08 | 21.9 | 1.23 |
| 30 to 39 | 54.5 | 0.98 | 67.8 | 1.01 | 39.9 | 1.01 | 26.0 | 1.04 | 21.3 | 1.05 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>56.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>41.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>27.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>22.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 55.4 | 0.84 | 71.0 | 1.15 | 40.1 | 1.09 | 24.6 | 1.02 | 25.2 | 1.18 |
| 1 or 2 | <i>60.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>38.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>24.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>21.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 55.6 | 0.83* | 68.7 | 0.96 | 36.0 | 0.93 | 24.7 | 1.00 | 20.2 | 0.97 |
| 5+ | 57.0 | 0.92 | 69.2 | 0.95 | 41.5 | 0.96 | 29.0 | 1.15 | 24.4 | 1.21 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 59.8 | 0.99 | 71.6 | 1.08 | 44.9 | 0.99 | 32.5 | 1.13 | 28.0 | 1.11 |
| Primary | <i>59.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>70.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>40.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>26.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>22.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 44.9 | 0.77*** | 58.7 | 0.72*** | 23.9 | 0.85 | 15.8 | 0.88 | 13.6 | 0.85 |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | <i>62.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>74.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>46.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>33.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 52.5 | 0.69*** | 64.6 | 0.69*** | 32.7 | 0.61*** | 20.1 | 0.57*** | 17.8 | 0.57*** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | <i>60.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>72.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>46.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>31.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>26.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 54.4 | 0.99 | 66.0 | 0.89 | 32.6 | 0.85* | 21.3 | 0.88 | 18.6 | 0.92 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | <i>58.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>41.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>24.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 55.5 | 1.02 | 67.9 | 1.03 | 36.2 | 0.92 | 22.5 | 0.85* | 19.4 | 0.84+ |
| 25 years or more | 55.5 | 0.96 | 71.2 | 1.01 | 32.9 | 0.70+ | 23.3 | 0.91 | 24.0 | 1.09 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | <i>57.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>39.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>26.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>23.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 56.4 | 0.92 | 68.8 | 0.96 | 40.1 | 1.00 | 27.6 | 1.07 | 20.6 | 0.86 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 58.5 | 1.07 | 69.6 | 1.05 | 37.1 | 0.94 | 24.0 | 0.93 | 23.0 | 1.03 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | <i>59.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>70.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>42.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>24.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 44.5 | 0.81* | 58.3 | 0.78* | 20.3 | 0.83 | 12.0 | 0.85 | 9.3 | 0.60*** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | <i>59.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>40.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>27.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>23.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 52.3 | 0.86* | 67.5 | 0.94 | 36.3 | 0.97 | 23.0 | 0.89 | 20.5 | 0.98 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | <i>60.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>72.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>47.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>33.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>27.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 62.9 | 1.14 | 74.1 | 1.11 | 48.7 | 1.07 | 31.7 | 0.98 | 29.5 | 1.11 |
| Middle | 60.8 | 1.05 | 70.2 | 0.94 | 40.5 | 0.84 | 27.0 | 0.88 | 22.6 | 0.89 |
| Richer | 56.5 | 0.91 | 67.0 | 0.87 | 35.4 | 0.69** | 25.1 | 0.78* | 19.3 | 0.80+ |
| Richest | 45.3 | 0.72* | 61.0 | 0.81 | 21.8 | 0.51*** | 13.7 | 0.50*** | 12.4 | 0.61** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.01** | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.01*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.98*** | n/a | 0.98*** | n/a | 0.98*** |
| Constant | n/a | 1.11 | n/a | 1.78*** | n/a | 0.42*** | n/a | 0.27*** | n/a | 0.18*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.12. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Zambia

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 87.9 | 2.58*** | 68.9 | 1.86*** | 64.6 | 1.88*** | 54.5 | 0.98 | 56.8 | 1.79*** |
| 20 to 29 | 83.0 | 1.63*** | 64.0 | 1.41** | 56.2 | 1.38** | 50.1 | 1.01 | 47.8 | 1.42** |
| 30 to 39 | 80.1 | 1.17 | 60.2 | 1.08 | 52.2 | 1.11 | 48.3 | 0.85+ | 43.8 | 1.05 |
| 40 to 49 | 79.8 | 1.00 | 59.4 | 1.00 | 51.6 | 1.00 | 54.2 | 1.00 | 43.8 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 77.5 | 0.59** | 57.1 | 0.67** | 53.5 | 0.75* | 49.4 | 0.96 | 48.1 | 0.93 |
| 1 or 2 | 82.4 | 1.00 | 63.2 | 1.00 | 56.2 | 1.00 | 48.3 | 1.00 | 45.6 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 81.8 | 1.02 | 62.2 | 0.97 | 53.2 | 0.95 | 49.3 | 1.03 | 46.0 | 1.08 |
| 5+ | 82.9 | 1.43** | 63.4 | 1.17 | 55.8 | 1.20+ | 53.8 | 1.15 | 48.1 | 1.32** |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 77.5 | 0.69*** | 64.1 | 0.94 | 56.6 | 0.91 | 52.5 | 0.90 | 50.5 | 1.01 |
| Primary | 85.3 | 1.00 | 66.3 | 1.00 | 59.8 | 1.00 | 55.8 | 1.00 | 50.7 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 76.5 | 0.61*** | 52.1 | 0.69*** | 42.2 | 0.65*** | 36.4 | 0.60*** | 34.6 | 0.70*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 82.6 | 1.00 | 63.3 | 1.00 | 55.9 | 1.00 | 52.3 | 1.00 | 47.5 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 81.1 | 1.02 | 61.3 | 1.06 | 53.6 | 1.07 | 47.7 | 0.92 | 45.6 | 1.09 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 83.5 | 1.00 | 66.9 | 1.00 | 60.5 | 1.00 | 55.5 | 1.00 | 52.1 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 80.5 | 0.83+ | 57.7 | 0.82** | 49.0 | 0.87+ | 45.1 | 0.86* | 40.8 | 0.88+ |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 83.8 | 1.00 | 65.0 | 1.00 | 57.4 | 1.00 | 54.8 | 1.00 | 50.1 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 80.8 | 1.07 | 60.3 | 1.04 | 53.2 | 1.07 | 45.9 | 0.86* | 43.2 | 0.96 |
| 25 years or more | 67.1 | 0.73 | 47.0 | 0.75 | 36.2 | 0.68* | 34.0 | 0.60** | 30.2 | 0.73 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 80.4 | 1.00 | 61.6 | 1.00 | 55.5 | 1.00 | 50.8 | 1.00 | 46.5 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 83.3 | 1.19* | 63.3 | 1.08 | 54.8 | 1.01 | 49.2 | 0.90 | 47.4 | 1.06 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 82.5 | 1.15 | 62.7 | 1.07 | 55.0 | 0.99 | 53.6 | 1.04 | 46.5 | 0.98 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 81.7 | 1.00 | 64.2 | 1.00 | 58.4 | 1.00 | 52.7 | 1.00 | 49.9 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 82.8 | 1.24 | 59.7 | 1.37** | 49.1 | 1.22+ | 47.0 | 1.52*** | 41.2 | 1.34** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 82.7 | 1.00 | 64.7 | 1.00 | 56.7 | 1.00 | 53.1 | 1.00 | 48.6 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 81.1 | 0.94 | 59.2 | 0.92 | 52.5 | 1.07 | 46.7 | 0.95 | 43.9 | 0.97 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 76.6 | 1.00 | 61.1 | 1.00 | 57.0 | 1.00 | 50.1 | 1.00 | 48.9 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 83.4 | 1.57*** | 66.9 | 1.31** | 61.5 | 1.21* | 55.9 | 1.26* | 52.4 | 1.16 |
| Middle | 86.5 | 1.83*** | 69.1 | 1.43*** | 61.6 | 1.20+ | 57.2 | 1.30** | 54.4 | 1.23* |
| Richer | 84.3 | 1.51* | 61.8 | 1.11 | 54.2 | 0.90 | 51.5 | 1.20 | 44.8 | 0.92 |
| Richest | 77.8 | 1.05 | 52.0 | 0.97 | 39.3 | 0.58** | 36.6 | 0.88 | 31.7 | 0.67* |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.01* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99** |
| Constant | n/a | 3.07*** | n/a | 1.50*** | n/a | 0.98 | n/a | 0.94 | n/a | 0.84 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.13. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Zimbabwe

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 44.1 | 2.72*** | 43.6 | 2.86*** | 49.7 | 2.63*** | 30.6 | 1.42 | 22.9 | 3.68*** |
| 20 to 29 | 28.4 | 1.65*** | 32.6 | 2.13*** | 33.7 | 1.82*** | 24.6 | 1.29+ | 11.9 | 1.88** |
| 30 to 39 | 25.6 | 1.12 | 27.9 | 1.30* | 29.9 | 1.22+ | 26.2 | 1.18 | 9.8 | 1.02 |
| 40 to 49 | 27.0 | 1.00 | 26.4 | 1.00 | 31.9 | 1.00 | 26.2 | 1.00 | 11.6 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 32.6 | 1.10 | 33.5 | 0.99 | 36.2 | 0.97 | 22.4 | 0.94 | 12.1 | 0.84 |
| 1 or 2 | 27.5 | 1.00 | 30.7 | 1.00 | 33.2 | 1.00 | 23.8 | 1.00 | 11.6 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 26.9 | 1.12 | 29.2 | 1.15 | 29.9 | 0.93 | 26.6 | 1.09 | 12.3 | 1.26 |
| 5+ | 31.4 | 1.34* | 32.8 | 1.48** | 37.3 | 1.14 | 29.9 | 1.13 | 13.2 | 1.36 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 33.9 | 1.11 | 35.2 | 1.10 | 46.8 | 1.48** | 34.5 | 1.21 | 20.6 | 1.71** |
| Primary | 33.4 | 1.00 | 35.5 | 1.00 | 40.7 | 1.00 | 32.3 | 1.00 | 14.9 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 23.0 | 0.76** | 25.8 | 0.75** | 24.0 | 0.57*** | 17.6 | 0.64*** | 7.8 | 0.66** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 32.1 | 1.00 | 33.9 | 1.00 | 36.6 | 1.00 | 27.3 | 1.00 | 13.8 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 25.3 | 0.80** | 28.2 | 0.80** | 30.6 | 0.88+ | 24.4 | 1.01 | 10.6 | 0.81+ |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 34.6 | 1.00 | 34.8 | 1.00 | 41.3 | 1.00 | 33.0 | 1.00 | 15.5 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 24.5 | 0.92 | 28.4 | 1.08 | 28.2 | 0.98 | 20.7 | 0.82* | 9.8 | 0.88 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 33.3 | 1.00 | 35.2 | 1.00 | 40.1 | 1.00 | 31.2 | 1.00 | 17.1 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 26.7 | 0.98 | 29.1 | 0.93 | 30.1 | 0.87 | 23.3 | 0.81* | 9.1 | 0.72** |
| 25 years or more | 18.5 | 0.80 | 22.1 | 0.94 | 20.7 | 0.72+ | 15.3 | 0.47*** | 8.6 | 0.68 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 26.9 | 1.00 | 28.4 | 1.00 | 30.3 | 1.00 | 23.8 | 1.00 | 11.1 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 30.3 | 1.05 | 33.2 | 1.12 | 36.5 | 1.24* | 26.7 | 1.06 | 11.8 | 1.01 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 29.4 | 0.90 | 31.7 | 0.94 | 34.2 | 0.94 | 26.8 | 0.87 | 13.4 | 1.01 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 34.2 | 1.00 | 35.4 | 1.00 | 40.5 | 1.00 | 31.6 | 1.00 | 15.2 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 19.1 | 0.69+ | 23.4 | 0.97 | 21.6 | 1.04 | 15.7 | 0.66+ | 6.8 | 0.41** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 29.0 | 1.00 | 30.1 | 1.00 | 33.2 | 1.00 | 25.9 | 1.00 | 12.4 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 28.4 | 0.88 | 32.8 | 1.08 | 34.5 | 1.03 | 25.9 | 0.96 | 11.7 | 0.87 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 35.5 | 1.00 | 40.8 | 1.00 | 48.1 | 1.00 | 37.8 | 1.00 | 15.8 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 38.9 | 1.22+ | 37.8 | 0.93 | 41.5 | 0.88 | 32.7 | 0.88 | 15.2 | 1.02 |
| Middle | 31.1 | 0.91 | 31.1 | 0.70** | 37.1 | 0.70** | 27.4 | 0.70** | 14.3 | 0.97 |
| Richer | 24.2 | 0.91 | 27.8 | 0.64** | 29.4 | 0.59*** | 22.2 | 0.76+ | 12.5 | 1.03 |
| Richest | 17.6 | 0.69+ | 21.0 | 0.49*** | 17.0 | 0.34*** | 12.9 | 0.48** | 4.6 | 0.44* |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99* |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.02** |
| Constant | n/a | 0.36*** | n/a | 0.61** | n/a | 0.61** | n/a | 0.23*** | n/a | 0.11*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.14. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Armenia

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 38.4 | 1.45 | 37.4 | 1.10 | 32.7 | 1.49 | 8.1 | 0.60 | 7.1 | 0.87 |
| 20 to 29 | 22.5 | 1.01 | 30.2 | 0.98 | 16.5 | 1.05 | 7.0 | 0.78 | 4.9 | 1.14 |
| 30 to 39 | 22.2 | 1.02 | 29.5 | 0.96 | 16.1 | 1.10 | 7.2 | 0.83 | 5.5 | 1.19 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>20.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>13.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>4.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 18.1 | 0.86 | 19.5 | 0.68* | 16.3 | 1.18 | 4.2 | 0.66 | 3.7 | 0.92 |
| 1 or 2 | <i>17.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>24.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>13.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>6.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>3.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 26.7 | 1.30** | 35.3 | 1.20* | 17.7 | 1.06 | 8.7 | 1.05 | 6.0 | 1.04 |
| 5+ | 38.3 | 1.96*** | 43.1 | 1.32+ | 25.4 | 1.33 | 14.9 | 1.45 | 9.9 | 1.48 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None or primary | <i>42.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>49.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>34.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>18.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>12.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 20.7 | 0.65** | 28.1 | 0.69** | 14.4 | 0.57*** | 6.8 | 0.55*** | 4.4 | 0.54** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>25.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>32.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>17.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>5.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 11.3 | 0.55*** | 18.2 | 0.64*** | 8.9 | 0.66*** | 5.4 | 0.89 | 3.1 | 0.92 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>40.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>46.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>16.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>11.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 20.3 | 0.61*** | 27.8 | 0.68*** | 14.5 | 0.66** | 6.7 | 0.57*** | 4.3 | 0.62** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>33.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>41.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>24.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>11.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 20.1 | 0.76** | 27.6 | 0.79* | 14.2 | 0.75** | 6.7 | 0.72* | 4.1 | 0.73+ |
| 25 years or more | 12.9 | 0.59** | 18.6 | 0.59** | 9.2 | 0.51** | 5.8 | 0.65 | 4.5 | 0.86 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>20.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>27.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>14.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>7.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>4.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 24.7 | 0.99 | 32.6 | 1.05 | 17.3 | 0.99 | 7.2 | 0.77+ | 5.2 | 0.86 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 23.0 | 0.84 | 28.7 | 0.87 | 15.5 | 0.77 | 7.6 | 0.75 | 5.4 | 0.86 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>33.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>43.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>23.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>11.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 13.7 | 0.74** | 19.6 | 0.71*** | 10.0 | 0.74* | 4.9 | 0.86 | 2.3 | 0.48** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>20.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>30.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>15.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>7.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>5.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 23.4 | 1.07 | 29.2 | 0.87+ | 16.4 | 0.94 | 7.6 | 1.08 | 4.8 | 0.92 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>41.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>49.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>14.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>11.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 29.1 | 0.69*** | 39.9 | 0.81* | 20.2 | 0.82+ | 8.8 | 0.69* | 6.6 | 0.85 |
| Middle | 17.7 | 0.49*** | 27.8 | 0.66*** | 14.5 | 0.65** | 6.7 | 0.67* | 3.7 | 0.67+ |
| Richer | 15.0 | 0.45*** | 19.9 | 0.47*** | 10.2 | 0.50*** | 4.8 | 0.51** | 2.5 | 0.58+ |
| Richest | 9.2 | 0.34*** | 13.4 | 0.37*** | 7.0 | 0.43*** | 3.5 | 0.40** | 1.7 | 0.42* |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.01* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.98*** | n/a | 0.98** |
| Constant | n/a | 0.47+ | n/a | 0.97 | n/a | 0.55 | n/a | 0.52 | n/a | 0.15* |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.15. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Jordan

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|-----|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 35.3 | 1.69* | 46.8 | 1.44+ | 4.6 | 1.02 | n/a | n/a | 73.9 | 1.91** |
| 20 to 29 | 23.8 | 1.22 | 35.3 | 1.04 | 2.7 | 0.78 | n/a | n/a | 61.2 | 1.36** |
| 30 to 39 | 21.9 | 1.08 | 33.6 | 0.89 | 3.8 | 0.88 | n/a | n/a | 57.5 | 1.04 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 26.2 | 1.00 | 41.1 | 1.00 | 6.1 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 58.8 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 30.6 | 1.33* | 40.1 | 1.24+ | 7.0 | 2.11** | n/a | n/a | 63.9 | 1.19 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 20.4 | 1.00 | 31.6 | 1.00 | 2.2 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 54.7 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 18.3 | 0.94 | 28.7 | 0.94 | 2.4 | 1.28 | n/a | n/a | 54.4 | 1.13 |
| 5+ | 29.2 | 1.27* | 44.5 | 1.45*** | 5.8 | 1.61* | n/a | n/a | 65.6 | 1.52*** |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 63.3 | 1.93*** | 73.8 | 1.79*** | 21.0 | 1.84*** | n/a | n/a | 84.0 | 1.83*** |
| <i>Primary</i> | 48.6 | 1.00 | 58.3 | 1.00 | 9.9 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 78.5 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 17.9 | 0.34*** | 30.8 | 0.46*** | 2.1 | 0.30*** | n/a | n/a | 55.2 | 0.51*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 25.3 | 1.00 | 38.0 | 1.00 | 4.3 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 61.2 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 10.8 | 0.54*** | 20.5 | 0.61*** | 1.6 | 0.50* | n/a | n/a | 42.7 | 0.59*** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 23.4 | 1.00 | 33.6 | 1.00 | 4.3 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 55.3 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 24.0 | 1.02 | 36.6 | 1.05 | 4.0 | 0.97 | n/a | n/a | 59.9 | 1.08 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 30.7 | 1.00 | 44.6 | 1.00 | 5.5 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 69.6 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 22.1 | 0.87+ | 34.5 | 0.93 | 3.2 | 0.84 | n/a | n/a | 57.0 | 0.78*** |
| 25 years or more | 18.4 | 0.78+ | 27.4 | 0.80+ | 4.5 | 1.09 | n/a | n/a | 49.8 | 0.72** |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 23.6 | 1.00 | 35.8 | 1.00 | 3.8 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 58.1 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 22.2 | 0.85* | 35.6 | 0.90 | 3.2 | 0.91 | n/a | n/a | 60.0 | 0.97 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 27.9 | 1.10 | 38.8 | 1.02 | 6.1 | 1.06 | n/a | n/a | 61.2 | 1.00 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 37.0 | 1.00 | 49.7 | 1.00 | 8.6 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 72.8 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 20.6 | 0.69*** | 32.9 | 0.72*** | 2.9 | 0.65*** | n/a | n/a | 56.0 | 0.67*** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 23.6 | 1.00 | 36.0 | 1.00 | 3.9 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 59.2 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 26.0 | 1.39*** | 38.2 | 1.23* | 4.9 | 1.62** | n/a | n/a | 61.2 | 1.27** |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 38.7 | 1.00 | 51.0 | 1.00 | 8.7 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 72.5 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 27.3 | 0.76** | 38.1 | 0.76*** | 4.4 | 0.68* | n/a | n/a | 63.1 | 0.78** |
| Middle | 20.7 | 0.52*** | 35.8 | 0.68*** | 2.3 | 0.39*** | n/a | n/a | 61.6 | 0.76** |
| Richer | 19.6 | 0.51*** | 29.8 | 0.56*** | 2.5 | 0.42*** | n/a | n/a | 54.4 | 0.67*** |
| Richest | 11.0 | 0.32*** | 24.4 | 0.49*** | 1.8 | 0.39*** | n/a | n/a | 42.4 | 0.47*** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.01** | n/a | 1.01** | n/a | 1.01 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.01** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Constant | n/a | 0.34*** | n/a | 0.57** | n/a | 0.04*** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.69* |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.16. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Morocco

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 72.5 | 1.69** | 67.9 | 1.42* | 71.1 | 1.49* | 59.5 | 1.11 | 37.9 | 1.64** |
| 20 to 29 | 58.3 | 1.24* | 55.8 | 1.14 | 57.5 | 1.08 | 46.9 | 0.83* | 26.0 | 1.08 |
| 30 to 39 | 51.6 | 1.08 | 50.8 | 1.06 | 53.1 | 1.04 | 46.3 | 0.94 | 23.7 | 0.98 |
| 40 to 49 | 53.7 | 1.00 | 52.5 | 1.00 | 55.8 | 1.00 | 51.0 | 1.00 | 26.2 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 56.8 | 1.22* | 53.1 | 1.07 | 55.6 | 1.10 | 44.4 | 1.00 | 24.9 | 1.01 |
| 1 or 2 | 48.1 | 1.00 | 47.3 | 1.00 | 48.6 | 1.00 | 39.6 | 1.00 | 20.4 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 51.8 | 1.02 | 50.7 | 1.01 | 53.5 | 1.09 | 47.0 | 1.12 | 23.8 | 1.10 |
| 5+ | 66.0 | 1.16+ | 63.9 | 1.13 | 67.4 | 1.26** | 62.5 | 1.24* | 34.4 | 1.28** |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 68.2 | 1.54*** | 65.7 | 1.42*** | 67.5 | 1.26*** | 61.1 | 1.46*** | 34.9 | 1.67*** |
| Primary | 47.6 | 1.00 | 46.8 | 1.00 | 50.7 | 1.00 | 39.8 | 1.00 | 16.2 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 18.4 | 0.39*** | 19.3 | 0.40*** | 22.5 | 0.43*** | 14.9 | 0.44*** | 3.9 | 0.33*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 58.7 | 1.00 | 56.5 | 1.00 | 59.2 | 1.00 | 51.2 | 1.00 | 27.3 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 27.6 | 0.60*** | 30.7 | 0.75*** | 31.5 | 0.67*** | 28.2 | 0.81* | 13.8 | 1.07 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 77.7 | 1.00 | 76.8 | 1.00 | 78.5 | 1.00 | 72.3 | 1.00 | 46.5 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 51.0 | 0.83* | 49.3 | 0.76*** | 51.9 | 0.74*** | 44.3 | 0.73*** | 22.0 | 0.83** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 62.9 | 1.00 | 61.1 | 1.00 | 64.1 | 1.00 | 57.7 | 1.00 | 30.7 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 54.4 | 1.06 | 52.4 | 0.98 | 54.8 | 0.97 | 46.5 | 0.90+ | 24.6 | 0.98 |
| 25 years or more | 36.3 | 0.83+ | 36.9 | 0.83* | 38.5 | 0.79* | 31.0 | 0.72*** | 16.2 | 1.04 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 57.0 | 1.00 | 55.7 | 1.00 | 57.0 | 1.00 | 50.4 | 1.00 | 27.0 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 54.1 | 0.92 | 51.8 | 0.88* | 55.5 | 0.98 | 48.0 | 0.95 | 24.7 | 0.99 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 53.2 | 0.88* | 52.2 | 0.89+ | 54.8 | 0.94 | 46.4 | 0.90+ | 25.1 | 1.00 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 75.3 | 1.00 | 72.8 | 1.00 | 73.4 | 1.00 | 66.8 | 1.00 | 40.9 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 39.8 | 0.73*** | 38.9 | 0.74*** | 42.8 | 0.83* | 34.8 | 0.74*** | 14.3 | 0.80** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 52.0 | 1.00 | 50.4 | 1.00 | 53.1 | 1.00 | 46.2 | 1.00 | 23.1 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 59.4 | 1.07 | 57.9 | 1.13* | 60.1 | 1.16** | 52.0 | 1.16** | 29.6 | 1.23*** |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 80.7 | 1.00 | 78.3 | 1.00 | 79.7 | 1.00 | 72.7 | 1.00 | 49.1 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 73.8 | 0.92 | 71.0 | 0.86+ | 71.2 | 0.78** | 63.3 | 0.87+ | 37.1 | 0.81** |
| Middle | 56.7 | 0.64*** | 54.9 | 0.61*** | 57.6 | 0.61*** | 50.9 | 0.80* | 22.1 | 0.55*** |
| Richer | 41.6 | 0.50*** | 39.3 | 0.44*** | 45.1 | 0.48*** | 36.2 | 0.62*** | 15.1 | 0.45*** |
| Richest | 23.9 | 0.34*** | 25.2 | 0.34*** | 27.6 | 0.33*** | 20.9 | 0.45*** | 6.4 | 0.28*** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.00*** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00** |
| Constant | n/a | 1.22 | n/a | 1.06 | n/a | 1.34* | n/a | 1.07 | n/a | 0.33*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.17. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Cambodia

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 25.9 | 1.21 | 31.8 | 1.29 | 20.6 | 0.81 | 9.3 | 0.62 | 11.2 | 0.94 |
| 20 to 29 | 25.2 | 1.01 | 28.5 | 1.08 | 18.7 | 0.89 | 8.0 | 0.58* | 11.9 | 0.95 |
| 30 to 39 | 27.8 | 1.10 | 31.1 | 1.21 | 18.0 | 0.85 | 9.7 | 0.92 | 9.6 | 0.87 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>26.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>27.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>21.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>10.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>13.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 19.0 | 0.87 | 24.8 | 0.84 | 19.6 | 1.22 | 9.2 | 1.18 | 14.4 | 1.40 |
| 1 or 2 | <i>23.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>16.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>9.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>10.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 29.1 | 1.14 | 30.4 | 1.00 | 20.5 | 1.12 | 10.1 | 0.89 | 11.0 | 1.19 |
| 5+ | 28.4 | 0.95 | 30.2 | 0.94 | 20.5 | 0.98 | 9.0 | 0.66+ | 11.8 | 0.98 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 28.3 | 0.96 | 31.8 | 0.98 | 20.6 | 0.99 | 11.3 | 1.26 | 14.9 | 1.22 |
| Primary | <i>27.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>29.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>9.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 17.6 | 0.67* | 22.2 | 0.79 | 15.5 | 0.83 | 7.7 | 0.87 | 8.8 | 0.94 |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | <i>24.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>27.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>16.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>9.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>11.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 30.4 | 1.47*** | 32.9 | 1.54*** | 23.6 | 1.76*** | 10.1 | 1.29+ | 10.9 | 1.22 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | <i>26.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>20.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>11.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>15.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 26.8 | 1.10 | 29.6 | 1.14 | 19.0 | 1.13 | 8.6 | 1.11 | 9.3 | 0.66** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | <i>30.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>33.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>21.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>9.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>10.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 25.3 | 0.78* | 27.2 | 0.76** | 17.6 | 0.72** | 8.8 | 0.74* | 11.1 | 0.93 |
| 25 years or more | 21.8 | 0.63* | 27.4 | 0.70+ | 20.9 | 0.92 | 13.3 | 1.03 | 14.2 | 1.40 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | <i>27.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>29.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>10.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>10.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 25.6 | 0.96 | 29.8 | 0.94 | 20.4 | 0.93 | 7.9 | 0.80 | 13.5 | 1.35* |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 25.0 | 0.80 | 25.1 | 0.79 | 17.0 | 0.89 | 8.1 | 0.91 | 12.0 | 1.01 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | <i>28.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>31.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>20.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>9.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>12.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 17.5 | 0.75+ | 19.2 | 0.73* | 15.1 | 0.85 | 8.6 | 1.03 | 6.8 | 0.65* |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | <i>27.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>29.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>9.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>11.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 24.6 | 0.85 | 28.9 | 0.98 | 19.2 | 0.96 | 9.7 | 0.97 | 11.4 | 0.96 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | <i>29.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>35.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>12.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>14.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 27.6 | 1.01 | 29.1 | 0.86 | 18.4 | 1.05 | 7.5 | 0.78 | 10.7 | 0.92 |
| Middle | 28.4 | 1.10 | 29.9 | 0.92 | 20.1 | 1.12 | 10.0 | 1.23 | 11.8 | 1.27 |
| Richer | 29.7 | 1.15 | 31.3 | 0.89 | 21.4 | 1.27 | 9.2 | 1.09 | 11.8 | 1.23 |
| Richest | 18.1 | 0.83 | 20.8 | 0.71+ | 17.2 | 1.16 | 8.5 | 1.48 | 7.6 | 1.58+ |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 0.99*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 0.27*** | n/a | 0.34*** | n/a | 0.36*** | n/a | 0.21*** | n/a | 0.27*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.18. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Indonesia

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 24.6 | 1.67*** | 24.1 | 1.90*** | 7.0 | 1.66*** | 9.2 | 1.61*** | 3.7 | 1.39+ |
| 20 to 29 | 21.7 | 1.47*** | 23.3 | 1.54*** | 5.5 | 1.34*** | 7.2 | 1.29*** | 3.1 | 1.35** |
| 30 to 39 | 16.8 | 1.22*** | 18.3 | 1.20*** | 4.5 | 1.13+ | 6.6 | 1.16* | 2.8 | 1.09 |
| 40 to 49 | 15.7 | 1.00 | 17.1 | 1.00 | 5.4 | 1.00 | 6.7 | 1.00 | 2.7 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 21.5 | 1.09 | 20.1 | 0.96 | 5.9 | 1.02 | 6.9 | 1.05 | 3.4 | 0.98 |
| 1 or 2 | 17.8 | 1.00 | 19.3 | 1.00 | 4.5 | 1.00 | 6.3 | 1.00 | 2.5 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 17.7 | 1.20*** | 19.4 | 1.22*** | 5.2 | 1.19** | 6.8 | 1.20** | 2.9 | 1.13 |
| 5+ | 19.5 | 1.45*** | 21.6 | 1.52*** | 7.0 | 1.52*** | 9.1 | 1.54*** | 4.1 | 1.50*** |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 17.4 | 0.87* | 17.3 | 0.89* | 7.3 | 1.20* | 7.7 | 1.15+ | 3.0 | 0.89 |
| Primary | 19.2 | 1.00 | 20.5 | 1.00 | 5.7 | 1.00 | 7.7 | 1.00 | 3.4 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 17.3 | 1.07+ | 19.1 | 1.08* | 4.0 | 0.78*** | 5.7 | 0.92 | 2.2 | 0.73*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 18.6 | 1.00 | 20.1 | 1.00 | 5.1 | 1.00 | 7.0 | 1.00 | 2.9 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 17.6 | 1.08* | 19.0 | 1.04 | 5.3 | 1.26*** | 6.6 | 1.11* | 2.8 | 1.16* |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 20.7 | 1.00 | 22.6 | 1.00 | 7.8 | 1.00 | 8.6 | 1.00 | 5.1 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 17.8 | 1.10* | 19.2 | 1.09* | 4.6 | 0.89+ | 6.5 | 0.96 | 2.4 | 0.78*** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 19.7 | 1.00 | 20.2 | 1.00 | 5.7 | 1.00 | 8.0 | 1.00 | 3.1 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 18.0 | 1.00 | 20.2 | 1.07* | 4.9 | 1.06 | 6.3 | 0.96 | 2.8 | 1.14+ |
| 25 years or more | 13.4 | 0.84** | 15.5 | 0.96 | 3.8 | 0.98 | 5.2 | 0.95 | 2.3 | 1.16 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 18.1 | 1.00 | 19.8 | 1.00 | 5.0 | 1.00 | 6.8 | 1.00 | 2.8 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 18.9 | 1.01 | 19.9 | 1.01 | 5.3 | 0.91+ | 7.2 | 1.03 | 2.9 | 0.97 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 17.6 | 1.04 | 18.9 | 1.06 | 5.3 | 0.98 | 6.4 | 1.02 | 3.3 | 1.04 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 21.2 | 1.00 | 22.3 | 1.00 | 6.1 | 1.00 | 7.8 | 1.00 | 3.6 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 14.9 | 0.89** | 16.7 | 0.92* | 4.0 | 0.91 | 5.8 | 0.92 | 2.1 | 0.79** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 18.8 | 1.00 | 20.3 | 1.00 | 5.2 | 1.00 | 7.4 | 1.00 | 2.9 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 17.4 | 0.97 | 18.8 | 0.92** | 5.1 | 1.03 | 5.9 | 0.91* | 2.9 | 1.00 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 24.2 | 1.00 | 26.9 | 1.00 | 8.9 | 1.00 | 9.9 | 1.00 | 5.5 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 21.6 | 1.05 | 22.2 | 0.99 | 5.5 | 1.11 | 7.7 | 1.06 | 3.1 | 1.07 |
| Middle | 18.0 | 0.84*** | 19.1 | 0.79*** | 4.7 | 1.01 | 6.7 | 0.91 | 2.7 | 0.95 |
| Richer | 17.2 | 0.80*** | 17.9 | 0.70*** | 3.9 | 0.95 | 5.8 | 0.94 | 1.8 | 0.86 |
| Richest | 10.6 | 0.49*** | 12.6 | 0.48*** | 2.7 | 0.69*** | 4.4 | 0.74** | 1.3 | 0.78+ |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00*** | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.00*** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.98*** |
| Constant | n/a | 0.41*** | n/a | 0.40*** | n/a | 0.21*** | n/a | 0.17*** | n/a | 0.10*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.19. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Nepal

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 12.5 | 0.98 | 27.8 | 1.33* | 11.4 | 1.16 | 3.2 | 0.86 | 6.3 | 1.00 |
| 20 to 29 | 13.1 | 1.08 | 27.0 | 1.29** | 8.9 | 1.04 | 2.7 | 0.88 | 5.1 | 1.09 |
| 30 to 39 | 10.9 | 0.93 | 24.1 | 1.12 | 7.5 | 0.84 | 3.2 | 0.99 | 4.3 | 0.94 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>11.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>21.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>3.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>4.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 13.0 | 1.16 | 26.2 | 0.93 | 10.6 | 1.28 | 3.7 | 1.54 | 6.6 | 1.48+ |
| 1 or 2 | <i>12.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>26.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>2.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>4.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 11.6 | 0.91 | 24.5 | 0.94 | 7.9 | 0.92 | 2.9 | 1.06 | 4.2 | 0.78 |
| 5+ | 12.2 | 0.93 | 23.5 | 0.96 | 9.1 | 0.99 | 3.8 | 1.13 | 5.6 | 0.94 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 12.7 | 0.95 | 24.8 | 0.96 | 9.4 | 0.94 | 3.7 | 1.61* | 5.8 | 1.21 |
| Primary | <i>12.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>26.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>1.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>4.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 8.4 | 0.63** | 26.0 | 0.97 | 4.8 | 0.58** | 0.7 | 0.38* | 1.2 | 0.37** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | <i>11.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>24.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>3.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>5.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 14.0 | 1.18 | 28.4 | 1.18* | 8.2 | 1.04 | 2.8 | 1.06 | 4.3 | 1.03 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | <i>13.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>25.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>10.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>3.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>6.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 10.4 | 0.75*** | 25.1 | 0.96 | 7.0 | 0.70*** | 2.4 | 0.80 | 3.7 | 0.71** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | <i>12.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>25.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>9.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>3.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>5.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 10.8 | 0.86+ | 24.3 | 0.89+ | 6.3 | 0.74** | 2.3 | 0.83 | 3.3 | 0.72* |
| 25 years or more | 10.7 | 0.85 | 25.4 | 1.13 | 5.7 | 0.53 | 4.1 | 1.40 | 0.8 | 0.35 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | <i>12.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>25.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>9.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>3.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>5.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 12.0 | 0.95 | 24.8 | 0.95 | 8.0 | 0.87 | 2.7 | 0.91 | 4.7 | 0.97 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 11.0 | 0.97 | 24.0 | 0.98 | 8.5 | 1.03 | 2.9 | 1.00 | 4.6 | 1.15 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | <i>12.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>24.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>3.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>5.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 13.1 | 1.20 | 29.0 | 1.19+ | 8.0 | 1.36+ | 2.7 | 1.08 | 3.5 | 0.93 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | <i>11.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>24.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>2.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>4.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 12.5 | 1.05 | 25.5 | 1.00 | 9.1 | 1.04 | 3.2 | 1.14 | 5.2 | 1.04 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | <i>12.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>24.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>2.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>4.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 12.7 | 1.07 | 27.3 | 1.12 | 8.9 | 1.16 | 3.3 | 1.24 | 5.5 | 1.16 |
| Middle | 12.8 | 1.02 | 25.2 | 1.03 | 10.2 | 1.36* | 3.8 | 1.55* | 5.4 | 1.27 |
| Richer | 11.9 | 0.99 | 23.4 | 0.89 | 9.6 | 1.28+ | 2.9 | 1.23 | 6.2 | 1.54* |
| Richest | 11.3 | 0.93 | 25.7 | 0.84 | 6.6 | 1.06 | 2.5 | 1.49 | 3.2 | 1.06 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.98*** | n/a | 0.98*** | n/a | 0.97*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.01** | n/a | 1.00** | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.01* | n/a | 1.02*** |
| Constant | n/a | 0.15*** | n/a | 0.38*** | n/a | 0.11*** | n/a | 0.03*** | n/a | 0.04*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.20. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Philippines

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 14.6 | 1.27 | 28.0 | 1.27 | 6.7 | 1.30 | 5.0 | 1.37 | 5.0 | 1.49 |
| 20 to 29 | 9.7 | 0.97 | 21.5 | 1.00 | 5.7 | 1.16 | 3.4 | 1.22 | 2.8 | 0.92 |
| 30 to 39 | 9.7 | 0.98 | 21.1 | 0.97 | 5.8 | 1.08 | 4.1 | 1.47* | 3.7 | 1.21 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>9.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>21.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>5.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>2.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>3.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 6.6 | 0.75 | 16.9 | 0.81+ | 3.5 | 0.64+ | 3.0 | 1.05 | 2.0 | 0.57+ |
| 1 or 2 | <i>7.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>18.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>4.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>2.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>2.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 10.6 | 1.20+ | 22.3 | 1.17* | 5.9 | 1.24+ | 3.9 | 1.23 | 3.5 | 1.07 |
| 5+ | 13.1 | 1.08 | 26.8 | 1.19* | 7.6 | 1.30+ | 4.8 | 1.23 | 4.2 | 0.97 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 23.6 | 1.20 | 35.8 | 1.20 | 5.4 | 0.50* | 4.7 | 0.61 | 6.8 | 1.01 |
| Primary | <i>15.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>26.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>5.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>5.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 7.3 | 0.72*** | 19.2 | 0.96 | 4.7 | 0.85 | 2.9 | 0.85 | 2.4 | 0.64** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | <i>10.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>21.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>6.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>3.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>3.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 8.7 | 1.01 | 21.3 | 1.14* | 5.1 | 1.03 | 3.1 | 1.01 | 2.9 | 1.00 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | <i>16.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>27.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>6.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>5.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 9.2 | 1.17 | 20.9 | 1.06 | 5.4 | 1.03 | 3.3 | 0.85 | 3.1 | 1.00 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | <i>14.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>7.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>5.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>4.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 9.7 | 0.89 | 21.3 | 0.82** | 5.6 | 0.90 | 3.7 | 0.81 | 3.3 | 1.05 |
| 25 years or more | 5.5 | 0.66** | 14.8 | 0.61*** | 3.8 | 0.78 | 1.5 | 0.44*** | 2.3 | 0.83 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 9.9 | 1.00 | 21.4 | 1.00 | 5.7 | 1.00 | 3.7 | 1.00 | 3.3 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 9.4 | 0.78** | 22.4 | 0.88+ | 5.2 | 0.84 | 3.5 | 0.82 | 3.1 | 0.88 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 10.2 | 0.92 | 20.2 | 0.85+ | 6.5 | 1.10 | 2.9 | 0.71 | 3.4 | 1.07 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | <i>13.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>25.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>7.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>4.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>4.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 6.5 | 0.91 | 17.9 | 0.93 | 3.9 | 0.66*** | 2.5 | 0.78+ | 2.1 | 0.56*** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | <i>10.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>22.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>6.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>3.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>3.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 7.9 | 1.01 | 19.1 | 1.01 | 4.7 | 0.93 | 3.1 | 1.01 | 3.1 | 1.24 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | <i>19.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>31.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>9.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>6.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>6.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 12.3 | 0.78* | 24.9 | 0.82* | 7.5 | 0.89 | 4.1 | 0.73+ | 3.3 | 0.71* |
| Middle | 8.0 | 0.56*** | 21.6 | 0.72*** | 5.4 | 0.78 | 3.7 | 0.75 | 3.4 | 0.82 |
| Richer | 6.1 | 0.49*** | 17.9 | 0.66*** | 4.0 | 0.67* | 2.1 | 0.50** | 2.1 | 0.63* |
| Richest | 3.6 | 0.32*** | 12.3 | 0.44*** | 2.1 | 0.40*** | 1.6 | 0.39*** | 1.6 | 0.54* |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01* | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 1.00** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 0.18*** | n/a | 0.34*** | n/a | 0.05*** | n/a | 0.03*** | n/a | 0.04*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.21. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Bolivia

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 15.5 | 1.56* | 24.6 | 1.47* | 10.1 | 1.15 | 5.2 | 1.33 | 9.2 | 1.18 |
| 20 to 29 | 9.2 | 0.95 | 16.9 | 1.03 | 6.6 | 0.81+ | 2.5 | 0.80 | 4.5 | 0.78+ |
| 30 to 39 | 10.4 | 1.00 | 17.2 | 1.07 | 6.8 | 0.85 | 3.1 | 0.84 | 5.5 | 0.83+ |
| 40 to 49 | 10.2 | 1.00 | 16.1 | 1.00 | 8.2 | 1.00 | 3.6 | 1.00 | 6.2 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 10.5 | 1.05 | 15.8 | 1.00 | 6.7 | 0.97 | 2.6 | 0.65 | 5.4 | 1.01 |
| 1 or 2 | 8.7 | 1.00 | 16.3 | 1.00 | 6.0 | 1.00 | 2.5 | 1.00 | 4.1 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 9.5 | 1.11 | 16.4 | 1.12 | 7.2 | 1.06 | 2.4 | 1.06 | 4.4 | 0.96 |
| 5+ | 12.4 | 1.17 | 19.0 | 1.08 | 8.7 | 1.02 | 4.5 | 1.33 | 8.2 | 1.19 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 12.0 | 0.86 | 19.2 | 0.97 | 10.5 | 1.04 | 5.4 | 1.12 | 9.6 | 1.01 |
| Primary | 12.7 | 1.00 | 19.6 | 1.00 | 8.9 | 1.00 | 3.6 | 1.00 | 6.9 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 5.7 | 0.56*** | 12.8 | 0.72*** | 3.7 | 0.58*** | 1.7 | 0.74+ | 2.4 | 0.59*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 11.5 | 1.00 | 18.0 | 1.00 | 8.1 | 1.00 | 3.7 | 1.00 | 7.0 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 9.1 | 1.01 | 16.4 | 1.05 | 6.6 | 1.10 | 2.6 | 1.04 | 4.3 | 0.91 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 13.1 | 1.00 | 17.0 | 1.00 | 9.3 | 1.00 | 6.1 | 1.00 | 9.0 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 9.8 | 1.04 | 17.1 | 1.24* | 7.0 | 1.18 | 2.7 | 0.76+ | 5.1 | 1.10 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 11.2 | 1.00 | 19.4 | 1.00 | 8.7 | 1.00 | 3.8 | 1.00 | 7.2 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 9.8 | 1.05 | 16.5 | 0.93 | 6.6 | 0.76** | 2.8 | 0.85 | 4.7 | 0.78** |
| 25 years or more | 9.2 | 0.94 | 14.3 | 0.82* | 6.3 | 0.85 | 2.6 | 0.81 | 4.7 | 0.77 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 9.6 | 1.00 | 16.5 | 1.00 | 6.9 | 1.00 | 2.9 | 1.00 | 5.3 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 11.6 | 1.06 | 18.7 | 1.00 | 7.6 | 0.95 | 3.5 | 1.05 | 5.5 | 0.94 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 11.1 | 1.08 | 18.4 | 1.05 | 8.6 | 1.19 | 3.9 | 1.15 | 6.8 | 1.20 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 13.2 | 1.00 | 19.5 | 1.00 | 10.0 | 1.00 | 4.7 | 1.00 | 8.8 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 8.5 | 0.94 | 15.8 | 0.97 | 5.7 | 0.97 | 2.2 | 1.34 | 3.7 | 0.92 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 10.0 | 1.00 | 16.8 | 1.00 | 7.4 | 1.00 | 2.9 | 1.00 | 5.4 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 10.8 | 1.06 | 19.1 | 1.22** | 6.5 | 1.09 | 3.9 | 1.53** | 5.9 | 1.28* |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 13.3 | 1.00 | 20.1 | 1.00 | 11.0 | 1.00 | 5.6 | 1.00 | 10.3 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 12.4 | 0.91 | 19.2 | 0.92 | 9.6 | 0.76* | 4.6 | 0.82 | 7.5 | 0.69** |
| Middle | 12.0 | 0.89 | 20.0 | 0.88 | 7.0 | 0.58*** | 2.5 | 0.45*** | 5.3 | 0.46*** |
| Richer | 8.9 | 0.69* | 16.1 | 0.63*** | 5.9 | 0.50*** | 1.7 | 0.31*** | 3.2 | 0.31*** |
| Richest | 4.4 | 0.39*** | 10.2 | 0.42*** | 3.1 | 0.25*** | 1.6 | 0.26*** | 2.0 | 0.21*** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.00* |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 0.10*** | n/a | 0.17*** | n/a | 0.06*** | n/a | 0.03*** | n/a | 0.04*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.22. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Haiti

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|-------------|---------------------------|--------------|---------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 39.9 | 1.22 | 44.0 | 2.29*** | 11.9 | 1.55 | 21.2 | 0.93 | 18.1 | 1.28 |
| 20 to 29 | 30.2 | 0.90 | 25.3 | 1.23 | 11.6 | 1.05 | 13.5 | 0.83 | 10.5 | 0.94 |
| 30 to 39 | 29.3 | 0.87 | 27.5 | 1.00 | 8.6 | 0.67* | 14.8 | 0.79+ | 6.7 | 0.70* |
| 40 to 49 | <i>34.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>27.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>13.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>20.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>11.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 29.4 | 1.16 | 27.7 | 1.22 | 7.7 | 0.81 | 13.9 | 1.04 | 8.8 | 1.27 |
| 1 or 2 | <i>28.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>25.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>8.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>13.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>9.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 33.8 | 1.24+ | <i>32.4</i> | <i>1.24+</i> | 12.1 | 1.27 | 13.8 | 1.23 | 9.2 | 1.24 |
| 5+ | <i>33.7</i> | <i>1.02</i> | 27.2 | 1.11 | <i>13.1</i> | <i>1.04</i> | <i>21.3</i> | <i>1.26</i> | 11.1 | 1.07 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 35.1 | 1.06 | 31.4 | 0.92 | 14.3 | 1.16 | 22.2 | 1.12 | 12.3 | 0.93 |
| Primary | <i>34.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>29.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>11.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>14.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>10.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 17.8 | 0.57*** | 17.2 | 0.62** | 2.8 | 0.45** | 6.7 | 0.54** | 3.3 | 0.47** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | <i>30.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>11.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>16.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>10.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 32.2 | 0.96 | 27.4 | 0.93 | 10.5 | 0.94 | 16.3 | 0.87 | 9.5 | 1.07 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | <i>33.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>30.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>14.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>19.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>11.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 30.4 | 1.22* | 26.1 | 1.15 | 8.7 | 1.08 | 13.8 | 1.16 | 9.0 | 1.00 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | <i>32.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>29.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>12.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>17.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>12.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 33.5 | 1.01 | 27.4 | 1.00 | 9.9 | 0.88 | 15.9 | 0.98 | 9.2 | 0.82 |
| 25 years or more | 21.8 | 0.90 | 25.3 | 1.09 | 10.4 | 0.90 | 14.1 | 1.04 | 6.9 | 0.93 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | <i>30.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>31.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>10.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>16.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>9.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 32.9 | 1.29** | 28.5 | 1.03 | 11.5 | 1.14 | 15.0 | 1.14 | 10.9 | 0.91 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 32.8 | 1.04 | 20.9 | 0.95 | 11.5 | 0.97 | 18.5 | 1.13 | 9.7 | 1.04 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | <i>34.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>31.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>14.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>18.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>12.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 26.6 | 1.15 | 21.2 | 1.16 | 5.8 | 1.01 | 12.2 | 0.88 | 5.9 | 0.84 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | <i>34.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>27.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>12.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>16.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>10.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 28.4 | 0.78** | 28.5 | 0.83* | 8.8 | 0.79* | 15.9 | 1.05 | 9.2 | 0.87 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | <i>39.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>37.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>18.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>24.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>16.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 34.1 | 0.81+ | 26.0 | 0.72** | 14.1 | 0.70* | 15.1 | 0.60*** | 14.1 | 0.71* |
| Middle | 31.6 | 0.87 | 32.2 | 0.78* | 8.9 | 0.68* | 17.0 | 0.77+ | 7.4 | 0.70* |
| Richer | 35.6 | 0.83 | 28.3 | 0.81 | 9.7 | 0.79 | 17.5 | 0.69+ | 9.5 | 0.91 |
| Richest | 16.9 | 0.48** | 15.7 | 0.62* | 3.6 | 0.53+ | 7.1 | 0.51* | 2.6 | 0.37* |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 0.99+ | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99+ |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 0.48*** | n/a | 0.54*** | n/a | 0.13*** | n/a | 0.19*** | n/a | 0.11*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3A.23. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Nicaragua

| Characteristic | A husband is justified in beating his wife if: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | She goes out without telling him | | She neglects the children | | She argues with him | | She refuses to have sex with him | | She burns the food | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 13.4 | 2.28*** | 18.0 | 1.98*** | 8.4 | 1.90** | 4.4 | 1.63 | 10.2 | 2.30*** |
| 20 to 29 | 8.9 | 1.35* | 14.0 | 1.48** | 6.4 | 1.25 | 4.4 | 1.40+ | 6.7 | 1.35+ |
| 30 to 39 | 6.4 | 0.93 | 9.9 | 1.00 | 4.9 | 0.90 | 3.2 | 0.90 | 4.8 | 0.84 |
| 40 to 49 | 7.7 | 1.00 | 11.2 | 1.00 | 5.9 | 1.00 | 4.4 | 1.00 | 6.4 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 9.2 | 0.97 | 13.4 | 0.98 | 5.3 | 0.82 | 2.9 | 0.76 | 6.8 | 0.94 |
| 1 or 2 | 6.9 | 1.00 | 11.6 | 1.00 | 5.1 | 1.00 | 3.0 | 1.00 | 5.3 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 7.9 | 1.26+ | 12.3 | 1.18 | 5.9 | 1.16 | 4.1 | 1.36+ | 5.8 | 1.15 |
| 5+ | 10.2 | 1.25 | 13.4 | 1.11 | 7.7 | 1.07 | 5.6 | 1.27 | 8.2 | 1.22 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 14.4 | 1.22* | 18.6 | 1.20* | 11.5 | 1.28* | 7.7 | 1.25 | 12.2 | 1.35** |
| Primary | 10.8 | 1.00 | 14.8 | 1.00 | 7.3 | 1.00 | 5.0 | 1.00 | 7.8 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 2.5 | 0.36*** | 6.8 | 0.55*** | 1.9 | 0.32*** | 1.1 | 0.29*** | 1.8 | 0.35*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 10.2 | 1.00 | 13.3 | 1.00 | 7.3 | 1.00 | 4.8 | 1.00 | 7.7 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 5.3 | 0.86 | 11.1 | 1.19* | 4.1 | 0.92 | 2.9 | 0.88 | 4.3 | 0.90 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 13.3 | 1.00 | 16.6 | 1.00 | 9.4 | 1.00 | 6.7 | 1.00 | 10.2 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 7.8 | 1.03 | 12.0 | 1.03 | 5.7 | 1.20 | 3.8 | 1.18 | 6.0 | 1.06 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 9.2 | 1.00 | 13.5 | 1.00 | 6.4 | 1.00 | 4.1 | 1.00 | 6.6 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 7.3 | 1.30** | 11.5 | 1.15+ | 5.7 | 1.28* | 4.1 | 1.48** | 6.5 | 1.59*** |
| 25 years or more | 4.5 | 1.60* | 6.8 | 1.06 | 3.3 | 1.48 | 2.5 | 1.80+ | 2.5 | 1.27 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 7.3 | 1.00 | 12.1 | 1.00 | 5.4 | 1.00 | 3.6 | 1.00 | 5.9 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 10.6 | 1.29** | 12.9 | 1.02 | 6.9 | 1.22+ | 4.9 | 1.36* | 7.1 | 1.22+ |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 8.2 | 0.91 | 13.2 | 0.93 | 6.9 | 1.12 | 4.2 | 1.00 | 6.8 | 0.96 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 12.8 | 1.00 | 16.8 | 1.00 | 9.4 | 1.00 | 6.1 | 1.00 | 10.3 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 4.9 | 0.88 | 9.2 | 1.04 | 3.5 | 0.90 | 2.5 | 1.10 | 3.4 | 0.87 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 8.5 | 1.00 | 12.7 | 1.00 | 6.4 | 1.00 | 4.5 | 1.00 | 6.7 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 7.8 | 1.08 | 12.0 | 1.04 | 5.4 | 0.97 | 3.3 | 0.96 | 5.8 | 0.95 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 16.5 | 1.00 | 19.5 | 1.00 | 12.4 | 1.00 | 8.6 | 1.00 | 13.3 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 11.7 | 0.77* | 16.1 | 0.89 | 8.1 | 0.76* | 5.2 | 0.70* | 8.2 | 0.69** |
| Middle | 8.5 | 0.65** | 13.4 | 0.80 | 4.8 | 0.65* | 3.5 | 0.49** | 6.6 | 0.75 |
| Richer | 4.1 | 0.41*** | 8.9 | 0.62** | 3.4 | 0.48** | 1.9 | 0.30*** | 3.0 | 0.48** |
| Richest | 1.9 | 0.27*** | 5.5 | 0.42*** | 2.2 | 0.43** | 1.4 | 0.29*** | 1.6 | 0.33*** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 0.07*** | n/a | 0.15*** | n/a | 0.06*** | n/a | 0.03*** | n/a | 0.05*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.1. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Benin

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--------------|---|--------------|------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 83.3 | 0.79 | 51.2 | 1.12 | 84.7 | 1.29 | 68.6 | 0.98 |
| 20 to 29 | 88.2 | 1.00 | 58.2 | 1.16 | 88.3 | 1.26 | 75.2 | 1.09 |
| 30 to 39 | 88.9 | 1.08 | 57.7 | 1.15 | 87.0 | 1.04 | 73.5 | 0.92 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>87.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>52.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>86.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>75.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 85.8 | 0.88 | 52.4 | 0.77* | 81.7 | 0.62** | 67.8 | 0.79+ |
| 1 or 2 | <i>88.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>59.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>88.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 89.1 | 1.02 | 58.1 | 0.96 | 88.5 | 1.14 | 76.6 | 1.25* |
| 5 + | 87.2 | 0.93 | 54.0 | 0.93 | 86.9 | 1.12 | 74.4 | 1.17 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 87.1 | 1.01 | 54.8 | 0.88 | 87.2 | 0.93 | 74.3 | 1.04 |
| Primary | <i>89.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>60.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>88.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 91.2 | 0.87 | 63.2 | 1.05 | 85.2 | 0.68+ | 74.4 | 1.01 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | <i>83.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>53.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>82.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 88.7 | 1.42** | 57.1 | 1.14 | 88.1 | 1.44** | 75.0 | 1.22* |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | <i>84.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>54.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>86.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>71.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 89.9 | 1.47*** | 57.7 | 1.04 | 87.8 | 1.10 | 75.6 | 1.23** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | <i>86.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>52.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>85.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>72.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 89.4 | 1.14 | 60.2 | 1.28*** | 88.7 | 1.30* | 75.7 | 1.17* |
| 25 years or more | 89.6 | 0.96 | 59.4 | 1.10 | 87.3 | 1.28 | 73.4 | 1.15 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | <i>89.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>60.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>88.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 89.0 | 0.98 | 57.1 | 0.92 | 88.9 | 1.08 | 76.4 | 1.17+ |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | <i>86.0</i> | <i>0.77*</i> | <i>53.5</i> | <i>0.82*</i> | 85.6 | 0.81+ | 73.2 | 0.98 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | <i>87.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>56.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>88.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>74.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 89.6 | 0.92 | 56.9 | 0.82* | 85.7 | 0.76* | 73.6 | 0.97 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | <i>87.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>56.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>87.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>74.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 88.4 | 0.95 | 56.1 | 0.92 | 88.0 | 1.14 | 74.2 | 1.01 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | <i>83.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>51.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>83.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>71.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 86.2 | 1.10 | 56.1 | 1.18+ | 89.1 | 1.59*** | 74.9 | 1.15 |
| Middle | 88.9 | 1.34* | 55.9 | 1.16 | 89.9 | 1.61*** | 76.7 | 1.22+ |
| Richer | 90.1 | 1.36+ | 60.3 | 1.22+ | 88.1 | 1.38* | 75.1 | 1.12 |
| Richest | 91.8 | 1.60+ | 59.9 | 1.00 | 86.1 | 1.39 | 73.0 | 1.01 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.02*** | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.01*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99** |
| Constant | n/a | 4.93*** | n/a | 1.04 | n/a | 5.11*** | n/a | 2.33*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

**Appendix Table 3B.2. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression):
Burkina Faso**

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------|---|---------|------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------|---------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 76.9 | 1.04 | 61.0 | 1.26+ | 82.1 | 1.03 | 62.3 | 1.20 |
| 20 to 29 | 80.3 | 1.19+ | 65.3 | 1.25** | 86.1 | 1.49*** | 65.5 | 1.31*** |
| 30 to 39 | 79.6 | 1.02 | 62.1 | 1.02 | 82.9 | 1.03 | 61.1 | 1.03 |
| 40 to 49 | 79.3 | 1.00 | 63.2 | 1.00 | 84.2 | 1.00 | 60.8 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 77.0 | 0.94 | 61.2 | 0.97 | 83.3 | 0.99 | 60.0 | 0.86 |
| 1 or 2 | 78.8 | 1.00 | 61.9 | 1.00 | 84.3 | 1.00 | 64.2 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 79.2 | 1.13 | 64.3 | 1.14+ | 82.9 | 0.91 | 62.6 | 1.03 |
| 5 + | 80.8 | 1.28* | 64.6 | 1.36*** | 85.6 | 1.34** | 62.6 | 1.17+ |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 79.6 | 0.83+ | 63.0 | 0.73*** | 84.8 | 0.86 | 62.7 | 0.72*** |
| Primary | 79.1 | 1.00 | 66.6 | 1.00 | 82.8 | 1.00 | 63.8 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 79.8 | 1.36+ | 67.7 | 1.40* | 79.5 | 1.33+ | 64.2 | 1.34* |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 79.9 | 1.00 | 64.6 | 1.00 | 85.3 | 1.00 | 64.2 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 78.1 | 1.02 | 59.5 | 0.85** | 80.8 | 0.84* | 57.6 | 0.79*** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 79.1 | 1.00 | 63.0 | 1.00 | 84.9 | 1.00 | 63.5 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 80.0 | 1.26*** | 64.0 | 1.13* | 83.9 | 1.15* | 62.3 | 1.04 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 79.8 | 1.00 | 63.3 | 1.00 | 85.7 | 1.00 | 63.0 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 79.3 | 1.07 | 64.3 | 1.10* | 82.3 | 0.88+ | 62.5 | 1.03 |
| 25 years or more | 77.2 | 1.11 | 55.8 | 0.77 | 81.6 | 0.89 | 64.3 | 1.30 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 80.8 | 1.00 | 64.4 | 1.00 | 83.7 | 1.00 | 65.5 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 78.6 | 0.86+ | 63.9 | 0.96 | 83.4 | 0.99 | 63.3 | 0.98 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 78.9 | 0.86* | 61.5 | 0.87* | 84.6 | 1.00 | 60.3 | 0.86* |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 80.5 | 1.00 | 64.4 | 1.00 | 85.4 | 1.00 | 64.2 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 74.1 | 1.18 | 58.8 | 1.16 | 78.9 | 1.13 | 55.7 | 1.07 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 79.8 | 1.00 | 64.9 | 1.00 | 84.8 | 1.00 | 64.0 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 79.1 | 1.06 | 61.4 | 1.00 | 83.8 | 1.08 | 61.1 | 1.02 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 82.0 | 1.00 | 66.6 | 1.00 | 86.8 | 1.00 | 67.1 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 82.1 | 0.95 | 66.8 | 1.05 | 86.6 | 1.00 | 65.0 | 0.92 |
| Middle | 80.5 | 0.80* | 63.5 | 0.85* | 84.8 | 0.87 | 64.6 | 0.87+ |
| Richer | 79.4 | 0.76** | 60.9 | 0.79** | 84.8 | 0.88 | 61.6 | 0.80** |
| Richest | 72.8 | 0.50*** | 59.0 | 0.61*** | 78.3 | 0.54*** | 54.6 | 0.58*** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00+ |
| Constant | n/a | 5.12*** | n/a | 2.09*** | n/a | 5.92*** | n/a | 2.23*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.3. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Cameroon

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------|---|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 84.5 | 0.64** | 67.9 | 0.97 | 86.6 | 1.35+ | 75.1 | 0.95 |
| 20 to 29 | 87.8 | 0.79+ | 71.6 | 1.06 | 87.0 | 1.18 | 76.9 | 0.94 |
| 30 to 39 | 89.3 | 0.95 | 71.9 | 1.08 | 85.0 | 0.97 | 76.4 | 0.99 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | <i>87.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>68.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>84.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 89.3 | 0.97 | 72.0 | 1.05 | 83.9 | 0.72** | 77.7 | 0.96 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>88.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>71.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>86.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 88.1 | 0.98 | 71.2 | 1.00 | 86.9 | 0.98 | 77.3 | 0.97 |
| 5 + | 86.5 | 0.96 | 68.8 | 0.99 | 85.1 | 0.93 | 72.9 | 0.91 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 80.5 | 0.53*** | 63.1 | 0.63*** | 85.6 | 0.76** | 62.0 | 0.40*** |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>88.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>71.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>87.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>80.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 94.4 | 1.76*** | 76.5 | 1.21** | 84.2 | 0.90 | 83.3 | 1.14 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>87.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>68.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>85.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 88.3 | 0.90 | 72.3 | 1.10+ | 86.4 | 1.10 | 78.6 | 1.17* |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>83.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>66.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>86.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>71.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 91.9 | 1.37*** | 74.6 | 1.21** | 85.9 | 1.19* | 80.9 | 1.24** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>85.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>67.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>86.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 90.9 | 1.13 | 74.2 | 1.19** | 86.1 | 1.10 | 79.1 | 0.94 |
| 25 years or more | 97.1 | 3.16*** | 82.6 | 1.85*** | 83.1 | 0.96 | 81.5 | 0.90 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>88.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>71.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>85.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 88.8 | 1.05 | 72.1 | 1.09 | 86.6 | 1.02 | 77.1 | 1.03 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 86.6 | 1.05 | 69.0 | 1.04 | 85.3 | 0.93 | 74.2 | 1.07 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>84.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>68.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>86.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>72.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 91.6 | 1.40** | 73.2 | 1.08 | 85.5 | 1.18 | 80.1 | 1.14 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>86.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>70.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>86.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>74.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 89.2 | 1.02 | 71.3 | 0.91+ | 85.9 | 1.00 | 77.9 | 0.95 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>83.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>66.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>88.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>68.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 83.5 | 0.95 | 68.1 | 1.06 | 85.4 | 0.73** | 72.3 | 0.95 |
| Middle | 87.4 | 1.16 | 68.9 | 1.08 | 85.6 | 0.74* | 75.9 | 0.90 |
| Richer | 91.2 | 1.34+ | 72.7 | 1.33* | 85.3 | 0.85 | 81.7 | 1.16 |
| Richest | 94.6 | 1.59* | 78.1 | 1.68*** | 84.2 | 0.82 | 82.2 | 0.99 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 14.30*** | n/a | 3.86*** | n/a | 8.09*** | n/a | 2.96*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.4. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Ghana

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------|---|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 83.2 | 0.78 | 82.5 | 1.24 | 88.4 | 0.96 | 75.4 | 0.81 |
| 20 to 29 | 85.7 | 0.95 | 78.7 | 1.03 | 83.8 | 0.76+ | 75.6 | 0.84 |
| 30 to 39 | 85.2 | 0.81 | 76.0 | 0.91 | 83.3 | 0.79+ | 72.9 | 0.81* |
| 40 to 49 | <i>87.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>78.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>85.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>74.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 86.4 | 0.82 | 80.5 | 1.00 | 88.4 | 1.26 | 79.5 | 1.37+ |
| 1 or 2 | <i>85.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>78.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>84.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>76.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 85.1 | 1.05 | 77.1 | 1.04 | 83.8 | 0.95 | 72.4 | 0.87 |
| 5 + | 86.3 | 1.16 | 76.8 | 1.05 | 82.7 | 0.87 | 72.9 | 0.84 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 85.1 | 0.91 | <i>72.4</i> | 0.61*** | 82.0 | 0.86 | 69.6 | 0.76** |
| Primary | <i>84.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>81.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>84.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>76.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | <i>87.9</i> | 1.32* | 80.9 | 0.95 | 86.4 | 1.09 | 77.9 | 1.02 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>86.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>84.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 85.7 | 0.99 | <i>78.8</i> | 1.23* | 84.0 | 1.07 | 74.7 | 1.13 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>85.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>75.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>83.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 85.8 | 1.00 | 78.5 | 0.98 | 84.4 | 0.96 | 74.6 | 0.88 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>85.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>78.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>83.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>74.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 85.5 | 1.00 | 77.4 | 0.99 | 83.8 | 0.91 | 75.0 | 0.91 |
| 25 years or more | 87.9 | 1.15 | 78.3 | 1.07 | 86.9 | 1.04 | 70.9 | 0.67* |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>84.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>78.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>84.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 85.8 | 1.13 | 78.4 | 1.14 | 84.6 | 1.09 | 77.1 | 1.31** |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 87.0 | 1.21 | 76.9 | 1.03 | 82.8 | 1.02 | 72.9 | 1.07 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>84.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>75.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>83.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>72.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | <i>87.4</i> | 1.16 | <i>80.6</i> | 1.39* | <i>85.6</i> | 0.97 | <i>77.6</i> | 1.10 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>84.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>83.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | <i>88.2</i> | 1.39** | <i>79.2</i> | 1.23* | <i>84.8</i> | 1.04 | <i>75.8</i> | 1.12 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>86.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>83.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>72.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 85.5 | 0.88 | 77.0 | 0.88 | 83.0 | 0.90 | 72.1 | 0.85 |
| Middle | 82.2 | 0.71* | 79.0 | 0.82 | 81.8 | 0.76+ | 72.4 | 0.78+ |
| Richer | 85.7 | 0.84 | <i>80.1</i> | 0.72+ | 84.7 | 0.95 | 76.1 | 0.85 |
| Richest | 89.4 | 1.00 | 79.3 | 0.59* | 87.8 | 0.86 | 78.8 | 0.79 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01** | n/a | 1.00* |
| Constant | n/a | 7.47*** | n/a | 3.39*** | n/a | 5.14*** | n/a | 2.44*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.5. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Kenya

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------|---|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 86.1 | 0.85 | 77.1 | 0.93 | 83.4 | 1.04 | 62.0 | 1.09 |
| 20 to 29 | 88.7 | 0.86 | 79.2 | 0.86 | 87.4 | 1.17 | 62.4 | 1.09 |
| 30 to 39 | 88.9 | 0.95 | 78.3 | 0.88 | 87.3 | 1.17 | 58.0 | 0.90 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | <i>88.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>80.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>84.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>60.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 87.8 | 0.73 | 86.6 | 0.68* | 83.5 | 0.69* | 62.0 | 0.88 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>90.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>81.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>87.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>62.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 89.1 | 1.03 | 79.0 | 0.87 | 87.0 | 0.93 | 58.6 | 0.86+ |
| 5 + | 86.7 | 1.02 | 76.8 | 0.95 | 85.6 | 1.15 | 59.8 | 1.03 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 78.6 | 0.64*** | 65.8 | 0.56*** | 77.6 | 0.65*** | 50.9 | 0.67*** |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>89.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>79.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>86.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>62.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 92.8 | 0.99 | 85.6 | 1.11 | 91.1 | 1.19 | 61.8 | 0.96 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>87.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>76.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>85.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>57.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 89.9 | 1.12 | 81.4 | 1.17* | 87.5 | 1.03 | 63.6 | 1.24*** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>81.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>71.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>80.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>54.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 90.5 | 1.30* | 81.1 | 1.11 | 88.2 | 1.35** | 62.2 | 1.16+ |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>86.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>85.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>61.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 90.0 | 1.12 | 79.4 | 0.93 | 86.9 | 1.01 | 59.6 | 0.92 |
| 25 years or more | 90.8 | 1.03 | 85.2 | 1.07 | 90.3 | 1.17 | 61.8 | 0.93 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>89.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>81.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>87.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>61.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 88.6 | 0.95 | 79.8 | 0.98 | 87.0 | 0.92 | 61.6 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 86.7 | 0.87 | 74.9 | 0.81* | 84.1 | 0.83+ | 58.0 | 0.89 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>87.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>85.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>59.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 93.8 | 1.19 | 85.5 | 0.99 | 90.0 | 1.08 | 63.8 | 1.38** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>87.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>78.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>86.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>58.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 89.7 | 1.11 | 79.6 | 0.98 | 87.2 | 1.05 | 63.6 | 1.15* |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>83.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>83.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>60.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 84.8 | 0.87 | 72.6 | 0.72** | 84.6 | 0.83 | 61.0 | 0.93 |
| Middle | 86.4 | 0.92 | 78.1 | 0.94 | 85.8 | 0.92 | 59.7 | 0.78* |
| Richer | 92.6 | 1.49* | 82.4 | 1.02 | 87.1 | 0.91 | 56.6 | 0.65*** |
| Richest | 94.4 | 1.36 | 86.4 | 1.08 | 91.1 | 1.04 | 64.1 | 0.66** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.01+ | n/a | 1.01** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 6.23*** | n/a | 2.72*** | n/a | 4.85*** | n/a | 1.31** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.6. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Malawi

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------|---|---------|------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------|---------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 73.1 | 0.98 | 68.2 | 1.15 | 76.6 | 1.00 | 63.2 | 1.06 |
| 20 to 29 | 75.5 | 1.11 | 71.7 | 1.30** | 80.1 | 1.15 | 63.5 | 1.13 |
| 30 to 39 | 75.6 | 1.08 | 70.6 | 1.20* | 81.0 | 1.15+ | 62.0 | 1.10 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 75.4 | 1.00 | 66.6 | 1.00 | 80.2 | 1.00 | 60.5 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 71.4 | 0.78* | 65.8 | 0.81* | 72.8 | 0.69*** | 58.7 | 0.78** |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 75.8 | 1.00 | 70.5 | 1.00 | 79.2 | 1.00 | 63.9 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 74.8 | 0.94 | 70.6 | 1.04 | 80.7 | 1.03 | 63.6 | 0.98 |
| 5 + | 76.1 | 1.02 | 70.6 | 1.10 | 81.9 | 1.13 | 61.3 | 0.90 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 72.7 | 0.78*** | 67.5 | 0.79*** | 78.9 | 0.80*** | 59.8 | 0.85** |
| <i>Primary</i> | 76.2 | 1.00 | 71.2 | 1.00 | 80.5 | 1.00 | 63.6 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 79.2 | 1.22+ | 73.6 | 1.24* | 80.6 | 1.20 | 65.6 | 1.15 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 73.6 | 1.00 | 68.3 | 1.00 | 78.8 | 1.00 | 60.8 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 80.5 | 1.53*** | 75.9 | 1.50*** | 83.5 | 1.54*** | 67.9 | 1.33*** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 74.4 | 1.00 | 69.6 | 1.00 | 80.4 | 1.00 | 61.7 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 76.1 | 0.99 | 70.7 | 1.01 | 79.7 | 0.88* | 63.2 | 1.01 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 75.8 | 1.00 | 70.6 | 1.00 | 81.1 | 1.00 | 63.5 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 74.3 | 0.91+ | 69.9 | 0.93 | 78.6 | 0.88* | 61.0 | 0.87** |
| 25 years or more | 80.1 | 1.29 | 66.3 | 0.90 | 79.4 | 0.91 | 65.3 | 0.91 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 75.1 | 1.00 | 70.0 | 1.00 | 78.6 | 1.00 | 61.8 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 75.6 | 1.05 | 71.1 | 1.06 | 81.0 | 1.15* | 63.4 | 1.09+ |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 75.2 | 1.07 | 68.8 | 0.99 | 81.6 | 1.19* | 63.5 | 1.17* |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 75.6 | 1.00 | 70.8 | 1.00 | 80.9 | 1.00 | 63.7 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 73.3 | 1.08 | 66.4 | 1.08 | 74.9 | 0.92 | 55.9 | 0.76*** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 75.5 | 1.00 | 70.8 | 1.00 | 80.1 | 1.00 | 62.4 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 74.7 | 1.00 | 68.2 | 0.94 | 79.6 | 1.05 | 62.9 | 1.02 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 73.6 | 1.00 | 69.3 | 1.00 | 79.1 | 1.00 | 59.7 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 77.6 | 1.21* | 71.5 | 1.10 | 82.3 | 1.20* | 62.0 | 1.00 |
| Middle | 75.9 | 1.10 | 71.0 | 1.07 | 80.6 | 1.15 | 65.0 | 1.14+ |
| Richer | 75.6 | 1.09 | 70.6 | 1.10 | 80.6 | 1.14 | 66.8 | 1.22** |
| Richest | 73.8 | 1.01 | 68.4 | 1.00 | 77.3 | 1.13 | 59.6 | 1.07 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99 | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 4.32*** | n/a | 2.93*** | n/a | 5.03*** | n/a | 1.76*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.7. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Mali

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------|---|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 37.1 | 0.84+ | 31.9 | 1.20+ | 49.9 | 1.02 | 30.8 | 1.25* |
| 20 to 29 | 47.6 | 1.10 | 35.0 | 1.21** | 57.4 | 1.18* | 29.7 | 1.16* |
| 30 to 39 | 45.5 | 1.05 | 30.4 | 1.09 | 57.4 | 1.10 | 29.3 | 1.18** |
| 40 to 49 | <i>44.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 29.9 | <i>1.00</i> | <i>55.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 26.5 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 41.8 | 0.95 | 29.4 | 0.89 | 46.2 | 0.67*** | 28.3 | 0.91 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>44.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>34.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>57.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>30.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 48.7 | 1.08 | 34.1 | 0.98 | 58.9 | 1.02 | 30.5 | 1.05 |
| 5 + | 44.5 | 1.04 | 30.3 | 0.97 | 56.2 | 1.03 | 27.8 | 0.95 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 43.6 | 0.72*** | 31.7 | 0.84* | 55.7 | 0.83** | 29.0 | 0.91 |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>51.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>35.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>57.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>28.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 58.2 | 1.15 | 34.8 | 1.01 | 61.1 | 1.11 | 30.2 | 1.39** |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>45.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 29.2 | <i>1.00</i> | <i>60.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 28.2 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 45.1 | 0.92+ | 35.5 | 1.19*** | 51.4 | 0.80*** | 30.1 | 1.12** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>42.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>30.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>57.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 29.2 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 46.6 | 1.21*** | 32.9 | 1.23*** | 55.6 | 1.04 | 29.0 | 1.16** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>43.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 32.8 | <i>1.00</i> | <i>54.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 30.0 | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 49.6 | 1.16** | 30.3 | 0.89* | 59.8 | 1.25*** | 26.7 | 0.87** |
| 25 years or more | 55.0 | 1.40** | 32.9 | 1.07 | 58.8 | 1.42** | 28.3 | 0.91 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>50.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 32.9 | <i>1.00</i> | 61.7 | <i>1.00</i> | 29.2 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 44.4 | 0.86* | 32.4 | 0.98 | 55.3 | 0.81** | 28.2 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 44.4 | 0.89+ | 31.9 | 1.07 | 55.2 | 0.86* | 29.6 | 1.08 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>44.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 31.8 | <i>1.00</i> | <i>56.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 29.6 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 48.5 | 1.54*** | 33.5 | 1.58*** | 55.5 | 1.21* | 27.5 | 1.48*** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>45.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 32.4 | <i>1.00</i> | <i>57.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 29.6 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 45.3 | 0.95 | 31.6 | 0.95 | 51.7 | 0.82*** | 27.2 | 0.88* |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>45.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 36.6 | <i>1.00</i> | <i>53.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 34.1 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 43.7 | 0.91 | 31.8 | 0.80*** | 59.6 | 1.11+ | 30.0 | 0.81** |
| Middle | 44.4 | 0.96 | 29.5 | 0.72*** | 57.0 | 1.04 | 28.4 | 0.76*** |
| Richer | 44.2 | 0.98 | 31.3 | 0.70*** | 57.2 | 1.12+ | 26.1 | 0.70*** |
| Richest | 48.9 | 0.87 | 31.4 | 0.61*** | 53.4 | 0.88 | 26.3 | 0.69*** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 1.00** | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 0.99*** |
| Constant | n/a | 1.42*** | n/a | 0.65*** | n/a | 1.60*** | n/a | 0.63*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.8. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Mozambique

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------|---|---------|------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------|---------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 79.5 | 1.02 | 51.7 | 1.13 | 80.9 | 1.06 | 59.5 | 1.06 |
| 20 to 29 | 80.8 | 0.99 | 52.9 | 1.07 | 87.2 | 1.10 | 63.8 | 1.04 |
| 30 to 39 | <i>77.9</i> | 0.82* | 50.4 | 0.94 | 85.7 | 0.86 | 62.2 | 0.97 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>81.9</i> | 1.00 | <i>52.4</i> | 1.00 | <i>88.7</i> | 1.00 | <i>63.3</i> | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | <i>75.4</i> | 0.83+ | <i>46.9</i> | 0.82* | <i>70.3</i> | 0.40*** | <i>55.4</i> | 0.79** |
| 1 or 2 | <i>81.1</i> | 1.00 | <i>54.0</i> | 1.00 | <i>87.8</i> | 1.00 | <i>65.0</i> | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 81.3 | 1.15 | 53.6 | 1.08 | 88.5 | 1.19+ | 63.2 | 1.04 |
| 5 + | 79.3 | 1.14 | 50.1 | 1.05 | 87.6 | 1.23+ | 62.3 | 1.02 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | <i>76.9</i> | 0.78*** | <i>49.0</i> | 0.92+ | 85.8 | 1.00 | <i>60.4</i> | 0.92 |
| Primary | <i>82.4</i> | 1.00 | <i>53.5</i> | 1.00 | <i>86.7</i> | 1.00 | <i>64.1</i> | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | <i>88.1</i> | 1.76** | <i>66.9</i> | 1.61*** | 87.6 | 1.37+ | <i>74.1</i> | 1.60*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | <i>78.8</i> | 1.00 | <i>50.3</i> | 1.00 | <i>85.9</i> | 1.00 | <i>61.1</i> | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | <i>85.5</i> | 1.41*** | <i>59.2</i> | 1.25*** | <i>88.0</i> | 1.06 | <i>70.2</i> | 1.31*** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | <i>76.5</i> | 1.00 | <i>48.7</i> | 1.00 | <i>84.9</i> | 1.00 | <i>61.4</i> | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | <i>83.8</i> | 1.29*** | <i>55.3</i> | 1.20*** | <i>87.9</i> | 1.31*** | <i>64.2</i> | 1.06 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | <i>79.2</i> | 1.00 | <i>50.5</i> | 1.00 | <i>85.6</i> | 1.00 | <i>61.8</i> | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | <i>81.7</i> | 1.13+ | <i>54.2</i> | 1.08 | <i>87.7</i> | 1.24** | <i>64.7</i> | 1.05 |
| 25 years or more | 79.6 | 1.19 | 53.6 | 1.11 | 86.4 | 1.16 | 61.4 | 0.89 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | <i>81.3</i> | 1.00 | <i>55.6</i> | 1.00 | <i>86.2</i> | 1.00 | <i>64.9</i> | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 79.4 | 1.03 | <i>50.8</i> | 0.88* | 86.0 | 1.18* | 62.5 | 0.97 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | <i>78.6</i> | 0.97 | <i>46.5</i> | 0.77*** | 86.9 | 1.16+ | <i>59.1</i> | 0.84** |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | <i>79.2</i> | 1.00 | <i>51.1</i> | 1.00 | <i>87.0</i> | 1.00 | <i>62.6</i> | 1.00 |
| Urban | <i>82.1</i> | 0.91 | <i>53.9</i> | 1.08 | <i>84.6</i> | 0.89 | 63.0 | 0.99 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | <i>78.7</i> | 1.00 | <i>52.0</i> | 1.00 | <i>86.6</i> | 1.00 | <i>63.2</i> | 1.00 |
| Extended | <i>82.3</i> | 1.11 | 51.6 | 0.90* | 85.9 | 1.03 | 61.9 | 0.89* |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | <i>76.4</i> | 1.00 | <i>50.7</i> | 1.00 | <i>84.8</i> | 1.00 | <i>62.9</i> | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 77.8 | 0.90 | 50.9 | 0.99 | 86.6 | 1.18 | 62.0 | 0.92 |
| Middle | 79.1 | 1.10 | 50.3 | 0.95 | 86.5 | 1.09 | 59.1 | 0.87+ |
| Richer | <i>83.2</i> | 1.35** | 50.5 | 0.90 | 87.3 | 1.40** | 63.8 | 0.98 |
| Richest | <i>86.1</i> | 1.40* | <i>58.1</i> | 1.05 | 87.0 | 1.37+ | 66.8 | 1.00 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.01+ | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 7.64*** | n/a | 1.43*** | n/a | 8.93*** | n/a | 2.15*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different (p>0.05) from the value for the reference category.

+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.9. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Nigeria

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------|---|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 84.6 | 0.93 | 71.6 | 1.27 | 62.1 | 1.01 | 40.1 | 0.70 * |
| 20 to 29 | 86.2 | 1.04 | 71.0 | 1.15 | 71.6 | 1.23 * | 54.6 | 0.97 |
| 30 to 39 | 86.4 | 0.98 | 70.9 | 1.06 | 69.5 | 0.97 | 53.9 | 0.92 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>85.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>70.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>54.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 83.4 | 0.97 | 68.6 | 0.90 | 63.4 | 0.89 | 44.7 | 0.84 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>87.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>71.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>71.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>56.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 87.0 | 0.93 | 71.3 | 0.96 | 71.8 | 0.97 | 54.0 | 0.93 |
| 5 + | 85.0 | 0.87 | 70.1 | 0.93 | 68.5 | 0.99 | 51.4 | 0.85 + |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 84.1 | 0.90 | 70.1 | 0.87 | 66.4 | 0.81 * | 44.3 | 0.63 *** |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>85.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>70.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>71.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>60.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 90.6 | 1.31 + | 71.7 | 1.11 | 75.6 | 1.06 | 65.0 | 1.06 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>84.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>65.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>64.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>46.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 87.6 | 1.16 + | 74.2 | 1.46 *** | 73.3 | 1.38 *** | 58.0 | 1.43 *** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>82.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>67.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>50.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 88.1 | 1.36 *** | 72.6 | 1.28 *** | 69.8 | 1.01 | 53.9 | 1.01 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>85.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>71.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>66.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>48.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 87.5 | 0.80 * | 69.9 | 0.85 * | 76.0 | 1.20 * | 61.4 | 1.15 + |
| 25 years or more | 87.6 | 0.50 *** | 64.7 | 0.61 *** | 74.3 | 0.93 | 63.4 | 0.97 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>86.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>68.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>70.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>58.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 87.7 | 1.17 | 71.1 | 1.01 | 71.7 | 1.05 | 56.3 | 0.94 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 84.9 | 0.97 | 70.8 | 0.97 | 68.2 | 1.00 | 49.2 | 0.84 + |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>84.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>68.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>50.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 90.0 | 0.85 | 72.1 | 0.94 | 73.6 | 0.97 | 57.4 | 0.95 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>85.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>70.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>53.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 87.3 | 1.19 + | 69.8 | 0.95 | 69.4 | 0.96 | 51.4 | 0.98 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>82.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>68.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>71.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>52.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 85.1 | 1.11 | 71.9 | 1.18 + | 68.3 | 0.74 ** | 47.9 | 0.74 *** |
| Middle | 83.9 | 1.07 | 72.0 | 1.07 | 63.8 | 0.56 *** | 46.2 | 0.63 *** |
| Richer | 90.4 | 1.18 | 71.4 | 0.87 | 71.5 | 0.59 *** | 56.9 | 0.66 *** |
| Richest | 89.4 | 0.89 | 69.2 | 0.68 * | 74.4 | 0.45 *** | 62.0 | 0.50 *** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01 *** | n/a | 1.01 *** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.01 *** | n/a | 1.01 ** | n/a | 1.00 * | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 4.24 *** | n/a | 1.76 *** | n/a | 1.52 *** | n/a | 0.86 + |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.10. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing her husband sex for specified reason by background characteristics and the odds ratios estimated using multivariable logistic regression: Rwanda

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------|---|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 91.9 | 3.59 ** | 69.2 | 1.21 | 73.8 | 1.58 + | 54.1 | 0.91 |
| 20 to 29 | 89.7 | 1.43 + | 70.2 | 1.27 + | 78.2 | 1.49 ** | 59.2 | 1.02 |
| 30 to 39 | 88.8 | 1.24 | 68.7 | 1.06 | 78.4 | 1.31 * | 59.1 | 1.05 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | <i>88.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>67.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>55.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 88.9 | 0.80 | 73.5 | 1.10 | 70.2 | 0.67 * | 58.3 | 0.96 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>89.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>58.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 88.8 | 1.00 | 69.1 | 1.03 | 78.8 | 1.16 | 60.8 | 1.08 |
| 5 + | 89.1 | 1.17 | 68.1 | 1.14 | 77.0 | 1.29 + | 56.3 | 0.92 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 89.8 | 1.20 | 65.3 | 0.78 ** | 75.4 | 0.87 | 55.1 | 0.86 * |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>88.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>70.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>59.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 89.5 | 0.92 | 72.9 | 1.06 | 80.1 | 0.97 | 60.9 | 0.78 + |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>89.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>68.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>75.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>57.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 90.8 | 1.10 | 77.1 | 1.45 *** | 82.1 | 1.43 ** | 65.8 | 1.34 ** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>87.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>67.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>75.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>56.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 91.0 | 1.98 *** | 71.3 | 1.36 *** | 79.4 | 1.32 ** | 60.5 | 1.13 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>89.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>67.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>78.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>56.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 89.4 | 1.12 | 69.3 | 1.02 | 76.9 | 0.92 | 58.6 | 0.97 |
| 25 years or more | 87.7 | 1.42 | 69.8 | 1.06 | 76.5 | 1.00 | 58.6 | 1.00 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>89.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>76.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>57.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 88.9 | 1.04 | 69.0 | 1.02 | 77.2 | 0.98 | 57.6 | 1.01 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 90.0 | 1.05 | 67.6 | 0.98 | 78.5 | 1.00 | 60.4 | 1.10 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>89.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>76.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>57.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 86.5 | 0.44 *** | 64.9 | 0.51 *** | 78.9 | 0.91 | 61.0 | 0.77 + |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>89.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>68.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>57.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 89.3 | 1.10 | 71.2 | 1.05 | 77.5 | 0.92 | 60.1 | 0.98 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>88.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>72.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>79.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>61.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 90.2 | 1.11 | 68.0 | 0.76 * | 74.7 | 0.72 * | 54.1 | 0.76 * |
| Middle | 88.7 | 0.85 | 67.9 | 0.71 ** | 77.0 | 0.74 * | 57.6 | 0.86 |
| Richer | 89.0 | 0.73 + | 68.3 | 0.62 *** | 76.8 | 0.68 ** | 57.4 | 0.77 * |
| Richest | 89.4 | 0.93 | 69.6 | 0.71 * | 79.3 | 0.77 | 62.5 | 0.86 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.01 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01 | n/a | 1.01 *** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.99 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 9.17 *** | n/a | 2.21 *** | n/a | 3.39 *** | n/a | 1.25 * |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different (p>0.05) from the value for the reference category.

+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.11. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Uganda

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------|---|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 89.3 | 0.95 | 76.2 | 1.39+ | 90.8 | 1.52 | 81.5 | 1.34 |
| 20 to 29 | 91.8 | 0.96 | 75.5 | 1.03 | 90.8 | 0.99 | 80.2 | 0.98 |
| 30 to 39 | 92.1 | 0.94 | 76.6 | 1.03 | 90.7 | 1.00 | 82.6 | 1.17 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>92.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>75.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>89.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 87.4 | 0.68+ | 72.2 | 0.81 | 88.3 | 0.74 | 79.5 | 0.80 |
| 1 or 2 | <i>91.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>74.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>90.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>79.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 92.1 | 1.14 | 77.4 | 1.26* | 91.2 | 1.14 | 82.8 | 1.18 |
| 5 + | 92.5 | 1.19 | 76.3 | 1.20+ | 90.4 | 1.07 | 80.4 | 1.05 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 89.8 | 0.85 | 69.6 | 0.78** | 87.9 | 0.82+ | 73.4 | 0.68*** |
| Primary | <i>91.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>90.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>82.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 94.7 | 1.00 | 81.5 | 1.10 | 95.1 | 1.02 | 87.0 | 1.02 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | <i>88.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>75.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>88.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 95.0 | 2.35*** | 76.2 | 1.00 | 92.6 | 1.31** | 84.0 | 1.30*** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | <i>90.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>87.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 92.8 | 1.09 | 78.4 | 1.05 | 93.1 | 1.47*** | 83.8 | 1.21* |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | <i>90.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>75.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>89.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>80.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 93.1 | 1.20 | 76.4 | 1.03 | 91.7 | 1.15 | 81.1 | 0.95 |
| 25 years or more | 94.5 | 1.32 | 80.1 | 1.32 | 92.5 | 1.21 | 82.2 | 1.00 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | <i>92.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>76.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>91.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>81.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 90.8 | 0.80+ | 77.9 | 1.03 | 89.8 | 0.89 | 80.3 | 0.97 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 91.3 | 0.84 | 72.2 | 0.80** | 90.9 | 0.99 | 81.0 | 0.93 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | <i>91.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>75.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>89.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>79.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 93.4 | 0.69+ | 78.8 | 0.72** | 95.0 | 0.70+ | 85.7 | 0.63*** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | <i>91.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>75.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>90.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>79.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 92.9 | 1.12 | 76.6 | 0.96 | 91.7 | 1.09 | 83.5 | 1.05 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | <i>90.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>69.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>88.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 89.9 | 0.92 | 75.0 | 1.22+ | 87.3 | 0.79 | 77.5 | 0.91 |
| Middle | 92.6 | 1.22 | 76.9 | 1.35* | 90.8 | 1.07 | 80.2 | 1.03 |
| Richer | 92.0 | 1.23 | 78.3 | 1.56*** | 91.7 | 1.26 | 82.6 | 1.24+ |
| Richest | 94.5 | 1.46 | 80.7 | 1.55** | 95.4 | 1.67* | 86.6 | 1.69** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.01+ | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.02*** | n/a | 1.01** |
| Constant | n/a | 10.35*** | n/a | 2.29*** | n/a | 8.10*** | n/a | 2.86*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different (p>0.05) from the value for the reference category.

+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.12. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Zambia

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------|---|---------|------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------|---------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 81.5 | 0.59* | 68.7 | 0.95 | 89.7 | 1.22 | 64.6 | 0.84 |
| 20 to 29 | 87.7 | 0.90 | 74.7 | 1.13 | 92.1 | 1.23 | 68.9 | 0.93 |
| 30 to 39 | 89.1 | 1.09 | 75.6 | 1.20+ | 92.9 | 1.19 | 71.3 | 1.05 |
| 40 to 49 | 87.5 | 1.00 | 71.3 | 1.00 | 92.0 | 1.00 | 69.5 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 85.4 | 0.98 | 72.5 | 1.08 | 87.0 | 0.53** | 94.9 | 0.92 |
| 1 or 2 | 87.3 | 1.00 | 72.4 | 1.00 | 92.2 | 1.00 | 68.1 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 88.0 | 1.00 | 76.3 | 1.14 | 92.6 | 1.03 | 70.8 | 1.04 |
| 5 + | 87.7 | 0.93 | 73.5 | 1.07 | 92.6 | 1.18 | 70.1 | 1.01 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 82.5 | 0.72** | 67.3 | 0.76** | 90.6 | 0.84 | 65.6 | 0.79* |
| Primary | 87.3 | 1.00 | 73.9 | 1.00 | 92.1 | 1.00 | 69.6 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 91.0 | 1.30+ | 77.6 | 1.02 | 92.9 | 1.10 | 70.8 | 0.99 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 85.9 | 1.00 | 72.4 | 1.00 | 91.0 | 1.00 | 68.0 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 90.4 | 1.41*** | 76.5 | 1.14+ | 94.0 | 1.59*** | 71.6 | 1.19** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 85.1 | 1.00 | 71.3 | 1.00 | 90.9 | 1.00 | 68.4 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 90.2 | 1.12 | 76.8 | 1.11 | 93.5 | 1.21 | 70.3 | 1.08 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 86.8 | 1.00 | 73.0 | 1.00 | 92.0 | 1.00 | 69.3 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 88.6 | 1.04 | 75.1 | 1.03 | 92.2 | 1.02 | 68.8 | 0.97 |
| 25 years or more | 85.9 | 0.73 | 73.2 | 0.82 | 92.6 | 0.99 | 76.5 | 1.42+ |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 88.1 | 1.00 | 73.4 | 1.00 | 92.1 | 1.00 | 70.0 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 87.2 | 0.91 | 74.9 | 1.05 | 92.0 | 0.94 | 70.0 | 0.99 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 87.2 | 0.87 | 72.7 | 0.96 | 92.6 | 1.02 | 67.5 | 0.86+ |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 86.6 | 1.00 | 72.2 | 1.00 | 92.2 | 1.00 | 70.1 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 89.1 | 0.72+ | 76.9 | 0.97 | 91.8 | 0.55** | 67.8 | 0.77* |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 86.5 | 1.00 | 73.3 | 1.00 | 91.8 | 1.00 | 68.6 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 89.1 | 1.01 | 74.7 | 0.98 | 92.6 | 1.12 | 70.4 | 1.07 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 82.8 | 1.00 | 69.7 | 1.00 | 90.6 | 1.00 | 70.1 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 86.3 | 1.22 | 72.3 | 1.09 | 92.5 | 1.24 | 68.7 | 0.92 |
| Middle | 86.6 | 1.16 | 73.0 | 0.95 | 91.7 | 1.12 | 70.1 | 0.91 |
| Richer | 89.2 | 1.55* | 75.8 | 1.00 | 91.1 | 1.06 | 67.8 | 0.83 |
| Richest | 92.0 | 2.38** | 78.2 | 0.98 | 94.2 | 1.55 | 70.2 | 0.91 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01+ | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 6.81*** | n/a | 2.28*** | n/a | 10.74*** | n/a | 2.16*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.13. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Zimbabwe

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----|---|---------|------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------|---------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | n/a | n/a | 58.3 | 0.86 | 81.2 | 0.93 | 55.4 | 1.04 |
| 20 to 29 | n/a | n/a | 63.2 | 1.07 | 84.3 | 0.90 | 53.0 | 0.92 |
| 30 to 39 | n/a | n/a | 63.3 | 1.18 | 85.2 | 0.84 | 50.0 | 0.92 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | n/a | n/a | 56.7 | 1.00 | 85.8 | 1.00 | 47.8 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | n/a | n/a | 61.2 | 0.81 | 79.8 | 0.67* | 53.0 | 0.79+ |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | n/a | n/a | 65.5 | 1.00 | 84.7 | 1.00 | 56.4 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | n/a | n/a | 58.8 | 0.81* | 84.6 | 1.13 | 48.7 | 0.80* |
| 5 + | n/a | n/a | 58.1 | 0.96 | 86.0 | 1.29 | 45.9 | 0.71** |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | n/a | n/a | 47.1 | 0.64*** | 82.3 | 0.80 | 48.1 | 1.04 |
| <i>Primary</i> | n/a | n/a | 58.2 | 1.00 | 83.5 | 1.00 | 47.1 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | n/a | n/a | 68.0 | 1.25* | 86.0 | 1.16 | 56.6 | 1.19* |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | n/a | n/a | 62.1 | 1.00 | 84.5 | 1.00 | 51.9 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | n/a | n/a | 61.3 | 0.87+ | 84.6 | 0.95 | 51.4 | 0.92 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | n/a | n/a | 57.5 | 1.00 | 83.5 | 1.00 | 46.7 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | n/a | n/a | 64.7 | 1.05 | 85.3 | 1.14 | 55.2 | 1.10 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | n/a | n/a | 58.3 | 1.00 | 82.1 | 1.00 | 49.6 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | n/a | n/a | 63.4 | 1.10 | 85.9 | 1.45** | 52.4 | 1.03 |
| 25 years or more | n/a | n/a | 67.6 | 1.27 | 88.7 | 1.97** | 58.1 | 1.24 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | n/a | n/a | 64.9 | 1.00 | 85.9 | 1.00 | 53.2 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | n/a | n/a | 61.1 | 0.90 | 85.6 | 1.01 | 51.8 | 0.95 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | n/a | n/a | 60.2 | 0.96 | 82.4 | 0.76* | 49.8 | 0.96 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | n/a | n/a | 58.4 | 1.00 | 84.6 | 1.00 | 49.0 | 1.00 |
| Urban | n/a | n/a | 67.3 | 1.14 | 84.5 | 1.15 | 56.2 | 1.18 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | n/a | n/a | 60.2 | 1.00 | 83.3 | 1.00 | 51.1 | 1.00 |
| Extended | n/a | n/a | 64.4 | 1.24** | 86.9 | 1.23+ | 52.6 | 1.07 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | n/a | n/a | 57.4 | 1.00 | 85.3 | 1.00 | 44.5 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | n/a | n/a | 57.3 | 0.93 | 85.2 | 0.92 | 48.4 | 1.09 |
| Middle | n/a | n/a | 59.4 | 1.00 | 86.0 | 0.92 | 52.0 | 1.26* |
| Richer | n/a | n/a | 60.8 | 1.01 | 79.9 | 0.58** | 53.0 | 1.18 |
| Richest | n/a | n/a | 71.7 | 1.33 | 87.2 | 0.74 | 58.5 | 1.43+ |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99+ | n/a | 0.99*** |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.94*** | n/a | 8.21*** | n/a | 1.83*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.14. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Armenia

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|----------|---|----------|------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|--------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 84.8 | 0.67 | 82.7 | 1.27 | 74.5 | 0.62+ | 94.6 | 0.79 |
| 20 to 29 | 91.7 | 0.83 | 86.0 | 0.95 | 87.3 | 1.13 | 68.2 | 0.82+ |
| 30 to 39 | 93.4 | 1.00 | 86.0 | 0.99 | 86.4 | 0.93 | 71.5 | 0.89 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | 93.7 | 1.00 | 85.7 | 1.00 | 87.6 | 1.00 | 73.9 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 87.9 | 0.67 | 80.0 | 0.67* | 79.0 | 0.60** | 62.1 | 0.73* |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | 94.1 | 1.00 | 87.3 | 1.00 | 88.3 | 1.00 | 71.6 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 92.2 | 0.80 | 85.1 | 0.87 | 86.2 | 0.84 | 72.0 | 0.93 |
| 5 + | 90.1 | 0.88 | 81.1 | 0.77 | 82.9 | 0.84 | 69.6 | 1.01 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| <i>None or primary</i> | 84.1 | 1.00 | 76.4 | 1.00 | 78.3 | 1.00 | 64.4 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 93.5 | 1.73** | 86.5 | 1.77*** | 87.4 | 1.41* | 71.7 | 1.25 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | 92.2 | 1.00 | 85.5 | 1.00 | 86.1 | 1.00 | 70.8 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 95.0 | 1.22 | 86.9 | 0.98 | 89.0 | 1.07 | 72.5 | 0.98 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | 87.2 | 1.00 | 82.1 | 1.00 | 80.7 | 1.00 | 63.0 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 93.4 | 1.54* | 86.2 | 1.18 | 87.4 | 1.37* | 72.0 | 1.43** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | 89.6 | 1.00 | 84.0 | 1.00 | 83.2 | 1.00 | 68.6 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 93.6 | 1.31+ | 86.4 | 1.18 | 87.8 | 1.35* | 71.9 | 1.16 |
| 25 years or more | 94.5 | 1.35 | 85.3 | 1.07 | 86.8 | 1.30 | 71.6 | 1.17 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | 93.1 | 1.00 | 85.5 | 1.00 | 87.4 | 1.00 | 70.7 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 92.3 | 1.04 | 86.2 | 1.13 | 85.8 | 1.00 | 71.8 | 1.13 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 93.2 | 1.32 | 85.9 | 1.12 | 86.4 | 1.12 | 72.5 | 1.24 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | 91.1 | 1.00 | 85.0 | 1.00 | 86.4 | 1.00 | 72.9 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 94.1 | 0.99 | 86.4 | 1.06 | 87.1 | 0.80+ | 69.9 | 0.71** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | 93.6 | 1.00 | 86.1 | 1.00 | 88.5 | 1.00 | 74.4 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 92.2 | 0.97 | 85.5 | 0.97 | 85.4 | 0.78* | 68.6 | 0.78** |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | 89.6 | 1.00 | 84.9 | 1.00 | 85.3 | 1.00 | 72.5 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 91.5 | 1.13 | 84.7 | 0.91 | 86.0 | 1.00 | 70.5 | 0.94 |
| Middle | 93.1 | 1.29 | 85.1 | 0.88 | 85.5 | 0.98 | 70.5 | 1.05 |
| Richer | 93.3 | 1.26 | 87.0 | 0.92 | 86.4 | 1.01 | 67.7 | 0.91 |
| Richest | 96.4 | 2.15** | 87.0 | 0.96 | 90.3 | 1.33 | 74.7 | 1.27 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01 | n/a | 1.01+ |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.98*** | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 0.99* |
| Constant | n/a | 56.19*** | n/a | 13.95*** | n/a | 5.68** | n/a | 2.06+ |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.15. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Jordan

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------|---|-----|------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------|--------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 89.0 | 0.40* | n/a | n/a | 93.5 | 0.57 | 65.4 | 1.00 |
| 20 to 29 | 93.4 | 0.56** | n/a | n/a | 95.1 | 0.51** | 67.8 | 0.90 |
| 30 to 39 | 96.0 | 1.10 | n/a | n/a | 95.7 | 0.73+ | 69.7 | 1.02 |
| 40 to 49 | 93.7 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 95.3 | 1.00 | 98.9 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 92.3 | 0.98 | n/a | n/a | 93.2 | 0.78 | 61.8 | 0.83 |
| 1 or 2 | 94.9 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 95.9 | 1.00 | 69.7 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 95.6 | 0.98 | n/a | n/a | 95.6 | 0.84 | 70.6 | 1.03 |
| 5 + | 93.7 | 0.80 | n/a | n/a | 95.2 | 0.75 | 68.2 | 0.97 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 79.9 | 0.35*** | n/a | n/a | 87.0 | 0.45*** | 61.7 | 0.69** |
| Primary | 90.9 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 91.8 | 1.00 | 65.7 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 95.9 | 2.27*** | n/a | n/a | 96.4 | 2.18*** | 69.7 | 1.09 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 94.2 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 95.2 | 1.00 | 68.6 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 96.9 | 1.39 | n/a | n/a | 96.2 | 0.95 | 70.3 | 1.12 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 93.1 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 94.0 | 1.00 | 68.5 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 94.6 | 1.16 | n/a | n/a | 95.5 | 1.38+ | 68.8 | 1.00 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 92.5 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 95.3 | 1.00 | 68.7 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 95.1 | 1.08 | n/a | n/a | 95.5 | 0.92 | 68.7 | 0.94 |
| 25 years or more | 95.2 | 0.94 | n/a | n/a | 94.6 | 0.70 | 69.1 | 0.93 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 93.8 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 95.1 | 1.00 | 69.1 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 95.2 | 1.17 | n/a | n/a | 96.0 | 1.14 | 67.2 | 0.94 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 94.5 | 1.15 | n/a | n/a | 94.6 | 0.82 | 71.0 | 1.10 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 92.7 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 94.7 | 1.00 | 69.1 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 94.9 | 0.99 | n/a | n/a | 95.5 | 0.94 | 68.7 | 0.92 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 94.7 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 95.6 | 1.00 | 69.1 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 93.0 | 0.69* | n/a | n/a | 93.9 | 0.67* | 67.0 | 0.94 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 90.3 | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | 94.3 | 1.00 | 65.7 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 94.3 | 1.22 | n/a | n/a | 95.3 | 1.01 | 68.7 | 1.12 |
| Middle | 95.9 | 1.60** | n/a | n/a | 96.0 | 1.33 | 67.9 | 1.11 |
| Richer | 95.4 | 1.45+ | n/a | n/a | 94.6 | 1.09 | 70.1 | 1.26* |
| Richest | 96.8 | 1.67* | n/a | n/a | 96.6 | 1.13 | 72.0 | 1.23+ |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1.01 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 6.54*** | n/a | n/a | n/a | 5.53*** | n/a | 1.62* |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.16. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Morocco

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----------|---|----------|------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------|----------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 94.8 | 0.89 | 89.3 | 0.85 | 39.3 | 1.08 | 55.5 | 0.89 |
| 20 to 29 | 95.3 | 0.96 | 92.2 | 1.15 | 39.4 | 1.04 | 58.6 | 0.93 |
| 30 to 39 | 94.6 | 1.08 | 91.0 | 1.01 | 38.8 | 1.03 | 59.8 | 0.95 |
| 40 to 49 | 93.1 | 1.00 | 89.6 | 1.00 | 37.1 | 1.00 | 58.3 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 95.7 | 1.20 | 91.5 | 1.00 | 39.2 | 0.91 | 57.5 | 0.87 + |
| 1 or 2 | 95.7 | 1.00 | 92.6 | 1.00 | 40.1 | 1.00 | 61.1 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 95.0 | 0.98 | 92.4 | 1.06 | 39.0 | 1.02 | 60.8 | 1.02 |
| 5 + | 91.3 | 0.64 ** | 86.9 | 0.73 * | 35.6 | 0.94 | 54.3 | 0.83 * |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 92.7 | 0.54 *** | 88.9 | 0.70 ** | 36.8 | 0.92 | 55.7 | 0.75 *** |
| Primary | 96.6 | 1.00 | 93.5 | 1.00 | 39.1 | 1.00 | 63.8 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 97.5 | 1.18 | 94.8 | 1.10 | 43.4 | 1.05 | 64.4 | 0.94 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 94.2 | 1.00 | 90.6 | 1.00 | 37.7 | 1.00 | 58.2 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 95.3 | 0.82 | 92.9 | 0.95 | 44.3 | 1.28 ** | 62.8 | 1.01 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 89.2 | 1.00 | 83.9 | 1.00 | 33.8 | 1.00 | 48.8 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 95.2 | 1.67 *** | 92.1 | 1.75 *** | 39.3 | 1.35 *** | 60.5 | 1.46 *** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 93.2 | 1.00 | 89.1 | 1.00 | 37.2 | 1.00 | 56.7 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 94.9 | 1.05 | 91.4 | 1.08 | 39.4 | 1.07 | 58.8 | 1.01 |
| 25 years or more | 95.1 | 0.79 | 93.5 | 1.13 | 38.6 | 0.95 | 64.0 | 1.12 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 94.1 | 1.00 | 90.6 | 1.00 | 36.7 | 1.00 | 58.0 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 94.5 | 0.90 | 91.0 | 0.96 | 37.9 | 1.01 | 59.0 | 1.05 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 94.4 | 0.96 | 91.0 | 0.99 | 41.5 | 1.21 *** | 59.7 | 1.10 + |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 92.3 | 1.00 | 88.0 | 1.00 | 36.5 | 1.00 | 54.2 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 95.9 | 1.45 * | 93.0 | 1.42 ** | 39.9 | 1.25 ** | 62.2 | 1.25 ** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 94.0 | 1.00 | 91.3 | 1.00 | 37.8 | 1.00 | 59.6 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 94.7 | 1.09 | 90.2 | 0.86 + | 39.4 | 1.12 * | 57.5 | 0.96 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 91.3 | 1.00 | 87.2 | 1.00 | 38.0 | 1.00 | 53.2 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 93.7 | 0.87 | 89.6 | 0.93 | 38.0 | 0.84 * | 56.8 | 0.92 |
| Middle | 94.6 | 0.67 * | 91.0 | 0.79 | 36.1 | 0.64 *** | 59.4 | 0.84 + |
| Richer | 95.9 | 0.63 + | 92.6 | 0.80 | 38.1 | 0.55 *** | 61.6 | 0.78 * |
| Richest | 96.0 | 0.46 ** | 93.7 | 0.72 | 41.9 | 0.52 *** | 62.5 | 0.69 ** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 ** | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.01 * | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 10.30 *** | n/a | 8.18 *** | n/a | 0.48 *** | n/a | 1.24 + |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different (p>0.05) from the value for the reference category.

+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.17. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Cambodia

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|----------|---|----------|------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------|----------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 63.6 | 0.77 | 65.4 | 0.80 | 67.6 | 0.79 | 66.4 | 0.83 |
| 20 to 29 | 66.2 | 0.97 | 64.0 | 0.85 | 66.9 | 0.85 | 63.7 | 0.84 |
| 30 to 39 | 70.9 | 1.16 | 70.1 | 1.07 | 72.8 | 1.13 | 71.2 | 1.14 |
| 40 to 49 | 69.3 | 1.00 | 68.6 | 1.00 | 72.2 | 1.00 | 69.6 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 69.3 | 1.30 | 68.6 | 1.13 | 71.2 | 1.12 | 70.6 | 1.17 |
| 1 or 2 | 65.8 | 1.00 | 65.3 | 1.00 | 69.3 | 1.00 | 66.7 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 68.8 | 1.03 | 67.9 | 1.01 | 69.1 | 0.91 | 66.8 | 0.90 |
| 5 + | 70.9 | 1.05 | 69.5 | 0.98 | 73.3 | 0.99 | 70.8 | 1.01 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 69.0 | 0.94 | 68.5 | 0.95 | 71.3 | 0.91 | 68.5 | 0.95 |
| Primary | 68.2 | 1.00 | 66.9 | 1.00 | 69.8 | 1.00 | 67.6 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 71.4 | 0.90 | 69.7 | 0.90 | 73.9 | 0.92 | 72.2 | 0.92 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 66.5 | 1.00 | 65.1 | 1.00 | 68.4 | 1.00 | 65.9 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 72.6 | 1.21 + | 72.4 | 1.30 ** | 75.0 | 1.29 * | 72.9 | 1.27 * |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 63.9 | 1.00 | 64.7 | 1.00 | 68.0 | 1.00 | 64.5 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 71.2 | 1.47 *** | 69.3 | 1.32 ** | 72.3 | 1.29 * | 70.5 | 1.41 ** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 69.1 | 1.00 | 67.9 | 1.00 | 71.2 | 1.00 | 68.7 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 69.2 | 0.91 | 68.1 | 0.91 | 70.4 | 0.87 | 68.5 | 0.91 |
| 25 years or more | 64.9 | 0.62 * | 65.1 | 0.66 * | 71.7 | 0.74 | 67.5 | 0.77 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 69.2 | 1.00 | 67.9 | 1.00 | 70.7 | 1.00 | 68.8 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 69.9 | 0.89 | 69.7 | 0.95 | 72.3 | 0.96 | 70.0 | 0.89 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 63.5 | 0.74 + | 62.5 | 0.75 + | 68.8 | 0.87 | 62.3 | 0.72 * |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 67.5 | 1.00 | 66.3 | 1.00 | 69.3 | 1.00 | 66.8 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 76.1 | 0.91 | 76.0 | 1.02 | 79.4 | 0.96 | 77.5 | 0.94 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 67.1 | 1.00 | 66.3 | 1.00 | 69.0 | 1.00 | 66.5 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 72.2 | 1.02 | 70.8 | 1.01 | 74.5 | 1.05 | 72.4 | 1.06 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 66.1 | 1.00 | 67.0 | 1.00 | 67.3 | 1.00 | 65.5 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 66.9 | 1.26 + | 66.7 | 1.21 | 68.4 | 1.27 + | 65.0 | 1.14 |
| Middle | 70.0 | 1.39 * | 67.6 | 1.23 | 73.7 | 1.63 ** | 70.0 | 1.40 * |
| Richer | 67.6 | 1.17 | 65.1 | 1.05 | 68.9 | 1.21 | 66.8 | 1.15 |
| Richest | 73.5 | 1.33 | 72.7 | 1.26 | 76.0 | 1.37 + | 75.1 | 1.34 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.01 *** | n/a | 1.01 *** | n/a | 1.01 *** | n/a | 1.01 *** |
| Constant | n/a | 1.06 | n/a | 1.09 | n/a | 1.35 * | n/a | 1.12 |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.18. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Indonesia

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|----------|---|----------|------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------|----------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 83.6 | 1.04 | 84.6 | 1.48 *** | 89.8 | 1.20 | 67.1 | 0.95 |
| 20 to 29 | 86.3 | 1.19 ** | 85.1 | 1.43 *** | 91.8 | 1.32 *** | 68.6 | 1.02 |
| 30 to 39 | 85.5 | 1.11 * | 83.7 | 1.22 *** | 91.0 | 1.12 * | 70.5 | 1.07 * |
| 40 to 49 | 83.1 | 1.00 | 81.5 | 1.00 | 90.3 | 1.00 | 69.0 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 83.9 | 0.90 | 82.3 | 0.83 ** | 88.6 | 0.73 *** | 68.2 | 0.88 * |
| 1 or 2 | 87.2 | 1.00 | 85.3 | 1.00 | 92.2 | 1.00 | 70.7 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 84.3 | 0.99 | 83.0 | 1.00 | 91.2 | 1.07 | 70.1 | 0.97 |
| 5 + | 79.8 | 0.88 * | 79.6 | 0.97 | 88.2 | 1.06 | 64.2 | 0.81 *** |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 77.2 | 0.77 *** | 78.8 | 0.93 | 86.8 | 0.77 *** | 69.3 | 0.94 |
| Primary | 82.2 | 1.00 | 82.1 | 1.00 | 89.3 | 1.00 | 68.5 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 90.4 | 1.50 *** | 86.5 | 1.19 *** | 94.2 | 1.45 *** | 70.5 | 1.08 * |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 84.4 | 1.00 | 83.2 | 1.00 | 90.4 | 1.00 | 68.2 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 86.4 | 1.04 | 84.4 | 0.97 | 92.4 | 1.07 | 72.0 | 1.07 * |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 79.1 | 1.00 | 78.5 | 1.00 | 85.5 | 1.00 | 67.3 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 86.3 | 1.07 | 84.7 | 1.04 | 92.2 | 1.20 *** | 69.8 | 1.00 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 82.5 | 1.00 | 82.3 | 1.00 | 89.7 | 1.00 | 69.3 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 86.3 | 0.98 | 84.4 | 1.02 | 91.9 | 0.95 | 69.0 | 0.96 |
| 25 years or more | 89.9 | 1.15 * | 85.0 | 1.08 | 92.3 | 0.98 | 71.1 | 0.98 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 85.9 | 1.00 | 84.1 | 1.00 | 91.7 | 1.00 | 68.4 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 84.8 | 1.00 | 83.9 | 0.99 | 91.1 | 1.00 | 71.0 | 1.05 + |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 82.9 | 1.02 | 81.3 | 0.95 | 88.8 | 0.92 | 69.2 | 1.05 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 81.6 | 1.00 | 81.1 | 1.00 | 88.7 | 1.00 | 69.2 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 89.1 | 1.19 *** | 86.5 | 1.14 ** | 93.7 | 1.24 *** | 69.6 | 1.01 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 84.2 | 1.00 | 82.8 | 1.00 | 90.5 | 1.00 | 68.3 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 86.6 | 1.12 ** | 85.0 | 1.08 * | 92.0 | 1.05 | 71.4 | 1.12 *** |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 77.8 | 1.00 | 77.8 | 1.00 | 85.7 | 1.00 | 66.0 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 82.8 | 1.11 * | 82.5 | 1.16 ** | 90.0 | 1.03 | 71.8 | 1.14 ** |
| Middle | 86.3 | 1.17 ** | 84.9 | 1.28 *** | 92.3 | 1.13 + | 69.3 | 1.10 * |
| Richer | 87.7 | 1.31 *** | 85.8 | 1.44 *** | 92.7 | 1.18 * | 68.7 | 1.07 |
| Richest | 90.8 | 1.40 *** | 87.0 | 1.52 *** | 94.6 | 1.21 * | 71.1 | 1.12 * |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 *** | n/a | 1.00 * | n/a | 1.00 * | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 *** | n/a | 1.00 *** | n/a | 1.01 *** | n/a | 1.00 *** |
| Constant | n/a | 3.05 *** | n/a | 3.38 *** | n/a | 4.25 *** | n/a | 1.53 *** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.19. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Nepal

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--------------|---|--------------|------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------|--------------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 95.8 | 1.06 | 94.2 | 1.51 + | 97.2 | 0.83 | 96.5 | 0.92 |
| 20 to 29 | 95.6 | 1.04 | 93.8 | 1.11 | 97.6 | 0.81 | 96.9 | 0.94 |
| 30 to 39 | 95.2 | 0.97 | 93.7 | 0.96 | 97.1 | 0.71 | 96.4 | 0.84 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>94.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>93.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>97.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>96.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 95.6 | 0.86 | 93.5 | 0.77 | 97.3 | 0.80 | 96.8 | 1.06 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>96.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>93.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>97.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>96.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 95.1 | 1.01 | 93.9 | 1.22 | 97.4 | 1.08 | 97.2 | 1.35 |
| 5 + | <i>94.3</i> | <i>0.95</i> | 94.3 | 1.31 + | 97.1 | 0.89 | 96.0 | 0.87 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | <i>94.4</i> | <i>0.65*</i> | 93.8 | 0.91 | <i>97.0</i> | <i>0.76</i> | 96.4 | 0.93 |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>97.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>94.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>98.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>97.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 98.0 | 1.25 | 94.3 | 0.98 | 98.8 | 1.32 | 97.1 | 1.11 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>95.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>94.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>97.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>96.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 94.8 | 0.71 * | 93.3 | 0.99 | 98.0 | 1.41 | <i>95.4</i> | 0.81 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>94.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>93.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>97.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>96.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | <i>96.4</i> | <i>1.34*</i> | 94.0 | 1.06 | <i>97.9</i> | <i>1.28</i> | 97.0 | <i>1.42*</i> |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>94.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>93.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>97.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>96.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | <i>96.4</i> | <i>1.26+</i> | 94.5 | <i>1.23+</i> | <i>98.4</i> | <i>1.55*</i> | <i>97.4</i> | <i>1.41*</i> |
| 25 years or more | 98.3 | <i>3.51+</i> | 95.9 | <i>2.32+</i> | 99.2 | <i>3.74</i> | 97.5 | <i>1.79</i> |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>94.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>93.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>97.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>96.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 95.9 | <i>1.27+</i> | 93.6 | 1.00 | 97.7 | 1.29 | 96.9 | <i>1.28+</i> |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 95.8 | 1.15 | 94.5 | 1.09 | 98.0 | 1.19 | 97.6 | <i>1.47+</i> |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>95.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>94.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>97.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>96.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 95.5 | 0.64 * | 92.3 | 0.92 | 97.5 | 1.18 | <i>95.2</i> | 1.03 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>95.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>93.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>97.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>96.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 95.2 | 0.90 | 94.0 | 1.06 | 97.5 | 1.11 | 96.7 | 1.00 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>94.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>94.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>97.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>97.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 95.1 | 0.98 | 93.3 | 0.92 | 97.1 | 0.82 | 96.5 | 0.76 |
| Middle | 93.9 | 0.72 * | 93.8 | 0.93 | 96.9 | 0.76 | 96.3 | 0.70 + |
| Richer | 96.3 | 1.12 | 94.6 | 1.14 | 98.0 | 1.11 | 97.7 | 1.20 |
| Richest | 96.5 | 0.87 | 93.4 | 1.01 | 97.7 | 0.76 | 95.6 | 0.61 + |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.01 ** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01 | n/a | 1.01 * |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99 * | n/a | 0.99 *** |
| Constant | n/a | 20.41 *** | n/a | 20.60 *** | n/a | 100.15 *** | n/a | 41.00 *** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.20. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Philippines

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------|---|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 93.8 | 1.19 | 86.2 | 1.03 | 94.1 | 1.29 | 87.4 | 0.88 |
| 20 to 29 | 95.8 | 1.23 | 91.6 | 1.31 * | 95.7 | 1.27 | 92.0 | 1.18 |
| 30 to 39 | 95.4 | 0.92 | 90.5 | 0.99 | 95.4 | 0.98 | 91.0 | 0.97 |
| 40 to 49 | <i>95.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>90.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>95.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>91.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 95.5 | 0.99 | 88.3 | 0.70 * | 94.6 | 0.78 | 90.4 | 0.96 |
| 1 or 2 | <i>95.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>91.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>95.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>91.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 95.8 | 1.16 | 90.8 | 0.99 | 96.0 | 1.17 | 91.9 | 1.22 * |
| 5 + | 95.0 | 1.14 | 90.4 | 1.05 | 95.4 | 1.20 | 91.4 | 1.24 + |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 94.6 | 1.19 | 88.4 | 1.01 | 97.3 | 2.40 + | 85.1 | 0.75 |
| Primary | <i>94.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>90.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>95.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>91.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 96.0 | 1.08 | 90.9 | 0.85 + | 95.7 | 0.94 | 91.7 | 0.98 |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | <i>95.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>90.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>95.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>91.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 95.9 | 1.05 | 91.0 | 1.01 | 95.6 | 0.98 | 91.1 | 0.90 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | <i>93.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>88.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>94.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>89.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 95.7 | 1.15 | 91.0 | 1.06 | 95.6 | 1.04 | 91.5 | 1.01 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | <i>94.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>89.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>95.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>90.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 95.6 | 1.07 | 91.0 | 1.08 | 95.7 | 1.12 | 91.7 | 1.08 |
| 25 years or more | 96.2 | 1.25 | 91.5 | 1.29 + | 95.5 | 1.15 | 91.5 | 1.16 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | <i>95.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>90.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>95.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>91.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 95.4 | 0.96 | 90.5 | 0.99 | 95.4 | 0.97 | 90.4 | 0.89 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 95.0 | 0.86 | 90.5 | 0.94 | 95.8 | 1.02 | 92.3 | 1.13 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | <i>95.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>90.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>95.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>90.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 95.7 | 0.88 | 91.2 | 0.97 | 95.8 | 1.04 | 91.9 | 1.04 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | <i>95.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>90.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>95.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>91.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 95.5 | 0.88 | 91.2 | 0.99 | 95.7 | 0.97 | 91.5 | 1.01 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | <i>94.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>87.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>94.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>89.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 94.0 | 0.88 | 90.4 | 1.31 * | 95.1 | 1.11 | 91.6 | 1.18 |
| Middle | 96.1 | 1.28 | 92.0 | 1.47 ** | 95.7 | 1.20 | 91.9 | 1.18 |
| Richer | 95.8 | 1.16 | 91.6 | 1.42 * | 95.7 | 1.25 | 91.6 | 1.07 |
| Richest | 97.5 | 1.85 ** | 92.0 | 1.59 ** | 96.8 | 1.65 * | 90.4 | 1.24 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 * | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.01 ** | n/a | 1.01 *** | n/a | 1.00 + | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 15.66 *** | n/a | 7.55 *** | n/a | 22.04 *** | n/a | 7.06 *** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.21. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Bolivia

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------|---|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 81.5 | 0.55** | 89.2 | 1.00 | 89.4 | 0.83 | 80.8 | 1.22 |
| 20 to 29 | 88.2 | 0.86 | 91.2 | 1.13 | 91.2 | 0.96 | 79.6 | 1.08 |
| 30 to 39 | 87.9 | 1.03 | 91.7 | 1.29** | 92.5 | 1.29* | 80.6 | 1.15* |
| 40 to 49 | <i>84.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 89.2 | <i>1.00</i> | 89.9 | <i>1.00</i> | 78.5 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 88.5 | 0.80 | 89.5 | 0.84 | 87.7 | 0.56*** | 81.6 | 0.95 |
| 1 or 2 | <i>89.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 92.6 | <i>1.00</i> | 92.7 | <i>1.00</i> | <i>80.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 88.2 | 1.03 | 90.8 | 0.82* | 92.4 | 1.10 | 80.8 | 1.15* |
| 5 + | 82.0 | 0.89 | 88.8 | 0.99 | 89.1 | 1.10 | 77.6 | 1.22* |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 68.9 | 0.52*** | 84.6 | 0.94 | 82.9 | 0.66*** | 72.5 | 0.74*** |
| Primary | <i>84.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 89.5 | <i>1.00</i> | 89.5 | <i>1.00</i> | 77.6 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 95.2 | 2.43*** | 94.1 | 1.54*** | 96.1 | 2.36*** | 84.8 | 1.51*** |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | <i>84.6</i> | <i>1.00</i> | 89.8 | <i>1.00</i> | 90.1 | <i>1.00</i> | 78.2 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 88.7 | 0.93 | 91.5 | 0.94 | 92.2 | 0.90 | 80.9 | 0.97 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 73.6 | <i>1.00</i> | 83.1 | <i>1.00</i> | 83.1 | <i>1.00</i> | 70.5 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 88.4 | 1.18+ | 91.6 | 1.34** | 92.2 | 1.27* | 80.8 | 1.25** |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 87.2 | <i>1.00</i> | 90.5 | <i>1.00</i> | 92.0 | <i>1.00</i> | 79.3 | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 86.5 | 0.77*** | 90.5 | 0.97 | 90.3 | 0.75*** | 79.6 | 0.94 |
| 25 years or more | 87.4 | 0.80+ | 92.2 | 1.15 | 93.2 | 0.84 | 81.2 | 1.11 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 86.1 | <i>1.00</i> | 90.6 | <i>1.00</i> | 90.8 | <i>1.00</i> | 79.2 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 88.5 | 1.19* | 91.2 | 1.03 | 91.9 | 1.13 | 81.2 | 1.11 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 88.3 | 1.19+ | 90.7 | 1.00 | 93.2 | 1.28+ | 80.4 | 1.09 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 77.7 | <i>1.00</i> | 86.5 | <i>1.00</i> | 85.9 | <i>1.00</i> | 75.3 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 91.9 | 1.06 | 93.1 | 0.93 | 94.2 | 0.90 | 82.2 | 0.99 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 86.5 | <i>1.00</i> | 90.8 | <i>1.00</i> | 91.2 | <i>1.00</i> | 79.4 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 88.7 | 1.07 | 90.3 | 0.84+ | 91.8 | 0.98 | 81.7 | 1.01 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 75.0 | <i>1.00</i> | 84.6 | <i>1.00</i> | 85.2 | <i>1.00</i> | 74.9 | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 81.4 | 1.01 | 88.8 | 1.12 | 88.6 | 0.93 | 77.0 | 0.95 |
| Middle | 87.0 | 0.99 | 92.2 | 1.15 | 90.8 | 0.89 | 80.4 | 1.00 |
| Richer | 93.6 | 1.52** | 92.7 | 1.10 | 94.4 | 1.19 | 80.9 | 0.91 |
| Richest | 95.3 | 1.72** | 94.6 | 1.29 | 96.4 | 1.34 | 84.7 | 1.00 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00** | n/a | 1.00+ |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.00*** |
| Constant | n/a | 4.90*** | n/a | 5.71*** | n/a | 6.76*** | n/a | 3.35*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable; numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.22. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Haiti

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------|---|---------|------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------|---------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 88.1 | 0.71 | 75.6 | 1.12 | 85.4 | 0.74 | 67.4 | 0.77 |
| 20 to 29 | 87.5 | 0.84 | 76.9 | 1.02 | 86.6 | 1.01 | 73.0 | 0.84 |
| 30 to 39 | 88.4 | 0.80 | 74.4 | 0.79* | 87.7 | 0.79 | 76.7 | 0.91 |
| 40 to 49 | 90.2 | 1.00 | 80.7 | 1.00 | 88.6 | 1.00 | 75.4 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 90.2 | 0.83 | 83.1 | 1.08 | 88.2 | 0.76 | 75.4 | 0.87 |
| 1 or 2 | 90.3 | 1.00 | 78.2 | 1.00 | 88.0 | 1.00 | 76.2 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 89.0 | 1.12 | 76.3 | 0.99 | 88.2 | 1.06 | 72.2 | 0.97 |
| 5 + | 85.9 | 1.26 | 74.3 | 1.25 | 86.0 | 1.45+ | 74.3 | 1.04 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 82.2 | 0.58*** | 69.4 | 0.82+ | 82.3 | 0.70* | 68.4 | 0.74** |
| Primary | 91.9 | 1.00 | 81.8 | 1.00 | 89.8 | 1.00 | 79.3 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 95.2 | 1.34 | 82.8 | 0.99 | 93.3 | 1.21 | 77.4 | 0.68** |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 87.6 | 1.00 | 77.0 | 1.00 | 84.8 | 1.00 | 77.5 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 89.0 | 1.29* | 76.8 | 1.19+ | 88.9 | 1.75*** | 72.7 | 1.04 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 86.6 | 1.00 | 75.4 | 1.00 | 85.9 | 1.00 | 73.2 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 89.8 | 0.99 | 78.0 | 0.89 | 88.4 | 1.06 | 75.4 | 0.82* |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 86.9 | 1.00 | 73.1 | 1.00 | 84.6 | 1.00 | 71.8 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 88.1 | 1.19 | 77.4 | 1.17 | 88.0 | 1.33* | 73.8 | 1.11 |
| 25 years or more | 94.0 | 1.26 | 84.4 | 1.48* | 92.1 | 1.46+ | 84.1 | 1.12 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 91.3 | 1.00 | 78.8 | 1.00 | 89.8 | 1.00 | 78.7 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 89.4 | 0.73* | 81.3 | 1.02 | 88.3 | 0.79+ | 76.3 | 0.85 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 81.6 | 0.72* | 67.1 | 0.76* | 81.1 | 0.92 | 63.7 | 0.79* |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 85.4 | 1.00 | 74.4 | 1.00 | 85.1 | 1.00 | 71.6 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 93.9 | 0.67* | 81.3 | 0.93 | 91.3 | 0.63* | 79.5 | 0.92 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 85.0 | 1.00 | 73.3 | 1.00 | 84.6 | 1.00 | 69.3 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 92.7 | 1.37* | 81.2 | 1.12 | 90.7 | 1.21 | 80.7 | 1.18+ |
| Wealth Index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 84.8 | 1.00 | 68.6 | 1.00 | 83.6 | 1.00 | 67.8 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 80.7 | 0.83 | 74.5 | 1.31* | 82.8 | 0.98 | 70.7 | 1.23 |
| Middle | 87.6 | 1.09 | 75.8 | 1.42* | 86.2 | 1.16 | 72.0 | 1.47** |
| Richer | 93.4 | 1.14 | 79.3 | 1.52* | 89.6 | 1.05 | 77.3 | 1.79** |
| Richest | 95.5 | 1.07 | 86.2 | 2.45*** | 94.5 | 0.91 | 84.6 | 2.17** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99* |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.01* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.01* |
| Constant | n/a | 6.65*** | n/a | 3.86*** | n/a | 5.65*** | n/a | 3.40*** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3B.23. Percentage of currently married women who agree that a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband for the specified reason, by background characteristics, and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression): Nicaragua

| Characteristic | A wife is justified in refusing sex with her husband when: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|----------|---|----------|------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|----------|
| | She knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease | | She knows that her husband has sex with other women | | She has recently given birth | | She is tired or not in the mood | |
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 91.2 | 0.69 + | 89.9 | 0.97 | 92.6 | 0.80 | 84.9 | 0.73 + |
| 20 to 29 | 92.2 | 0.79 | 91.2 | 1.17 | 94.2 | 0.85 | 96.5 | 0.84 |
| 30 to 39 | 94.2 | 1.05 | 92.0 | 1.21 + | 95.4 | 1.01 | 87.6 | 0.93 |
| 40 to 49 | 93.6 | 1.00 | 90.1 | 1.00 | 95.0 | 1.00 | 86.5 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | |
| None | 93.0 | 0.86 | 92.5 | 0.94 | 94.1 | 0.70 + | 84.9 | 0.77 + |
| 1 or 2 | 94.2 | 1.00 | 92.6 | 1.00 | 95.5 | 1.00 | 88.9 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 93.2 | 0.90 | 91.5 | 0.97 | 95.0 | 0.86 | 86.1 | 0.80 * |
| 5 + | 91.4 | 0.86 | 88.2 | 0.94 | 93.1 | 0.84 | 84.8 | 0.79 + |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| None | 87.1 | 0.68 *** | 95.9 | 0.79 * | 90.9 | 0.71 ** | 82.1 | 0.77 ** |
| Primary | 92.5 | 1.00 | 90.9 | 1.00 | 94.0 | 1.00 | 86.2 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 96.5 | 1.44 * | 93.8 | 1.12 | 97.1 | 1.29 + | 89.5 | 1.21 + |
| Work | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 91.5 | 1.00 | 89.9 | 1.00 | 93.3 | 1.00 | 85.7 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 95.4 | 1.19 | 92.9 | 1.03 | 96.6 | 1.36 * | 88.1 | 1.10 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 85.1 | 1.00 | 83.3 | 1.00 | 90.2 | 1.00 | 80.3 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 93.8 | 1.48 ** | 91.9 | 1.53 *** | 95.0 | 1.20 | 87.3 | 1.22 + |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 92.7 | 1.00 | 90.7 | 1.00 | 94.0 | 1.00 | 86.3 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 93.5 | 0.81 * | 91.4 | 0.87 | 95.4 | 0.96 | 87.0 | 0.90 |
| 25 years or more | 94.5 | 0.64 * | 94.0 | 0.89 | 95.7 | 0.68 | 89.0 | 0.79 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 93.6 | 1.00 | 91.4 | 1.00 | 94.7 | 1.00 | 86.3 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 92.2 | 0.93 | 90.7 | 0.92 | 94.5 | 1.01 | 87.5 | 1.09 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 92.1 | 0.94 | 90.1 | 0.93 | 94.3 | 1.06 | 86.6 | 1.06 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 89.0 | 1.00 | 87.5 | 1.00 | 91.8 | 1.00 | 83.4 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 96.0 | 1.64 ** | 93.7 | 1.68 *** | 96.7 | 1.59 ** | 89.1 | 1.55 *** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 92.6 | 1.00 | 90.4 | 1.00 | 94.3 | 1.00 | 86.4 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 93.8 | 0.95 | 92.3 | 1.10 | 95.1 | 1.04 | 87.2 | 1.01 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 86.2 | 1.00 | 85.9 | 1.00 | 90.1 | 1.00 | 81.2 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 91.1 | 1.17 | 89.6 | 1.11 | 93.1 | 1.27 + | 86.5 | 1.24 * |
| Middle | 94.4 | 1.08 | 91.1 | 0.91 | 95.2 | 1.12 | 87.4 | 0.95 |
| Richer | 95.7 | 1.18 | 93.7 | 0.99 | 96.5 | 1.59 + | 88.5 | 0.98 |
| Richest | 97.0 | 1.14 | 94.5 | 0.86 | 97.5 | 1.31 | 89.4 | 0.95 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99 * | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 8.28 *** | n/a | 7.09 *** | n/a | 16.79 *** | n/a | 5.88 *** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not available or not applicable

Appendix Table 3C. Percentage of currently married women who disagree with all five specified reasons justifying wife beating and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression), by background characteristics, according to country

| Characteristic | Benin | | Burkina Faso | | Cameroon | | Ghana | | Kenya | |
|---|-------|----------|--------------|----------|----------|----------|-------|----------|-------|----------|
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 31.4 | 0.67 * | 28.1 | 1.00 | 38.0 | 0.81 + | 35.5 | 0.61 * | 15.0 | 0.38 *** |
| 20 to 29 | 35.3 | 0.76 * | 28.5 | 1.01 | 42.6 | 0.88 | 44.7 | 0.62 *** | 26.3 | 0.59 *** |
| 30 to 39 | 37.9 | 0.92 | 26.9 | 1.03 | 44.5 | 0.94 | 50.2 | 0.75 ** | 31.9 | 0.82 + |
| 40 to 49 | 36.1 | 1.00 | 24.3 | 1.00 | 43.8 | 1.00 | 55.8 | 1.00 | 32.1 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 40.7 | 1.09 | 30.5 | 0.98 | 45.6 | 1.08 | 48.6 | 1.03 | 26.1 | 0.87 |
| 1 or 2 | 39.1 | 1.00 | 30.1 | 1.00 | 42.7 | 1.00 | 49.1 | 1.00 | 33.7 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 38.3 | 0.93 | 27.1 | 0.90 | 42.2 | 1.01 | 51.7 | 1.03 | 29.0 | 0.81 * |
| 5+ | 31.2 | 0.73 ** | 24.3 | 0.81 * | 42.4 | 1.03 | 46.5 | 0.85 | 23.6 | 0.67 *** |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 30.8 | 0.84 * | 25.4 | 0.90 | 41.2 | 1.22 ** | 36.5 | 0.99 | 18.0 | 0.98 |
| Primary | 41.8 | 1.00 | 29.6 | 1.00 | 37.8 | 1.00 | 45.5 | 1.00 | 22.0 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 68.1 | 2.08 *** | 57.2 | 2.83 *** | 51.0 | 1.32 *** | 66.0 | 1.75 *** | 49.2 | 2.30 *** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 38.6 | 1.00 | 26.9 | 1.00 | 42.8 | 1.00 | 36.5 | 1.00 | 24.1 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 35.6 | 0.90 | 27.9 | 0.84 ** | 42.9 | 0.95 | 51.8 | 1.45 *** | 32.9 | 1.04 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 35.9 | 1.00 | 26.6 | 1.00 | 38.3 | 1.00 | 34.3 | 1.00 | 19.3 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 36.1 | 0.74 *** | 27.5 | 0.88 * | 47.4 | 1.19 ** | 53.7 | 1.25 * | 31.1 | 1.06 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 32.2 | 1.00 | 25.4 | 1.00 | 39.2 | 1.00 | 44.9 | 1.00 | 20.2 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 37.3 | 0.93 | 29.3 | 1.08 | 47.6 | 1.25 *** | 50.7 | 1.06 | 31.4 | 1.16 + |
| 25 years or more | 53.9 | 1.00 | 41.7 | 1.26 | 55.6 | 1.54 *** | 57.7 | 0.89 | 49.3 | 1.67 *** |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 40.4 | 1.00 | 28.9 | 1.00 | 42.8 | 1.00 | 52.3 | 1.00 | 32.0 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 36.1 | 0.84 * | 28.2 | 1.01 | 43.6 | 1.08 | 49.4 | 1.11 | 28.7 | 1.05 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 32.6 | 0.83 * | 27.0 | 0.99 | 42.2 | 1.14 * | 44.9 | 1.04 | 23.2 | 0.96 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 30.5 | 1.00 | 25.6 | 1.00 | 38.3 | 1.00 | 43.0 | 1.00 | 24.2 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 46.7 | 1.17 + | 35.5 | 1.07 | 47.7 | 1.06 | 57.7 | 0.66 *** | 43.6 | 0.98 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 34.4 | 1.00 | 28.4 | 1.00 | 42.0 | 1.00 | 49.6 | 1.00 | 26.8 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 39.2 | 1.00 | 25.1 | 0.83 *** | 43.9 | 1.01 | 47.3 | 0.85 * | 31.7 | 1.03 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 29.7 | 1.00 | 27.7 | 1.00 | 41.2 | 1.00 | 31.6 | 1.00 | 16.9 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 28.5 | 0.95 | 28.9 | 1.02 | 34.9 | 0.72 *** | 42.2 | 1.06 | 22.0 | 0.99 |
| Middle | 29.6 | 0.93 | 24.1 | 0.81 ** | 38.4 | 0.73 *** | 47.9 | 1.29 * | 23.9 | 0.95 |
| Richer | 36.2 | 1.02 | 21.7 | 0.72 *** | 44.2 | 0.75 ** | 53.5 | 1.60 ** | 28.4 | 1.00 |
| Richest | 59.0 | 1.55 ** | 34.1 | 1.01 | 54.9 | 0.99 | 70.1 | 2.76 *** | 47.3 | 1.48 * |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.02 *** | n/a | 1.01 ** | n/a | 1.00 * | n/a | 1.01 *** | n/a | 1.00 + |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.99 * | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01 ** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01 *** |
| Constant | n/a | 0.68 *** | n/a | 0.53 *** | n/a | 0.86 * | n/a | 0.36 *** | n/a | 0.34 *** |

Continued...

Appendix Table 3C—Continued

| Characteristic | Malawi | | Malawi | | Mozambique | | Nigeria | | Rwanda | |
|---|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 56.9 | 0.89 | 8.8 | 0.66 ** | 39.6 | 0.81 + | 19.3 | 0.51 *** | 27.3 | 0.63 + |
| 20 to 29 | 63.5 | 1.01 | 9.4 | 0.69 ** | 43.5 | 0.88 + | 31.0 | 0.61 *** | 34.4 | 0.86 |
| 30 to 39 | 66.3 | 1.05 | 8.8 | 0.72 *** | 46.5 | 0.98 | 33.1 | 0.77 ** | 35.0 | 1.05 |
| 40 to 49 | 66.0 | 1.00 | 11.5 | 1.00 | 44.6 | 1.00 | 32.5 | 1.00 | 31.1 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 59.7 | 0.95 | 12.0 | 1.03 | 43.1 | 1.03 | 30.9 | 1.04 | 34.9 | 0.97 |
| 1 or 2 | 62.6 | 1.00 | 10.4 | 1.00 | 42.0 | 1.00 | 32.7 | 1.00 | 36.0 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 64.4 | 1.10 | 10.0 | 0.85 | 44.5 | 1.10 | 31.1 | 0.90 | 36.1 | 0.99 |
| 5+ | 66.0 | 1.18 * | 8.4 | 0.70 ** | 46.1 | 1.13 + | 29.2 | 0.84 + | 30.1 | 0.85 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 65.9 | 1.20 *** | 9.0 | 1.02 | 41.7 | 0.89 * | 20.5 | 0.74 *** | 26.2 | 0.79 ** |
| Primary | 61.5 | 1.00 | 8.4 | 1.00 | 45.0 | 1.00 | 32.5 | 1.00 | 33.3 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 76.6 | 1.56 *** | 21.2 | 1.91 *** | 63.0 | 1.54 *** | 52.3 | 1.60 *** | 61.1 | 2.49 *** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 64.2 | 1.00 | 9.2 | 1.00 | 43.8 | 1.00 | 25.7 | 1.00 | 30.2 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 63.4 | 0.91 + | 9.9 | 1.07 | 46.1 | 0.84 ** | 34.6 | 1.07 | 46.3 | 1.36 *** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 60.2 | 1.00 | 10.5 | 1.00 | 41.7 | 1.00 | 24.9 | 1.00 | 28.8 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 67.1 | 1.17 ** | 9.0 | 0.65 *** | 46.8 | 1.18 ** | 34.4 | 0.90 | 40.0 | 1.21 * |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 63.0 | 1.00 | 8.6 | 1.00 | 43.6 | 1.00 | 23.9 | 1.00 | 27.2 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 64.7 | 1.06 | 11.2 | 1.03 | 45.1 | 0.96 | 40.9 | 1.33 *** | 35.0 | 1.32 ** |
| 25 years or more | 72.6 | 1.32 * | 18.9 | 1.01 | 44.8 | 1.02 | 60.1 | 1.94 *** | 40.4 | 1.30 + |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 63.7 | 1.00 | 12.8 | 1.00 | 44.1 | 1.00 | 36.7 | 1.00 | 32.8 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 63.3 | 1.00 | 10.9 | 0.82 + | 44.9 | 1.02 | 32.8 | 0.99 | 36.9 | 1.15 + |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 66.1 | 1.06 | 8.1 | 0.64 *** | 43.3 | 0.96 | 27.3 | 0.92 | 32.5 | 0.94 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 61.8 | 1.00 | 8.8 | 1.00 | 41.4 | 1.00 | 27.0 | 1.00 | 30.7 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 77.4 | 1.22 * | 12.1 | 1.65 *** | 51.0 | 1.16 * | 39.4 | 0.91 | 50.7 | 1.06 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 63.5 | 1.00 | 8.8 | 1.00 | 44.0 | 1.00 | 30.2 | 1.00 | 30.8 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 65.7 | 1.03 | 12.2 | 1.09 | 44.6 | 0.99 | 32.6 | 1.00 | 46.2 | 1.25 * |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 59.6 | 1.00 | 10.2 | 1.00 | 45.7 | 1.00 | 22.8 | 1.00 | 33.7 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 62.2 | 1.09 | 8.0 | 0.71 ** | 39.1 | 0.79 *** | 20.2 | 1.02 | 26.4 | 0.69 ** |
| Middle | 60.0 | 1.07 | 8.5 | 0.67 *** | 39.9 | 0.71 *** | 27.0 | 1.33 ** | 28.8 | 0.73 * |
| Richer | 64.5 | 1.11 | 8.0 | 0.78 * | 43.0 | 0.71 *** | 31.7 | 1.21 | 32.9 | 0.77 * |
| Richest | 74.4 | 1.35 *** | 13.4 | 1.25 | 54.0 | 0.90 | 55.4 | 1.68 *** | 47.9 | 0.71 * |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 + | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.01 | n/a | 0.99 *** | n/a | 1.00 * | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 2.13 *** | n/a | 0.21 *** | n/a | 0.83 ** | n/a | 0.56 *** | n/a | 0.67 *** |

Continued...

Appendix Table 3C—Continued

| Characteristic | Uganda | | Zambia | | Zimbabwe | | Armenia | | Jordan | |
|---|--------|----------|--------|----------|----------|----------|---------|----------|--------|----------|
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 21.9 | 0.80 | 7.3 | 0.33 *** | 28.7 | 0.27 *** | 46.5 | 0.68 | 18.2 | 0.45 ** |
| 20 to 29 | 28.9 | 0.70 ** | 11.7 | 0.56 *** | 46.8 | 0.49 *** | 64.4 | 0.97 | 32.8 | 0.74 ** |
| 30 to 39 | 24.6 | 0.90 | 13.8 | 0.77 + | 52.9 | 0.85 | 63.8 | 0.91 | 36.9 | 0.97 |
| 40 to 49 | 24.9 | 1.00 | 14.7 | 1.00 | 51.9 | 1.00 | 68.0 | 1.00 | 35.2 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 22.1 | 0.93 | 15.5 | 1.87 *** | 44.7 | 0.98 | 71.2 | 1.17 | 31.9 | 0.89 |
| 1 or 2 | 21.9 | 1.00 | 11.9 | 1.00 | 48.9 | 1.00 | 70.3 | 1.00 | 39.0 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 22.8 | 1.03 | 13.3 | 1.06 | 50.5 | 0.88 | 59.2 | 0.83 * | 40.6 | 0.92 |
| 5+ | 23.2 | 1.01 | 11.6 | 0.71 * | 44.8 | 0.71 ** | 49.2 | 0.70 * | 27.8 | 0.64 *** |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 20.2 | 0.95 | 13.9 | 1.40 * | 39.7 | 0.87 | n/a | n/a | 9.3 | 0.49 *** |
| Primary | 21.2 | 1.00 | 9.5 | 1.00 | 40.7 | 1.00 | 42.4 | 1.00 | 14.7 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 34.4 | 1.45 *** | 19.0 | 1.88 *** | 56.9 | 1.51 *** | 66.6 | 0.70 *** | 39.1 | 2.41 *** |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 17.3 | 1.00 | 12.0 | 1.00 | 45.2 | 1.00 | 60.8 | 1.00 | 32.8 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 27.5 | 1.60 *** | 13.2 | 0.92 | 50.8 | 1.12 | 78.9 | 1.66 | 51.8 | 1.71 *** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 19.4 | 1.00 | 10.2 | 1.00 | 40.4 | 1.00 | 46.6 | 1.00 | 38.4 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 25.8 | 1.09 | 15.0 | 1.31 * | 53.4 | 0.97 | 66.8 | 1.48 *** | 34.3 | 0.94 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 21.7 | 1.00 | 10.9 | 1.00 | 40.7 | 1.00 | 50.5 | 1.00 | 24.3 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 24.1 | 0.99 | 13.6 | 0.92 | 51.0 | 1.06 | 67.5 | 1.41 | 36.8 | 1.27 ** |
| 25 years or more | 23.3 | 1.13 | 25.5 | 1.45 | 66.5 | 1.36 + | 77.4 | 1.82 | 46.2 | 1.47 ** |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 22.2 | 1.00 | 13.1 | 1.00 | 51.5 | 1.00 | 66.8 | 1.00 | 36.1 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 22.8 | 1.10 | 12.2 | 0.95 | 45.1 | 0.88 | 61.5 | 0.97 ** | 33.8 | 1.05 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 23.6 | 1.04 | 11.8 | 0.88 | 46.7 | 1.08 | 66.4 | 1.28 | 33.2 | 1.00 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 20.8 | 1.00 | 11.9 | 1.00 | 40.3 | 1.00 | 49.7 | 1.00 | 22.2 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 35.1 | 1.41 ** | 13.2 | 0.69 * | 61.4 | 1.31 | 76.1 | 1.37 | 37.9 | 1.52 *** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 21.5 | 1.00 | 11.9 | 1.00 | 48.1 | 1.00 | 65.7 | 1.00 | 35.1 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 25.9 | 1.15 + | 13.3 | 0.92 | 47.5 | 1.03 | 64.4 | 1.09 * | 32.4 | 0.73 ** |
| Wealth index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 18.5 | 1.00 | 14.9 | 1.00 | 34.8 | 1.00 | 42.7 | 1.00 | 21.4 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 18.6 | 0.99 | 10.0 | 0.59 *** | 37.4 | 1.01 | 52.9 | 1.29 *** | 30.9 | 1.28 ** |
| Middle | 20.4 | 1.06 | 7.8 | 0.52 *** | 43.7 | 1.37 ** | 66.9 | 1.68 *** | 31.4 | 1.32 ** |
| Richer | 24.2 | 1.18 | 12.0 | 0.92 | 52.6 | 1.56 ** | 75.3 | 2.32 | 41.4 | 1.70 *** |
| Richest | 32.5 | 1.36 + | 18.8 | 1.54 | 66.0 | 2.40 *** | 84.2 | 3.08 *** | 51.5 | 2.22 *** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 0.99 *** | n/a | 0.99 ** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | n/a |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.01 *** | n/a | 1.01 + | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01 *** | n/a | 0.99 ** |
| Constant | n/a | 0.41 *** | n/a | 0.22 *** | n/a | 0.86 | n/a | 0.68 *** | n/a | 0.37 *** |

Continued...

Appendix Table 3C—Continued

| Characteristic | Morocco | | Cambodia | | Indonesia | | Nepal | | Philippines | |
|---|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 18.8 | 0.68 * | 60.2 | 1.02 | 70.6 | 0.57 *** | 68.0 | 0.77 * | 65.8 | 0.80 |
| 20 to 29 | 29.8 | 0.91 | 62.0 | 1.14 | 70.8 | 0.66 *** | 69.5 | 0.81 * | 75.1 | 1.04 |
| 30 to 39 | 34.3 | 0.94 | 58.7 | 0.94 | 76.3 | 0.83 *** | 72.5 | 0.92 | 74.6 | 1.00 |
| 40 to 49 | 31.9 | 1.00 | 59.9 | 1.00 | 78.3 | 1.00 | 74.7 | 1.00 | 74.5 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 32.4 | 0.89 | 66.9 | 1.02 | 73.4 | 0.98 | 69.5 | 1.02 | 79.3 | 1.19 |
| 1 or 2 | 38.8 | 1.00 | 62.4 | 1.00 | 75.5 | 1.00 | 69.8 | 1.00 | 78.0 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 33.4 | 0.93 | 58.3 | 0.96 | 75.3 | 0.81 *** | 71.9 | 1.06 | 73.5 | 0.86 * |
| 5+ | 20.8 | 0.82 * | 58.1 | 1.09 | 72.9 | 0.67 *** | 73.0 | 1.04 | 68.6 | 0.87 + |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 20.1 | 0.74 *** | 57.0 | 1.15 | 78.0 | 1.18 ** | 71.6 | 1.10 | 58.8 | 0.89 |
| Primary | 35.6 | 1.00 | 59.4 | 1.00 | 74.2 | 1.00 | 69.5 | 1.00 | 68.2 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 66.1 | 2.28 *** | 69.7 | 1.31 + | 75.3 | 0.92 * | 71.4 | 1.11 | 77.5 | 1.08 |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 28.3 | 1.00 | 62.4 | 1.00 | 74.7 | 1.00 | 71.7 | 1.00 | 74.2 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 55.8 | 1.42 *** | 55.5 | 0.67 *** | 75.4 | 0.95 | 67.8 | 0.86 + | 74.9 | 0.89 * |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 12.2 | 1.00 | 57.8 | 1.00 | 72.3 | 1.00 | 71.0 | 1.00 | 67.0 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 35.1 | 1.29 ** | 61.1 | 0.98 | 75.5 | 0.90 ** | 71.6 | 1.06 | 75.3 | 0.91 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 23.5 | 1.00 | 55.8 | 1.00 | 74.3 | 1.00 | 70.7 | 1.00 | 66.4 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 32.6 | 1.04 | 61.8 | 1.26 * | 74.6 | 0.95 + | 72.6 | 1.12 * | 74.9 | 1.25 *** |
| 25 years or more | 49.6 | 1.28 * | 63.5 | 1.39 + | 79.8 | 1.07 | 72.1 | 1.00 | 82.5 | 1.69 *** |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 30.6 | 1.00 | 59.8 | 1.00 | 74.8 | 1.00 | 71.0 | 1.00 | 74.8 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 32.1 | 1.05 | 60.1 | 1.00 | 74.5 | 1.00 | 71.6 | 1.04 | 73.3 | 1.11 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 32.6 | 1.10 | 62.0 | 1.11 | 76.3 | 0.97 | 72.0 | 0.99 | 75.4 | 1.15 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 15.3 | 1.00 | 58.0 | 1.00 | 72.1 | 1.00 | 71.8 | 1.00 | 69.0 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 43.9 | 1.14 | 70.7 | 1.26 + | 78.2 | 1.07 + | 66.6 | 0.82 * | 79.2 | 1.13 + |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 33.8 | 1.00 | 58.8 | 1.00 | 74.3 | 1.00 | 71.5 | 1.00 | 73.1 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 28.4 | 0.91 + | 62.2 | 1.18 + | 76.0 | 1.07 * | 71.1 | 0.99 | 77.4 | 0.97 |
| Wealth Index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 11.0 | 1.00 | 54.3 | 1.00 | 68.0 | 1.00 | 72.3 | 1.00 | 62.5 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 15.8 | 1.19 | 59.6 | 1.09 | 71.8 | 0.98 | 69.1 | 0.90 | 70.3 | 1.25 ** |
| Middle | 28.2 | 1.85 *** | 59.7 | 1.04 | 74.7 | 1.22 *** | 71.1 | 0.99 | 74.7 | 1.43 *** |
| Richer | 41.5 | 2.45 *** | 58.0 | 1.03 | 76.8 | 1.37 *** | 72.8 | 1.11 | 79.5 | 1.66 *** |
| Richest | 60.2 | 3.40 *** | 68.4 | 1.24 | 83.2 | 2.10 *** | 70.8 | 1.21 + | 85.3 | 2.33 *** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 ** | n/a | 1.00 * | n/a | 1.00 *** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01 *** | n/a | 1.00 *** | n/a | 1.00 ** |
| Constant | n/a | 0.37 *** | n/a | 1.41 ** | n/a | 1.81 *** | n/a | 2.14 *** | n/a | 2.27 *** |

Continued...

Appendix Table 3C—Continued

| Characteristic | Bolivia | | Haiti | | Nicaragua | |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 70.0 | 0.69 ** | 48.2 | 0.63 * | 74.3 | 0.45 |
| 20 to 29 | 77.5 | 1.00 | 59.4 | 0.99 | 81.3 | 0.70 ** |
| 30 to 39 | 77.7 | 1.02 | 62.8 | 1.17 | 86.4 | 1.01 |
| <i>40 to 49</i> | <i>77.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>52.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>84.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Children ever born | | | | | | |
| None | 79.8 | 1.03 | 62.3 | 0.92 | 81.3 | 1.02 |
| <i>1 or 2</i> | <i>79.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>61.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>84.2</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 3 or 4 | 77.7 | 0.90 + | 53.9 | 0.78 * | 83.6 | 0.87 |
| 5+ | 74.1 | 0.90 | 56.8 | 0.92 | 81.2 | 0.89 |
| Education | | | | | | |
| None | 73.2 | 1.06 | 52.4 | 0.98 | 74.6 | 0.85 * |
| <i>Primary</i> | <i>73.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>56.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>79.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Secondary or higher | 83.9 | 1.52 *** | 75.9 | 1.66 *** | 91.2 | 2.02 |
| Work | | | | | | |
| <i>Does not work</i> | <i>75.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>58.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>81.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Works for cash | 78.3 | 0.95 | 58.1 | 1.00 | 85.4 | 0.84 * |
| Media exposure | | | | | | |
| <i>No regular exposure</i> | <i>75.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>54.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>76.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Weekly exposure | 77.3 | 0.80 ** | 60.7 | 0.88 | 83.6 | 0.97 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | |
| <i>Less than 18 years</i> | <i>74.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>56.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>81.5</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| 18-24 years | 78.0 | 1.07 | 57.7 | 1.05 | 84.3 | 0.82 ** |
| 25 years or more | 80.3 | 1.12 | 66.1 | 1.08 | 90.2 | 0.86 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | |
| <i>Wife is 0-4 years younger</i> | <i>77.8</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>58.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>83.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 76.0 | 1.02 | 57.7 | 0.82 * | 81.8 | 0.94 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 75.3 | 0.95 | 58.2 | 0.97 | 82.6 | 1.11 |
| Residence | | | | | | |
| <i>Rural</i> | <i>73.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>53.1</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>77.0</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Urban | 79.4 | 0.98 | 67.0 | 0.80 + | 87.5 | 1.01 |
| Family structure | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear</i> | <i>77.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>56.7</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>82.4</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Extended | 76.3 | 0.90 | 60.2 | 1.13 | 84.0 | 0.98 |
| Wealth index | | | | | | |
| <i>Poorest</i> | <i>71.9</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>47.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> | <i>73.3</i> | <i>1.00</i> |
| Poorer | 73.6 | 1.16 + | 56.2 | 1.52 *** | 78.1 | 1.13 |
| Middle | 74.0 | 1.27 * | 54.2 | 1.27 * | 82.2 | 1.26 + |
| Richer | 78.8 | 1.63 *** | 55.8 | 1.34 + | 86.9 | 1.60 ** |
| Richest | 87.0 | 2.64 *** | 78.4 | 2.28 *** | 92.8 | 2.60 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 + | n/a | 1.00 + | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01 * | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 4.06 *** | n/a | 1.14 | n/a | 4.80 *** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = odds ratio

n/a = Not applicable or not available

Appendix Table 3D. Percentage of currently married women who agree with all of the four specified reasons justifying a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband and odds ratios (estimated using multivariable logistic regression), by background characteristics, according to country

| Characteristic | Benin | | Burkina Faso | | Cameroon | | Ghana | | Kenya | |
|---|-------|----------|--------------|----------|----------|----------|-------|----------|-------|----------|
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 41.5 | 1.11 | 43.3 | 1.35 * | 51.9 | 0.94 | 68.8 | 1.31 | 48.3 | 0.85 |
| 20 to 29 | 49.3 | 1.17 | 47.3 | 1.42 *** | 54.9 | 0.99 | 61.5 | 0.92 | 52.9 | 0.95 |
| 30 to 39 | 47.7 | 1.08 | 43.0 | 1.04 | 55.4 | 1.04 | 60.1 | 0.83 + | 49.1 | 0.86 + |
| 40 to 49 | 44.8 | 1.00 | 43.7 | 1.00 | 51.8 | 1.00 | 63.6 | 1.00 | 51.9 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 42.0 | 0.75 * | 41.8 | 0.94 | 54.9 | 0.97 | 63.6 | 1.03 | 48.4 | 0.75 * |
| 1 or 2 | 49.7 | 1.00 | 43.8 | 1.00 | 55.4 | 1.00 | 62.3 | 1.00 | 54.5 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 49.4 | 1.02 | 45.4 | 1.14 * | 55.2 | 0.97 | 61.5 | 1.07 | 49.7 | 0.82 * |
| 5 + | 45.3 | 0.97 | 46.0 | 1.39 *** | 52.0 | 0.94 | 61.2 | 1.01 | 49.8 | 0.92 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 46.1 | 0.89 | 44.9 | 0.73 *** | 46.0 | 0.56 *** | 55.5 | 0.73 *** | 39.4 | 0.61 *** |
| Primary | 51.0 | 1.00 | 44.7 | 1.00 | 56.9 | 1.00 | 64.8 | 1.00 | 52.7 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 50.6 | 0.91 | 44.7 | 1.44 ** | 58.2 | 1.07 | 66.4 | 1.07 | 54.9 | 0.98 |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 43.7 | 1.00 | 47.0 | 1.00 | 52.3 | 1.00 | 58.7 | 1.00 | 48.6 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 48.0 | 1.16 + | 36.7 | 0.77 *** | 56.0 | 1.10 + | 62.5 | 1.17 + | 53.8 | 1.15 * |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 44.8 | 1.00 | 47.0 | 1.00 | 51.1 | 1.00 | 58.9 | 1.00 | 44.5 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 48.7 | 1.09 | 42.9 | 0.99 | 57.2 | 1.18 ** | 62.7 | 0.99 | 53.1 | 1.13 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 43.7 | 1.00 | 45.6 | 1.00 | 51.9 | 1.00 | 62.9 | 1.00 | 50.8 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 51.0 | 1.29 *** | 44.1 | 1.03 | 57.1 | 1.09 | 61.1 | 0.91 | 51.0 | 0.92 |
| 25 years or more | 48.4 | 1.12 | 38.6 | 0.90 | 62.3 | 1.28 * | 60.9 | 0.86 | 54.0 | 0.93 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 49.7 | 1.00 | 45.8 | 1.00 | 54.7 | 1.00 | 61.3 | 1.00 | 52.4 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 48.0 | 0.95 | 45.6 | 0.99 | 56.2 | 1.09 | 64.4 | 1.21 * | 52.5 | 1.01 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 45.4 | 0.89 | 42.5 | 0.87 * | 52.1 | 0.99 | 59.8 | 1.03 | 47.6 | 0.87 + |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 47.3 | 1.00 | 46.8 | 1.00 | 52.5 | 1.00 | 60.1 | 1.00 | 49.5 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 47.6 | 0.88 | 34.2 | 1.03 | 55.9 | 1.12 | 64.3 | 1.10 | 57.1 | 1.40 *** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 47.6 | 1.00 | 47.0 | 1.00 | 54.0 | 1.00 | 61.4 | 1.00 | 49.3 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 47.1 | 0.93 | 41.7 | 0.99 | 54.4 | 0.92 | 62.7 | 1.10 | 54.6 | 1.15 * |
| Wealth Index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 42.8 | 1.00 | 52.2 | 1.00 | 51.7 | 1.00 | 59.0 | 1.00 | 50.9 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 47.2 | 1.14 | 50.4 | 0.99 | 51.7 | 0.94 | 61.9 | 0.86 | 48.5 | 0.78 * |
| Middle | 47.8 | 1.14 | 46.5 | 0.81 ** | 52.3 | 0.98 | 61.3 | 0.75 * | 49.7 | 0.74 ** |
| Richer | 49.9 | 1.13 | 39.7 | 0.67 *** | 55.6 | 1.19 + | 62.7 | 0.66 ** | 49.5 | 0.66 *** |
| Richest | 49.8 | 1.03 | 33.5 | 0.49 *** | 59.8 | 1.38 ** | 64.4 | 0.58 ** | 56.2 | 0.63 ** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.01 *** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99 *** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 * |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 0.99 *** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 * | n/a | 1.01 ** | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 0.69 *** | n/a | 0.91 | n/a | 1.61 *** | n/a | 1.28 * | n/a | 0.82 * |

Continued...

Appendix Table 3D—Continued

| Characteristic | Malawi | | Mali | | Mozambique | | Nigeria | | Rwanda | |
|---|--------|---------|------|---------|------------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 50.5 | 1.18 | 9.5 | 1.23 | 40.9 | 1.05 | 35.1 | 0.79 | 36.6 | 1.04 |
| 20 to 29 | 52.8 | 1.29*** | 10.4 | 1.22+ | 43.2 | 1.02 | 44.1 | 1.02 | 43.5 | 1.19 |
| 30 to 39 | 50.6 | 1.18* | 9.6 | 1.17+ | 41.9 | 0.91 | 44.0 | 0.97 | 43.8 | 1.12 |
| 40 to 49 | 46.7 | 1.00 | 8.8 | 1.00 | 44.5 | 1.00 | 45.1 | 1.00 | 39.6 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 45.5 | 0.78** | 8.5 | 0.82 | 35.2 | 0.77** | 35.4 | 0.85 | 39.4 | 0.79 |
| 1 or 2 | 52.8 | 1.00 | 10.8 | 1.00 | 44.1 | 1.00 | 46.3 | 1.00 | 42.6 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 51.1 | 0.98 | 10.3 | 0.98 | 44.5 | 1.11+ | 44.0 | 0.92 | 44.8 | 1.13 |
| 5+ | 50.4 | 1.01 | 9.0 | 0.96 | 42.2 | 1.05 | 43.1 | 0.88 | 41.5 | 1.08 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 48.4 | 0.87** | 9.3 | 0.71*** | 41.0 | 0.94 | 38.7 | 0.68*** | 39.0 | 0.81** |
| Primary | 51.6 | 1.00 | 11.2 | 1.00 | 43.6 | 1.00 | 49.7 | 1.00 | 44.4 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 56.9 | 1.18+ | 13.0 | 1.35+ | 52.9 | 1.64*** | 48.2 | 0.94 | 44.7 | 0.84 |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 48.7 | 1.00 | 9.7 | 1.00 | 41.8 | 1.00 | 37.7 | 1.00 | 42.3 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 57.9 | 1.32*** | 9.8 | 0.94 | 47.0 | 1.20** | 47.8 | 1.41*** | 49.8 | 1.25** |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 50.0 | 1.00 | 9.7 | 1.00 | 40.7 | 1.00 | 43.2 | 1.00 | 41.2 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 51.8 | 1.00 | 9.7 | 1.13+ | 45.0 | 1.17** | 43.5 | 1.00 | 44.3 | 1.18* |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 51.8 | 1.00 | 9.7 | 1.00 | 41.8 | 1.00 | 41.3 | 1.00 | 41.8 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 50.0 | 0.91* | 9.7 | 1.00 | 44.5 | 1.05 | 48.0 | 1.05 | 42.8 | 0.97 |
| 25 years or more | 49.3 | 0.90 | 9.4 | 0.99 | 43.2 | 0.98 | 44.9 | 0.77* | 42.5 | 1.04 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 50.1 | 1.00 | 9.9 | 1.00 | 46.2 | 1.00 | 44.8 | 1.00 | 42.6 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 52.4 | 1.11* | 9.1 | 0.88 | 41.9 | 0.91+ | 46.0 | 0.99 | 42.8 | 1.02 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 50.7 | 1.13* | 10.1 | 1.06 | 37.9 | 0.79*** | 41.2 | 0.86+ | 42.7 | 1.05 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 51.6 | 1.00 | 9.9 | 1.00 | 43.0 | 1.00 | 42.6 | 1.00 | 42.7 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 47.1 | 0.92 | 9.2 | 1.71*** | 42.1 | 1.07 | 45.3 | 0.98 | 41.8 | 0.65** |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 50.8 | 1.00 | 9.7 | 1.00 | 43.8 | 1.00 | 44.3 | 1.00 | 42.1 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 51.4 | 1.03 | 9.9 | 1.01 | 41.0 | 0.89* | 40.7 | 0.89+ | 44.5 | 1.04 |
| Wealth Index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 48.5 | 1.00 | 12.2 | 1.00 | 44.7 | 1.00 | 44.3 | 1.00 | 46.3 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 50.6 | 1.05 | 10.3 | 0.76** | 42.5 | 0.92 | 41.0 | 0.88 | 39.3 | 0.72** |
| Middle | 53.1 | 1.11 | 8.6 | 0.68*** | 40.9 | 0.84* | 40.6 | 0.79* | 42.7 | 0.80+ |
| Richer | 53.4 | 1.15+ | 8.6 | 0.72*** | 41.1 | 0.82* | 47.1 | 0.82+ | 41.5 | 0.69** |
| Richest | 49.5 | 1.01 | 8.8 | 0.60** | 44.2 | 0.89 | 44.6 | 0.64** | 44.9 | 0.80 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.01* |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 0.99* | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 1.14+ | n/a | 0.21*** | n/a | 0.93 | n/a | 0.60*** | n/a | 0.64*** |

Continued...

Appendix Table 3D—Continued

| Characteristic | Uganda | | Zambia | | Zimbabwe | | Armenia | | Jordan | |
|---|-------------|---------|-------------|-------|-------------|--------|-------------|---------|-------------|---------|
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 65.0 | 1.28 | 46.3 | 0.82 | 35.0 | 1.03 | 56.6 | 0.86 | 57.8 | 0.81 |
| 20 to 29 | 64.0 | 0.93 | 53.6 | 0.92 | 37.9 | 1.03 | 60.4 | 0.83+ | 64.6 | 0.82+ |
| 30 to 39 | 66.7 | 1.05 | 57.7 | 1.08 | 37.1 | 1.05 | 62.6 | 0.85+ | 67.0 | 0.97 |
| 40 to 49 | 64.6 | 1.00 | 55.0 | 1.00 | 31.2 | 1.00 | 66.0 | 1.00 | 66.4 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 58.7 | 0.69** | 48.4 | 0.92 | 35.1 | 0.72* | 53.0 | 0.66** | 55.7 | 0.78* |
| 1 or 2 | 63.6 | 1.00 | 51.9 | 1.00 | 41.1 | 1.00 | 64.9 | 1.00 | 67.3 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 66.6 | 1.20* | 56.4 | 1.08 | 33.1 | 0.76** | 62.7 | 0.89 | 68.2 | 1.01 |
| 5 + | 65.8 | 1.13 | 55.9 | 1.05 | 31.3 | 0.81 | 55.8 | 0.84 | 65.2 | 0.92 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 56.8 | 0.76*** | 49.3 | 0.82* | 28.4 | 0.86 | | | 53.1 | 0.59*** |
| Primary | 66.5 | 1.00 | 54.1 | 1.00 | 31.8 | 1.00 | 52.9 | 1.00 | 62.6 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 73.9 | 1.20+ | 57.7 | 0.98 | 42.1 | 1.18+ | 63.7 | 1.34* | 67.1 | 1.16+ |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 62.7 | 1.00 | 52.6 | 1.00 | 36.3 | 1.00 | 61.9 | 1.00 | 65.5 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 67.0 | 1.13+ | 57.3 | 1.15* | 36.1 | 0.90 | 66.7 | 1.05+ | 68.7 | 1.16 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 61.6 | 1.00 | 52.3 | 1.00 | 30.3 | 1.00 | 55.0 | 1.00 | 65.7 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 68.1 | 1.08 | 56.6 | 1.05 | 40.5 | 1.17+ | 63.8 | 1.33* | 65.9 | 0.98 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 64.8 | 1.00 | 53.5 | 1.00 | 31.9 | 1.00 | 58.9 | 1.00 | 65.2 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 65.0 | 0.95 | 55.4 | 1.05 | 38.0 | 1.16+ | 63.9 | 1.21* | 66.2 | 0.95 |
| 25 years or more | 67.8 | 1.10 | 57.0 | 1.01 | 47.3 | 1.46* | 65.6 | 1.28* | 65.6 | 0.91 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 64.9 | 1.00 | 54.7 | 1.00 | 39.2 | 1.00 | 62.3 | 1.00 | 65.8 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 66.7 | 1.06 | 55.2 | 1.00 | 35.1 | 0.88 | 64.1 | 1.19* | 65.3 | 0.97 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 63.2 | 0.86+ | 52.3 | 0.87+ | 34.8 | 0.94 | 63.4 | 1.24* | 66.9 | 1.07 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 64.2 | 1.00 | 54.0 | 1.00 | 32.7 | 1.00 | 62.7 | 1.00 | 64.9 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 70.1 | 0.66*** | 54.8 | 0.76* | 42.3 | 1.14 | 63.2 | 0.81+ | 66.1 | 0.93 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 64.2 | 1.00 | 54.0 | 1.00 | 35.2 | 1.00 | 65.8 | 1.00 | 66.2 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 67.1 | 1.02 | 54.8 | 0.96 | 38.1 | 1.15+ | 60.7 | 0.84 | 63.8 | 0.93 |
| Wealth Index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 57.9 | 1.00 | 52.1 | 1.00 | 30.4 | 1.00 | 62.9 | 1.00 | 61.2 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 63.0 | 1.12 | 52.6 | 0.99 | 30.6 | 0.93 | 59.5 | 0.87 | 65.9 | 1.12 |
| Middle | 64.8 | 1.20+ | 53.7 | 0.96 | 34.9 | 1.06 | 62.2 | 1.01 | 65.7 | 1.15 |
| Richer | 68.0 | 1.43** | 53.7 | 1.00 | 35.2 | 1.05 | 61.5 | 0.94 | 67.4 | 1.27* |
| Richest | 72.2 | 1.60*** | 59.3 | 1.27 | 47.8 | 1.54* | 68.5 | 1.22* | 69.6 | 1.20+ |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.01** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | n/a |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 0.99*** | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 1.22+ | n/a | 0.99 | n/a | 0.88 | n/a | 1.73*** | n/a | 1.41+ |

Continued...

Appendix Table 3D—Continued

| Characteristic | Morocco | | Cambodia | | Indonesia | | Nepal | | Philippines | |
|---|---------|---------|----------|---------|-----------|---------|-------|----------|-------------|---------|
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 27.5 | 1.05 | 58.3 | 0.85 | 60.5 | 1.01 | 90.6 | 1.20 | 79.1 | 1.08 |
| 20 to 29 | 28.6 | 1.00 | 57.4 | 0.84 | 61.0 | 1.03 | 90.1 | 1.00 | 86.2 | 1.27* |
| 30 to 39 | 28.2 | 0.98 | 64.9 | 1.06 | 62.7 | 1.06+ | 89.9 | 0.96 | 84.7 | 1.02 |
| 40 to 49 | 26.8 | 1.00 | 63.6 | 1.00 | 60.9 | 1.00 | 89.8 | 1.00 | 84.9 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 27.3 | 0.80* | 62.1 | 1.12 | 60.2 | 0.87** | 90.0 | 0.79+ | 82.0 | 0.78* |
| 1 or 2 | 30.0 | 1.00 | 59.6 | 1.00 | 63.5 | 1.00 | 90.7 | 1.00 | 85.5 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 29.1 | 1.02 | 61.7 | 0.99 | 62.0 | 0.94+ | 89.7 | 1.05 | 85.6 | 1.13 |
| 5+ | 24.1 | 0.84+ | 64.5 | 0.98 | 55.1 | 0.80*** | 89.8 | 1.03 | 84.6 | 1.20+ |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 25.8 | 0.84* | 62.7 | 1.04 | 58.1 | 0.91+ | 89.4 | 0.83 | 79.7 | 0.98 |
| Primary | 29.5 | 1.00 | 61.2 | 1.00 | 60.1 | 1.00 | 91.5 | 1.00 | 83.8 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 33.0 | 1.00 | 65.3 | 0.96 | 64.2 | 1.11*** | 92.2 | 1.05 | 85.7 | 0.98 |
| Work | | | | | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 27.0 | 1.00 | 59.4 | 1.00 | 60.4 | 1.00 | 90.3 | 1.00 | 85.4 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 34.4 | 1.32*** | 67.0 | 1.29* | 64.2 | 1.04 | 88.8 | 0.85 | 84.6 | 0.90+ |
| Media exposure | | | | | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 22.9 | 1.00 | 57.1 | 1.00 | 57.9 | 1.00 | 89.3 | 1.00 | 81.8 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 28.7 | 1.48*** | 64.7 | 1.46*** | 62.3 | 0.97 | 90.8 | 1.16+ | 85.4 | 1.05 |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 26.5 | 1.00 | 61.7 | 1.00 | 60.1 | 1.00 | 89.4 | 1.00 | 82.6 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 28.1 | 1.05 | 63.2 | 0.98 | 62.0 | 0.98 | 91.6 | 1.28** | 85.7 | 1.19* |
| 25 years or more | 30.6 | 1.04 | 57.5 | 0.65* | 65.8 | 1.03 | 94.3 | 2.43* | 85.8 | 1.36** |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 26.3 | 1.00 | 62.6 | 1.00 | 61.1 | 1.00 | 89.6 | 1.00 | 85.4 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 27.7 | 1.05 | 63.9 | 0.89 | 62.6 | 1.01 | 90.6 | 1.14 | 84.2 | 0.96 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 30.4 | 1.25*** | 54.7 | 0.68* | 60.8 | 1.03 | 91.1 | 1.15 | 84.9 | 0.99 |
| Residence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural | 25.3 | 1.00 | 60.4 | 1.00 | 60.2 | 1.00 | 90.2 | 1.00 | 84.1 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 29.8 | 1.45*** | 72.2 | 1.04 | 63.1 | 1.03 | 88.8 | 0.91 | 85.8 | 0.99 |
| Family structure | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 27.1 | 1.00 | 61.1 | 1.00 | 60.4 | 1.00 | 90.0 | 1.00 | 84.8 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 28.9 | 1.15** | 64.1 | 0.93 | 63.7 | 1.11*** | 90.1 | 1.00 | 85.4 | 1.01 |
| Wealth Index | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 28.6 | 1.00 | 60.5 | 1.00 | 56.0 | 1.00 | 90.6 | 1.00 | 81.2 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 26.0 | 0.69*** | 60.0 | 1.11 | 62.3 | 1.17*** | 89.1 | 0.84 | 84.8 | 1.26* |
| Middle | 25.4 | 0.47*** | 61.9 | 1.18 | 62.5 | 1.19*** | 89.0 | 0.80+ | 86.4 | 1.31* |
| Richer | 27.3 | 0.39*** | 59.9 | 1.02 | 61.8 | 1.20*** | 91.4 | 1.10 | 85.5 | 1.20 |
| Richest | 31.9 | 0.37*** | 68.6 | 1.18 | 65.2 | 1.29*** | 90.1 | 0.88 | 87.2 | 1.43** |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00+ | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.01*** | n/a | 1.00*** | n/a | 1.00* | n/a | 1.00+ |
| Constant | n/a | 0.28*** | n/a | 0.83 | n/a | 1.06 | n/a | 12.09*** | n/a | 4.17*** |

Continued...

Appendix Table 3D—Continued

| Characteristic | Bolivia | | Haiti | | Nicaragua | |
|---|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|
| | % | OR | % | OR | % | OR |
| Age | | | | | | |
| 15 to 19 | 63.2 | 1.04 | 57.5 | 0.75 | 78.3 | 0.87 |
| 20 to 29 | 69.4 | 1.13 + | 63.8 | 0.87 | 80.5 | 0.99 |
| 30 to 39 | 69.8 | 1.17 ** | 63.6 | 0.82 + | 82.1 | 1.06 |
| 40 to 49 | 64.9 | 1.00 | 68.2 | 1.00 | 79.4 | 1.00 |
| Children ever born | | | | | | |
| None | 68.3 | 0.81 + | 65.9 | 0.99 | 78.7 | 0.74 * |
| 1 or 2 | 71.4 | 1.00 | 66.0 | 1.00 | 83.9 | 1.00 |
| 3 or 4 | 69.4 | 1.09 | 63.4 | 1.04 | 79.4 | 0.84 * |
| 5 + | 63.3 | 1.16 * | 62.7 | 1.11 | 77.8 | 0.92 |
| Education | | | | | | |
| None | 51.0 | 0.67 *** | 55.7 | 0.74 ** | 72.6 | 0.76 *** |
| Primary | 64.4 | 1.00 | 70.9 | 1.00 | 79.9 | 1.00 |
| Secondary or higher | 78.2 | 1.61 *** | 68.5 | 0.91 | 85.3 | 1.30 ** |
| Work | | | | | | |
| Does not work | 66.1 | 1.00 | 67.2 | 1.00 | 79.2 | 1.00 |
| Works for cash | 69.9 | 0.91 * | 62.4 | 1.05 | 82.6 | 0.99 |
| Media exposure | | | | | | |
| No regular exposure | 52.4 | 1.00 | 62.4 | 1.00 | 70.5 | 1.00 |
| Weekly exposure | 70.0 | 1.18 * | 65.5 | 0.80 * | 81.5 | 1.27 * |
| Age at first marriage | | | | | | |
| Less than 18 years | 67.4 | 1.00 | 62.2 | 1.00 | 79.7 | 1.00 |
| 18-24 years | 68.0 | 0.93 | 63.2 | 1.11 | 81.3 | 0.93 |
| 25 years or more | 70.8 | 1.12 | 73.7 | 1.17 | 85.7 | 0.96 |
| Spousal age difference | | | | | | |
| Wife is 0-4 years younger | 67.3 | 1.00 | 68.2 | 1.00 | 80.8 | 1.00 |
| Wife is 5-9 years younger | 70.4 | 1.11 + | 67.0 | 0.95 | 81.1 | 1.03 |
| Wife is 10+ years younger | 69.3 | 1.09 | 52.7 | 0.75 ** | 78.8 | 1.00 |
| Residence | | | | | | |
| Rural | 57.0 | 1.00 | 60.5 | 1.00 | 76.0 | 1.00 |
| Urban | 74.3 | 1.15 * | 70.6 | 0.89 | 84.0 | 1.39 *** |
| Family structure | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | 67.6 | 1.00 | 59.4 | 1.00 | 80.1 | 1.00 |
| Extended | 71.0 | 1.02 | 70.0 | 1.14 + | 81.3 | 0.99 |
| Wealth Index | | | | | | |
| Poorest | 54.7 | 1.00 | 55.0 | 1.00 | 72.0 | 1.00 |
| Poorer | 62.2 | 1.02 | 60.8 | 1.29 * | 79.7 | 1.24 * |
| Middle | 69.6 | 1.08 | 61.2 | 1.34 * | 81.6 | 1.06 |
| Richer | 73.8 | 1.08 | 69.3 | 1.64 ** | 83.5 | 1.03 |
| Richest | 78.5 | 1.19 | 74.6 | 1.69 * | 85.1 | 1.01 |
| Community-level variables | | | | | | |
| Percentage of women whose husbands have completed high school | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Percentage of women who watch television at least weekly | n/a | 1.00 *** | n/a | 1.00 | n/a | 1.00 |
| Constant | n/a | 1.62 *** | n/a | 1.82 *** | n/a | 3.24 *** |

Note: Categories in italics are the reference categories for each variable. Numbers in bold are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$) from the value for the reference category.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OR = Odds ratio

n/a = Not applicable or not available

4 Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter, the findings of the earlier chapters are summarized and generalizable conclusions are offered regarding women's empowerment. These conclusions provide policy-relevant insights for the promotion of women's empowerment.

In Chapter 1, three variables—education level, employment for cash, and regular media exposure—were presented as important *sources* of empowerment; and two variables—age at first marriage and spousal age difference—were presented as measuring important aspects of the *setting* for empowerment for currently married women. All of these variables are subject to policy manipulation.

In this chapter, the relationships between the *evidence* of empowerment variables—measures of women's participation in decisionmaking and conscientization about gender equality—and the *sources* of and *setting* for empowerment variables are summarized for all of the countries included in this report together and by region. This is accomplished using a system that scores the independent relationship (i.e., the relationship estimated net of all control variables in the multivariate analysis) in every country of each *evidence* of empowerment variable with each *setting* and each *sources* variable and then looking at the sum of these scores across all countries and by region. The scoring system is based on the hypothesis that each of the *setting* and *sources* variables should be positively associated with each *evidence* variable, and is as follows:

- Score of 1:* Relationship is significant and positive (for spousal age difference, this means that the relationship with lower spousal age difference is positive).
- Score of -1:* Relationship is significant and negative or nonlinear.
- Score of 0:* Relationship is not significant.

This scoring system helps to determine the net direction of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. For example, employment for cash has a positive relationship with women making decisions *jointly* about their own health care in 13 countries, a negative relationship in 3 countries, and a nonsignificant relationship in 11 countries. The score for this variable is thus +10, implying that the net effect of employment for cash is positive across these 23 countries, even though it is negative or nonsignificant in some countries.

Summary Tables 4A-C show the results of this procedure for the different sets of *evidence* of empowerment variables.

4.1A Net Effects of Sources of and Setting for Empowerment Variables on Women's Participation in Decisionmaking

Summary Table 4A shows the sum of the scores across all countries for each explanatory variable for each decision and for all decisions. This is done separately for each type of decisionmaking (participation in decisions *alone*, *jointly*, and *alone or jointly*) and shown in the three panels of the table.

The maximum possible score for each of the *sources* and *setting* variables in each panel depends on the number of countries for which the data are available. The maximum score is 21 for decisions about purchases for daily needs and 23 for each of the other decisions. Thus, across all decisions and all countries, the maximum total score for any explanatory variable in a panel is $(1 \cdot 21) + (3 \cdot 23) = 90$. For example, if education level were positively related with decisionmaking *alone* for all four decisions in every country, the total score would be 90 in the cell for all countries in the education column.

Summary Table 4A also shows the sum of the scores across the different *sources* of empowerment variables, *setting* for empowerment variables, and *sources* and *setting* variables together for each of the different decisions and for all decisions. These total scores are shown in the last three columns of the table. The maximum scores possible for these variables are:

For decisions about purchases for daily needs:

- 63 (21*3) across the three *sources* of empowerment variables
- 42 (21*2) across the two *setting* for empowerment variables
- 105 across all five *sources* and *setting* variables

For each of the other decisions:

- 69 (23*3) across the three *sources* of empowerment variables
- 46 (23*2) across the two *setting* for empowerment variables
- 115 across all five *sources* and *setting* variables

For all decisions together:

- 270 across the three *sources* of empowerment variables
- 180 across the two *setting* for empowerment variables
- 450 across all *sources* and *setting* variables

The lower rows of each panel provide the total scores for explanatory variables by region. Because the 23 countries included in this report are not equally divided into the different regions, an average-per-country score is also provided to enable comparisons across regions. Note that in this chapter, the two regions North Africa/West Asia/Europe and Asia are combined into a single North Africa/Asia/Europe region.

Secondary or higher education. An examination of the independent effect of having at least secondary or higher education on women's participation in decisionmaking yields a score that is positive but relatively low for all decisions and for any type of participation (*alone*, *joint*, or *alone* or *joint*). The low scores indicate the inconsistency in the direction of the relationship of education level with decisionmaking of any type across countries. However, the positive score does show that the relationship of having at least secondary education with any type of decisionmaking is positive in more countries than it is negative, nonlinear, or nonsignificant. Notably, for most decisions as well as all decisions, participation in the decision at all (i.e., *alone* or *jointly*) is more often positively related to having at least secondary education than participation *alone* or participation *jointly*.

The highest score for decisionmaking *alone* is for decisions about purchases for daily needs and the lowest score is for decisions about large household purchases. For *joint* decisionmaking, scores are highest and similar for decisions about visits to family or friends and large household purchases. Thus, the decisions for which education level is related positively to decisionmaking *alone* are not the same as those for which education level is related positively to decisionmaking *jointly*. Even so, the net effect of education level is positive for all decisions, whether the decisions are made *alone* or *jointly*. Across all decisions, the total score for education level for all countries is higher for *joint* decisionmaking (39) than for decisionmaking *alone* (31).

Table 4A. Sums of scores based on logistic regression results for the relationship between type of decisionmaking (*alone* or *joint*) and the *sources* of empowerment and *setting* for empowerment variables, by decision and for all decisions, and for all countries and by region

| | Selected <i>sources</i> of empowerment variables | | Selected <i>setting</i> for empowerment variables | | | Sum of scores for <i>sources</i> of empowerment variables | Sum of scores for <i>setting</i> for empowerment variables | Sum of scores for <i>sources</i> and <i>setting</i> for empowerment variables |
|--|--|-------------------|---|------------------------------|------------------------------|---|--|---|
| | Secondary or higher education | Employed for cash | Regular media exposure | Higher age at first marriage | Lower spousal age difference | | | |
| Decisionmaking <i>alone</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Total score for all countries by decision | | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 9 | 19 | -6 | 0 | -3 | 22 | -3 | 19 |
| Large household purchases | 3 | 21 | -1 | -9 | -9 | 23 | -18 | 5 |
| Purchases for daily needs | 14 | 17 | 7 | -3 | 1 | 38 | -2 | 36 |
| Visits to family or friends | 5 | 17 | -5 | -8 | -6 | 17 | -14 | 3 |
| Total score across all decisions | | | | | | | | |
| All countries | 31 | 74 | -5 | -20 | -17 | 100 | -37 | 63 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 19 | 45 | -11 | -9 | -7 | 53 | -16 | 37 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 1.46 | 3.46 | -0.85 | -0.69 | -0.54 | 4.08 | -1.23 | 2.85 |
| North Africa/Asia/Europe | 13 | 18 | 6 | -7 | -9 | 37 | -16 | 21 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 1.86 | 2.57 | 0.86 | -1.00 | -1.29 | 5.29 | -2.29 | 3.00 |
| Latin America/Caribbean | -1 | 11 | 0 | -4 | -1 | 10 | -5 | 5 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | -0.33 | 3.67 | 0.00 | -1.33 | -0.33 | 3.33 | -1.67 | 1.67 |
| Joint decisionmaking | | | | | | | | |
| Total score for all countries by decision | | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 6 | 10 | -3 | -1 | 3 | 13 | 2 | 15 |
| Large household purchases | 12 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 28 | 6 | 34 |
| Purchases for daily needs | 8 | 11 | -5 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 2 | 16 |
| Visits to family or friends | 13 | 10 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 25 | 10 | 35 |
| Total score across all decisions | | | | | | | | |
| All countries | 39 | 46 | -5 | 4 | 16 | 80 | 20 | 100 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 25 | 45 | -1 | -2 | 13 | 69 | 11 | 80 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 1.92 | 3.46 | -0.08 | -0.15 | 1.00 | 5.31 | 0.85 | 6.15 |
| North Africa/Asia/Europe | 10 | 6 | -3 | 4 | 5 | 13 | 9 | 22 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 1.43 | 0.86 | -0.43 | 0.57 | 0.71 | 1.86 | 1.29 | 3.14 |
| Latin America/Caribbean | 4 | -5 | -1 | 2 | -2 | -2 | 0 | -2 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 1.33 | -1.67 | -0.33 | 0.67 | -0.67 | -0.67 | 0.00 | -0.67 |
| Decisionmaking <i>alone</i> or <i>jointly</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Total score for all countries by decision | | | | | | | | |
| Woman's own health care | 12 | 19 | -5 | 1 | -2 | 26 | -1 | 25 |
| Large household purchases | 14 | 22 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 37 | 5 | 42 |
| Purchases for daily needs | 15 | 18 | 0 | -1 | 3 | 33 | 2 | 35 |
| Visits to family or friends | 12 | 21 | -3 | 1 | 2 | 30 | 3 | 33 |
| Total score across all decisions | | | | | | | | |
| All countries | 53 | 80 | -7 | 3 | 6 | 126 | 9 | 135 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 30 | 49 | -11 | 5 | 8 | 68 | 13 | 81 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 2.31 | 3.77 | -0.85 | 0.38 | 0.62 | 5.23 | 1.00 | 6.23 |
| North Africa/Asia/Europe | 17 | 22 | 4 | -3 | -3 | 43 | -6 | 37 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 2.43 | 3.14 | 0.57 | -0.43 | -0.43 | 6.14 | -0.86 | 5.29 |
| Latin America/Caribbean | 6 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 2 | 17 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 2.00 | 3.00 | 0.00 | 0.33 | 0.33 | 5.00 | 0.67 | 5.67 |

The ranking of regions differs by type of decisionmaking: secondary or higher education has the most consistently positive effect on decisionmaking *alone* in the North Africa/ Asia/Europe region and on *joint* decisionmaking in the sub-Saharan Africa region. Notably too, the net effect of education level is positive for *joint* decisionmaking in all regions but is negative for decisionmaking *alone* for the three countries in the Latin America/Caribbean region.

The score in the third horizontal panel (decisionmaking *alone* or *joint*) for education level varies only slightly by type of decision (ranges from 12 to 15) and is 53 compared to a maximum score of 90 for all countries. Any decisionmaking is more likely to be positively related to education level in the North Africa/Asia/Europe region than in the other regions, but the net relationship is positive in all regions.

On balance, these results show that education level has the most consistently positive effect on women's participation in decisionmaking at all. However, whether the effect is stronger for women making decisions *alone* or *jointly* depends on the type of decision.

Employment for cash. The net effect of employment for cash on participation (*joint* or *alone*) in decisionmaking is positive in almost all countries for all four decisions. The score for this variable across all countries and decisions is 80 out of a maximum of 90. Furthermore, of all the variables considered, employment for cash has the most positive net effect on decisionmaking *alone* for all four decisions, and there is little difference in the scores by decision. Its effect is also positive, but weaker, on *joint* decisionmaking. The total score across all countries for decisionmaking *alone* is 74, compared with 46 for *joint* decisionmaking. Notably, women employed for cash across all countries are more likely to make decisions about large household purchases *jointly* than any of the other three decisions.

The net effect of employment for cash on any participation (*alone* or *joint*) in decisionmaking is positive in all regions. This variable most consistently affects decisionmaking *alone* in the Latin America/Caribbean region, followed closely by sub-Saharan Africa. For *joint* decisionmaking its effect is strongly positive only in the sub-Saharan Africa region. In the Latin America/Caribbean region its net effect is negative. This suggests that in the sub-Saharan African countries, women who are employed for cash are consistently more likely to take part in decisionmaking both *alone* and *jointly*; in the Latin America and Caribbean countries they are more likely to make decisions *alone* and less likely to make them *jointly*; and in the North Africa/Asia/Europe countries, the effect of employment for cash is positive, although relatively weak, on both decisionmaking *alone* and *joint*.

Regular media exposure. The net effect of media exposure is negative on decisionmaking *alone* for all decisions except purchases for daily needs. The net effect of this variable on *joint* decisionmaking is positive for decisions about large household purchases and visits to family or friends; however, its score is very low. For both decisionmaking *alone* and *joint* decisionmaking, as well as for any participation (*alone* or *joint*) in decisionmaking, the net result over all countries is negative. The effect of media exposure on decisionmaking is surprisingly weak and largely negative in all regions except North Africa/Asia/Europe, where the effect for any participation and participation *alone* is positive.

Sources of empowerment variables as a group. By decision, the effect of the three variables is most strongly positive on decisionmaking *alone* about purchases for daily needs and on *joint* decisionmaking about large household purchases, followed closely by decisions about visits to family or friends. The *sources* of empowerment variables together are most consistently related to decisionmaking *alone* in North Africa/Asia/Europe and with *joint* decisionmaking in the sub-Saharan Africa region. As a group, they affect *joint* decisionmaking negatively in the Latin America/Caribbean region.

Any participation in decisionmaking is also positively associated with the *sources* variables as a group. The score is highest for decisions about large household purchases. Across all countries, the total

score is higher for any participation (126 out of 270) than for participation *alone* (100) or *joint* participation (80).

Age at first marriage. An older age at first marriage has a very weak positive net effect on any participation in decisionmaking and on *joint* decisionmaking. By region, the effect of a higher age at first marriage is weakly negative in the sub-Saharan Africa region for *joint* decisionmaking and in the North Africa/Asia/Europe region for any participation in decisionmaking. By contrast, a higher age at first marriage has a negative net effect on decisionmaking *alone* and this negative effect is spread across all regions. Thus, on average, women who marry for the first time at an older age are less likely to make decisions *alone*.

Overall, the effect of a higher age at first marriage is to lower the likelihood of women making decisions *alone*, and only marginally increasing the likelihood of participating in decisionmaking at all or in making decisions *jointly*.

Spousal age difference. A lower spousal age difference has a negative net effect on decisionmaking *alone* in all countries and all regions for all decisions, except decisions about purchases for daily needs. The effect of lower spousal age difference on *joint* decisionmaking is, however, positive for all decisions, particularly for decisions about large household purchases and visits to family or friends. This effect is positive in the sub-Saharan Africa and the North Africa/Asia/Europe regions but negative in the third region. The net effect of a lower spousal age difference on any participation in decisionmaking is also positive, although the total score for any participation for all countries is only 6, compared with 16 for *joint* decisionmaking.

Thus, a lower spousal age difference has a negative net effect on decisionmaking *alone* but a positive net effect on *joint* decisionmaking, on average.

Setting for empowerment variables as a group. The sum of scores for the two *setting* for empowerment variables is most strongly negative for decisionmaking *alone* about large household purchases and visits to family or friends; for the same two decisions, however, the sum is positive and highest for *joint* decisionmaking. Furthermore, decisionmaking *alone* is most consistently negatively related to a higher age at marriage and a lower spousal age difference in the North Africa/Asia/Europe region; in this same region, *joint* decisionmaking is most consistently positively related to a higher age at marriage and a lower spousal age difference.

The net effect of the two *setting* for empowerment variables on any participation in decisionmaking is slightly positive for all decisions except those about women's own health care. However, the net effect of these variables is much more consistently positive on *joint* decisionmaking than on any decisionmaking.

Sources and setting variables together. The last column of Summary Table 4A shows that the net effect of all five variables summed together on decisionmaking *alone* and decisionmaking *jointly* is positive for all four decisions. However, the score (36) for decisionmaking *alone* about purchases for daily needs is more than twice as high as the next highest score (19), which is for making decisions *alone* about women's own health care. Furthermore, the score for making decisions *alone* about purchases for daily needs is similar to the scores for making *joint* decisions about large household purchases and visits to family or friends. It can thus be concluded that these empowerment variables do not affect all decisions equally and that their impact on decisionmaking *alone* and *joint* decisionmaking is different.

Decisionmaking *alone* is affected equally positively in the two regions of sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa/Asia/Europe by the *setting* and *sources* variables as a group. However, the effect on *joint*

decisionmaking is strongest in the sub-Saharan Africa region and is negative in the Latin America/Caribbean region.

The net effect of all of these variables is also consistently positive on any participation in any decision and in any region. However, the score for the sub-Saharan Africa region is higher for *joint* decisionmaking than for any participation in decisionmaking.

4.1B Net Effects of Sources of and Setting for Empowerment Variables on Women's Gender-role Attitudes

The other *evidence* of empowerment variables examined in this report relate to women's gender-role attitudes, specifically their rejection of spousal violence and their acceptance of a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband for one or more reasons. Using the scoring system described above, Summary Table 4B shows the scores for the net effect of the same *sources* and *setting* variables on these two sets of *evidence* variables. As before, the maximum scores depend on the number of countries for which the data are available and are as follows:

Disagreement with wife beating:

- 22 for refusing to have sex with her husband
- 23 for each of the other four justifications

Thus, across all justifications and all countries, the maximum score for any explanatory variable in the disagreement with wife beating panel is $(1*22) + (4*23) = 114$.

As before, the last three columns of Summary Table 4B show the sum of the scores across the different *sources* of empowerment variables, *setting* variables, and *sources* and *setting* variables together for each justification and across all justifications. The maximum possible scores in this context are:

For refusing to have sex with her husband:

- 66 across the three *sources* of empowerment variables
- 44 across the two *setting* for empowerment variables
- 110 across all *sources* and *setting* variables

For each of the other justifications:

- 69 across the three *sources* of empowerment variables
- 46 across the two *setting* for empowerment variables
- 115 across all *sources* and *setting* variables

For all justifications together:

- 342 across the three *sources* of empowerment variables
- 228 across the two *setting* for empowerment variables
- 570 across all *sources* and *setting* variables

Agreement with a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband:

- 22 each for when the husband has an STD and has sex with other women
- 23 for each of the other two justifications

Thus, across all justifications and all countries, the maximum possible score for any explanatory variable in the agreement with a wife's right to refuse to have sex with her husband panel is $(2*22) + (2*23) = 90$.

For the sum of the scores across the different *sources* of empowerment variables, *setting* variables, and *sources* and *setting* variables together, the maximum scores are:

For when the husband has an STD and when the husband has sex with other women:

- 66 across the three *sources* of empowerment variables
- 44 across the two *setting* for empowerment variables
- 110 across all *sources* and *setting* variables

For each of the other justifications:

- 69 across the three *sources* of empowerment variables
- 46 across the two *setting* for empowerment variables
- 115 across all *sources* and *setting* variables

For all justifications together:

- 270 across the three *sources* of empowerment variables
- 180 across the two *setting* for empowerment variables
- 450 across all *sources* and *setting* variables

The lower rows of each panel provide the total scores for explanatory variables by region.

Secondary or higher education. In general, the net effect of having secondary or higher education on the two gender-role attitudes represented here is consistently positive, although the score does not reach the maximum possible for any justification. In addition, there is little variation in the variable's effect by justification, although higher education has the weakest relationship across countries with disagreement that spousal violence is justified when the wife neglects the children. The net relationship of education level with both types of gender-role attitudes is strongest in the Latin America/Caribbean region and weakest in the North Africa/Asia/ Europe region.

Employment for cash. The net effect of employment for cash on gender-role attitudes is much weaker than on participation in decisionmaking. Of the two gender-role attitudes, scores are much higher for women's agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband than for women's rejection of wife beating. In fact, for the wife beating variable, the score for employment for cash is very low for four of the five justifications and is negative for the justification of refusing to have sex with her husband.

Although none of the scores for employment for cash is high for women's agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband, they are consistently positive. It is also notable that the net scores are highest for the justification that the wife is tired or not in the mood; this justification is hypothesized as most directly violating traditional norms about sexual relations between couples.

Table 4B. Sums of scores based on logistic regression results for the relationship between the two gender-role attitude indicators (agreement that wife beating is justified and agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband) and the sources of empowerment and setting for empowerment variables, by justification and for all justifications, and for all countries and by region

| | Selected sources of empowerment variables | | Selected setting for empowerment variables | | | Sum of scores for sources of empowerment variables | Sum of scores for setting for empowerment variables | Sum of scores for sources and setting for empowerment variables |
|---|---|-------------------|--|------------------------------|------------------------------|--|---|---|
| | Secondary or higher education | Employed for cash | Regular media exposure | Higher age at first marriage | Lower spousal age difference | | | |
| Disagreement with wife beating | | | | | | | | |
| Total score for all countries by justification | | | | | | | | |
| Wife goes out without telling husband | 15 | 4 | 6 | 5 | -6 | 25 | -1 | 24 |
| Wife neglects children | 12 | 1 | 5 | 6 | -1 | 18 | 5 | 23 |
| Wife argues with husband | 17 | 2 | 11 | 1 | -2 | 30 | -1 | 29 |
| Wife refuses to have sex with husband | 19 | -1 | 13 | 4 | -1 | 31 | 3 | 34 |
| Wife burns food | 19 | 3 | 11 | -3 | -1 | 33 | -4 | 29 |
| Total score across all justifications | | | | | | | | |
| All countries | 82 | 9 | 46 | 13 | -11 | 137 | 2 | 139 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 46 | 9 | 33 | 13 | 3 | 88 | 16 | 104 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 3.54 | 0.69 | 2.54 | 1.00 | 0.23 | 6.77 | 1.23 | 8.00 |
| North Africa/Asia/Europe | 21 | 1 | 14 | 6 | -9 | 36 | -3 | 33 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 3.00 | 0.14 | 2.00 | 0.86 | -1.29 | 5.14 | -0.43 | 4.71 |
| Latin America/Caribbean | 15 | -1 | -1 | -6 | -5 | 13 | -11 | 2 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 5.00 | -0.33 | -0.33 | -2.00 | -1.67 | 4.33 | -3.67 | 0.67 |
| Agreement with a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband | | | | | | | | |
| Total score for all countries by justification | | | | | | | | |
| Wife knows that husband has a sexually transmitted disease | 17 | 6 | 14 | -3 | 2 | 37 | -1 | 36 |
| Wife knows that husband has sex with other women | 16 | 9 | 10 | -1 | 7 | 35 | 6 | 41 |
| Wife has recently given birth | 12 | 8 | 11 | -5 | -1 | 31 | -6 | 25 |
| Wife is tired or not in the mood | 14 | 11 | 10 | -5 | 0 | 35 | -5 | 30 |
| Total score across all justification | | | | | | | | |
| All countries | 59 | 34 | 45 | -14 | 8 | 138 | -6 | 132 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 37 | 25 | 24 | -11 | 10 | 86 | -1 | 85 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 2.85 | 1.92 | 1.85 | -0.85 | 0.77 | 6.62 | -0.08 | 6.54 |
| North Africa/Asia/Europe | 12 | 5 | 15 | -2 | -2 | 32 | -4 | 28 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 1.71 | 0.71 | 2.14 | -0.29 | -0.29 | 4.57 | -0.57 | 4.00 |
| Latin America/Caribbean | 10 | 4 | 6 | -1 | 0 | 20 | -1 | 19 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 3.33 | 1.33 | 2.00 | -0.33 | 0.00 | 6.67 | -0.33 | 6.33 |

Employment for cash has a low but positive score for women's disagreement with wife beating in the sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa/Asia/Europe regions, but a net negative score in the Latin America/Caribbean region. By contrast, employment for cash has a net positive effect on women's agreement with a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband in all regions. The largest effect is in the sub-Saharan Africa region, followed by the Latin America/Caribbean region.

Regular media exposure. The net effect of media exposure is consistently positive on both sets of gender-role attitudes. The effect is most consistently positive for women's disagreement with wife beating when the wife refuses to have sex with her husband and for agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband when she knows that her husband has a sexually transmitted disease. The latter finding suggests that messages about HIV and AIDS could be influencing women's responses.

By region, the net effect of media exposure on women's disagreement with wife beating is negative in the Latin America/Caribbean region, despite the overall positive net effect across all countries. The net effect on women's agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband is positive in all regions, however.

Sources of empowerment variables as a group. Of all the justifications for wife beating, the effect of the three variables together is most strongly positive for the justification of burning the food, followed closely by refusing to have sex with her husband and arguing with him. Notably, the score is smallest for the justification of neglecting the children. This suggests that looking after children properly is commonly perceived as so integral to a woman's role that, in most countries, even education, employment for cash, and access to media cannot easily change the view that violations of this fundamental gender role justify wife beating.

These *sources* variables together are positively related to women's disagreement with wife beating in all regions. The score is highest in the sub-Saharan Africa region and lowest in the Latin America/Caribbean region.

Taken together, the *sources* variables are even more consistently and positively associated with women's agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband than with their disagreement with wife beating. The score for women's right to refuse sex to her husband is positive in all regions but lowest in North Africa/Europe/Asia.

Age at first marriage. A higher age at first marriage has a net positive effect on the rejection of all justifications for wife beating except for when the wife burns the food. However, the net effect across all reasons is positive. The effect is also positive in all regions, except the Latin America/Caribbean region. The net effect of a higher age at first marriage on women's agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband is, however, negative for all reasons and across all regions.

Spousal age difference. A lower spousal age difference has a net negative effect on women's attitudes towards wife beating in all regions. By contrast, a lower spousal age difference has a net positive, if weak, effect on a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband. This positive effect is, however, due to the large number of countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region where the effect is positive, even though the net effect is negative or nil in the remaining regions.

Setting for empowerment variables together. The net effect of the two *setting* variables together on women's disagreement with wife beating is marginally positive, although it is negative for three of the justifications. Notably, the score is highest for the justification of neglecting the children. This suggests that the most consistent positive effect of the *setting* variables is on disagreement that wife beating is justified for the one reason that is least affected by the *sources* of empowerment variables. The *setting* variables together have a net positive effect only in the sub-Saharan African countries.

The net effect of the *setting* variables taken together on agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband is negative for all reasons except the wife knowing that her husband has sex with other women. The effect is also negative in all regions.

Sources and setting variables together. The last column of Summary Table 4B shows that the net effect of all five variables summed together on gender-role attitudes is positive. In addition, the effect across all countries and justifications is similar for both gender-role attitudes (scores are 139 and 132, respectively).

Furthermore, the *sources* and *setting* variables together have their most consistently positive effect on women's disagreement with wife beating and on women's agreement that a wife has a right to refuse sex with her husband in sub-Saharan Africa. The other regions have scores for disagreement with wife beating that are much lower than the score for sub-Saharan Africa. The score for the Latin America/Caribbean region is less than 1. By contrast, the score for women's agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband in the Latin America/Caribbean region is almost as high as in the sub-Saharan Africa region. In the North Africa/Asia/Europe region the score for the *sources* and *setting* variables together are similar for both gender-role attitudes.

4.1C Net Effects of Sources of and Setting for Empowerment Variables on Summary Evidence of Empowerment Indicators

Finally, Summary Table 4C shows the scores for the *sources* and *setting* variables for all three summary *evidence* of empowerment variables. The first two *evidence* of empowerment variables are agreement with none of the five reasons for wife beating and agreement with all four reasons justifying a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband. The third *evidence* of empowerment variable is women's participation in making the four specified decisions *alone* or *jointly*. The scores for this last variable were shown in Summary Table 4A (in the "all countries" row of the third panel); these scores are also presented here to summarize the effects of the *sources* and *setting* variables on all three summary indicators of empowerment together. The maximum scores for the first two variables are:

- 23 for agreement with none of the reasons justifying wife beating
- 23 for agreement with all the reasons justifying a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband

Across all three summary variables, the maximum score (90 [see section 4.1A]) + $(2 \times 23) = 136$.

The maximum scores across the different *sources* of empowerment variables, *setting* for empowerment variables, and *sources* and *setting* variables together for the three different summary indicators are:

For each of the two gender-role summary indicators:

- 69 across the three *sources* of empowerment variables
- 46 across the two *setting* for empowerment variables
- 115 across all *sources* and *setting* variables

For the decisionmaking summary indicator, see Section 4.1A above.

For all three variables together:

- 408 across the three *sources* of empowerment variables
- 372 across the two *setting* for empowerment variables
- 680 across all *sources* and *setting* variables

For women's disagreement with all five justifications for wife beating, Summary Table 4C shows that among all the *sources* and *setting* variables, the variable that most consistently has a positive association with disagreement with wife beating is secondary or higher education. Even for education

level, however, the score is only 11, compared with the maximum of 23. This is followed by a higher age at first marriage (positive score of 7) and regular media exposure (positive score of 3). For the other two variables, the net score is negative. Notably, employment for cash has a negative net effect on women's rejection of wife beating for all reasons, although it is positively associated with their rejection of four of the five justifications for wife beating (see Summary Table 4B).

Table 4C. Sums of scores based on logistic regression results for the relationship between any participation in decisionmaking (*alone or joint*) and the *sources* of empowerment and *setting* for empowerment variables, and between the two gender-role attitude indicators (disagreement with wife beating for any specified reason and agreement that a woman has a right to refuse sex with her husband for each specified reason) and the *sources* of empowerment and *setting* for empowerment variables

| | Selected <i>sources</i> of empowerment variables | | | Selected <i>setting</i> for empowerment variables | | Sum of scores for <i>sources</i> of empowerment variables | Sum of scores for <i>setting</i> for empowerment variables | Sum of scores for <i>sources</i> and <i>setting</i> for empowerment variables |
|---|--|-------------------|------------------------|---|------------------------------|---|--|---|
| | Secondary or higher education | Employed for cash | Regular media exposure | Higher age at first marriage | Lower spousal age difference | | | |
| Total score for all countries | | | | | | | | |
| Does not agree with wife beating | 11 | -2 | 3 | 7 | -2 | 12 | 5 | 17 |
| Agrees with a wife's right to refuse sex with her husband | 19 | 10 | 10 | 1 | 3 | 39 | 4 | 43 |
| Participates in decisionmaking | 53 | 80 | -7 | 3 | 6 | 126 | 9 | 135 |
| Total score across all summary indicators | | | | | | | | |
| All countries | 83 | 88 | 6 | 11 | 7 | 177 | 18 | 195 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 49 | 58 | -3 | 10 | 12 | 104 | 22 | 126 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 3.77 | 4.46 | -0.23 | 0.77 | 0.92 | 8.00 | 1.69 | 9.69 |
| North Africa/Asia/Europe | 22 | 23 | 9 | 1 | -5 | 54 | -4 | 50 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 3.14 | 3.29 | 1.29 | 0.14 | -0.71 | 7.71 | -0.57 | 7.14 |
| Latin America/Caribbean | 12 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 0 | 19 |
| Total score/number of countries in region | 4.00 | 2.33 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6.33 | 0.00 | 6.33 |

The scores are positive for women's agreement with all four reasons justifying a woman's refusal to have sex with her husband for all *sources* and *setting* variables. However, the most consistently positive association for this *evidence* variable is also with education.

With the exception of a higher age at first marriage, the relationship of the *sources* and *setting* variables is consistently positive with the second gender-role attitude variable more often than the first gender-role attitude variable. Thus, the sum of the scores across all the *sources* and *setting* variables, although positive for both summary *evidence* variables related to gender roles, is much higher (43) for the agreement with all four reasons justifying a wife's refusal to have sex with her husband than for disagreement with all five justifications for wife beating (17).

The sum for all three summary *evidence* variables shows that the net effect of all of the *sources* and *setting* variables is positive. The most consistent effect is for employment for cash because of its consistently positive net effect on women's participation in decisionmaking, followed closely by education level.

Finally, the table shows that the effects of different *sources* and *setting* variables on all three summary *evidence* variables taken together varies greatly by region. Whereas the average score in the Latin America/Caribbean region is highest among the three regions for the effect of education, it is 0 for

three of the remaining four *sources* and *setting* variables. This region also has the lowest score across all five *sources* and *setting* variables.

The North Africa/Asia/Europe region has the highest score only for regular media exposure; in fact it is the only region with a positive score on this variable. This region has a negative score for lower spousal age difference and scores from this region are between the scores from the other regions for the other variables. By contrast, the sub-Saharan Africa region has the highest scores for employment for cash and for both the *setting* for empowerment variables. Its score is negative for regular media exposure. The sub-Saharan Africa region also has the highest sum of scores across the *sources* of empowerment and *setting* for empowerment variables, suggesting that the different *sources* of empowerment and *setting* for empowerment variables have the strongest net potential for increasing women's empowerment in sub-Saharan Africa.

4.2 Conclusions

Two important components of women's empowerment are *agency* and the *rejection* of gender inequality. Increases in access to higher education, paid employment, and media exposure are typically considered to be policy instruments by which women's agency can be enhanced. Furthermore, policies that discourage the traditional practices of early marriage and marriages between very young girls and much older men enable married women to be better empowered as individuals, spouses, and mothers.

This report examined the effect of hypothesized correlates on several variables of women's agency, as measured by women's participation in decisionmaking and women's acceptance of egalitarian gender-roles. In all, 23 different measures of women's empowerment were examined. Some of the major conclusions of this report relate to the relationship between the five variables—women's level of education, employment for cash status, extent of media exposure, age at first marriage, and spousal age difference (all variables that can be manipulated directly by policies and programs)— and women's empowerment. Specifically:

- There is a net positive effect of these five variables taken together on the three summary indicators of women's empowerment. This finding supports a policy and program emphasis on improving performance on these variables.
- However, the approach to increasing women's empowerment needs to be nuanced and tailored to specific country-level findings and settings. This is because these five policy-manipulable variables do not have similar relationships with all measures of women's empowerment and across the different regions of the world. In particular:
 - Providing higher education to women will have the most consistently positive effect on all aspects of women's empowerment. Nonetheless, its effect on women's gender-role attitudes is likely to be more consistently beneficial than on women's decisionmaking roles.
 - Increasing the proportion of women who are employed for cash will likely have the greatest impact on women's agency by increasing participation in decisionmaking, particularly decisionmaking alone.
 - Regular media exposure will not likely have the net effect of increasing women's decisionmaking participation in many countries. Nonetheless, increased regular media exposure among women will have a strong positive effect on promoting more

gender-egalitarian viewpoints, particularly regarding a woman's right to decide when to have sex.

- There is a largely nonlinear relationship between age at first marriage and women's empowerment, with the likelihood empowerment being higher among women married at an age that is neither "too young" nor "too old." The specific ages that fall into these two groups are likely to vary across countries and, perhaps, also over time. Thus, while it is important to discourage early marriage, this variable is not likely to have unlimited potential as a tool for increasing women's empowerment in most countries.
- A lower spousal age difference will have its most positive effect on women's joint decisionmaking and on their acceptance of a woman's right to refuse sex with her husband.
- The relationship of the policy-manipulable variables with empowerment varies greatly across regions and, within regions, across countries. In fact, by region, the effect of these variables is most consistently positive in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and least consistently positive in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Finally, this report also raises some methodological concerns for the measurement of women's empowerment and agency. The finding that variables such as education, employment, and media exposure, among others, have different relationships with each of the 23 different women's *evidence* of empowerment variables examined in this report, suggests that these empowerment indicators are not equivalent or even close substitutes for one another. For example, *joint* decisionmaking about large household purchases is not affected by the same variables as *joint* decisionmaking about other decisions or decisionmaking *alone* about large household purchases. Correlates of any participation in decisionmaking are also different from correlates of decisionmaking *alone*, or decisionmaking *jointly*, or of women's gender-role attitudes. Within the set of indicators for gender-role attitudes too, there is great variation in how the different *sources* and *setting* variables relate to not just the rejection of wife beating or acceptance of a woman's right to refuse her husband sex, but also to the rejection/acceptance of different components of these variables.

Thus, an important methodological contribution of this report is the finding that the many different facets of women's empowerment do not all relate in the same way to one another or to various explanatory variables. Hence, when studying women's empowerment, there is a need to be very specific about what it is that is to be measured.

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